History of the Peloponnesian War

Demosthenes, however, would not at all listen to the proposal for continuing the siege; but if it were necessary for them not to withdraw the forces without a decree from the Athenians, but to remain in the country, he said that they should either remove to Thapsus and do so, or to Catana, where they could overrun with their troops a large part of the country, and support themselves by ravaging their enemies' property, and so might injure them; while at the same time with their fleet they would fight their battles on the open deep, and not in a confined space, which was more in favour of the enemy, but rather with spacious sea-room, where their skill would be of service to them, and they would have an opportunity of retreating and advancing in no narrow and circumscribed space, both on putting out and coming to land.

In a word, he did not, he said, at all approve of remaining in their present position, but of removing immediately without delay. Eurymedon also supported him in this view.

But as Nicias objected to it, a degree of diffidence and hesitation was produced in them, and a suspicion also that Nicias might be so positive from knowing something more than he expressed. The Athenians, then, in this way lingered on, and remained where they were.

In the mean time, Gylippus and Sicanus had come to Syracuse; and though Sicanus had failed in winning Acragas, (for while he was still at Gela, the party [*]( Literally, the party for the Syracusans, for friendship with them, as Arnold renders it. See his note.) friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out;) yet Gylippus came with fresh troops raised from the rest of Sicily, and with the heavy-armed which had been sent out from the Peloponnese in the spring, on board the merchantmen, and had arrived at Selinus from Libya.

For when they had been carried by a tempest to Libya, and the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes, and pilots for their voyage, during their passage along shore they entered into alliance with the Euesperitae, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and defeated the latter people; and after coasting along thence to Neapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from which the distance is shortest to Sicily, namely, a voyage of two days and a night, they crossed over there from that place, and arrived at Selinus.

Immediately on their arrival, the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again on both sides, by sea and by land. When the Athenian generals, on the other hand, saw that a fresh force had joined them, and that their own circumstances at the same time were not improving, but were daily becoming worse, and most especially were depressed through the sickness of the men, they repented of not having removed before. And as even Nicias did not now oppose them in the same degree, except by begging them not openly to vote on the question, they gave orders, as secretly as they could, for all to sail out of their station, and to be ready when the signal should be given.

And when, after all was in readiness, they were on the point of sailing away, the moon was eclipsed; for it happened to be at the full. The greater part therefore of the Athenians urged the generals to stop, regarding the matter with religious scruple; and Nicias (for he was somewhat over addicted to superstition, and such feelings,) declared that he would not now so much as consider the matter, with a view to moving, until, as the soothsayers directed, he had waited thrice nine days. And so the Athenians, having been stopped on this account, remained in the country.

When the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athenians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were no longer their superiors, either by sea or by land, (for they would not else have meditated sailing away;) and at the same time, because they did not wish them to go and settle in any other part of Sicily, and so to be more difficult to make war upon;

but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, as quickly as possible, in a position that was advantageous to themselves. They manned their ships therefore, and practised as many days as they thought sufficient. And when a favourable opportunity presented itself, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian lines; and a small division of their heavy-armed and horse having sallied forth against them through certain gateways, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routed and pursued them back; and as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed.

On that day, then, the army of the Syracusans drew off; but on the next they both sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their troops against the walls. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closed and fought with them.

Now when Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, and wished to surround the ships of the enemy, had sailed out from the line too much towards the shore; the Syracusans and their allies, after first defeating the centre of the Athenians, intercepted him also in the bottom and furthest recess of the harbour, and both killed him, and destroyed the ships that were following him. After which the Syracusans closely pursued all the ships of the Athenians, and drove them ashore.