Hannibalic War

The Metapontines, whose prefect had taken half of [*](B.C.211) his force to Tarentum, slew the remainder, who were few in number, and delivered themselves up to Hannibal. Heraclea, which lay midway between Metapontum and Tarentum, followed their example, being moved by fear rather than inclination. Thus Hannibal's affairs again began to wear a flourishing aspect. In the following year some of the Lucanians revolted from Rome, and Sempronius Gracchus, the proconsul, marched against them. A certain Lucanian named Flavius, of the party that had remained faithful to the Romans, who had been also a friend and guest of Gracchus but was now his betrayer, persuaded him to come to a certain place to have a conference with the Lucanian generals, saying that they had repented and wished to return to the Roman allegiance. Suspecting nothing, he went to the place with thirty horsemen, where he found himself surrounded by a large force of Numidians in ambush, with whom Flavius then joined himself. When Gracchus discovered the treachery he leaped from his horse with his companions, and after performing many noble deeds of valor was slain with all the others, except three. These were the only ones captured by Hannibal, who had exerted himself to the utmost to take the Roman proconsul alive. Although he had basely entrapped him, nevertheless in admiration of his bravery in the final struggle he gave him a funeral and sent his bones to Rome. After this he passed the summer in Apulia and collected large supplies of corn.

The Romans decided to attack the Capuans, and Hannibal sent Hanno with 1000 foot and as many horse to enter Capua by night. This he did without the knowledge of the Romans. At daylight the Romans discovered what had taken place by observing greater numbers of men on the walls. So they turned back from the city forthwith and began hurriedly to reap the harvest of the Capuans and the other inhabitants of Campania. When the Campanians bewailed their losses Hannibal said to them that he had plenty of corn in Apulia, and he gave an order that they should send and get it as often as they wished. Accordingly they sent not only their pack animals and men, but also their women and children, to bring loads of corn. They had no fear of danger on the way because Hannibal had transferred his headquarters from Apulia to Campania and was encamped on the river Calor near the country of the Beneventines, whom alone they feared as the latter were still in alliance with Rome. While Hannibal was there they despised all their enemies. [*](Y.R. 542)

It happened, however, that Hannibal was called by [*](B.C.212) Hanno into Lucania, leaving the greater part of his baggage under a small guard in the camp near Beneventum. One of the two Roman consuls who were in command there (Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius), learning of this, fell upon the Campanians who were bringing corn and slew many who were unprepared for an attack, and gave the corn to the Beneventines. He also took Hannibal's camp and plundered his baggage, and, as Hannibal was still in Lucania, drew a line of circumvallation around Capua. Then the two consuls built another wall outside of this and established their camp between the two. They erected battlements also, some toward the besieged Capuans and others toward the enemy outside. There was the appearance of a great city enclosing a smaller one. The space between the enclosing wall and Capua was about two stades, in which many enterprises and encounters took place each day and many single combats, as in a theatre surrounded by walls, for the bravest were continually challenging each other. A certain Capuan named Taureus having had a single combat with the Roman Claudius Asellus, and seeking to escape, retreated, Asellus pursuing till he came to the walls of Capua. The latter not being able to check his horse dashed at full speed through the gate into Capua, and galloping through the whole city, ran out at the opposite gate and rejoined the Romans, and was thus marvellously saved. [*](Y.R. 543)

Hannibal, having failed in the task that called him to [*](B.C.211) Lucania, turned back to Capua, considering it very important to defend a city so large, and which had been a city of importance under Roman sway. He accordingly at-tacked their enclosing wall, but as he accomplished nothing and could devise no way to introduce either provisions or soldiers into the city, and as none of them could communicate with him on account of the closeness of the siege, he marched to Rome with his whole army, having learned that the Romans also were hard pressed by famine and hoping to draw the Roman generals away from Capua, or to accomplish something more important than its relief. Moving with the greatest celerity through the country inhabited by many hostile peoples, some of whom were not able to hinder him while others would not incur the risk of battle, he encamped at the river Anio, two and thirty stades from Rome.

The city was thrown into consternation as never before. They were without any suitable force (what they had being in Campania), and now this strong, hostile army came suddenly against them under a general of invincible bravery and good fortune. Nevertheless, for the present emergency those who were able to bear arms manned the gates, the old men mounted the walls, and the women and children brought stones and missiles, while those who were in the fields flocked in all haste to the city. Confused cries, lamentations, prayers, and mutual exhortations on every side filled the air. Some went out and cut down the bridge over the river Anio. The Romans had at one time fortified a small town among the Æqui, which they called Alba after the name of their mother city. Its inhabitants with the lapse of time, either because of carelessness of pronunciation or corruption of language, or to distinguish them from the Albanians, were called Albenses. Two thousand of these Albenses hastened to Rome to share the danger. As soon as they arrived they armed themselves and mounted guard at the gates. Such zeal did this one small town, out of many colonies, exhibit, just as the little city of Platæa came to the aid of the Athenians at Marathon and shared their danger.

Appius, one of the Roman generals, remained at Capua, believing that he could capture the place by him-self. Fulvius Flaccus, the other one, marched with untiring haste by other roads and encamped opposite Hannibal, with the river Anio flowing between them. When Hannibal found that the bridge had been destroyed and that Fulvius was occupying the opposite bank, he decided to go around by the sources of the stream. Fulvius moved parallel with him on the other side. Here, again, as was his custom, Hannibal devised a stratagem. He left some Numidian horse behind, who, as soon as the armies had moved off, crossed the Anio and ravaged the Roman territory until they had come very near to the city itself, and had carried consternation into it, when they rejoined Hannibal according to their orders. The latter, when he had passed around the sources of the stream, whence the road to Rome was not long, is said to have reconnoitred the city with three body-guards secretly by night, and to have observed the lack of force and the confusion prevailing. Nevertheless he went back to Capua, either because divine Providence turned him aside this time as in other instances, or because he was intimidated by the valor and fortune of the city, or because, as he said to those who urged him to attack it, he did not wish to bring the war to an end lest the Carthaginians should deprive him of his command. At any rate, the army under Fulvius was by no means a match for him. Fulvius followed him as he retreated, merely preventing him from foraging and taking care not to fall into any traps.

Hannibal, on a certain moonless night, having observed that Fulvius, at the close of the day, had neglected to throw up a wall in front of his camp (but had merely dug a ditch with certain spaces in lieu of gates, and the earth thrown outward instead of a wall), quietly sent a body of cavalry to a fortified hill overlooking Fulvius' camp, and ordered them to keep silence until the Romans should believe the hill unoccupied. Then he ordered his Indians to mount their elephants and break into the camp of Fulvius through the open spaces, and over the piles of earth, in any way they could. He also directed a number of trumpeters and horn-blowers to follow at a short distance. When they should be inside the entrenchments some of them were ordered to run around and raise a great tumult so that they might seem to be very numerous, while others, speaking Latin, should call out that Fulvius, the Roman general, ordered the evacuation of the camp and the seizure of the neighboring hill. Such was Hannibal's stratagem, and at first all went according to his intention. The elephants broke into the camp, trampling down the guards, and the trumpeters did as they were ordered. The unexpected clamor striking the ears of the Romans as they started out of bed in the darkness of the night was some-thing fearful. Hearing orders given in Latin directing them to take refuge on the hill, they hurried in that direction.

Fulvius, who was always looking out for some stratagem and suspecting one in everything that Hannibal did, being guided either by his own intelligence or by divine inspiration, or having learned the facts from some prisoner, quickly stationed his military tribunes in the roads leading to the hill to stop those who were rushing that way, and to tell them that it was not the Roman general but Hannibal who had given the command in order to lead them into an ambush. Then he stationed strong guards at the ramparts to repel any new attack from without, and with others passed rapidly through the camp exclaiming that there was no danger and that those who had broken in with the elephants were but few. Torches were lighted and fires kindled on all sides. Then the smallness of the attacking force was so manifest that the Romans utterly despised them, and, turning from fear to wrath, slew them the more easily since they were few in number and light-armed. The elephants not having room to turn around, and being entangled among the tents and huts, furnished an excellent mark for darts by reason of the narrowness of the place and the size of their bodies. Enraged with pain and unable to reach their enemies, they shook off their riders and trampled them under foot with fury and savage outcries, and broke out of the camp. Thus did Fulvius Flaccus by his constancy and skill bring to naught this unexpected ambush, frustrate Hannibal, and save his army, which had always been in terror of Hannibal's stratagems.