Against Alcibiades: For Deserting the Ranks

I do not believe, gentlemen of the jury, that you desire to hear any excuse for the action of those who have resolved to accuse Alcibiades: for from the outset he has shown himself so unworthy of the citizenship that it is the duty of anyone, even in the absence of a personal wrong suffered at his hands, to regard him none the less as an enemy because of the general tenor of his life.

His offences are not slight or entitled to indulgence, nor do they offer a hope of his reform in the future: they have been committed in such a manner, and have carried villainy to such lengths, that even his enemies feel ashamed for some of the things on which he prides himself. Yet I, gentlemen, since our fathers were previously at feud, and since my long-standing sense of his rascally character has now been increased by maltreatment at his hands, will try with your aid to make him pay the penalty for all that he has done.

The main indictment has been sufficiently delivered by Archestratides; for he has exhibited the laws and produced witnesses to everything. But on certain points that he has omitted I will give you particular information.

Now it is reasonable, gentlemen of the jury, that men who are now trying such a case for the first time since we settled the peace[*](i.e., the peace of 404 B.C, which ended the Peloponnesian War.) should act not merely as jurors, but in fact as law-makers. For you know well that your decision upon these cases will determine the attitude of the city towards them for all time. And it is the duty, in my opinion, alike of a loyal citizen and of a just juror to put such constructions on the laws as are likely to be of benefit to the city in the future.

For some are bold enough to assert that nobody can be chargeable with desertion or cowardice, since no battle has taken place; that the law merely provides for a court-martial on anyone who, from cowardice, has deserted the ranks and retreated while the rest were fighting. But the provisions of the law apply not only to such a case, but also to that of anyone who fails to appear in the infantry lines. Please read the law.

LawYou hear, gentlemen, how it covers both alike,—those who retreat to the rear during battle, and those who do not appear in the infantry lines. And consider who they are that are bound to appear. Are they not all persons who have reached the proper age? Are they not those whom the generals have enrolled?

I believe, gentlemen, that he is the one citizen who is liable to the full scope of the law: for he would with justice be convicted of refusing duty, because after being enrolled as a foot-soldier he did not march out with you; of desertion, because he alone of the whole force did not present himself for the formation of the ranks; and of cowardice, because, when it was his duty to share the danger with the infantry, he chose to serve in the cavalry.

They say, indeed, that he will resort to the defence that, since he was in the cavalry, he was doing no wrong to the State. But in my opinion you would find just cause for indignation against him in the fact that, although the law provides that anyone who serves in the cavalry without having passed his scrutiny[*](Held by the Council in order to maintain a high class of manhood in the cavalry.) shall be disfranchised, he had the audacity to serve in the cavalry without having passed his scrutiny. Now, please, read the law.

LawThis man, then, carried roguery to such a length, and was so contemptuous of you and so timorous of the enemy, so desirous of serving in the cavalry and so heedless of our laws, that he recked nought of the risks involved, and preferred the prospect of being disfranchised, having his property confiscated and being liable to all the statutory penalties, to that of taking his place with the citizens and serving as an infantryman.

There were others who had never before served in the infantry, but had always been cavalrymen and had inflicted many losses on the enemy: yet they did not venture to mount their horses, from fear of you and of the law. For they had shaped their plans on the prospect, not of the city’s destruction, but of its deliverance, its ascendancy and its retaliation upon wrongdoers. But Alcibiades was rash enough to mount, though he is no supporter of the people, nor had seen service in the cavalry before, nor is qualified for it now, nor had passed your scrutiny: he presumed that the city would be without the power to do justice upon wrongdoers.

You must reflect that, if men are to be permitted to do whatever they please, it is useless to have your code of laws, your Assemblies, or your election of generals. And I wonder, gentlemen, at anyone considering it right, when a man has retired, at the approach of the enemy, from his post in the first rank to a place in the second, to convict him of cowardice, and then, if a man has appeared in the cavalry when his post was in the infantry, to grant him a pardon!

And besides, gentlemen, I conceive that your judgement is given, not merely with a view to the offenders, but also for the reformation of all other insubordinate persons. Now, if you punish men who are unknown, not one among the rest will be improved; for nobody will know the sentences that you have passed: but if you inflict the penalty on the most conspicuous offenders, everyone will be apprised, and so the citizens, with this example before them, will be improved.

Again, if you condemn this man, not only will the people of our city know, but our allies also will take notice and our enemies will be informed; and they will hold our city in much higher regard if they see that you are especially indignant at this kind of offence, and that those who are insubordinate in war obtain no pardon.

And reflect, gentlemen, that some of the soldiers were sick, while others lacked the necessaries of life, and that the former would have been glad to remain for treatment in their cities, and the latter to retire home and attend to their own affairs; others would have liked to serve as light-armed troops, or else to take their risk with the cavalry.

But still, you did not venture to desert your ranks or choose what was most agreeable to yourselves, but were far more afraid of the city’s laws than of the danger of meeting the foe. All this you should remember when you give your vote today, and so make evident to all that any Athenians who do not wish to do battle with the enemy will suffer sorely at your hands.

I believe, gentlemen, that on the point of law and on the actual fact they will have nothing to say; but they will stand up here to beg him off and plead with you, claiming that you ought not to convict of such utter cowardice the son of Alcibiades, since that person has been the source of so many benefits,—instead of so much harm! Nay, if you had put that man to death at this man’s age, the first time that you caught him offending against you, the city would have escaped her great disasters.

And I feel it will be extraordinary, gentlemen, if, after condemning that person himself to death, you acquit on his account the son with guilt upon him,—this son who had not the courage himself to fight in your ranks, and whose father thought fit to march in those of the enemy. When this person, as a child, had not yet shown what kind of man he would be, he came near being handed over to the Eleven[*](The officers appointed to execute condemned criminals.) on account of his father’s offences; and now that you are acquainted with the roguery which this man has added to his father’s exploits, will you think proper to pity him on his father’s account?

Is it not monstrous, gentlemen, that these people should be so fortunate, when taken in transgression, as to come off safe on account of their birth, while we, if we had met with the misfortune as a result of their insubordination, would be unable to retrieve a single man from the enemy even on the plea of your ancestors’ high achievements?

And yet these have been numerous, important and advantageous to all the Greeks, and utterly unlike the conduct of these men towards the city, gentlemen of the jury. If they are more valued for trying to save their friends, clearly you on your part will be more honored for seeking to punish your enemies.

And I expect you, gentlemen, if some of his relatives attempt to beg him off, to be indignant that they were not at pains to entreat him—or, having entreated, were unable to prevail on him—to do what the city enjoined, but are endeavoring to persuade you that you should not punish wrongdoers.