Against Philon, On his Scrutiny

He argues, so I am told, that, if it was a crime to absent himself at that crisis, we should have had a law expressly dealing with it, as in the case of all other crimes. He does not expect you to perceive that the gravity of the crime was the reason why no law was proposed to deal with it. For what orator would ever have conceived, or lawgiver have anticipated, that any of the citizens would be guilty of so grave an offence?

So, I suppose, if one should desert one’s post when the city itself was not in danger, but was rather endangering another people,[*](i.e., we are to suppose, forsooth, that desertion is a crime only when the city is so far from being in danger as to be at war with another city.) a law would have been made condemning that as a grievous crime; but if one deserted the city itself when the city itself was in danger, we should have had no law against this! Certainly we should, if there had been a thought that any of the citizens would ever commit such a crime.

Not a man but would have reason to rebuke you, gentlemen, if, after honoring in a manner worthy of the city our resident aliens for having supported the democracy beyond the requirements of their duty, you are not going to inflict on this man, for having betrayed the city in violation of his duty, if not some heavier punishment of another kind, at least the dishonor which you hold over him today.

Recall to your minds what reason you can have for honoring those who have proved themselves good servants of the State and for dishonoring those who serve her ill. In either case the distinction has been made not so much for the sake of those who have come into the world, as of those who are yet to come, in order that they may strive to become worthy by studious effort, and in no single direction may attempt to be base.