Civil Wars
Appianus of Alexandria
Appianus. The Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, Volume 2: The Civil Wars. White, Horace, translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1899.
After conveying these hints to Antony, Octavius wrote still more plainly to Lepidus and Asinius concerning the indignities put upon himself and the rapid advancement of the murderers, causing them to fear, lest in consequence of the favor extended to the Pompeian faction, each of the Cæsarians should, one by one, share the fate of Antony, although he was suffering the consequences of his own folly and arrogance.[*](ka)kei/nw| di' a)frosu/nhn kai\ u(peroyi/an tou=de tou= de/ous ta/de paqo/nti, a sentence rendered obscure by the introduction of the words tou=de tou= de/ous. Nauck thinks that the whole sentence is spurious.) He advised that, for the sake of appearances, they should obey the Senate, but that they should confer together for their own safety while they could still do so, and reproach Antony for his conduct; that they should follow the example of their own soldiers, who did not separate even when theywere discharged from the service but, in order that they might not be exposed to the assaults of enemies, preferred to unite their strength by settling together on ground that belonged not to them in groups, rather than enjoy their own homesteads singly. These things Octavius wrote to Lepidus and Asinius.[*](That Octavius was serving his own interest, and not that of the republic, was perceived by Plancus, who wrote to Cicero as follows: "You know, my dear Cicero, that I share your affection for Octavius. Because of my intimacy with Cæsar when he was alive, I was under the necessity of defending and loving Octavius, and for the further reason that, as far as I could discover, he was himself a young man of most moderate and humane sentiments. Considering the distinguished friendship that existed between Cæsar and myself, it would have been base in me not to hold him in the place of a son, when he had been adopted as such by Cæsar, and confirmed by the judgment of the Senate. Now, what I write to you I swear that I write more in sorrow than in anger. That Antony is alive to-day, that Lepidus has joined him, that they have an army not to be despised, that they have hope and courage, are due wholly to Octavius. Not to go farther back, if he had been willing to join me at the time he said he would, either the war would now be ended, or it would be pushed into Spain, which is most hostile to them, to their great disadvantage." (Ad Fam. x. 24.) This letter is dated July 28.) The first soldiers of Decimus fell sick by reason of excessive eating after their famine, and suffered from dysentery, and the newer ones were still undrilled. Plancus soon joined him with his army, and then Decimus wrote to the Senate that he would pursue and capture Antony immediately.[*](nautikw=n per h)/dh gegono/twn; literally " whose naval arrangements were already made." This is so incongruous with historical facts that most commentators have substituted some other word for nautikw=n. Schweighäuser suggested nasti/kon (hard pressed), but he left a blank at this place in the Latin version. Combes-Dounous adds the word au)=tw|, and renders the passage that Antony had made preparations for flight by water. Tyrwhitt (as we learn from the preface to the Didot edition) conceived that the right words were au)ti/ka. w)=nper h)/dh gegono/twn, oi(/ te *pomphi+anoi\, etc., the last six words being transferred to the beginning of Sec. 82. Thus the rendering would be: "Decimus wrote to the Senate that he would pursue and capture Antony immediately. When the Pompeians learned what had happened," etc., a rational explanation.)
When the Pompeians learned what had happened (and an astonishing number showed themselves to be of that party), they exclaimed that their ancestral freedom had at last been regained, and they each offered sacrifices. Decemvirs were chosen to examine the accounts of Antony's magistracy. This was a preliminary step to annulling Cæsar's arrangements, for Antony had done little or nothing himself, but had conducted all the affairs of state in accordance with Cæsar's memoranda.[*](This is very far from the truth. Appian's partiality for Antony is equal to all emergencies.) The Senate knew this well, but it hoped that by finding a pretext for annulling a part of the measures it should be enabled in the same way to annul the whole. The decemvirs gave public notice that whoever had received anything from Antony's government should make it known in writing immediately, and threatened any who should disobey. The Pompeians also sought the consulship for the remainder of the year in place of Hirtius and Pansa. But Octavius also sought it, applying not to the Senate, but to Cicero privately, whom he urged to become his colleague, saying that Cicero should carry on the government, as he was the elder and more experienced, and that he (Octavius) would enjoy the title only, by which means he could dismiss his army in a becoming manner, for which reason he had previously asked the honor of a triumph. Cicero, whose desire for office was excited by this proposal, said to the Senate that he understood that a negotiation was on foot among the generals commanding the provinces, and he advised that they should conciliate the man whom they had treated with disdain and who was still at the head of a large army, and allow him to hold office in the city, notwithstanding his youth, rather than that he should remain under arms in a hostile attitude. But lest he should do anything contrary to the interest of the Senate, Cicero proposed that some man of prudence from among the older ones should be chosen as his colleague as a firm check upon the immaturity of Octavius. The Senate laughed at Cicero's ambition, and the relatives of the conspirators especially opposed him, fearing lest Octavius, as consul, should bring the murderers to punishment."[*](Plutarch says that "Octavius sent friends to Cicero to beg and persuade him to obtain the consulship for both of them, saying that he (Cicero) might conduct the business in whatever way he chose after entering upon the office, and might govern him, as he was a young man solicitous only for the name and the honor. Octavius himself acknowledges that, as he was fearful of being ruined and in danger of being deserted, he made use of Cicero's desire for office by persuading him to seek the consulship in coöperation with himself, and to assist him in the canvass. Thereupon Cicero, although now an old man, was allured by the young man and cheated by him, for he aided Octavius in this canvass for the consulship, and brought the Senate over to his side; but being presently blamed by his friends, he perceived a little later that he was undone, and that he had betrayed the liberty of the people." (Life of Cicero, 45 and 46.) It seems that Plutarch drew his information, either directly or indirectly, from the memoirs of Octavius, which were extant in his time. It is probable that Appian drew from the same source, as he refers to it in his Illyrian history, Sec. 14. Both Dr. Middleton and Mr. Strachan-Davidson, in their respective biographies of Cicero, doubt this tale, and I agree with them. Yet its truth might be conceded without discredit to Cicero. That he was hoodwinked disastrously by Octavius is well known. In the fifth Philippic (18) he had pledged himself to the Senate in the most fervent terms for the fidelity of Octavius to the republic, and he might well have reasoned that the latter would allow him to guide the republic, whose fate was then trembling in the balance. The death of the two consuls had left Rome at the mercy of half a dozen commanders in the field, who could not be controlled by the Senate. Under such circumstances Cicero might have grasped at the consulship in conjunction with Octavius, without the motive of personal ambition. But the whole story is incongruous with known facts. The Epitome of Livy makes no mention of it.)
For various reasons the election was postponed in accordance with the law. Meanwhile, Antony passed over the Alps with the permission of Culleo, who had been stationed there by Lepidus to guard them, and advanced to a river where the latter was encamped. He neglected to surround himself with palisade and ditch, as though he were camping alongside a friend. Messengers were going back and forth between them constantly, Antony reminding Lepidus of their friendship and of his various good offices, and showing him that after he (Antony) should be destroyed all who had enjoyed Cæsar's friendship would suffer a like fate, one by one. Lepidus feared the Senate, which had ordered him to make war on Antony, but he promised nevertheless that he would not do so voluntarily. The army of Lepidus, having respect for Antony's dignity and perceiving the messengers going back and forth, and being gratified with the simple manners prevailing in Antony's camp, mingled with his men, at first secretly, then openly, like fellow-citizens and fellow-soldiers, disregarding the orders of the tribunes, who forbade their doing so; and in order to facilitate their intercourse they made a bridge of boats across the river. The so-called Tenth Legion, that had been enlisted by Antony originally, arranged things for him inside the camp of Lepidus.
When Laterensis, one of the distinguished members of the Senate, perceived this he warned Lepidus. As the latter was incredulous Laterensis advised him to divide his army in several parts and send them away on certain errands in order to test whether they were faithful or not. Accordingly, Lepidus divided them in three parts, and ordered them to go out by night in order to protect some quæstors who were approaching. About the last watch the soldiers armed themselves as if for the march, seized the fortified parts of the camp, and opened the gates to Antony. The latter came running to the tent of Lepidus, whose whole army was now escorting Antony, and they besought Lepidus for peace and compassion to their unfortunate fellow-citizens. Lepidus leaped out of bed among them undressed, just as he was, promised to do what they asked, embraced Antony, and pleaded necessity as his excuse. Some say that he fell on his knees before Antony, being an inexperienced and timid man. Not all writers put faith in this report, nor do I, for he had as yet done nothing whatever inimical to Antony and nothing to cause fear. Thus did Antony again become a very powerful man and most formidable to his enemies. He had the army with which he had abandoned the siege of Mutina, including its magnificent cavalry. Ventidius had joined him on the road with three legions. Lepidus had become his ally with seven legions of foot soldiers and a great number of auxiliary troops and apparatus in proportion. Lepidus nominally retained the command of these, but Antony directed every-thing.
When these facts became known at Rome a wonderful and sudden change took place. Those who had just now held Antony in contempt were alarmed, while the fears of others were changed to courage. The edicts of the decemvirs were torn down with derision and the consular election was still further postponed. The Senate, wholly at a loss what to do and fearful lest Octavius and Antony should form an alliance, sent two of their number, Lucius and Pansa, secretly to Brutus and Cassius, under pretence of attending the games in Greece, to urge them to lend all the assistance possible. It recalled from Africa two of the three legions under Sextius, and ordered the third to be given over to Cornificius, who commanded another portion of Africa, and who favored the senatorial party. Although they knew that these legions had served under Gaius Cæsar, and although they suspected everything of his, yet the want of other forces compelled them to take this course. Most awkwardly, too, they reappointed the young Octavius as general with Decimus against Antony, for they feared lest he should unite with Antony.
Octavius excited the army to anger against the Senate on account of its repeated indignities toward himself, and for requiring the soldiers to undertake a second campaign before paying them the 5000 drachmas per man which it had promised to give them for the first. He advised them to send and ask for the money. They sent their centurions. The Senate understood that the men had been advised to this course by Octavius and said that it would make answer by its own legates. It sent the latter, under instructions, to address themselves, when Octavius was not present, to the two legions which had deserted from Antony, and to advise the soldiers not to rest their hopes on a single person, but on the Senate, which alone had perpetual power, and to go to the camp of Decimus, where they would find the promised money. Having delivered this charge to the legates it forwarded one-half of the donative and appointed ten men to divide it, to whom it did not add Octavius as the eleventh. As the two legions refused to meet them without Octavius, the legates returned leaving the business unfinished. Octavius no longer held communication with the troops through the medium of others and no longer asked them to wait, but assembled the army and came before them and related to them the indignities he had suffered from the Senate, and its purpose to destroy all the friends of Gaius Cæsar, one by one. He admonished them also to beware against being transferred to a general opposed to their party and sent to one war after another for the purpose of being killed or arrayed in opposition to each other. This was the reason why, after their common struggles at Mutina were ended, rewards were given to only two legions, in order to induce strife and sedition in the army.