Civil Wars
Appianus of Alexandria
Appianus. The Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, Volume 2: The Civil Wars. White, Horace, translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1899.
When all things were in readiness he set sail for Sicily, going himself from Tarentum, while Calvisius, with Sabinus and Menodorus, sailed from Etruria. The infantry was sent on the march to Rhegium and great haste was displayed in all quarters. Pompeius had scarcely heard of the desertion of Menodorus when Octavius was already moving against him. While the hostile fleets were advancing from both sides, he awaited the attack of Octavius at Messana, and ordered his freedman Menecrates, who was the bitterest enemy of Menodorus, to advance against Calvisius and Menodorus with a large fleet. Menecrates was observed by his enemies near nightfall on the open sea. They retired into the bay near Cumæ, where they passed the night, Menecrates proceeding to Ænaria. At daybreak they drew up their fleet, in the form of a crescent, as close to the shore as possible, in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through it. Menecrates again showed himself, and immediately came on with a rush. As his enemies would not advance to the open sea, and he could do nothing of importance there, he made a charge in order to drive them upon the land. They beached their ships and fought back against the attacking prows. Menecrates had the opportunity to draw off and renew the attack as he pleased, and to bring up fresh ships by turns, while the enemy were distressed by the rocks, on which they had grounded, and by the inability to move. They were like infantry contending against sea forces, unable either to pursue or retreat.
In this situation Menodorus and Menecrates came in sight of each other; and, abandoning the rest of the fight, drove against each other with fury and shouting, as though they had staked the issue of the battle on this encounter, whichever should be the victor. Their ships came into violent collision and were badly damaged, Menodorus losing his prow and Menecrates his oar-blades. Grapplingirons were thrown by both, and the ships, being fastened together, could no longer manœuvre, but the men, as in a battle on land, failed not in deeds of valor. Showers of javelins, stones, and arrows were discharged, and bridges for boarding were thrown from one ship to the other. As the ship of Menodorus was higher than the other his bridges made a better passageway for his daring crew, and his missiles were more effective for the same reason. Many men were already slain, and the remainder wounded, when Menodorus was pierced in the arm with a dart, which was, however, drawn out. Menecrates was struck in the thigh with a Spanish javelin, made wholly of iron with numerous barbs, which could not be readily extracted. Although Menecrates could no longer take part in the fight, he remained there all the same, encouraging the others, until his ship was captured, when he plunged into the depths of the sea. Menodorus towed the captured ship to the land, but was able to do nothing more himself.
This took place on the left wing of the naval fight. Calvisius directed his course from the right to the left and cut off some of Menecrates' ships from the main body, and when they fled pursued them to the open sea. Demochares, who was a fellow-freedman of Menecrates and his lieutenant, fell upon the remainder of Calvisius' ships, put some of them to flight, broke others in pieces on the rocks, and set fire to them after the crews had abandoned them. Finally Calvisius, returning from the pursuit, led back his own fleeing ships and prevented the burning of any more. As night was approaching, all returned to their former station. Such was the end of this naval fight, in which the forces of Pompeius had much the best of it; but Demochares, grieving over the death of Menecrates as the greatest possible defeat (for those two, Menecrates and Menodorus, had been the foremost of Pompeius' sea captains), abandoned everything[*](a(/panta meqei\s e)k xeirw=n: abandoned everything. All the codices read e)k ke/rwn (from the wings), which, being nonsense, led to much conjecture in the learned world. Schweighäuser solved the difficulty by striking them out, and marking a lacuna at that place. Tyrwhitt furnishes a happy solution (see preface to the Didot edition) by substituting xeirw=n for ke/rwn,, so that the phrase is equivalent to "released his hold" in English.) and sailed for Sicily immediately, mediately, as though he had lost not merely the body of Menecrates and one ship, but his whole, fleet.
Calvisius, as long as he expected that Demochares would renew his attack, remained at his station, unable to fight in the open sea, for his best ships had been destroyed and the others were unfit for battle. When he learned that his antagonist had gone to Sicily, he repaired his ships and coasted along the shore exploring the bays. Octavius, in the meantime, proceeded from Tarentum to Rhegium, with a large fleet and army, and near Messana came up with Pompeius, who had forty ships only. Octavius' friends advised him to improve this most favorable opportunity and attack Pompeius with his great fleet, while the latter had so few ships and before the rest of his naval force should arrive. He did not follow this advice, but waited for Calvisius, saying that it was not good policy to run a risk when he was expecting reinforcements. When Demochares arrived at Messana, Pompeius appointed him and Apollophanes, another of his freedmen, admirals in place of Menodorus and Menecrates.
When Octavius heard of his disaster at Cumæ he sailed out of the straits to meet Calvisius. After accomplishing the greater part of the distance and while he was passing Stylis[*](Schweighäuser gives this place the Latin name of Columna Rhegina, which is referred to by Strabo (III. v. 5) as a small tower erected by the inhabitants of Rhegium at the strait of Sicily,) and turning into Scyllæum, Pompeius darted out of Messana and fell upon his rear, pushed on to his front, attacked him all along the line, and challenged him to fight. Although beset in this way, Octavius' fleet did not give battle, since Octavius did not permit it, either because he feared to fight in the straits or because he adhered to his first determination not to fight without Calvisius. He gave orders, however, that all should hug the shore, cast anchor, and defend themselves with their prows toward the enemy. Demochares,by setting two of his ships by turns against one of the enemy's, threw them into confusion. They dashed against the rocks and against each other, and began to fill with water. And so these ships were lost, like those at Cumæ, without striking a blow, being stuck fast and battered by the enemy, who had freedom of movement to advance and retreat.[*](One of the mishaps to which ancient manuscripts were exposed is found here. Several codices add to this sentence the words e)mell', e)pei\ ou)de/pw kako/n g' a)pw/leto, very likely, since nothing that is bad ever perishes. Musgrave stamped it as erroneous. Schweighäuser recognized it as an iambic verse from some poet whom he could not recall, and inferred that somebody had written it on the margin of his copy, and that the next copyist had embodied it in the text. So he rejected it. Nauck points out the original in the Philoctetes of Sophocles (446). It is found in the editio princeps of Appian and in the Latin versions of both Candidus and Geslen, whose attempts to reconcile it with the text are ingenious but futile.)
Octavius leaped from his ship upon the rocks and pulled out of the water those who swam ashore, and conducted them to the mountain above. However, Cornificius and the other generals who were there, encouraged each other, cut loose from their anchors without awaiting orders, and put to sea against the enemy, thinking that it was better to be conquered fighting than to fall unresisting before the blows of their assailants. First, with wonderful audacity, Cornificius rammed the flag-ship of Demochares and captured it. The latter leaped upon another vessel. Then, while the struggle and carnage were in progress, Calvisius and Menodorus hove in sight, advancing from the open sea, although they had not been observed by Octavius' men either from the land or the water. The Pompeians, being farther out at sea, beheld them first, and, when they saw them, retreated, for darkness was approaching, and, fatigued as they were, they dared not encounter fresh men. This conjuncture happened very opportunely for those who had just now been in difficulties.
At nightfall, those who had reached the shore from the ships took refuge on the mountains and lighted numerous fires as signals to those who were still on the sea, and there passed the night without food, uncared for, and in want of everything. Octavius fared like the rest, and moved around exhorting them to endure their privations till morning. While he was undergoing these hardships it was not known that Calvisius had arrived, nor could anything thing needful be obtained from the ships in their wrecked condition. But good luck came to them from another quarter. The thirteenth legion was approaching by way of the mountains, and, learning of the disaster and judging of the road by the fire, they made their way through the crags. They found their commander, and those who had taken refuge with him, suffering from fatigue and want of food, and ministered to them, dividing the work, some caring for some, others for others. The centurions brought their commander into an improvised tent, as none of his body-servants were present, these having been dispersed in the darkness and disorder. He sent messengers in all directions forthwith, to announce that he was safe, and he learned that Calvisius had arrived with the vanguard of his fleet; and, in view of these two helpful and unexpected events, he allowed himself some rest.