Civil Wars

Appianus of Alexandria

Appianus. The Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, Volume 2: The Civil Wars. White, Horace, translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1899.

Pompey was surrounded by a great number of senators, of equal rank with himself, by very distinguished knights, and by many kings and princes. Some of these, by reason of their inexperience in war, others because they were too much elated by the victory at Dyrrachium, others because they outnumbered the enemy, and others because they were quite tired of the war and preferred a quick decision rather than a sound one -- all urged him to fight, pointing out to him that Cæsar was always drawn up for battle and challenging him. Pompey answered along this very line of argument by saying that Cæsar was compelled to do so by his want of supplies, and that they had the more reason to remain quiet because Cæsar was pushed by necessity. Yet, harassed by the whole army, which was unduly puffed up by the victories at Dyrrachium, and by men of rank who accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order to prolong his authority over so many men of his own rank -- and for this reason called him derisively king of kings and Agamemnon,[*](Plutarch says that this nickname was bestowed upon Pompey by Domitius Ahenobarbus, the same who was sent to supersede Cæsar in Gaul and who fell into the latter's hands at Corfinium, and was dismissed with contempt. He was an intense aristocrat, enormously rich, and he hated Cæsar with fury. He was killed in the pursuit after Pharsalus. During the exchange of pleasantries at Pompey's head -- quarters "Afranius, who had been accused of betraying his army in Spain, when he saw Pompey trying to avoid a battle said he wondered why his accusers did not move forward and fight this huckster of provinces." Favonius, who had suggested before they left Italy that Pompey should stamp armies out of the ground, now said: " Gentlemen, we shall not partake of the figs at Tusculum this year." (Life of Pompey, 67.)) because that general also ruled over kings while war lasted -- he allowed himself to be moved from his own purpose and gave in to them, being deceived now by the god that had misled him on other occasions during the whole of this war. He had now become, contrary to his nature, sluggish and dilatory in all things,[*](The text, or at all events the punctuation, is here doubtful. I have followed that of Schweighäuser but his Latin version does not accord with it: Tandem a proposito se moveri passus, deo jam exitium ejus properante, concessit illorum voluntati. Quemadmodum et alias per totum illud bellum contra naturam suam, tardus fuerat et veluti torpidus, sic nunc, etc., i.e.: "Finally allowing himself to be moved from his purpose he yielded to their wish, a god now hurrying him to his doom. As in other matters he had been, contrary to his nature, sluggish and as it were stupefied through this whole war, so now," etc.) and he prepared for battle against his will, to his own hurt and that of the men who had persuaded him to it.

That same night three of Cæsar's legions started out to forage; for Cæsar himself approved Pompey's dilatory proceedings and had no idea that he would change, and accordingly sent them out to procure food. When he perceived that the enemy was preparing to fight he was delighted at the pressure which he conjectured had been put upon Pompey by his army, and he recalled all of his forces at once and made preparations on his own side. He offered sacrifice at midnight and invoked Mars and his own ancestress, Venus (for it was believed that from Æneas and his son, Ilus, was descended the Julian race, with a slight change of name), and he vowed that he would build a temple in Rome as a thank-offering to her as the Bringer of Victory if everything went well. Thereupon a flame from heaven flew through the air from Cæsar's camp to Pompey's, where it was extinguished. Pompey's men said that it signified a brilliant victory for them over their enemies, but Cæsar interpreted it as meaning that he should fall upon and extinguish the fame and power of Pompey. When Pompey was sacrificing the same night some of the victims escaped and could not be caught, and a swarm of bees settled on the altar, the type of weakness.[*](These prodigies, with some slight variations, are related by Plutarch, by Lucan, and by Florus. "Never," says Florus, "were there more manifest signs of impending ruin.") Shortly before daylight a panic occurred in his army. He himself went around and quieted it and then fell into a deep sleep.

When his friends aroused him he said that he had just dreamed that he had dedicated a temple in Rome to Venus the Bringer of Victory. His friends and his whole army when they heard of this were delighted, being in ignorance of Cæsar's vow, and they went about their work in a reckless and contemptuous way as though it were already accomplished. Many of them adorned their tents with laurel branches, the insignia of victory, and their slaves prepared magnificent banquets for them. Some of them began already to contend with each other for Cæsar's office of Pontifex Maximus. Pompey, being experienced in military affairs, turned away from these squabbles with concealed indignation. He remained altogether silent in hesitancy and dread, as though he were no longer commander but under command, and as though he were doing everything under compulsion and against his judgment; such dejection had come over this man of great deeds (who, until this day, had been most fortunate in every undertaking), either because he had not carried his point when he had decided what was the best course but was about to cast the die involving the safety of so many men and also involving his own reputation, until now invincible; or because some presentiment of approaching evil troubled him, presaging his complete downfall that very day from a position of such vast power. After merely saying to his friends that whichever should conquer, that day would be the beginning of great evils to the Romans for all future time, he began to make arrangements for the battle. In this remark some people thought his real intentions escaped him, involuntarily expressed in a moment of fright, and they inferred that if Pompey had been victorious he would not have laid down the supreme power.

Cæsar's army (for since many writers differ I shall follow the most credible Roman authorities, who give the most careful enumeration of the Italian soldiers, in whom they place most confidence, but do not make much account of the allied forces or record them exactly, regarding them as foreigners and as contributing to them little real assistance) consisted of about 22,000 men and of these about 1000 were cavalry. Pompey had more than double that number, of whom about 7000 were cavalry. Some of the most trustworthy writers say that 70,000 Italian soldiers were engaged in this battle. Others give the smaller number, 60,00000. Still others, grossly exaggerating, say 400,000.[*](One of the grossly exaggerating writers is Florus, who says: "Never did fortune behold so large a force of the Roman people or so much of their dignity collected in one place. More than 300,000 men were assembled on one side and the other, in addition to the auxiliaries of kings and nations.") Of the whole number some say Pompey's forces were to those of Cæsar as one-and-a-half to one, others say that he had two parts out of three. So much doubt is there as to the exact truth. However that may be, each of them placed his chief reliance on his Italian troops. In the way of allied forces Cæsar had cavalry from both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, besides some light-armed Greeks, consisting of Dolopians, Acarnanians, and Ætolians. Such were Cæsar's allies. Pompey had a great number from all the eastern nations, part horse, part foot. From Greece he had Lacedemonians marshalled by their own kings, and others from Peloponnesus and Bœotians with them. The Athenians marched to his aid also, although proclamation had been made on both sides that no harm should be done to them by the soldiers, since they were the priests of the Thesmophoræ.[*](The Thesmophoræ (law-bringers) were Ceres and Proserpine. They were worshipped together as the goddesses of tillage and civilized life. The Thesmophoria was an annual religious festival at Athens.) Nevertheless, they wished to share in the glory of the war because this was a contest for the Roman leadership.[*](Schweighäuser says that the meaning of this passage is not quite clear to him. Combes-Dounous renders it intelligibly: "They came to take part in this war merely to have the glory of fighting in a contest where the empire of the Roman people was at stake.")

Besides the Greeks almost all the nations that one meets in making the circuit of the eastern sea sent aid to Pompey: Thracians, Hellespontines, Bithynians, Phrygians, Ionians, Lydians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, Paphlagonians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Hebrews, and their neighbors the Arabs, Cyprians, Rhodians, Cretan slingers, and other islanders. Kings and princes were there leading their own troops: Deïotarus, the tetrarch of Galatia in the East, and Ariarthes, king of Cappadocia. Taxiles commanded

the Armenians from the hither side of the Euphrates. Those from the other side were led by Megabates, the lieutenant of King Artabazes. Some other small princes took part with Pompey in the work. It was said that sixty ships from Egypt were contributed to him by the sovereigns of that country, Cleopatra and her brother, who was still a boy. But these did not take part in the battle, nor did any other naval force. They remained idle at Corcyra. Pompey seems to have acted very foolishly in this respect in disregarding the fleet, in which he excelled so greatly that he could have deprived the enemy of all the supplies brought to them from abroad, and in risking a battle on land with men who boasted that they were inured to every kind of toil and who were ferocious fighters. Although he had been on his guard against them at Dyrrachium, a certain spell seems to have come over him at a time when it would inure most to Cæsar's advantage. Under this spell also Pompey's army was most nonsensically puffed up, and rendered insubordinate to its own commander, and hurried into action without previous experience in war. But this was the ordering of divine Providence to bring in the imperial power which now embraces everything.