Civil Wars

Antony moved his army rapidly, wishing to anticipate the enemy in occupying Amphipolis as an advantageous position for the battle. When he found it already fortified by Norbanus he was delighted. Leaving his apparatus there and one legion, under the command of Pinarius, he advanced with the greatest boldness and encamped in the plain at a distance of only eight stades from the enemy, and straightway the superiority of the enemy's situation and the inferiority of his own became evident. The former were on elevated ground, the latter on the plain; the former procured fuel from the mountains, the latter from the marshes; the former obtained water from a river, the latter from wells freshly dug; the former drew their supplies from Thasos, requiring carriage of only a few stades, while the latter was 350 stades[*](This should be 250 stades, according to Schweighäuser, that being approximately the distance between Amphipolis and Philippi.) from Amphipolis. Still it seems that Antony was compelled to do as he did, for there was no other hill, and the rest of the plain, lying in a sort of hollow, was liable to inundation at times from the river; for which reason also the fountains of water were found fresh and abundant in the wells that were dug there. Antony's audacity, although he was driven to it by necessity, confounded the enemy when they saw him pitch his camp so near them and in such a contemptuous manner as soon as he arrived. He raised numerous towers and fortified himself on all sides with ditch, wall, and palisade. The enemy also completed their fortification wherever the work was defective. Cassius, observing that Antony's advance was reckless, extended his fortification at the only place where it was still wanting, from the camp to the marsh, a space which had been overlooked on account of its narrowness, so that there was now nothing unfortified except the cliffs on Brutus's flank and the marsh on that of Cassius and the sea lying against the marsh. In the centre everything was intercepted by ditch, palisade, wall, and gates.

In this way both sides had fortified themselves, in the meantime making trial of each other by cavalry skirmishes only. When they had done all that they intended and Octavius had arrived (for, although he was not yet strong enough for a battle, he could be carried along the ranks reclining in a litter), he and Antony prepared for battle forthwith. Brutus and Cassius also drew out their forces on their higher ground, but did not come down. They decided not to give battle, hoping to wear out the enemy by want of supplies. There were nineteen legions of infantry on each side, but those of Brutus and Cassius lacked something of being full, while those of Octavius and Antony were complete. Of cavalry the latter had 13,000 and the former 20,000, including Thracians on both sides. Thus in the multitude of men, in the spirit and bravery of the commanders, and in arms and munitions, was beheld a most magnificent display on both sides; yet they did nothing for several days. Brutus and Cassius did not wish to engage, but rather to continue wasting the enemy by lack of provisions, since they themselves had abundance from Asia, all transported by the sea from close at hand, while the enemy had nothing in abundance and nothing from their own territory. They could obtain nothing through merchants from Egypt, since that country was exhausted by famine, nor from Spain or Africa by reason of Pompeius, nor from Italy by reason of Murcus and Domitius. Macedonia and Thessaly, which were the only countries then supplying them, would not suffice much longer.

Mindful chiefly of these facts Brutus and Cassius protracted the war. Antony, fearful of the same, resolved to force them to an engagement. He formed a plan of effecting a passage through the marsh secretly, if possible, in order to get in the enemy's rear without their knowledge, and cut off their avenue of supply from Thasos. So he arrayed his forces for battle with all the standards set each day, so that it might seem that his entire army was drawn up, while a part of his force was really working night and day cutting a narrow passage in the marsh, cutting down reeds, throwing up a causeway and flanking it with stone so that the earth should not fall away, and bridging the deeper parts with piles, all in the profoundest silence. The reeds, which were still growing around his passage-way, prevented the enemy from seeing his work. After working ten days in this manner he sent a column of troops by night suddenly, who occupied all the strong positions inside and built several redoubts at the same time. Cassius was amazed at the ingenuity as well as the secrecy of this work, and he formed the counter design of cutting Antony off from his redoubts. He carried a transverse wall across the whole marsh from his camp to the sea, cutting and bridging in the same manner as Antony had done, and laying a solid foundation for his rampart, thus intercepting the passage sage made by Antony, so that those inside could not escape to him, nor he render assistance to them.

When Antony saw this about noon, instantly, with rage and fury, he turned his own army, which was facing in another direction, and led it against the fortification of Cassius which lay between his camp and the marsh. He carried tools and ladders intending to take it by storm and force his way into Cassius' camp. While he was making this audacious charge, obliquely and up hill, across the space that separated the two armies, the soldiers of Brutus were provoked at the insolence of the enemy in dashing boldly athwart their front while they stood there armed. So they charged of their own volition, without any order from their officers, took them in flank, and killed as many as they could reach. The battle once begun they charged upon the army of Octavius, also, which was drawn up opposite, put it to flight, pursued it to the camp which Antony and Octavius had in common, and captured it. Octavius himself was not there, having been warned in a dream to beware of that day, as he has himself written in his Memoirs.[*](w(s au)to\s e)n toi=s u(pomnh/masin e)/grayen. Plutarch used the same words with a single variation, substituting i(storei= (relates) for e)/grayen (has written). This identity of language would indicate that they drew from the same source, yet their accounts of the beginning of the battle differ from each other. Plutarch says that at a council of war held by Brutus and Cassius it was resolved to give battle on the following day, although Cassius favored delay; that after the resolution was taken Cassius was in good spirits, and expressed his confidence in victory; and that on the following morning the scarlet robe, which was the Roman signal of battle, was hung out in the camps of both Brutus and Cassius. Still, the two accounts are not necessarily conflicting, since one tells what took place in the republican camp, and the other what occurred in that of the triumvirs. Plutarch's authority is Messala Corvinus, who commanded a legion under Brutus, and who was probably present at the council of war, since he relates a conversation that he had with Cassius immediately after it. (Life of Brutus, 39, 40.))

When Antony saw that battle was joined he was delighted because he had forced it, for he had been in trouble about his supplies. He judged it inadvisable to turn again toward the plain, lest in making the evolution his ranks should be thrown into disorder. So he continued his charge, as he had begun it, on the run, and advanced under a shower of missiles, and forced his way till he struck a body of Cassius' troops, which had not moved from its assigned position and which was amazed at this unexpected audacity. He courageously broke this advance guard and dashed against the fortification that ran between the marsh and the camp, demolished the palisade, filled up the ditch, undermined the works, and killed the men at the gates, disregarding the missiles hurled from the wall, until he had forced an entrance through the gates, and others had made breaches in the fortification, and still others had climbed up on the debris. All this was done so swiftly that those who had just now captured the fortification met Cassius' men, who had been at work in the marsh, coming to the assistance of their friends, and, with a powerful charge, put them to flight, drove them into the marsh, and then at once wheeled against the camp of Cassius itself. These were only the men who had scaled the fortification with Antony, the remainder being engaged in conflict with the enemy on the other side of the wall.

As the camp was in a strong position it was guarded by only a few men, for which reason Antony easily overcame them. Cassius' soldiers outside the camp were already worsted, and when they saw that the camp was taken they scattered in disorderly flight. The victory was complete and alike on either side, Brutus defeating the enemy's left wing and taking their camp, while Antony overcame Cassius and ravaged his camp with irresistible courage. There was great slaughter on both sides, but by reason of the extent of the plain and the clouds of dust they were ignorant of each other's fate. When they learned the facts they recalled their scattered forces. Those who returned resembled porters rather than soldiers, and did not at once perceive each other nor see anything clearly. Otherwise either party would have flung down their burdens and fiercely attacked the others carrying off plunder in this disorderly fashion. According to conjecture the number of killed on the side of Cassius, including slave shield-bearers, was about 8000 and on the side of Octavius double that number.[*](Messala is the authority for this estimate of the losses. Plutarch says: "The losses of Brutus and Cassius were 8000, including the military servants, whom Brutus called Brigas. Messala says that he thinks those of the enemy were more than twice as great," evidently a a very wild guess, like most of our statistics of the casualties of battles in ancient times. (Life of Brutus, 45.))

When Cassius was driven out of his fortifications and no longer had any camp to go to, he ascended the hill to Philippi and took a survey of the situation. He could not see accurately on account of the dust, nor could he see everything, but upon discovering that his own camp was captured he ordered Pindarus, his shield-bearer, to draw his sword and kill him. While Pindarus delayed a messenger ran up and said that Brutus had been victorious on the other wing and was ravaging the enemy's camp. Cassius merely answered, "Tell him that I pray his victory may be complete." Then, turning to Pindarus, he said, "What are you waiting for? Why do you not deliver me from my shame?" Then, as he presented his throat, Pindarus slew him. This is one account of the death of Cassius. Others say that as some horsemen were approaching, bringing the good news from Brutus, he took them for enemies and sent Titinius to find out exactly; that the horsemen pressed around Titinius joyfully as a friend of Cassius, and at the same time uttered loud hurrahs; that Cassius, thinking that Titinius had fallen into the hands of enemies, said, "Have I waited to see my friend torn from me?" and that then he withdrew to a tent with Pindarus, and Pindarus was never seen afterward. For this reason some persons think that he killed Cassius without orders. Cassius ended his life on his birthday, on which also the battle was fought, and Titinius killed himself because he had been too slow.[*](The second of these two accounts of the death of Cassius is found, at greater length, in Plutarch (Life of Brutus, 43); in Velleius (ii. 70); in Valerius Maximus (ix. 9. 2); in Dion Cassius (xlvii. 46); and with a slight variation in Florus (iv. 7).)

Brutus wept over the dead body of Cassius and called him the last of the Romans, meaning that his equal in virtue would never exist again. He reproached him for haste and precipitancy, but at the same time he esteemed him happy because he was freed from cares and troubles, "which," he said, "are leading Brutus, ah, whither?" He delivered the corpse to friends to be buried secretly lest the army should be moved to tears at the sight; and himself passed the whole night, without food and without care for his own person, restoring order in Cassius' army. In the morning the enemy drew up their army in order of battle, so that they might not seem to have been beaten. Brutus, perceiving their design, exclaimed, "Let us arm also and make believe that we have suffered no defeat." So he put his forces in line, and the enemy withdrew. Brutus said to his friends, jeeringly, "They challenged us when they thought we were tired, but they dared not put us to the test."

On the same day that witnessed the battle of Philippi another great calamity took place in the Adriatic. Domitius Calvinus was bringing two legions of infantry on transport ships to Octavius, one of which was known as the Martian legion, a name which had been given to it as a distinction for bravery. He led also a prætorian cohort of about 2000 men, four squadrons of horse, and a considerable corps d'elite of other troops, under the convoy of a few triremes. Murcus and Ahenobarbus met them with 130 war-ships. A few of the transports that were in front got away under sail. The wind suddenly failing, the rest floated about in a dead calm on the sea, having been delivered by some god into the hands of their enemies. The latter, without danger to themselves, fell upon each ship and crushed it; nor could the triremes that escorted them render any aid, since they were hemmed in by reason of their small number. The men who were exposed to this danger performed many deeds of valor. They hastily lashed their ships together with ropes and spars to prevent the enemy from breaking through their line. But when they succeeded in doing this Murcus discharged burning arrows at them. Then they cast off their fastenings as quickly as possible and separated from each other on account count of the fire, and thus again were exposed to being surrounded or rammed by the triremes.

Some of the soldiers, and especially the Martians, who excelled in bravery, were exasperated that they should lose their lives uselessly, and so killed themselves rather than be burned to death; others leaped on board the triremes of the enemy, giving and receiving blows. Vessels half burned floated a long time, containing men perishing by fire, by hunger, and by thirst. Others, clinging to masts or planks, were thrown upon barren rocks or promontories, and of these some were saved unexpectedly. Some of them were nourished for five days by licking pitch, or chewing sails or ropes, until the waves bore them to the land. The greater part, vanquished by their misfortunes, surrendered to the enemy. Seventeen triremes surrendered, and the men in them took the oath to Murcus. Their general, Calvinus, who was believed to have perished, returned to Brundusium on his ship five days later. Such was the catastrophe that befell in the Adriatic on the same day that the battle of Philippi was fought, whether it be more fitly called a shipwreck or a naval engagement. The coincidence of the two battles caused amazement when it became known later.

Brutus assembled his army and addressed it as follows: "In yesterday's engagement, fellow-soldiers, you were in every respect superior to the enemy. You began the battle eagerly, although without orders, and you utterly destroyed their far-famed fourth legion, on which their wing placed its reliance, and all those supporting it as far as their camp, and you took and plundered their camp first, so that our victory far outweighs the disaster on our left wing. When it was in your power to finish the whole work, you chose rather to plunder than to kill the vanquished. Most of you passed by the enemy and made a rush for his property. We are the superior again in this, that of our two camps they captured only one, while we took all of theirs, so that here our gain is twice as great as our loss. So great are our advantages in the battle. How far we excel them in other respects you may learn from our prisoners -- concerning the scarcity and dearness of provisions among them, the difficulty of procuring further supplies, and how near they are to absolute want. They can obtain nothing from Sicily, Sardinia, Africa, or Spain, because Pompeius, Murcus, and Ahenobarbus with 260 ships close the sea against them. They have already exhausted Macedonia. They are now dependent on Thessaly alone. How much longer will it suffice?

"When, therefore, you see them eager to fight, bear in mind that they are so pressed by hunger that they prefer death by battle. We will make it part of our plan that hunger shall engage them before we do, so that when it is necessary to fight we shall find them weakened and exhausted. Let us not be carried away by our ardor before the proper time. Let no one think that delay implies want of generalship more than haste,[*](*mhde\ braduth=ta/ tis h(gei/sqw th\n e)mpeiri/an h)/ taxuth=ta. The text is probably corrupt at this place. Various suggestions have been made for its amendment. In the edition of Tollius a)peiri/an (want of seneralship) is suggested in place of e)mpeiri/an. This solves the difficulty with the least possible change of the text.) when he casts his eye on the sea behind us, which sends us aid and provisions and enables us to win victory without danger if we wait and do not mind the insults and provocations of the enemy, who are not braver than ourselves, as yesterday's work shows, but are trying to avert another danger. Let the zeal which I now desire you to repress be shown abundantly when I ask it. The rewards of victory I will pay you in full when it shall please the gods that our work be finished. And now for your bravery in yesterday's engagement, I will give to each soldier 1000 drachmas and to your officers in proportion." After speaking thus he distributed the donative to the legions in their order. Some writers say that he promised to give them also the cities of Lacedæmon and Thessalonica to plunder.

Octavius and Antony, seeing that Brutus was not willing to fight, assembled their men, and Antony addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I am sure that the enemy claim in their speeches a share of yesterday's victory because they drove some of us and plundered our camp, but they will show by their action that it was wholly yours. I promise you that neither to-morrow nor on any subsequent day will they be willing to fight. It is the clearest proof of their defeat yesterday and of their lack of courage that, like those who have been vanquished in public games, they keep out of the arena. Surely they did not collect so numerous an army in order to pass their time in fortifications in the desert parts of Thrace. They built their fortifications when you were still approaching because they were afraid. Now that you have come they adhere to them because of yesterday's defeat, on which account also the older and more experienced of their generals in utter despair committed suicide, and this act is itself the greatest proof of their disaster. Since, therefore, they do not accept our challenge and come down from the mountain, but trust to their rocky fastnesses instead of their arms, be valliant, O my soldiers of Rome, and force them to it again as you forced them yesterday. Let us consider it base to yield to those who are afraid of us, to keep our hands off such sluggards, or, soldiers as we are, to be unequal to the capture of their fortifications. We did not come hither to pass our lives in this plain, and if we delay we shall be in want of everything. If we are well advised we shall prosecute the war sharply, in order that peace may be of the longest duration possible.

"We, who have not incurred your censure for the onset and the plan of yesterday's battle, will devise fresh opportunities and means for this end. You, on the other hand, when you are asked, repay your generals with your valor. Nor will you be troubled, after a little, by yesterday's plundering of our camp, for our wealth consists not in the property we hold, but in conquering with might, which will restore to us as victors not only what we lost yesterday, which is still safe in the enemy's possession, but the enemy's wealth in addition. And if we are in haste[*](kai\ ei) e)peigo/meqa. Nauck suggests eu)xo/meqa in place of the last word, so that it would read "if we wish to take these things let us hasten to bring on a battle.") to take these things let us hasten to bring on a battle. What we took from them yesterday balances what we lost, and perhaps more, for they brought with them all that they had extorted and plundered from Asia, while we, coming from our own country, left at home everything in the way of luxury, and brought with us only what was necessary. If there was anything lavish in our camp it was the property of your generals, who will gladly give it all to you as a reward for your victory. And as compensation for your losses we will give you an additional reward of 5000 drachmas for each soldier, five times as much to each centurion, and twice the latter sum to each tribune."

Having spoken thus, he led out his men again on the following day. As the enemy would not come down then, Antony was disgusted, but he continued to lead out his men daily. Brutus had a part of his army in line lest he should be compelled to fight; and with another part he guarded the road by which his supplies were conveyed. There was a hill very near the camp of Cassius, which it was difficult for an enemy to occupy because, by reason of its nearness, it was exposed to arrows from the camp. Nevertheless, Cassius had placed a guard on it, lest it should be forced unexpectedly. As it had been abandoned by Brutus, the army of Octavius occupied it by night with four legions and protected themselves with wickerwork and hides against the enemy's bowmen. When this position was secured they transferred ten other legions a distance of more than five stades toward the sea. Four stades farther they placed two legions, in order to extend themselves in this manner quite to the sea, with a view of breaking through the enemy's line either along the sea itself, or through the marsh, or in some other way, and to cut off their supplies. Brutus counteracted this movement by building fortified posts opposite their camps and in other ways.

The task of Octavius and Antony became pressing, hunger was already felt, and fear fell upon them more and more each day,[*](e)/s te me/geqos kai\ de/os e(ka/sths h(me/ras e)pegi/gneto: an obscure passage. The translation is in part conjecture.) for Thessaly could no longer furnish sufficient supplies, nor could they hope for anything from the sea, which was commanded by the enemy everywhere. News of their recent disaster in the Adriatic having now reached both armies,[*](Plutarch says expressly that Brutus was not aware of this disaster to his enemies; for, although a deserter from the camp of Octavius came to tell the news, he was not believed, and was not allowed to see Brutus at all. (Life of Brutus, 47.)) it caused them fresh alarm, as also did the approach of winter while they were quartered in this muddy plain. Moved by these considerations they sent a legion of troops to Achaia to collect all the food they could find and send it to them in haste. As they could not rest under so great an impending danger, and as their other artifices were of no avail, they ceased offering battle in the plain and advanced with shouts to the enemy's fortifications, and challenged Brutus to fight, reviling and scoffing at him, intending not so much to besiege him as by a mad rush to bring him to an engagement against his will.

Brutus adhered to his original intention, and all the more because he knew of the famine and of his own success in the Adriatic, and of the enemy's desperation for want of supplies. He preferred to endure a siege, or anything else, rather than come to an engagement with men who were famishing, and whose hopes rested solely on fighting because they despaired of every other resource. His soldiers, however, without reflection, entertained a different opinion. They took it hard that they should be shut up, idle and cowardly, like women, within their fortifications. Their officers, although they approved of Brutus' design, were vexed, thinking that in the present temper of the army they might overpower the enemy more quickly. Brutus himself was the cause of these murmurs, being of a gentle and kindly disposition toward all -- not like Cassius, who was austere and imperious in every way, for which reason the army obeyed his orders promptly, not interfering with his authority, not inquiring the reasons for his orders, and not criticising them when they had learned them. But in the case of Brutus they expected nothing else than to share the command with him on account of his mildness of temper. Finally, the soldiers began openly to collect together in companies and groups and to ask each other, "Why does our general put a stigma upon us? How have we offended lately -- we who conquered the enemy and put him to flight; we who slaughtered those opposed to us and took their camp?" Brutus took no notice of these murmurs, nor did he call an assembly, lest he should be forced from his position, contrary to his dignity, by the unreasoning multitude, and especially by the mercenaries, who, like fickle slaves seeking new masters, always rest their hopes of safety on desertion to the enemy.

His officers kept teasing and urging him to make use of the eagerness of the army now, which would speedily bring glorious results. If the battle should turn out adversely, they could fall back to their walls and put the same fortifications between themselves and the enemy. Brutus was especially vexed with these, for they were his officers, and he grieved that they, who were exposed to the same peril as himself, should capriciously side with the soldiers in preferring a quick and doubtful chance to a victory without danger; but, to the ruin of himself and them, he yielded, chiding them with these words, "I seem to be carrying on war like Pompey the Great, not so much commanding as commanded." I think that Brutus restricted himself to these words in order to conceal his greatest fear, lest those of his soldiers who had formerly served under Cæsar should become disaffected and desert to the enemy. This both himself and Cassius had apprehended from the beginning, and they had been careful not to give any excuse for such disaffection toward themselves.