Civil Wars

Gaius Norbanus and Lucius Scipio, who were then the consuls, and with them Carbo, who had been consul the previous year (all of them moved by equal hatred of Sulla and more fearful than others because they knew that they were more to blame for what had been done), levied the best possible army from the city, obtained an additional one from Italy, and marched against Sulla in detachments. They had 200 cohorts of 500 men each at first, and their forces were considerably augmented afterward. The sympathies of the people were much in favor of the consuls, because the action of Sulla, who was marching against his country, seemed to be that of an enemy, while that of the consuls, even if they were working for themselves, was ostensibly the cause of the republic. Many persons, too, who knew that they had shared the guilt of the consuls, and who were believed to share their fears, coöperated with them. They knew very well that Sulla was not meditating merely prevention, correction, and alarm for them, but destruction, death, confiscation, and complete extermination. In this they were not mistaken, for the war ruined everything. From 10,000 to 20,000 men were slain in a single battle more than once. Fifty thousand on both sides lost their lives around the city, and to the survivors Sulla was unsparing in severity, both to individuals and to communities, until, finally, he made himself the undisputed master of the whole Roman government, so far as he wished or cared to be.

It seems, too, that divine Providence foretold to them the results of this war. Sights terrible and unexpected were observed by many, both in public and in private, throughout all Italy. Ancient, awe-inspiring oracles were remembered. Many monstrous things happened. A mule gave birth to a colt. A pregnant woman was delivered of a viper instead of a baby. There was a severe earthquake divinely sent and some of the temples in Rome were thrown down (the Romans gave altogether too much attention to such things). The Capitol, that had been built by the kings 400 years before, burned down, and nobody could discover the cause of the fire. All things seemed to point to a succession of slaughters, to the conquest of Italy and of the Romans themselves, to the capture of the city, and a change in the form of government.

This war began as soon as Sulla arrived at Brundusium, which was in the 174th Olympiad. Considering the magnitude of the work accomplished, its length was not great, compared with such wars in general, since the combatants rushed upon each other with the fury of private enemies. For this reason greater and more distressing calamities than usual befell the eager participants in a short space of time. Nevertheless the war lasted three years in Italy alone, until Sulla had secured the supreme power, but in Spain it continued even after Sulla's death. Battles, skirmishes, sieges, and fighting of all kinds were numerous throughout Italy, both regular engagements under the generals and by detachments, and all were noteworthy. The greatest and most remarkable of them I shall mention in this book. First of all Sulla and Metellus fought a battle against Norbanus at Canusium and killed 6000 of his men, while Sulla's loss was seventy, but many of his men were wounded. Norbanus retreated to Capua.

While Sulla and Metellus were near Teanum, L. Scipio advanced against them with another army which was very downhearted and longed for peace. The Sullan faction knew this and sent envoys to Scipio to negotiate, not because they hoped or desired to come to an agreement, but because they expected to create dissensions in Scipio's army, which was in a state of dejection. In this they succeeded. Scipio took hostages for the armistice and marched down to the plain. Only three from each side came to the conference, hence what passed between them is not known. It seems that during the armistice Scipio sent Sertorius to his colleague, Norbanus, to communicate with him concerning the negotiation and that there was a cessation of hostilities while they were waiting for an answer. Sertorius on his way took possession of Suessa, which had espoused the side of Sulla, and Sulla made complaint of this to Scipio. The latter, either because he was privy to the affair or because he did not know what answer to make concerning the strange act of Sertorius, sent back Sulla's hostages. His army blamed the consuls for the unjustifiable seizure of Suessa during the armistice and for the surrender of the hostages, who were not demanded back, and made a secret agreement with Sulla to go over to him if he would draw nearer. This he did and straightway they all went over en masse, so that the consul, Scipio, and his son Lucius, alone of the whole army, were left nonplussed in their tent, where they were captured by Sulla. That Scipio was not aware of a conspiracy of this kind, embracing his whole army, seems to me inexcusable in a general.

When Sulla was unable to induce Scipio to change, he sent him away with his son unharmed. He also sent other envoys to Norbanus at Capua to open negotiations, either because he was apprehensive of the result (since the greater part of Italy still adhered to the consuls), or in order to play the same game on him that he had played on Scipio. As nobody came back and no answer was returned (for it seems that Norbanus feared lest he should be accused by his army in the same way that Scipio had been), Sulla again advanced, devastating all hostile territory. Norbanus did the same thing on other roads. Carbo hastened to the city and caused Metellus, and all the other senators who had joined Sulla, to be decreed public enemies. It was at this time that the Capitol was burned. Some attributed this deed to Carbo, others to the consuls, others to somebody sent by Sulla. It was a great mystery; nor am I able now to conjecture what caused the fire. Sertorius, who had been some time previously chosen prætor for Spain, after the taking of Suessa fled to his provincet and as the former prætors refused to recognize his authority, he stirred up a great deal of trouble for the Romans there. In the meantime the forces of the consuls were constantly increasing from the major part of. Italy, which still adhered to them, and also from the neighboring Gauls on the Po. Nor was Sulla idle. He sent messengers to all parts of Italy that he could reach, to collect troops by friendship, by fear, by money, and by promises. In this way the remainder of the summer was consumed on both sides. [*](Y.R. 672)

The consuls for the following year were Papirius Carbo again and Marius, the nephew of the great Marius, then twenty-seven years of age. At first the winter and severe frost kept the combatants apart. At the beginning of spring, on the banks of the river Æsis, there was a severe engagement lasting from early morning till noon between Metellus and Carinas, Carbo's lieutenant. Carinas was put to flight after heavy loss, whereupon all the country thereabout seceded from the consuls to Metellus. Carbo came up with Metellus and besieged him until he heard that Marius, the other consul, had been defeated in a great battle near Præneste, when he led his forces back to Ariminum. Pompey hung on his rear doing damage. The defeat at Præneste was in this wise. Sulla captured the town of [*](B.C. 82) Setia. Marius, who was encamped near by, drew a little farther away. When he arrived at the so-called sacred lake (Sacriportus) he gave battle and fought bravely. When his left wing began to give way five cohorts of foot and two of horse decided not to wait for open defeat, but lowered their standards together and went over to Sulla. This was the beginning of a terrible disaster to Marius. His shattered army fled to Præneste with Sulla in hot pursuit. The Præestians gave shelter to those who arrived first, but when Sulla pressed upon them the gates were closed, and Marius was hauled up by ropes. There was another great slaughter around the walls by reason of the closing of the gates. Sulla captured a large number of prisoners. All the Samnites among them he killed, because they were always ill-affected toward the Romans.

About the same time Metellus gained a victory over the other army of Carbo, and here again five cohorts, for safety's sake, deserted to Metellus during the battle. Pompey overcame Marcius near Senæ and plundered the town. Sulla, having shut Marius up in Præneste, drew a line of circumvallation around the town a considerable distance from it and left the work in charge of Lucretius Ofella, as he intended to reduce Marius by famine, not by fighting. When Marius saw that his condition was hopeless he hastened to put his private enemies out of the way. He wrote to Brutus, the city prætor, to call the Senate together on some pretext or other and to kill Publius Antistius, the other Papirius, Lucius Domitius, and Mucius Scævola, the pontifex maximus. Of these the two first were slain in their seats as Marius had ordered, assassins having been introduced into the senate-house for this purpose. Domitius ran out, but was killed at the door, and Scævola was killed a little farther away. Their bodies were thrown into the Tiber, for it was now the custom not to bury the slain. Sulla sent an army to Rome in detachments by different roads with orders to seize the gates, and if they were repulsed to rendezvous at Ostia. The towns on the way received them with fear and trembling, and the city opened its gates to them because the people were oppressed by hunger, and because, of present evils, they were accustomed to yield to the ones which were immediately weighing upon them.

When Sulla learned this he came on immediately and established his army before the gates in the Campus Martius. He went inside himself, all of the opposite faction having fled. Their property was at once confiscated and exposed to public sale. Sulla summoned the people to an assembly, where he lamented the necessity of his present doings and told them to cheer up, as the troubles would soon be over and the government go as it ought. Having arranged such matters as were pressing and put some of his own men in charge of the city, he set out for Clusium, where the war was still raging. In the meantime a body of Celtiberian horse, sent by the prætors in Spain, had joined the consuls, and there was a cavalry fight on the banks of the river Glanis. Sulla killed about fifty of the enemy, and then 270 of the Celtiberian horse deserted to him, and Carbo himself killed the rest of them, either because he was angry at the desertion of their countrymen or because he feared similar action on their own part. About the same time Sulla overcame another detachment of his enemies near Saturnia, and Metellus sailed around toward Ravenna and took possession of the level, wheat-growing country of Uritanus. Another Sullan division effected an entrance into Neapolis by treachery in the night, killed all the inhabitants except a few who had made their escape, and seized the triremes belonging to the city. A severe battle was fought near Clusium between Sulla himself and Carbo, lasting all day. Neither party had the advantage when darkness put an end to the conflict.

In the plain of Spoletium, Pompey and Crassus, both Sulla's officers, killed some 3000 of Carbo's men and besieged Carinas, the opposing general. Carbo sent reënforcements to Carinas, but Sulla learned of their movement, laid an ambush for them, and killed about 2000 of them on the road. Carinas escaped by night during a heavy rain-storm and thick darkness, and although the besiegers were aware of some movement, they made no opposition on account of the storm. Carbo sent Marcius with eight legions to the relief of his colleague, Marius, at Præneste, having heard that he was suffering from hunger. Pompey fell upon them from ambush in a defile, defeated them, killed a large number, and surrounded the remainder on a hill. Marcius made his escape, leaving his fires burning. His army blamed him for being caught in an ambush and stirred up an angry mutiny. One whole legion marched off under their standards to Ariminum without orders. The rest separated and went home in squads, so that only seven cohorts remained with their general. Marcius, having made a mess of it in this way, returned to Carbo. However, Marcus Lamponius from Lucania, Pontius Telesinus from Samnium, and Gutta the Capuan, with 70,000 men, hastened to deliver Marius from the siege, but Sulla occupied a pass which was the only approach to the place, and blocked the road. Marius now despaired of aid from without, and built a citadel in the wide space between himself and the enemy, within which he collected his soldiers and his engines, and from which he attempted to force his way through the besieging army of Lucretius. The attempt was renewed several days in different ways, but he accomplished nothing and was again shut up in Præneste.

About the same time Carbo and Norbanus went by a short road to attack the camp of Metellus in Faventia just before nightfall. There was only one hour of daylight left, and there were thick vineyards thereabout. They made their plans for battle in hot temper and not with good judgment, hoping to take Metellus unawares and to stampede him. But they were beaten, both the place and the time being unfavorable for them. They became entangled in the vines, and suffered a heavy slaughter, losing some 10,000 men. About 6000 more deserted, and the rest were dispersed, only 1000 getting back to Ariminum in good order. Another legion of Lucanians under Albinovanus, when they heard of this defeat, went over to Metellus to the great chagrin of their leader. As the latter was not able to restrain this impulse of his men, he, for the time, returned to Norbanus. Not many days later he sent secretly to Sulla, and having obtained a promise of safety from him, if he should accomplish anything important, he invited Norbanus and his lieutenants, Gaius Antipater and Flavius Fimbria (brother of the one who committed suicide in Asia), together with such of Carbo's lieutenants as were then present, to a feast. When they had all assembled except Norbanus (he was the only one who did not come), Albinovanus killed them all at the banquet and then fled to Sulla. Norbanus having learned that, in consequence of this disaster, Ariminum and many other camps in the vicinity were going over to Sulla, and being unable to rely on the good faith and firm support of any of his friends there present, since he found himself in adversity, took ship as a private individual and sailed to Rhodes. When, at a later period, Sulla demanded his surrender, and while the Rhodians were deliberating on it, he killed himself in the market-place.

Carbo sent Damasippus in haste with two other legions to Præneste to relieve Marius, who was still besieged, but not even these could force their way through the pass that was guarded by Sulla. The Gauls who inhabited the country lying between Ravenna and the Alps went over to Metellus en masse and Lucullus won a victory over another body of Carbo's forces near Placentia. When Carbo learned these facts, although he still had 30,000 men around Clusium, and the two legions of Damasippus, and others under Carinas and Marcius, besides a large force of Samnites, who were courageously enduring hardships at the pass, he fell into despair and weakly fled to Africa with his friends, although he was still consul, in order to make a stand there instead of in Italy. Of those whom he left behind, the army around Clusium had a battle with Pompey in which they lost 20,000. Naturally, after this greatest disaster of all, the remainder of the army dissolved in fragments and each man went to his own home. Carinas, Marcius, and Damasippus went with all the forces they had to the pass in order to force their way through it in conjunction with the Samnites. Failing in the attempt, they marched to Rome, thinking that the city might be easily taken, as it was bereft of men and provisions, and they encamped in the Alban territory at a distance of 100 stades from it.

Sulla feared for the safety of the city, and sent his cavalry forward with all speed to hinder their march, and then hastened in person with his whole army and encamped alongside the Colline gate around the temple of Venus about noon. The enemy were already encamped around the city. A battle was fought at once, late in the afternoon. On the right wing Sulla was victorious. His left wing was vanquished and fled to the gates. The old soldiers on the walls, when they saw the enemy rushing in with their own men, dropped the portcullis. It fell upon and killed many soldiers and many senators. But the majority, impelled by fear and necessity, turned and fought the enemy. The fighting continued through the night and a great many were killed. The generals, Telesinus and Albinus, were killed and their camp was taken. Lamponius the Lucanian, Marcius, and Carinas, and the other generals of the faction of Carbo, fled. It was estimated that 50,000 men on both sides lost their lives in this engagement. Prisoners, to the number of more than 8000, were shot down with darts by Sulla because they were mostly Samnites. The next day Marcius and Carinas were captured and brought in. Sulla did not spare them because they were Romans, but killed them both and sent their heads to Lucretius at Præneste to be displayed around the walls.

When the Prænestians saw them and knew that Carbo's army was completely destroyed, and that Norbanus himself had fled from Italy, and that Rome and all the rest of Italy were in the power of Sulla, they surrendered their city to Lucretius. Marius hid himself in an underground tunnel and shortly afterward committed suicide. Lucretius cut off his head and sent it to Sulla, who exposed it in the forum in front of the rostra. It is said that he indulged in a jest at the youth of the consul, saying that one ought to be a rower before he manages the helm. When Lucretius took Præneste he seized the senators who had held commands under Marius, and put some of them to death and cast the others into prison. The latter were put to death by Sulla when he came that way. All the others who were taken in Præneste he ordered to march out to the plain without arms, and when they had done so he chose out a very few who had been in any way serviceable to him. The remainder he ordered to be divided into three parts, consisting of Romans, Samnites, and Prænestians respectively. When this had been done he announced to the Romans by herald that they had merited death, but nevertheless he would pardon them. The others he massacred to the last man. He allowed their wives and children to go unharmed. He plundered the town, which was extremely rich at that time. In this way was Præneste served. Norba, another town, still resisted with all its might until Æmilius Lepidus was admitted to it in the night by treachery. The inhabitants were maddened by this treason. Some killed themselves, or fell on each other's swords, others strangled themselves with ropes. Still others closed the gates and set fire to the town. A strong wind fanned the flames, which so far consumed the place that no plunder was left in it. In this way did these stout-hearted men perish.

After accomplishing these deeds throughout Italy by war, fire, and murder, Sulla's generals visited the several cities and established garrisons at the suspected places. Pompey was despatched to Africa against Carbo and to Sicily against Carbo's friends who had taken refuge there. Sulla himself called the Roman people together in an assembly and made them a speech vaunting his own exploits and making other menacing statements in order to inspire terror. He finished by saying that he would bring about a change which would be beneficial to the public if they would obey him. He would not spare one of his enemies, but would visit them with the utmost severity. He would take vengeance by every means in his power on all prætors, quæstors, military tribunes, and everybody else who had committed any hostile act after the day when the consul Scipio violated the agreement made with him. After saying this he forthwith proscribed about forty senators and 1600 knights. [*](Mommsen says that the list of the proscribed reached 4700 names. "This total," he adds, "is given by Valerius Maximus, ix. 2, i. According to Appian (B.C. i. 95) there were proscribed by Sulla nearly 40 senators and 1600 knights; according to Florus (ii. 9, whence Augustine, de Civ. Dei, iii. 28) 2000 senators and knights. According to Plutarch (Sull. 31) 520 names were placed on the list in the first three days; according to Orosius (v. 21) 580 names during the first days. There is no material contradiction between these various reports, for it was not senators and knights alone that were put to death, and the list remained open for months. When Appian, at another passage (i. 103), mentions as put to death or banished by Sulla, 15 consulars, go senators, 2600 knights, he there confounds, as the context shows, the victims of the civil war throughout, with the victims of Sulla. . . . On a comparison of the figures 50 senators and 1000 knights were regarded as victims of Marius, 40 senators 1600 knights as victims of Sulla; this furnishes a standard--at least not altogether arbitrary--for estimating the extent of the mischief on both sides." (Hist. of Rome, iii. 423.)) He seems to have been the first one to punish by proscription, to offer prizes to assassins and rewards wards to informers, and to threaten with punishment those who should conceal the proscribed. Shortly afterward he added the names of other senators to the proscription. Some of these, taken unawares, were killed where they were caught, in their houses, in the streets, or in the temples. Others were picked up, carried to Sulla, and thrown down at his feet. Others were dragged through the city and trampled on, none of the spectators daring to utter a word of remonstrance against these horrors. Banishment was inflicted upon some and confiscation upon others. Spies were searching everywhere for those who had fled from the city, and those whom they caught they killed.

There was much killing, banishment, and confiscation also among those Italians who had obeyed Carbo, or Marius, or Norbanus, or their lieutenants. Severe judgments of the courts were rendered against them throughout all Italy on various charges--for exercising military command, for serving in the army, for contributing money, for rendering other service, or even giving counsel against Sulla. Hospitality, private friendship, the borrowing or lending of money, were alike accounted crimes. Now and then one would be arrested for doing a kindness to a suspect, or merely for being his companion on a journey. These accusations abounded mostly against the rich. When charges against individuals failed Sulla took vengeance on whole communities. He punished some of them by demolishing their citadels, or destroying their walls, or by imposing heavy fines and contributions on them. Among most of them he placed colonies of his troops in order to hold Italy under garrisons, sequestrating their lands and houses and dividing them among his soldiers, whom he thus made true to him during his life and even after his death. As they could not be secure in their own holdings unless all of Sulla's affairs were on a firm foundation, they were his stoutest champions even after he was deceased. While the affairs of Italy were in this state, Pompey sent a force and captured Carbo, who had fled with many persons of distinction from Africa to Sicily and thence to the island of Cossyra. He ordered his officers to kill all of the others without bringing them into his presence; but Carbo, who had been thrice consul, he caused to be brought before his feet in chains, and after making a public harangue at him, killed him and sent his head to Sulla.

When everything had been accomplished against his enemies as he desired, and there was no longer any hostile force except that of Sertorius, who was far distant, Sulla sent Metellus into Spain against him and managed everything in the city to suit himself. There was no longer any occasion for laws, or elections, or for casting lots, because everybody was shivering with fear and in hiding, or dumb. Everything that Sulla had done as consul, or as proconsul, was confirmed and ratified, and his gilded equestrian statue was erected in front of the rostra with the inscription, "Cornelius Sulla, a fortunate commander," for so his flatterers called him on account of his unbroken success against his enemies. And this flattering title still attaches to him. I have come across a history which relates that Sulla was styled Epaphroditus[*](The favorite of Venus.) by a decree of the Senate itself. This does not seem to me to be inappropriate for he was also called Faustus (lucky), which name seems to have very nearly the same signification as Epaphroditus. There was also an oracle given to him somewhere which, in response to his question concerning the future, assured his prosperous career as follows:--

"Believe me, Roman, the Cyprian goddess cares for the race of Æneas and has given it great power. Render yearly gifts to all the immortals, and do not forget them. Convey gifts to Delphi. There is also a place where men go up under snowy Taurus, a wide-reaching city of the Carians,[*](The town of Aphrodisias in Caria, dedicated to Venus. It is mentioned in the Annals of Tacitus (iii. 62) as one of those whose title to be considered a lawful sanctuary and refuge for criminals was investigated during the reign of Tiberius.) whose inhabitants have named it for Aphrodite. Give the goddess an axe and you shall gain sovereign power."[*](*pei/qeo/ moi *pwmai=e, kra/tos me/ga *ku/pris e)/dwken *ai)nei/ou geneh=| memelhme/nh. )*alla\ su\ pa=sin a=qana/tois e)pe/teia ti/qei: mh\ lh/qeo tw=nde. *delfoi=s dw=ra ko/mize. *kai\ e)/sti tis a)mbai/nousi *tau/rou u(po\ nifo/entos, o(/pou perimh/keton a)/sgu *karw=n, oi( nai/ousin e)pw/numon e)c )*afrodi/ghs: kai\ pe/lekun qe/menos, lh/yh| kra/tos a)miflafes soi.)

Whichever decree the Romans voted when they erected the statue, they seem to me to have made the inscription by way of jest or cajolery. However, Sulla sent a golden crown and an axe to Venus with this inscription:--

"The dictator Sulla dedicates this to thee, Venus, because in a dream he saw thee in panoply setting the army in order of battle and fighting with the weapons of Mars." [*](*to/nde soi au)tokra/twr *su/llas a)ne/qhk', )*afrodi/th, w(s ei)=don kat' o)/neiron a)na\ stratih\n die/pousan teu/xesi toi=s )/*areos marnamenhn e)/noplon.)

Thus Sulla became king, or tyrant, de facto, not elected, but holding power by force and violence. As, however, he needed some pretence of being elected it was managed in this way. The kings of the Romans in the olden time were chosen for their bravery, and when one of them died the senators held the royal power in succession for five days each, until the people could decide who should be the new king. This five-day ruler was called the Interrex, which means king for the time being. The retiring consuls always presided over the election of their successors in office, and if there chanced to be no consul at such a time an Interrex was appointed for the purpose of holding the consular comitia. Sulla took advantage of this custom. There were no consuls at this time, Carbo having lost his life in Sicily and Marius in Præneste. So Sulla went out of the city for a time and ordered the Senate to choose an Interrex. They chose Valerius Flaccus, expecting that he would soon hold the consular comitia. But Sulla wrote to Flaccus to bring before the people the proposition that he (Sulla) considered it advisable, under present circumstances, that the city should be governed by a dictator according to a custom that had been abandoned 400 years. [*](This is probably a corruption of the text. The last dictator was appointed in the year 202 B.C., or 120 years before Sulla assumed that office.) He told them not to appoint the dictator for any definite time, but until the city and Italy and the whole government, so shaken by factions and wars, should be put upon a firm foundation. That this proposal referred to Sulla himself was not at all doubtful. Sulla made no concealment of it. At the conclusion of the letter he declared openly that, in his judgment, he could be serviceable to the city in that capacity.

Such was Sulla's letter. The Romans were unwilling, but they had no more opportunities for elections according to law, and they considered that this matter was not altogether in their own power. So, in the absence of everything else, they welcomed this pretence of an election as an image and semblance of freedom and chose Sulla their absolute master for as long a time as he pleased. There had been autocratic rule of the dictators before, but it was limited to short periods. But in Sulla's time it first became unlimited and so an absolute tyranny; yet they added, for propriety's sake, that they chose him dictator for the enactment of such laws as he might deem best and for the regulation of the commonwealth. Thus the Romans, after having government by kings for sixty Olympiads, and a democracy, under consuls chosen yearly, for 100 Olympiads, resorted to kingly government again. This was in the 175th Olympiad according to the Greek calendar, but there were no Olympic games then except races in the stadium, since Sulla had carried away the athletes and all the sights and shows to Rome to celebrate his victories in the Mithridatic and Italian wars, under the pretext that the masses needed a breathing-spell and recreation after their toils. [*](Y.R. 673)