Civil Wars

When his friends aroused him he said that he had just dreamed that he had dedicated a temple in Rome to Venus the Bringer of Victory. His friends and his whole army when they heard of this were delighted, being in ignorance of Cæsar's vow, and they went about their work in a reckless and contemptuous way as though it were already accomplished. Many of them adorned their tents with laurel branches, the insignia of victory, and their slaves prepared magnificent banquets for them. Some of them began already to contend with each other for Cæsar's office of Pontifex Maximus. Pompey, being experienced in military affairs, turned away from these squabbles with concealed indignation. He remained altogether silent in hesitancy and dread, as though he were no longer commander but under command, and as though he were doing everything under compulsion and against his judgment; such dejection had come over this man of great deeds (who, until this day, had been most fortunate in every undertaking), either because he had not carried his point when he had decided what was the best course but was about to cast the die involving the safety of so many men and also involving his own reputation, until now invincible; or because some presentiment of approaching evil troubled him, presaging his complete downfall that very day from a position of such vast power. After merely saying to his friends that whichever should conquer, that day would be the beginning of great evils to the Romans for all future time, he began to make arrangements for the battle. In this remark some people thought his real intentions escaped him, involuntarily expressed in a moment of fright, and they inferred that if Pompey had been victorious he would not have laid down the supreme power.

Cæsar's army (for since many writers differ I shall follow the most credible Roman authorities, who give the most careful enumeration of the Italian soldiers, in whom they place most confidence, but do not make much account of the allied forces or record them exactly, regarding them as foreigners and as contributing to them little real assistance) consisted of about 22,000 men and of these about 1000 were cavalry. Pompey had more than double that number, of whom about 7000 were cavalry. Some of the most trustworthy writers say that 70,000 Italian soldiers were engaged in this battle. Others give the smaller number, 60,00000. Still others, grossly exaggerating, say 400,000.[*](One of the grossly exaggerating writers is Florus, who says: "Never did fortune behold so large a force of the Roman people or so much of their dignity collected in one place. More than 300,000 men were assembled on one side and the other, in addition to the auxiliaries of kings and nations.") Of the whole number some say Pompey's forces were to those of Cæsar as one-and-a-half to one, others say that he had two parts out of three. So much doubt is there as to the exact truth. However that may be, each of them placed his chief reliance on his Italian troops. In the way of allied forces Cæsar had cavalry from both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, besides some light-armed Greeks, consisting of Dolopians, Acarnanians, and Ætolians. Such were Cæsar's allies. Pompey had a great number from all the eastern nations, part horse, part foot. From Greece he had Lacedemonians marshalled by their own kings, and others from Peloponnesus and Bœotians with them. The Athenians marched to his aid also, although proclamation had been made on both sides that no harm should be done to them by the soldiers, since they were the priests of the Thesmophoræ.[*](The Thesmophoræ (law-bringers) were Ceres and Proserpine. They were worshipped together as the goddesses of tillage and civilized life. The Thesmophoria was an annual religious festival at Athens.) Nevertheless, they wished to share in the glory of the war because this was a contest for the Roman leadership.[*](Schweighäuser says that the meaning of this passage is not quite clear to him. Combes-Dounous renders it intelligibly: "They came to take part in this war merely to have the glory of fighting in a contest where the empire of the Roman people was at stake.")

Besides the Greeks almost all the nations that one meets in making the circuit of the eastern sea sent aid to Pompey: Thracians, Hellespontines, Bithynians, Phrygians, Ionians, Lydians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, Paphlagonians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Hebrews, and their neighbors the Arabs, Cyprians, Rhodians, Cretan slingers, and other islanders. Kings and princes were there leading their own troops: Deïotarus, the tetrarch of Galatia in the East, and Ariarthes, king of Cappadocia. Taxiles commanded

the Armenians from the hither side of the Euphrates. Those from the other side were led by Megabates, the lieutenant of King Artabazes. Some other small princes took part with Pompey in the work. It was said that sixty ships from Egypt were contributed to him by the sovereigns of that country, Cleopatra and her brother, who was still a boy. But these did not take part in the battle, nor did any other naval force. They remained idle at Corcyra. Pompey seems to have acted very foolishly in this respect in disregarding the fleet, in which he excelled so greatly that he could have deprived the enemy of all the supplies brought to them from abroad, and in risking a battle on land with men who boasted that they were inured to every kind of toil and who were ferocious fighters. Although he had been on his guard against them at Dyrrachium, a certain spell seems to have come over him at a time when it would inure most to Cæsar's advantage. Under this spell also Pompey's army was most nonsensically puffed up, and rendered insubordinate to its own commander, and hurried into action without previous experience in war. But this was the ordering of divine Providence to bring in the imperial power which now embraces everything.

Then each of the commanders assembled his soldiers and made an appeal to them. Pompey spoke as follows: "You, my fellow soldiers, are the leaders in this task rather than the led, for while I was still desirous of wearing Cæsar out by hunger you urged on this engagement. Since, therefore, you are the arbiters of the battle, conduct yourselves like those who are greatly superior in numbers. Despise the enemy as victors do the vanquished, as young men do the old, as fresh troops do those who are wearied with many toils. Fight like those who have the power and the means, and the consciousness of a good cause. We are contending for liberty and country. On our side are the laws and honorable fame, and this great number of senators and knights, against one man who has seized the government by robbery.[*](*pro\s a)/ndra e(/na lh|steu/onta th\n h(gemoni/an. This might be translated in the words of Hamlet: "The cutpurse of the empire and the rule.") Go forward then, as you have determined to do, with good hope, keeping in vision the flight of the enemy at Dyrrachium, and the great number of their standards that we captured in one day when we defeated them there." Such was Pompey's speech.

Cæsar addressed his men as follows: "My friends, we have already overcome our most formidable enemies, and are now about to encounter not hunger and want, but men. This day will decide everything. Remember what you promised me at Dyrrachium. Remember how you swore to each other in my presence that you would never leave the field except as conquerors. These men, fellow-soldiers, are the same that we met at the Pillars of Hercules, the same that we drove out of Italy. They are the same who sought to disband us without honors, without a triumph, without rewards, after the toils and struggles of ten years, after we had finished those great wars, after innumerable victories, and after we had added 400 nations in Spain, Gaul, and Britain to our country's sway. I have not been able to prevail upon them by offering fair terms, nor to win them by benefits. You know that I dismissed them unharmed, hoping that we should obtain justice from them. Recall all these facts to your minds to-day, and if you have had any experience of me recall also my care for you, my good faith, and the generosity of my gifts to you.

74 "Nor is it difficult for hardy and veteran soldiers to overcome new recruits who are without experience in war, and who, moreover, like boys, spurn the rules of discipline and of obedience to their commander. I learn that he was afraid and unwilling to come to an engagement. His star has already passed its zenith; he has become slow and hesitating in all his acts, and no longer commands, but obeys the orders of others. I say these things of his Italian forces only. As for his allies, do not think about them, pay no attention to them, do not fight with them at all. They are Syrian, Phrygian, and Lydian slaves, always ready for flight or servitude. I know very well, and you will presently see, that Pompey himself will not assign them any place in his line of battle. Give your attention to the Italians only, even though these allies come running around you like dogs trying to frighten you. When you have put the enemy to flight let us spare the Italians as being our own kindred, but slaughter the allies in order to strike terror into the others. Before all else, in order that I may know that you are mindful of your promise to choose victory or death, throw down the walls of your camp as you go out to battle and fill up the ditch, so that we may have no place of refuge if we do not conquer, and so that the enemy may see that we have no camp and know that we are compelled to occupy theirs."[*](Cæsar's speech, as given in his own Commentaries, bears no resemblance to this. " He exhorted the army to battle," he says, " according to the military custom, and spoke of the kindness he had shown them at all times, and especially reminded them, as the soldiers themselves could bear witness, with what earnestness he had sought for peace, what efforts he had made in his conference with Vatinius, what he had endeavored to do in the negotiation with Scipio through Aulus Claudius, and how he had labored with Libo at Oricum for the privilege of sending legates. He said that he never willingly shed the blood of his soldiers, and that it was not his wish that the republic should lose one of its armies. Having spoken thus he gave the signal by trumpet to the soldiers, who were eagerly awaiting it and burning with zeal for the battle." (iii. go.) Suetonius, Florus, and Lucan mention Cæsar's appeal to his soldiers to spare their fellow-citizens in the pursuit, but Florus says it was intended only for effect. Lucan refers to Cæsar's order to demolish the fortifications of his camp before the battle. (Pharsalia, vii. 326.))

Nevertheless, after he had thus spoken Cæsar detailed 2000 of his oldest men to guard the tents. The rest, as they passed out, demolished their fortification in the profoundest silence and filled up the ditch with the debris. When Pompey saw this, although some of his friends thought that it was a preparation for flight, he knew it was an exhibition of daring and groaned in spirit, that although they had with them famine, the most appropriate cure for such wild beasts, he must now meet these creatures in a hand-to-hand contest. But there was no drawing back now, his affairs being on the razor's edge.[*](This is a Greek proverb found in Homer, Herodotus, and several other authors, cited by Combes-Dounous, and also in Liddell and Scott's lexicon under curo/n.) Wherefore, leaving 4000 of his Italian troops to guard his camp, Pompey drew up the remainder between the city of Pharsalus and the river Enipeus opposite the place where Cæsar was marshalling his forces. Each of them ranged his Italians in front, divided into three lines with a moderate space between them, and placed his cavalry on the wings of each division. Archers and slingers were mingled among all. Thus were the Italian troops disposed, on which each commander placed his chief reliance. The allied forces were marshalled by themselves rather for show than for use. There was great clamor and confusion of tongues among Pompey's auxiliaries. Pompey stationed the Macedonians, Peloponnesians, Bœotians, and Athenians near the Italian legions, as he approved of their good order and quiet behavior. The rest, as Cæsar had anticipated, he ordered to lie in wait by tribes outside of the line of battle, and when the engagement should become close to surround the enemy, to pursue, to do what damage they could, and to plunder Cæsar's camp, which was without defences.

The centre of Pompey's formation was commanded by his father-in-law, Scipio, the left wing by Domitius Ahenobarbus, and the right by Lentulus. Afranius and Pompey guarded the camp.[*](This is a strange blunder, and is inconsistent with the author's own account of Pompey's subsequent movements. A few lines below he says that after the line of battle was formed each commander moved about among the ranks encouraging his men, and in Sec. 81 he says that when Pompey saw the flight of his men he slowly retired to his camp. Cæsar says that Pompey commanded the left wing of his army in person. Plutarch says he commanded the right wing. Of course Cæsar's testimony is to be preferred.) On Cæsar's side the commanders were P. Sulla, Antony, and Cn. Domitius. Cæsar took a convenient place in the tenth legion, as was his custom. When the enemy saw this they transferred, to face that legion, the best of their horse, in order to surround it if they could, by their superiority of numbers. When Cæsar perceived this movement he placed 3000 of his bravest foot-soldiers in ambush and ordered them, when they should see the enemy trying to flank him, to rise, dart forward, and thrust their spears directly in the faces of the men because, as they were fresh and inexperienced and still in the bloom of youth, they could not endure injury to their faces.[*](Cæsar's account of this manœuvre is as follows: " Fearing lest his right wing should be surrounded by the greater number of the enemy's horse he rapidly withdrew from the third line one cohort from each legion, and from these formed a fourth line and ranged them in opposition to the enemy's cavalry and explained what he wished them to do and admonished them that the success of this day depended on their valor." (iii. 89.) He says nothing about aiming at the faces of the enemy. It is mentioned by Plutarch, by Lucan, and by Florus, but is probably a fable.) Thus they laid their plans against each other, and each commander passed through the ranks of his own troops, attending to what was needful, exhorting his men to courage, and giving them the watchword, which on Cæsar's side was "Venus the Victorious," and on Pompey's "Hercules the Invincible."

When all was in readiness on both sides they waited for some time in profound silence, hesitating, looking steadfastly at each other, each expecting the other to begin the battle. They were stricken with sorrow for the great host, for never before had such large Roman armies confronted the same danger together. They had pity for the valor of these men (the elite of both parties), especially because they saw Romans embattled against Romans. As the danger came nearer, the ambition that had inflamed and blinded them was extinguished, and gave place to fear. Reason purged the mad passion for glory, estimated the peril, and exposed the cause of the war, showing how two men contending with each other for supremacy had put themselves in a position where the one who should be vanquished could no longer hold even the humblest place, and how so great a number of the nobility were incurring the same risk on their account. The leaders reflected also that they, who had lately been friends and relatives by marriage, and had coöperated with each other in many ways to gain rank and power, had now drawn the sword for mutual slaughter and were leading to the same impiety those serving under them, men of the same city, of the same tribe, blood relations, and in some cases brothers against brothers. Even these circumstances were not wanting in this battle; because many unexpected things must happen when thousands of the same nation come together in the clash of arms. Reflecting on these things each of them was seized with unavailing repentance, and since this day was to decide for each whether he should be the highest or the lowest of the human race, they hesitated to begin the fight. It is said that both of them shed tears.[*](This is a chapter of moralizing quite unusual in the writings of Appian. The view which he takes of this war, that it was merely a contest between two ambitious chieftains, instead of being one incident in a long struggle between a corrupt oligarchy and a debased democracy, was commonly held by men of letters until comparatively recent times.)

While they were waiting and looking at each other the day was advancing. All the Italian troops stood motionless in their places, but when Pompey saw that his allied forces were falling into confusion by reason of the delay he feared lest the disorder should spread from them before the beginning of the battle. So he gave the signal first and Cæsar reëchoed it. Straightway the trumpets, of which there were many distributed among so great a host, aroused the soldiers with their inspiring blasts, and the standard-bearers and officers put themselves in motion and exhorted their men. The latter advanced confidently to the encounter, but with stolidity and absolute silence, like men who had had experience in many similar engagements. And now, as they came nearer together, there was first a discharge of arrows and stones. Then as the cavalry were a little in advance of the infantry they charged each other. Those of Pompey prevailed and began to flank the tenth legion. Cæsar then gave the signal to the cohorts in ambush and these, starting up suddenly, advanced to meet the cavalry, and with spears elevated aimed at the faces of the riders. The latter could not endure the enemy's savagery, nor the blows on their mouths and eyes, but fled in disorder. Thereupon Cæsar's men,[*](The text says "Cæsar's horse," but Schweighäuser considers this a manifest error since Appian, in Sec. 79, says that it was the tenth legion that struck Pompey's left flank. Cæsar himself says that the six cohorts in reserve executed this decisive movement. At all events it could not have been Cæsar's horse.) who had just now been afraid of being surrounded, fell upon the flank of Pompey's infantry which was denuded of its cavalry supports.

When Pompey learned this he ordered his infantry not to advance farther, not to break the line of formation, and not to hurl the javelin, but to bring their spears to a rest and ward off the onset of the enemy. Some persons praise this order of Pompey as the best in a case where one is attacked in flank, but Cæsar criticises it in his letters.[*](There is some confusion here. Cæsar says (iii. 93) that at the beginning of the battle (not after the repulse of his cavalry) Pompey ordered his soldiers not to move from their places but to await the attack and not allow their line to be broken, thinking that the space between the two armies was so great that Cæsar's men if they charged across it would come up blown. "This," he continues, "seems to me to have been an error on Pompey's part, because there is a certain ardor and eagerness of spirit inborn in mankind, which is excited in the heat of battle, and which commanders ought to encourage, not repress.") He says that the blows are delivered with more force, and that the spirits of the men are raised, by running, while those who stand still lose courage by reason of their immobility and become excellent targets for those charging against them. So, he says, it proved in this case, for the tenth legion, with Cæsar himself, surrounded Pompey's left wing, now deprived of cavalry, and assailed it with javelins in flank, where it stood immovable; until, finally, the assailants threw it into disorder, routed it, and this was the beginning of the victory. In the rest of the field killing and wounding of all kinds were going on, but no cry came from the scene of carnage, no lamentation from the wounded or the dying, only sighs and groans from those who were falling honorably in their tracks. The allies, who were looking at the battle as at a game, were astonished at the discipline of the combatants. So dumfounded were they that they did not dare attack Cæsar's tents, although they were guarded only by a few old men. Nor did they accomplish anything else, but stood in a kind of stupor.

As Pompey's left wing began to give way his men even still retired step by step and in perfect order, but the allies who had not been in the fight, fled with headlong speed, shouting, "we are vanquished," dashed upon their own tents and fortifications as though they had been the enemy's, and pulled down and plundered whatever they could carry away in their flight. Now the rest of Pompey's legions, perceiving the disaster to the left wing, retired slowly at first, in good order, and still resisting as well as they could; but when the enemy, flushed with victory, pressed upon them they turned in flight. Then, in order that they might not rally, and that this might be the end of the whole war and not of one battle merely, Cæsar, with the greatest prudence, sent heralds everywhere among the ranks to order the victors to spare their own countrymen and to smite only the auxiliaries. The heralds drew near to the retreating enemy and told them to stand still without fear. As this proclamation was passed from man to man they halted, and the phrase "stand without fear" began to be passed as a sort of watchword among Pompey's soldiers; for, being Italians, they were clad in the same style as Cæsar's men and spoke the same language. Accordingly, the latter passed by them and fell upon the auxiliaries, who were not able to resist, and made a very great slaughter among them.[*](Cæsar says that the Pompeians fled to their fortified camp, and that, although it was now midday and the heat was excessive, he exhorted his soldiers to make use of their good fortune and storm the enemy's entrenchments, and that they obeyed cheerfully. After a short engagement here the Pompeians again fled and took refuge in the high mountains adjacent. (iii. 95.))

When Pompey saw the retreat of his men he became dazed and retired slowly to his camp, and when he reached his tent he sat down speechless,[*](There is a striking similarity here both in language and narrative, between Appian and Plutarch. The former says: *pomph/i+os a)ph/|ei ba/dhn e)s to\ strato/pedon kai\ parelqw\n e)s th\n skhnh\n e)kaqe/zeto a)/naudos. The latter (Life of Pompey, 72) says: a)ph/|ei ba/dhn ei)s to\n xa/raka . . . ei)s th\n skhnh\n parelqw\n a)/fqoggos kaqh=sto. Here is fresh confirmation of the belief that both Appian and Plutarch drew from a Greek, not from a Latin, source, for if they had translated from Latin it is most improbable that they would have used the same Greek words, in the same, or very nearly the same, order. Moreover, both of them make reference here to the Iliad xi. 543, where Ajax Telamon is smitten with panic by Zeus in the midst of battle. Plutarch quotes the passage itself.) resembling Ajax, the son of Telamon, who, they say, suffered in like manner in the midst of his enemies at Troy, being deprived of his senses by a god. Very few of the rest returned to the camp, for Cæsar's proclamation caused them to remain unharmed, and as their enemies had passed beyond them they dispersed in groups. As the day was declining Cæsar ran hither and thither among his troops and besought them to continue their exertions till they should capture Pompey's

camp, telling them that if they allowed the enemy to rally they would be the victors for only a single day, whereas if they should take the enemy's camp they would finish the war with this one blow. He stretched out his hands to them and took the lead in person. Although they were weary in body, the words and example of their commander lightened their spirits. Their success so far, and the hope of capturing the enemy's camp and the contents thereof, excited them; for in the midst of hope and prosperity men feel fatigue least. So they fell upon the camp and assaulted it with the utmost disdain for the defenders. When Pompey learned this he started up from his strange silence, exclaiming, "What! in our very camp?" Having spoken thus he changed his clothing, mounted a horse, and fled with four friends, and did not draw rein until he reached Larissa early the next morning. So Cæsar established himself in Pompey's camp as he had promised to do when he was preparing for the battle, and ate Pompey's supper, and the whole army feasted at the enemy's expense.[*](Plutarch's account of Pompey's flight is in nearly the same words, viz: "He sat in silence until some of those who were pursuing the fugitives rushed in with them, when he uttered the single sentence: 'What! in our very camp ?' He spoke not another word, but put on clothing suited to his present fortune and stole away." (Life of Pompey, 72.) Cæsar says: " When our men forced their way into his intrenchment Pompey threw off his general's uniform, mounted a horse, went out by the rear gate of his camp and urged his horse with all speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same speed, having collected a few of his scattered soldiers, still travelling by night, with a company of thirty horsemen, he pushed on to the sea where he embarked on a supply ship," etc. (iii. 96.))

The losses of Italians on each side -- for there was no report of the losses of auxiliaries, either because of their multitude or because they were despised -- were as follows: in Cæsar's army. thirty centurions and 200 legionaries, or, as some authorities have it, 1200; on Pompey's side ten senators, among whom was Lucius Domitius, the same who had been sent to succeed Cæsar himself in Gaul, and about forty distinguished knights. Some exaggerating writers put the loss in the remainder of his forces at 25,000, but Asinius Pollio, who was one of Cæsar's officers in this battle, records the number of dead Pompeians found as 6000.[*](Cæsar puts his own loss at thirty centurions and 200 private soldiers, and Pompey's at 15,000 killed and 24,000 prisoners. We must infer that Appian was not acquainted with Cæsar's Commentaries, for if he had been he would most probably have quoted him here instead of referring in a loose way to " exaggerating writers.") Such was the result of the famous battle of Pharsalus. Cæsar himself carries off the palm for first and second place by common consent, and with him the tenth legion. The third place is taken by the centurion Crastinus, whom Cæsar asked at the beginning of the battle what result he anticipated, and who responded proudly, "We shall conquer, O Cæsar, and you will thank me either living or dead." The whole army testifies that he darted through the ranks like one possessed and did many brilliant deeds. When sought for he was found among the dead, and Cæsar bestowed military honors on his body and buried it, and erected a special tomb for him near the common burial-place of the others.[*](The affair of Crastinus is mentioned by Cæsar, by Florus, and by Plutarch in his life of Pompey and again in his life of Cæsar. The reference here made to Asinius Pollio has led to much discussion in the learned world, touching the sources from which Appian and Plutarch drew. The words used by Crastinus are almost identical in the three passages (one of Appian and two of Plutarch), and this leads Wynne, Hulleman, and Hermann Peter to believe that both authors borrowed from Pollio's history. Vollgraff on the other hand contends that as Pollio wrote in Latin it would have been little less than miraculous if both of them had used the same Greek words in translating it. He considers it remarkable also that the only reference made to Pollio's writings by either of them should have been here, and that both of them mentioned incidentally the fact that Pollio himself took part in the engagement. All of these coincidences may be explained if we suppose that both Plutarch and Appian took the facts from a common Greek source; that is, from some author who took them from Pollio. (See Vollgraff's Greek Writers of Roman History, Leyden, 1880.))

From Larissa Pompey continued his flight to the sea where he embarked in a small boat, and meeting a ship by chance he sailed to Mitylene. There he joined his wife, Cornelia, and they embarked with four triremes which had come to him from Rhodes and Tyre. He decided not to sail for Corcyra and Africa, where he had other large military and naval forces as yet untouched, but intended to push on eastward to the king of the Parthians, expecting to receive every assistance from him. He concealed his intention until he arrived at Cilicia, where he revealed it hesitatingly to his friends; but they advised him to beware of the Parthian, against whom Crassus had lately led an expedition, and who was puffed up by his victory over the latter, and especially not to put in the power of these barbarians the beautiful Cornelia, who had formerly been the wife of Crassus.[*](The younger Crassus, who lost his life in the war against the Parthians.) Then he made a second proposal respecting Egypt and Juba.[*](King of Numidia. See Sec. 44 supra.) The latter they despised as not sufficiently distinguished, but they all agreed about going to Egypt, which was near and was a great kingdom, still prosperous and abounding in ships, provisions, and money. Its sovereigns, although children, were allied to Pompey by their father's friendship. For these reasons he sailed to Egypt.

Cleopatra, who had previously reigned with her brother, had been lately expelled from Egypt and was collecting an army in Syria. Ptolemy, her brother, was at Mount Casius in Egypt,[*](The modern Mount El Kas. There was another Mount Casius in Syria.) lying in wait for her invasion, and, as Providence would have it, the wind carried Pompey thither. Seeing a large army on the shore he stopped his ship, judging that the king was there, which was the fact. So he sent messengers to tell of his arrival and to speak of his father's friendship. The king was then about thirteen years of age and was under the tutelage of Achillas, who commanded his army, and the eunuch Pothinus, who had charge of his treasury. These took counsel together concerning Pompey. There was present also Theodotus, a rhetorician of Samos, the boy's tutor, who offered the infamous advice that they should lay a trap for Pompey and kill him in order to curry favor with Cæsar.[*](Theodotus argued (says Plutarch) " that if they should give shelter to the fugitive they would have Cæsar for an enemy and Pompey for a master; if they should send him away he would be offended by their want of hospitality, and Cæsar would be angry with them for letting him escape. The best way would be to send for him and kill him. In that way they would gratify the one and need not fear the other. He added with a smile that dead men do not bite." (Life of Pompey, 77).) His opinion prevailed. So they sent a miserable skiff to bring him, pretending that the sea was shallow and not adapted to large ships. Some of the king's attendants came in the skiff, among them a Roman, named Sempronius,[*](Cæsar, Plutarch, Florus, and Dion Cassius, give this miscreant the name of Septimius. Cæsar says that he was a military tribune and that he had served under Pompey in the war against the pirates. Florus adds that he was a deserter from Pompey's army.) who was then serving in the king's army and had formerly served under Pompey himself. He gave his hand to Pompey in the king's name and directed him to take passage in the boat to the young man as to a friend. At the same time the whole army was marshalled along the shore as if to do honor to Pompey, and the king was plainly seen in the midst of them wearing a purple robe.

Pompey's suspicions were aroused by all that he observed -- the marshalling of the army, the meanness of the skiff, and the fact that the king himself did not come to meet him nor send any of his high dignitaries. Nevertheless, he entered the skiff, repeating to himself these lines of Sophocles, "Whoever resorts to a tyrant becomes his slave, even if he were free when he went." While rowing to the shore all were silent, and this made him still more suspicious. Finally, either recognizing Sempronius as a Roman soldier who had served under him or guessing that he was such because he alone remained standing (for, according to military discipline, a soldier does not sit in the presence of his commander), he turned to him and said, "Do I not know you, comrade? " The other nodded and, as Pompey turned away, he immediately gave him the first stab and the others followed his example. Pompey's wife and friends who saw this at a distance cried out and, lifting their hands to heaven, invoked the gods, the avengers of violated faith. Then they sailed away in all haste as from an enemy's country.

The servants of Pothinus cut off Pompey's head and kept it for Cæsar, in expectation of a large reward, but he visited condign punishment on them for their nefarious deed. The remainder of the body was buried by somebody on the shore, and a small monument was erected over it, on which somebody else wrote this inscription: --

"What a pitiful tomb is here for one who had temples in abundance."[*](Plutarch gives a pathetic account of Pompey's funeral, which was performed by his freedman Philippus and one old Roman who had served as a soldier under him, and who was now living in exile and poverty. " Such," says another historian, " was the departure from life of a most excellent and illustrious man, after three consulships and as many triumphs, who had ruled the whole world and had reached a position above which it was not possible to rise, in the 58th year of his age and on the day before his birthday. So greatly had fortune been at strife with herself in his case that he who had been in want of earth to conquer was now in want of enough for a grave." (Velleius, ii. 53.) Dio Cassius (lxix. 11), describing the Emperor Hadrian's tour in the East A.D. 122, says that "while he was passing from Judea to Egypt he offered a funeral sacrifice for Pompey, on which occasion the following verse escaped him: 'What a pitiful tomb is here for one who had temples in abundance.' He also rebuilt the tomb that had fallen into ruin." This is not inconsistent with Appian's narrative.)

In the course of time the monument was wholly covered with sand, and the bronze images that had been erected to Pompey by his partisans at a later period near Mount Casius had been degraded and removed to the secret recess of the temple, but in my time they were sought for and found by the Roman emperor Hadrian, while making a journey thither, who cleared away the rubbish from the monument and made it again conspicuous, and placed Pompey's images in their proper places. Such was the end of Pompey, who had carried on the greatest wars and had made the greatest additions to the empire of the Romans, and had acquired by that means the title of Great. He had never been defeated before,[*](This is an error. Pompey was defeated by Sertorius in Spain, and the fact is mentioned in so many words by Appian himself in the preceding book Sec. 110: o( de\ *sertw/rios e)ni/ka *pomph/i+on.) but had remained unvanquished and most fortunate from his youth till now. From his twenty-third to his fifty-eighth year he had not ceased to exercise royal power, but on account of his jealousy of Cæsar he had seemed to rule in the interest of the people.

Lucius Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, and the other notables who had escaped from the battle of Pharsalus, more prudent than Pompey, proceeded to Corcyra and joined Cato, who had been left there with another army and 300 triremes. The leaders apportioned the fleet among themselves, and Cassius sailed to Pharnaces in Pontus to induce him to take up arms against Cæsar. Scipio and Cato embarked for Africa, relying on Varus and his army and his ally, Juba, king of Numidia. The elder son of Pompey, together with Labienus and Scapula, each with his own part of the army, hastened to Spain and, having detached it from Cæsar, collected a new army of Spaniards, Celtiberians, and slaves, and made formidable preparations for war. So great were the forces still remaining which Pompey had prepared, and which Pompey himself over-looked and ran away from in his insanity. Cato had been chosen commander of the forces in Africa, but he declined the appointment since there were consulars present who outranked him, he having held only the prætorship in Rome. So Lucius Scipio was made the commander and he collected and drilled a large army there. Thus two armies of considerable magnitude were brought together against Cæsar, one in Africa and the other in Spain.