Civil Wars

The next day they all withdrew to the camps at Mutina. After so severe a disaster Antony decided not to come to a general engagement with his enemies at present, not even if they should attack him, but merely to harass them daily with his cavalry until Decimus, who was reduced to extremity by famine, should surrender. For this very reason Hirtius and Octavius decided to push on a fight. As Antony would not come out when they offered battle, they moved toward the other side of Mutina where it was less closely besieged on account of the badness of the ground, as if about to force their way into the town with their strong army. Antony followed their movement with his cavalry and this time also with those alone. As the enemy fought him with their cavalry only, moving the rest of their army in whatever way they chose, Antony, lest he should lose Mutina, drew out of his entrenchments two legions. Then his enemies rejoiced at this, turned and delivered battle. Antony ordered up other legions from other camps, but as they came slowly, by reason of the suddenness of the call or the long distance, the army of Octavius won the victory. Hirtius even broke into Antony's camp, where he was killed, fighting near the general's tent. Octavius rushed in and carried off his body and possessed himself of the camp. A little later he was driven out by Antony. Both sides passed the night under arms.[*](This battle was fought on the 27th. While it was in progress Decimus made a sortie from Mutina and completed the victory. This is mentioned in a letter of Cicero (Ad Fam. xi. 14). Also in a letter from Marcus Brutus to Cicero (Ad Brutum, 4). Antony fled from the field toward the Alps with a very small force of infantry and those without arms, but by opening the workhouses and impressing all sorts of people on the road, he collected a considerable number of men. So Decimus Brutus reported to Cicero, May 5. (Ad farm. xi. 10.))

When Antony had suffered this second defeat, he took counsel with his friends directly after the battle. They advised him to adhere to his first resolution, to continue the siege of Mutina and not to go out and fight, saying that the losses had been about equal on both sides, Hirtius having been killed and Pansa wounded; that he (Antony) was superior in cavalry and that Mutina was reduced to extremity by famine and must soon succumb. Such was the advise of his friends, and it was truly for the best. But Antony, now misled by a god, was fearful lest Octavius should make another attempt to break into Mutina like that of yesterday, or even try to enclose him (Antony), as Octavius had the greater force of laborers, " in which case," said he, " our cavalry will be useless and Lepidus and Plancus will despise me as a vanquished man. If we withdraw from Mutina, Ventidius will presently join us with three legions from Picenum, and Lepidus and Plancus will be emboldened to ally themselves with us." So he spoke, although he was not a timid man in the presence of danger; and breaking camp forthwith he made his way toward the Alps.[*](It is plain from what has gone before that Antony aimed at the supreme power which Cæsar had held, and that Octavius was, in his eyes, an impertinence and an inconvenience. It is evident also that Octavius aimed not to destroy Antony, but to cripple and humble him, and so convince him that he (Octavius) was a person to be reckoned with. A perception of this truth was forced upon Antony before he was dislodged from Mutina, for he wrote a letter to Hirtius and Octavius appealing to them as Cæsarians, and pretending that he was solely concerned in taking vengeance on Decimus as one of the murderers. Hirtius sent it to Cicero, who read it, with a running comment, in the Senate (Phil. xiii. 10-21). It shows that Antony was not destitute of literary ability. A translation of it will be found in the appendix to Book III.)

When Decimus was delivered from the siege he began to be afraid of Octavius, whom, after the removal of the two consuls, he feared as an enemy. So he broke down the bridge over the river before daybreak and sent certain persons to Octavius in a boat, as if to return thanks for rescuing him, and asked that Octavius would come to the opposite bank of the river to hold a conversation with him in the presence of the citizens as witnesses, because he could convince Octavius, he said, that an evil spirit had deceived him and led him into the conspiracy against Cæsar with the others. Octavius answered the messengers in a tone of anger, declining the thanks that Decimus gave him, saying: " I am here not to rescue Decimus, but to fight Antony, with whom I may properly come to terms sometime, but nature forbids that I should even look at Decimus or hold any conversation with him. Let him have safety, however, as long as the authorities at Rome please." When Decimus heard this he stood on the river bank and, calling Octavius by name, read with a loud voice the letters of the Senate giving him command of the Gallic province, and forbade Octavius to cross the river without consular authority, into the government belonging to another, and not to follow Antony further, because he (Decimus) would suffice for the pursuit of the latter. Octavius knew that he was prompted to this audacious course by the Senate, and although able to seize him by giving an order, he spared him for the present and withdrew to Pansa at Bononia, where he wrote a full report to the Senate, and Pansa did likewise.[*](From the letters of Decimus Brutus to Cicero, we learn that this entire section 73 is at variance with the facts. Immediately after Antony's flight Decimus urged Octavius to cross the Apennines, in order to intercept Ventidius, who was leading three legions to Antony's assistance, in which case, he says, "I should have driven Antony to such straits that he would have succumbed to want rather than the sword. But I cannot command Octavius, nor can he command his own army, which is doubly unfortunate." (Ad Fam. xi. 10.) In another letter written from Pollentia, Decimus gives an account in detail of his movements after Antony's flight. " I was not able to pursue immediately," he says, "because I had neither cavalry nor pack animals. I did not know that Hirtius was dead. I could not trust Octavius, until I had met and conversed with him. So that day passed. Early the next day I was summoned by Pansa to Bononia. While I was on the road thither news was brought to me that he was dead. So I returned to my little band, for so I can truly call it, reduced as it is to extremity by the want of everything. Thus Antony got two days the start of me." (Ad Fam. xi. 13.))

In Rome Cicero read to the people the report of the consul, and to the Senate alone that of Octavius. For the victory over Antony, he caused them to vote a thanksgiving of fifty days,-- a longer festivity than the Romans had ever decreed even after the Gallic or any other war. He induced them to give the army of the consuls to Decimus, although Pansa was still alive (for his life was now despaired of), and to appoint Decimus the sole commander against Antony. Public prayers were offered that Decimus might prevail over him. Such was Cicero's passion and want of decorum in reference to Antony. He confirmed again, to the two legions that had deserted from Antony, the 5000 drachmas per man previously promised to them as the rewards of victory, as though they had already conquered, and gave them the perpetual right to wear the olive crown at the public festivals. There was nothing about Octavius in the decrees, and his name was not even mentioned. He was forthwith disregarded as though Antony were already destroyed. They wrote to Lepidus, to Plancus, and to Asinius Pollio to fight Antony when he should draw near them. Such was the course of events at Rome.[*](The decree of the Senate here referred to was passed after the first victory over Antony, and while both consuls were still alive. It forms the conclusion of the fourteenth and last Philippic. It awarded praise in equal measure to Pansa, to Hirtius, and to Octavius; it provided for a thanksgiving of fifty days, and for paying to the soldiers who had been engaged, or their surviving relatives, all the rewards previously promised them, and for the erection of a magnificent monument to the memory of those who fell in the battle.)