Civil Wars

Appianus of Alexandria

Appianus. The Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, Volume 2: The Civil Wars. White, Horace, translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1899.

Octavius and Antony, seeing that Brutus was not willing to fight, assembled their men, and Antony addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I am sure that the enemy claim in their speeches a share of yesterday's victory because they drove some of us and plundered our camp, but they will show by their action that it was wholly yours. I promise you that neither to-morrow nor on any subsequent day will they be willing to fight. It is the clearest proof of their defeat yesterday and of their lack of courage that, like those who have been vanquished in public games, they keep out of the arena. Surely they did not collect so numerous an army in order to pass their time in fortifications in the desert parts of Thrace. They built their fortifications when you were still approaching because they were afraid. Now that you have come they adhere to them because of yesterday's defeat, on which account also the older and more experienced of their generals in utter despair committed suicide, and this act is itself the greatest proof of their disaster. Since, therefore, they do not accept our challenge and come down from the mountain, but trust to their rocky fastnesses instead of their arms, be valliant, O my soldiers of Rome, and force them to it again as you forced them yesterday. Let us consider it base to yield to those who are afraid of us, to keep our hands off such sluggards, or, soldiers as we are, to be unequal to the capture of their fortifications. We did not come hither to pass our lives in this plain, and if we delay we shall be in want of everything. If we are well advised we shall prosecute the war sharply, in order that peace may be of the longest duration possible.

"We, who have not incurred your censure for the onset and the plan of yesterday's battle, will devise fresh opportunities and means for this end. You, on the other hand, when you are asked, repay your generals with your valor. Nor will you be troubled, after a little, by yesterday's plundering of our camp, for our wealth consists not in the property we hold, but in conquering with might, which will restore to us as victors not only what we lost yesterday, which is still safe in the enemy's possession, but the enemy's wealth in addition. And if we are in haste[*](kai\ ei) e)peigo/meqa. Nauck suggests eu)xo/meqa in place of the last word, so that it would read "if we wish to take these things let us hasten to bring on a battle.") to take these things let us hasten to bring on a battle. What we took from them yesterday balances what we lost, and perhaps more, for they brought with them all that they had extorted and plundered from Asia, while we, coming from our own country, left at home everything in the way of luxury, and brought with us only what was necessary. If there was anything lavish in our camp it was the property of your generals, who will gladly give it all to you as a reward for your victory. And as compensation for your losses we will give you an additional reward of 5000 drachmas for each soldier, five times as much to each centurion, and twice the latter sum to each tribune."

Having spoken thus, he led out his men again on the following day. As the enemy would not come down then, Antony was disgusted, but he continued to lead out his men daily. Brutus had a part of his army in line lest he should be compelled to fight; and with another part he guarded the road by which his supplies were conveyed. There was a hill very near the camp of Cassius, which it was difficult for an enemy to occupy because, by reason of its nearness, it was exposed to arrows from the camp. Nevertheless, Cassius had placed a guard on it, lest it should be forced unexpectedly. As it had been abandoned by Brutus, the army of Octavius occupied it by night with four legions and protected themselves with wickerwork and hides against the enemy's bowmen. When this position was secured they transferred ten other legions a distance of more than five stades toward the sea. Four stades farther they placed two legions, in order to extend themselves in this manner quite to the sea, with a view of breaking through the enemy's line either along the sea itself, or through the marsh, or in some other way, and to cut off their supplies. Brutus counteracted this movement by building fortified posts opposite their camps and in other ways.

The task of Octavius and Antony became pressing, hunger was already felt, and fear fell upon them more and more each day,[*](e)/s te me/geqos kai\ de/os e(ka/sths h(me/ras e)pegi/gneto: an obscure passage. The translation is in part conjecture.) for Thessaly could no longer furnish sufficient supplies, nor could they hope for anything from the sea, which was commanded by the enemy everywhere. News of their recent disaster in the Adriatic having now reached both armies,[*](Plutarch says expressly that Brutus was not aware of this disaster to his enemies; for, although a deserter from the camp of Octavius came to tell the news, he was not believed, and was not allowed to see Brutus at all. (Life of Brutus, 47.)) it caused them fresh alarm, as also did the approach of winter while they were quartered in this muddy plain. Moved by these considerations they sent a legion of troops to Achaia to collect all the food they could find and send it to them in haste. As they could not rest under so great an impending danger, and as their other artifices were of no avail, they ceased offering battle in the plain and advanced with shouts to the enemy's fortifications, and challenged Brutus to fight, reviling and scoffing at him, intending not so much to besiege him as by a mad rush to bring him to an engagement against his will.

Brutus adhered to his original intention, and all the more because he knew of the famine and of his own success in the Adriatic, and of the enemy's desperation for want of supplies. He preferred to endure a siege, or anything else, rather than come to an engagement with men who were famishing, and whose hopes rested solely on fighting because they despaired of every other resource. His soldiers, however, without reflection, entertained a different opinion. They took it hard that they should be shut up, idle and cowardly, like women, within their fortifications. Their officers, although they approved of Brutus' design, were vexed, thinking that in the present temper of the army they might overpower the enemy more quickly. Brutus himself was the cause of these murmurs, being of a gentle and kindly disposition toward all -- not like Cassius, who was austere and imperious in every way, for which reason the army obeyed his orders promptly, not interfering with his authority, not inquiring the reasons for his orders, and not criticising them when they had learned them. But in the case of Brutus they expected nothing else than to share the command with him on account of his mildness of temper. Finally, the soldiers began openly to collect together in companies and groups and to ask each other, "Why does our general put a stigma upon us? How have we offended lately -- we who conquered the enemy and put him to flight; we who slaughtered those opposed to us and took their camp?" Brutus took no notice of these murmurs, nor did he call an assembly, lest he should be forced from his position, contrary to his dignity, by the unreasoning multitude, and especially by the mercenaries, who, like fickle slaves seeking new masters, always rest their hopes of safety on desertion to the enemy.

His officers kept teasing and urging him to make use of the eagerness of the army now, which would speedily bring glorious results. If the battle should turn out adversely, they could fall back to their walls and put the same fortifications between themselves and the enemy. Brutus was especially vexed with these, for they were his officers, and he grieved that they, who were exposed to the same peril as himself, should capriciously side with the soldiers in preferring a quick and doubtful chance to a victory without danger; but, to the ruin of himself and them, he yielded, chiding them with these words, "I seem to be carrying on war like Pompey the Great, not so much commanding as commanded." I think that Brutus restricted himself to these words in order to conceal his greatest fear, lest those of his soldiers who had formerly served under Cæsar should become disaffected and desert to the enemy. This both himself and Cassius had apprehended from the beginning, and they had been careful not to give any excuse for such disaffection toward themselves.