Against Philon, On his Scrutiny

Now I will demonstrate that Philon here has set his private safety above the public danger of the city, and has held it preferable to pass his life without danger to himself rather than save the city by sharing her dangers with the rest of the citizens.

For this man, gentlemen of the Council, in the midst of the city’s disaster (which I only touch upon so far as I am forced to do so), was banned from the town by the Thirty along with the main body of the citizens, and for a while he lived in the country: but when the party of Phyle returned to the Peiraeus, and the people, not only from the country, but from over the border, assembled together, partly in the town and partly in the Peiraeus, and when each to the extent of his powers came to the rescue of his fatherland, Philon’s conduct was the opposite of that shown by the rest of the citizens.

For he packed up all his belongings and left the city to live beyond the border, at Oropus, where he paid the aliens’ tax and resided under the protection of a patron, since he preferred the life of an alien among those people to citizenship with us. And so he would not even do as some citizens did, who turned about when they saw the party of Phyle succeeding in their efforts; he did not even think fit to take any share in these successes, but chose to come when the business was achieved rather than join in the return after achieving something for the advantage of the common wealth. For he did not come to the Peiraeus, nor is there any instance of his having placed himself at your disposal.

But I ask you, if on seeing us successful he did not shrink from betraying us, what must he have done to us, had we failed of our object? Now those who were prevented by private calamities from sharing the dangers that then beset the city deserve some indulgence: for misfortune befalls no man of his own will.

But those who acted thus by design merit no indulgence, since their conduct was due not to mishap, but to policy. It is a custom accepted as just among all mankind that in face of the same crimes we should be most incensed with those men who are most able to avoid criminal action, but should be indulgent to the poor or disabled because we regard their offences as involuntary.

This man, therefore, deserves no indulgence; for neither was he disabled and thus unfit for hardship, as you see for yourselves, nor did he lack means for the public services, as I shall establish. If, then, he was as backward as he was able to help, how should he not hated with good reason by you all?