Civil Wars

Appianus of Alexandria

Appianus. The Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, Volume 2: The Civil Wars. White, Horace, translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1899.

These things accomplished, Octavius formed plans for a reconciliation with Antony, for he had learned that Brutus and Cassius had already collected twenty legions of soldiers, and he needed Antony's help against them. He moved out of the city toward the Adriatic coast and proceeded in a leisurely way, waiting to see what the Senate would do. Pedius persuaded the senators, after Octavius had taken his departure, not to make their differences with each other irremediable, but to be reconciled to Lepidus and Antony. They foresaw that such a reconciliation would not be for their advantage or for that of the country, but would be merely an assistance to Octavius against Brutus and Cassius. Nevertheless, they gave their approval and assent to it as a matter of necessity. So the decrees declaring Antony and Lepidus, and the soldiers under them, public enemies, were repealed, and others of a peaceful nature were sent to them. Thereupon Octavius wrote and congratulated them, and he promised to lend assistance to Antony against Decimus Brutus if he needed it. They replied to him at once in a friendly spirit and eulogized him. Antony wrote that he would himself take vengeance on Decimus for Cæsar's account and on Plancus[*](The movements of Plancus are minutely described in his numerous letters to Cicero. Although a Cæsarian, he intended to remain faithful to the republic and would probably have done so had not the supremacy acquired by Octavius at Rome and the reconciliation of the latter with Antony made his military position untenable.) for his own, and that then he would join forces with Octavius.

Such were the letters which they exchanged with each other. While pursuing Decimus, Antony was joined by Asinius Pollio with two legions. Asinius also brought about an arrangement with Plancus, by virtue of which the latter passed over to Antony with three legions, so that Antony now had much the strongest force. Decimus had ten legions, of whom four, the most experienced in war, had suffered severely from famine and were still enfeebled. The other six were new levies, still untrained and unaccustomed to their labors. As he despaired of fighting, he decided to flee to Marcus Brutus in Macedonia. He retreated not by the higher Alps, but toward Ravenna and Aquileia. Since Cæsar had travelled by this route, Decimus proposed another longer and more difficult one -- to cross the Rhine and traverse the wild country of barbarian tribes. Thereupon the new levies, bewildered and fatigued, were the first to desert him and join Octavius. After them the four older legions joined Antony, and the auxiliaries did the same, except a body-guard of Gallic horse. Then Decimus allowed those who wished to do so to return to their own homes, and, after distributing among them the gold he had with him, proceeded toward the Rhine with 300 followers, the only ones who remained. As it was difficult to cross the river with so few, he was now abandoned by all the others except ten. He put on Gallic clothing, and, as he was acquainted with the language, he proceeded on his journey with these, passing himself off as a Gaul. He no longer followed the longer route, but went toward Aquileia, thinking that he should escape notice by reason of the smallness of his force.[*](Appian's geography is much in need of amendment. It is impossible to trace the route taken by Decimus from this description.)

Having been captured by robbers and bound, he asked them who was the chief of this Gallic tribe. He was informed that it was Camillus, a man to whom he had done many favors. So he told them to bring him to Camillus. When the latter saw him led in, he greeted him in a friendly way in public, and scolded those who had bound him, for putting an indignity on so great a man through ignorance; but he sent word to Antony secretly. Antony was some-what touched by this change of fortune, and was not willing to see Decimus, but he ordered Camillus to kill him and send his head to himself.[*](Velleius (ii. 64) gives a somewhat different account of the death of Decimus. "Decimus Brutus," he says, "deserted first by Plancus and afterwards plotted against by him, seeing his army melting away, took to flight and accepted the hospitality of a nobleman named Camelus, in whose house he was found by Antony's emissaries and slain." The Epitome of Livy (cxx.) says that Decimus was put to death by Capenas Sequanus by order of Antony, into whose hands he had fallen.) When he saw the head he ordered his attendants to bury it. Such was the end of Decimus, who had been Cæsar's præfect of horse and had governed Farther Gaul[*](th=s palaia=s *keltikh=s; "older Gaul," which, as Appian himself tells us in iv. 2, infra, means that part of Transalpine Gaul which was held by the Romans before Cæsar's conquests. Yet we know from ii. III, supra, that the whole of Transalpine Gaul was placed in charge of Decimus Brutus by Cæsar just before he embarked for Africa. These facts make it almost certain that the original text was perai/as instead of palaia=s.) under him and had been designated by him for the consulship the coming year and for the governorship of Hither Gaul. He was the next of the murderers after Trebonius to meet punishment, within a year and a half of the assassination. About the same time Minucius Basilus, another of Cæsar's murderers, was killed by his slaves, some of whom he was castrating by way of punishment.

WHEN I heard of the death of Trebonius I was both glad and sorry. It rejoiced me to know-that a wretch had paid the penalty due to the ashes and bones of the most illustrious of men, and that the vengeance of the gods had overtaken him within the term of the revolving year, and that punishment for the parricidal act is either accomplished or impending. I mourn that Dolabella was voted an enemy as soon as he had put the assassin to death, and that the son of a buffoon should seem dearer to the Roman people than Gaius Cæsar, the father of his country. Most grievous is it that you, Aulus Hirtius, loaded as you are with Cæsar's benefactions, and left by him in a condition that must be a surprise to yourself, and you, O boy, who owe everything to his name, should so conduct yourselves that Dolabella should be condemned by law, and this pest [Decimus Brutus] delivered from siege, and Brutus and Cassius strengthened as much as possible. You look upon the present state of things too much as you have viewed the past. You call Pompey's camp the Senate. You have taken the vanquished Cicero for a leader. You are strengthening Macedonia with armies. You have placed Africa in charge of Varus, who was twice taken prisoner. You have sent Cassius into Syria. You have allowed Casca to hold the tribuneship. You have taken away the revenues of the Luperci assigned to them by Cæsar. You have abolished the colonies of veterans established by law and senatus consultum. You promise to restore to the Massilians what was taken from them by the law of war. Do you forget that under the law of Hirtius no Pompeian who lives can hold office? You have supplied Brutus with the money of Apuleius. You applauded the execution of Pætus and Menedemus, Cæsar's hosts, who had been given the citizenship by him. You took no notice of Theopompus when he was stripped and driven out by Trebonius and fled to Alexandria. You tolerate Servius Galba in your camp girded with the same dagger [with which he stabbed Cæsar]. You have enlisted my soldiers and the veterans under pretence of exterminating those who killed Cæsar, and have hurled them, in ignorance of what they were doing, against their quæstor, their general, their comrades. In short, what have you not approved of, what have you not done, that Pompey himself would do if he could come to life, or his son if he were at home? Finally, you say that peace is not possible unless I let Brutus go free or supply him with corn. What? Is this the opinion of those veterans who can still choose their own course? Since you have sold yourselves for adulation and poisoned gifts, . . . But you say you are bringing aid to beleaguered soldiers. I will not hinder them from escaping and going where they please if they will let that man perish who has deserved to perish. You write me that mention has been made of peace in the Senate, and of five ambassadors of consular rank. It is hard to believe that those who drove me headlong when I offered the fairest conditions, and was even thinking of abating some part of them, can contemplate any moderate or humane act. It is hardly probable that those who voted Dolabella an enemy for his most righteous deed could spare me, who hold the same sentiments with him. Wherefore you ought rather to reflect whether it is more fitting, and more useful to our party, to avenge the death of Trebonius or that of Cæsar, and whether it is more equitable for us to compete with each other in bringing to life the cause of Pompey that has so often had its throat cut, or to combine, so that we be not a laughing-stock to our enemies, who will be the gainers whichever of us shall fall. Fortune itself has thus far shunned that spectacle, that it might not behold two armies belonging to one body fighting each other, with Cicero for trainer, who is a happy man in so far as he can deceive you with the same compliments with which he boasted that he deceived Cæsar. I am resolved to endure no affront either to myself or to my friends, nor to desert the party that Pompey hated, nor to allow the veterans to be moved from their settlements or be put to the torture one by one; nor shall I come short of the faith I pledged to Dolabella, nor violate my alliance with Lepidus, that most conscientious man, nor betray Plancus, the partner of my counsels. If the immortal gods aid me, as I hope, in my righteous course, I shall be glad to live; but if another fate awaits me I shall enjoy your punishment in advance, for if the Pompeians are so insolent when vanquished, what they will be when victorious you will learn by experience rather than myself. Finally, the sum and substance of my decision is this, I can bear the injuries that my friends have done me if they are willing to forget that they have done them, or if they are ready to join me in avenging Cæsar's death. I do not believe that ambassadors are coming to the theatre of war. When they do come I shall know what they demand.
Cicero, Phil. xiii[*](Cicero said that the only answer made by Hirtius and Octavius to this letter was to move nearer to Antony's works. (Phil. xiii, 20.))

THUS was punishment visited upon two of Cæsar's murderers, who were conquered in their own provinces, Trebonius in Asia and Decimus Brutus in Gaul. How vengeance overtook Cassius and Marcus Brutus, who were the principal leaders in the conspiracy against Cæsar, and who controlled the territory from Syria to Macedonia, and had large forces of cavalry and sailors, and more than twenty legions of infantry, together with ships and money, this fourth book of the Civil Wars will show. During the progress of these events came the pursuit and capture of the proscribed in Rome and the sufferings consequent thereon, the like of which cannot be recalled among the civil commotions or wars of the Greeks, or those of the Romans themselves save only in the time of Sulla, who was the first to put his enemies on a proscription list. Marius searched for his and punished those whom he found, but Sulla proclaimed large rewards to persons who should kill the proscribed and severe punishment to those who should conceal them. But what took place in the time of Marius and Sulla I have previously narrated in the history relating to them. The following events came next in order.

Octavius and Antony composed their differences on a small, gradually sloping islet in the river Lavinius, near the city of Mutina. Each had five legions of soldiers whom they stationed opposite each other, after which each proceeded with 300 men to the bridges over the river. Lepidus himself went before them, searched the island, and shook his military cloak as a signal to them to come. Then each left his three hundred in charge of friends on the bridges and advanced to the middle of the island in plain sight, and there the three sat together in council, Octavius in the centre because he was consul. They were in conference from morning till night for two days, and came to these decisions: That Octavius should resign the consulship and that Ventidius should take it for the remainder of the year; that anew magistracy for quieting the civil dissensions should be created by law, which Lepidus, Antony, and Octavius should hold for five years with consular power (for this name seemed preferable to that of dictator, perhaps because of Antony's decree abolishing the dictatorship); that these three should at once designate the yearly magistrates of the city for the five years; that a distribution of the provinces should be made, giving to Antony the whole of Gaul except the part bordering the Pyrenees Mountains, which was called Old Gaul. The latter, together with Spain, was assigned to Lepidus, while Octavius was to have Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily, and the other islands in the vicinity thereof.

Thus was the dominion of the Romans divided by the triumvirate among themselves. The assignment of the parts beyond the Adriatic only was postponed, since these were still under the control of Brutus and Cassius, against whom Antony and Octavius were to wage war. Lepidus was to be consul the following year and to remain in the city to do what was needful there, meanwhile governing Spain by proxy. He was to retain three of his legions to guard the city, and to divide the other seven between Octavius and Antony, three to the former and four to the latter, so that each of them might lead twenty legions to the war. To encourage the army with the expectation of booty they promised them, beside other gifts, eighteen cities of Italy as colonies -- cities which excelled in wealth, in the fertility of their territory, and in handsome houses, and which were to be divided among them (land, buildings, and all), just as though they had been captured from an enemy in war. The most renowned among these were Capua, Rhegium, Venusia, Beneventum, Nuceria, Ariminum, and Vibo.[*](A town in Bruttium, called by the Greeks Hipponium -- the modern Monte Leone.) Thus were the most beautiful parts of Italy marked out for the soldiers. But they decided to destroy their personal enemies beforehand, so that the latter should not interfere with their arrangements while they were carrying on war abroad. Having come to these decisions, they reduced them to writing, and Octavius, as consul, communicated them to the soldiers, all except the proscriptions. When the soldiers heard them they applauded and embraced each other in token of mutual reconciliation.

While these transactions were taking place many fearful prodigies and portents were observed at Rome. Dogs howled exactly like wolves -- a fearful sign. Wolves darted through the forum -- an animal unused to the city. Cattle used the human voice. A newly born infant spoke. Sweat issued from statues; some even sweated blood. Loud voices of men were heard and the clashing of arms and the tramp of horses where none could be seen. Many fearful signs were observed around the sun, there were showers of stones, and continuous lightning fell upon the sacred temples and images; in consequence of which the Senate sent for diviners and soothsayers from Etruria. The oldest of them said that the kingly rule of former times was coming back, and that they would all be slaves except himself, whereupon he closed his mouth and held his breath till he was dead.

As soon as the triumvirs were by themselves they joined in making a list of those who were to be put to death. They put on the list those whom they suspected because of their power, and also their personal enemies, and they swapped their own relatives and friends with each other for death, both then and later. For they made additions to the catalogue from time to time, some on the ground of enmity, others for a grudge merely, or because the victims tims were friends of their enemies or enemies of their friends. Some were proscribed on account of their wealth, for the triumvirs needed a great deal of money to carry on the war, since the revenue from Asia had been paid to Brutus and Cassius, who were still collecting it, and the kings and satraps were coöperating with them. So the triumvirs were short of money because Europe, and especially Italy, was exhausted by wars and exactions; for which reason they levied very heavy contributions from the plebeians and finally even from women, and contemplated taxes on sales and rents. Some were proscribed because they had handsome villas or city residences. The number of senators who were sentenced to death and confiscation was about 300, and of the so-called knights about 2000. There were brothers and uncles of the triumvirs in the list of the proscribed, and also some of the lieutenants serving under them who had had some difficulty with the leaders, or with their fellow-lieutenants.

As they left the conference to proceed to Rome they postponed the proscription of the greater number of victims, but they decided to send executioners in advance and without warning to kill twelve, or, as some say, seventeen, of the most important ones, among whom was Cicero. Four of these were slain immediately, either at banquets or as they were met on the streets. Search was made for the others in temples and houses. There was a sudden panic which lasted through the night, and a running to and fro with cries and lamentation as in a captured city. When it was known that men had been seized and massacred, although nobody had been previously sentenced by proscription, every man thought that he was the one whom the pursuers were in search of. In despair some were on the point of burning their own houses, and others the public buildings, or of committing some terrible deed in their frenzied state before the blow should fall upon them; and they would have done so had not the consul Pedius hurried around with heralds and encouraged them, telling them to wait till daylight and get more accurate information. When morning came Pedius, contrary to the intention of the triumvirs, published the list of seventeen as deemed the sole authors of the civil strife and the only ones condemned. To the rest he pledged the public faith, being ignorant of the determinations of the triumvirs. Pedius died in consequence of fatigue the following night.

The triumvirs entered the city separately on three successive days, Octavius, Antony, and Lepidus, each with a prætorian cohort and one legion. As they arrived, the city was speedily filled with arms and military standards, disposed in the most advantageous places. A public assembly was forthwith convened in the midst of these armed men, and the tribune Publius Titius proposed a law providing for a new magistracy for settling the present disorders, to consist of three men to hold office for five years, namely, Lepidus, Antony, and Octavius, with the same power as consuls. (Among the Greeks these would have been called harmosts, which is the name the Lacedæmonians gave to those whom they appointed over their subject states.) No time was given for consideration of this measure, nor was a future day appointed for voting on it, but it was passed forthwith. That same night, the proscription of 130 men in addition to the seventeen was proclaimed in various parts of the city, and a little later 150 more, and additions to the lists were constantly made of those who had been previously condemned or killed by mistake, so that they might seem to have perished justly. It was ordered that the heads of all the victims should be brought to the triumvirs in order to adjust the rewards, which to a free person were payable in money and to a slave in both money and freedom. All were required to afford opportunity for searching their houses. Those who received fugitives, or concealed them, or refused to allow search to be made, were liable to the same penalties as the proscribed, and those who informed against concealers were allowed the same rewards [as those who killed the proscribed].

The proscription was in the following words: " Marcus Lepidus, Mark Antony, and Octavius Cæsar, chosen by the people to set in order and regulate the republic, do declare that, had not perfidious scoundrels begged for mercy and when they obtained it become the enemies of their benefactors and conspired against them, neither would Gaius Cæsar have been slain by those whom he saved by his clemency after capturing them in war, whom he admitted to his friendship and upon whom he heaped offices, honors, and gifts; nor should we have been compelled to use severity against those who have insulted us and declared us public enemies. Now, seeing that the malice of those, who have conspired against us and from whom Gaius Cæsar suffered, cannot be overcome by kindness, we prefer to anticipate our enemies rather than suffer at their hands. Let no one who sees what both Cæsar and ourselves have suffered consider our action unjust, cruel, or immoderate. Although Cæsar was clothed with supreme power, although he was pontifex maximus, although he had overthrown and added to our sway the nations most formidable to the Romans, although he was the first man to attempt the untried sea beyond the pillars of Hercules and was the discoverer of a country hitherto unknown to the Romans, this man was slain in a public and sacred place designated as the senate-house, under the eyes of the gods, with twenty-three dastardly wounds, by men whom he had taken prisoners in war and had spared, some of whom he had named as co-heirs of his wealth. After this execrable crime, instead of arresting the guilty wretches, the rest sent them forth as commanders and governors, in which capacity they seized upon the public money with which they are collecting an army against us and are seeking reënforcements from barbarians ever hostile to Roman rule. Cities subject to Rome that would not obey them they have burned, or ravaged, or levelled to the ground; other cities they have forced by terror to bear arms against the country and against us.

"Some of them we have punished already; and by the aid of divine providence you shall see the rest punished presently. Although the chief part of this work has been finished by us or is well in hand, appertaining to Spain and Gaul as well as to Italy, one task still remains, and that is to march against Cæsar's assassins beyond the sea. On the eve of undertaking this foreign war for you, we do not consider it safe, either for you or for us, to leave other enemies behind to take advantage of our absence and watch for opportunities during the war. We think that there should be no delay in such an emergency, but that we ought rather to sweep them out of our pathway, once for all, seeing that [*](Y.R. 712) they began the war against us when they voted us and the armies under us public enemies.

"What vast numbers of citizens have they doomed to destruction with us, disregarding the vengeance of the gods and the reprobation of mankind! We shall not deal harshly with any multitude of men, nor shall we count as enemies all who have opposed us or plotted against us, or those distinguished for their riches merely, their estates, or their high position; nor shall we go to the same lengths as another man who held the supreme power before us, when he, too, was regulating the commonwealth in civil convulsions, and whom you named the Fortunate[*](Sulla; see i. 97 supra.) on account of his success; and yet necessarily three persons will have more enemies than one. We shall take vengeance only on the worst and most guilty. This we shall do for your interest no less than for our own, for while we keep up our conflicts you will all be involved necessarily in great dangers. It is incumbent on us also to do something to quiet the army, which has been insulted, irritated, and decreed a public enemy by our common foes. Although we might arrest on the spot whomsoever we please, we prefer to proscribe rather than seize them unawares; and this, too, on your account, so that it may not be in the power of enraged soldiers to exceed their orders, but that they may be restricted to a certain number designated by name, and spare the others according to order.