Calumniae non temere credundum

In the first place, if you like, let us bring on the star of the play, I mean the author of the slander. That he is not a good man admits of no doubt, I am

sure, because no good man would make trouble for his neighbour. On the contrary, it is characteristic of good men to win renown and gain a reputation for kind-heartedness by doing good to their friends, not by accusing others wrongfully and getting them hated.

Furthermore, that such a man is unjust, lawless, impious and harmful to his associates is easy to see. Who will not admit that fairness in everything and unselfishness are due to justice, unfairness and: selfishness to injustice? But when a man plies slander in secret against people who are absent, is he not selfish, inasmuch as he completely appropriates his hearer by getting his ear first, stopping it up and making it altogether impervious to the defence because it has been previously filled with slander? Such conduct is indeed the height of injustice, and the best of the lawgivers, Solon and Draco, for example, would say so, too; for they put the jurors on oath to hear both sides alike and to divide their goodwill equally between the litigants until such time as the plea of the defendant, after comparison with the other, shall disclose itself to be better or worse. To pass judgment betore weighing the defence against the complaint would, they thought, be altogether impious and irreligious. In truth, we may say that the very gods would be angry if we should permit the plaintiff to say his say unhampered, but should stop our ears to the defendant or silence him,[*](The Greek is here corrupt. The translation merely gives the probable sense of the passage.) and then condemn him,

conquered by the'first plea. It may be said, then, that slander does not accord with what is just and legal, and what the jurors swear to do. But. if anybody thinks that the lawgivers, who regommend that verdicts be so just and impartial, are not good authority, I shall cite the best of poets in support of my contention. He makes a very admirable pronouncement — indeed, lays down a law—on this point, saying : [*](Though this verse was frequently quoted in antiquity, its authorship was unknown even then, and it was variously, attributed to Phocylides, Hesiod, and Pittheus. See Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. ii, p. 93.)

1. Nor give your verdict ere both sides you hear.

He knew, I suppose, like everyone else, that though there are many unjust things in the world, nothing worse or more unjust can be found than for men to have been condemned untried and unheard. But this is just what the slanderer tries his best to accomplish, exposing the slandered person untried to the anger of the hearer and precluding defence by the secrecy of his accusation.

Of course, all such men are also disingenuous and cowardly ; they do nothing in the open, but shoot from some hiding-place or, other, like soldiers in ambush, so that it is impossible either to face them or to fight them, but a man must let himself be slain in helplessness and in ignorance of the character of the war. And this is the surest proof that there is no truth in the stories of slanderers; for if a man is conscious that he is making a true charge, that man, I take it, accuses the other in public, brings him to book and pits himself against him in argument. No soldier who can win in fair fight makes use of ambushes and tricks against the enemy.