Laws

Ath. Did we not say[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 951d ff.) that we must have in our State a synod of the following kind:—The ten senior members, at the moment, of the body of Law-wardens shall form the synod, in company with all who have won the award of merit; and, moreover, those inspectors who have gone abroad[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 951a ff.) to discover if they could hear of anything pertinent to the safekeeping of laws, and who, in the belief that they have succeeded, have come safely home again, shall, after undergoing a searching test, be deemed worthy to take part in the synod? In addition to these, every member must bring with him one of the young men, not less than thirty years old, whom he has first selected as being both by nature and training a suitable person; after selecting him, he shall introduce him among the members, and if they also approve, he shall keep him as a colleague, but if they disapprove, the fact of his original selection must be concealed from all the rest, and especially from the person thus rejected. The synod must meet at an early hour, when everyone has his time most free from other business, private or public. Was it not some such organization as this that we described in our previous discourse?

Clin. It was.

Ath. Resuming, then, the subject of this synod, I will say this:—If one were to lay this down as an anchor for the whole State, possessing all the requisite conditions,—then, I affirm, it would secure the salvation of all that we desire.

Clin. How so?

Ath. Now will be the time for us to display no lack of zeal in declaring truly what follows.

Clin. Excellently spoken! Proceed as you propose.

Ath. One ought to observe, Clinias, in regard to every object, in each of its operations, what constitutes its appropriate savior—as, for example, in an animal, the soul and the head are eminently such by nature.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Surely it is the goodness of those parts that provides salvation to every animal.

Clin. How?

Ath. By the existence of reason in the soul, in addition to all its other qualities, and by the existence of sight and hearing, in addition to all else, in the head; thus, to summarize the matter, it is the combination of reason with the finest senses, and their union in one, that would most justly be termed the salvation of each animal.

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. It is probable. But what kind of reason is it which, when combined with senses, will afford salvation to ships in stormy weather and calm? On shipboard is it not the pilot and the sailors who, by combining the senses with the pilot reason, secure salvation both for themselves and for all that belongs to the ship?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. There is no need of many examples to illustrate this. Consider, for instance, what would be the right mark for a general to set up to shoot at in the case of an army, or the medical profession in the case of a human body, if they were aiming at salvation. Would not the former make victory his mark, and mastery over the enemy, while that of the doctors and their assistants would be the providing of health to the body?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. But if a doctor were ignorant of that bodily condition which we have now called health, or a general ignorant of victory, or any of the other matters we have mentioned, could he possibly be thought to possess reason about any of these things?

Clin. How could he?

Ath. What, now, shall we say about a State? If a man were to be plainly ignorant as regards the political mark to be aimed at, would he, first of all, deserve the title of magistrate, and, secondly, would he be able to secure the salvation of that object concerning the aim of which he knows nothing at all?

Clin. How could he?

Ath. So now, in our present case, if our settlement of the country is to be finally completed, there must, it would seem, exist in it some element which knows, in the first place, what that political aim, of which we are speaking, really is, and, secondly, in what manner it may attain this aim, and which of the laws, in the first instance, and secondly of men, gives it good counsel or bad. But if any State is destitute of such an element, it will not be surprising if, being thus void of reason and void of sense, it acts at haphazard always in all its actions.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. In which, then, of the parts or institutions of our State have we now got anything so framed as to prove an adequate safeguard of this kind? Can we answer that question?

Clin. No, Stranger; at least, not clearly. But if I must make a guess, it seems to me that this discourse of yours is leading up to that synod which has to meet at night, as you said just now.

Ath. An excellent reply, Clinias! And, as our present discourse shows, this synod must possess every virtue; and the prime virtue is not to keep shifting its aim among a number of objects,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 705e, Plat. Laws 934b.) but to concentrate its gaze always on one particular mark, and at that one mark to shoot, as it were, all its arrows continually.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. So now we shall understand that it is by no means surprising if the legal customs in States keep shifting, seeing that different parts of the codes in each State look in different directions. And, in general, it is not surprising that, with some statesmen, the aim of justice is to enable a certain class of people to rule in the State (whether they be really superior, or inferior), while with others the aim is how to acquire wealth (whether or not they be somebody’s slaves); and others again direct their efforts to winning a life of freedom. Still others make two objects at once the joint aim of their legislation,—namely, the gaining of freedom for themselves, and mastery over other States; while those who are the wisest of all, in their own conceit, aim not at one only, but at the sum total of these and the like objects, since they are unable to specify any one object of preeminent value towards which they would desire all else to be directed.

Clin. Then, Stranger, was not the view we stated long ago the right one? We said[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 630e ff.) that all our laws must always aim at one single object, which, as we agreed, is quite rightly named virtue.

Ath. Yes.

Clin. And we stated that virtue consists of four things.

Ath. Certainly.

Clin. And that the chief of all the four is reason,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 631c ff.: reason (or wisdom) as the most divine stands first, the others being temperance, justice and courage.) at which the other three, as well as everything else, should aim.

Ath. You follow us admirably, Clinias; and now follow us in what comes next. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed, as we said, towards the one object of aim which is proper in each case; and now we are at the point of examining reason in the case of a statesman, and, addressing it as a man, we shall question it thus:—O admirable sir, what is your aim? Medical reason is able to state clearly the one single object at which it aims; so will you be unable to state your one object—you who are superior, as perhaps you will say, to all the wise? Can you two, Megillus and Clinias, define that object on his behalf, and tell me what you say it is, just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their objects for you?

Clin. We are totally unable to do so.

Ath. Well then, can you declare that we need zeal in discerning both the object itself as a whole and the forms it assumes?

Clin. Illustrate what you mean by the forms you speak of.

Ath. For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, obviously, since there are four, we must assert that each is a separate one.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And yet we call them all by one name: we assert that courage is virtue, and wisdom virtue, and the other two likewise, as though they were really not a plurality, but solely this one thing—virtue.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Now it is not hard to explain wherein these two (and the rest) differ from one another, and how they have got two names; but to explain why we have given the one name virtue to both of them (and to the rest) is no longer an easy matter.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. It is not hard to make clear my meaning. Let one of us adopt the role of questioner, the other of answerer.[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 893a.)

Clin. In what way?

Ath. Do you ask me this question—why, when calling both the two by the single name of virtue, did we again speak of them as two—courage and wisdom? Then I shall tell you the reason,—which is, that the one of them has to do with fear, namely courage,[*](Cp. Plat. Lach. 196d ff., Plat. Prot. 349b ff.) in which beasts also share, and the characters of very young children; for a courageous soul comes into existence naturally and without reasoning, but without reasoning there never yet came into existence, and there does not nor ever will exist, a soul that is wise and rational, it being a distinct kind.

Clin. That is true.

Ath. Wherein they differ and are two you have now learnt from my reply. So do you, in turn, inform me how it is that they are one and identical. Imagine you are also going to tell me how it is that, though four, they are yet one; and then, after you have shown me how they are one, do you again ask me how they are four. And after that, let us enquire regarding the person who has full knowledge of any objects which possess both a name and a definition, whether he ought to know the name only, and not know the definition, or whether it is not a shameful thing for a man worth anything to be ignorant of all these points in regard to matters of surpassing beauty and importance.

Clin. It would certainly seem to be so.

Ath. For the lawgiver and the Law-warden, and for him who thinks he surpasses all men in virtue and who has won prizes for just such qualities, is there anything more important than these very qualities with which we are now dealing—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom?

Clin. Impossible.

Ath. In regard to these matters, is it not right that the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, as the wardens of the rest, in dealing with him that requires knowledge and information, or with him that requires punishment and reproof for his sin, should excel all others in the art of instructing him in the quality of vice and virtue and exhibiting it fully? Or is some poet who comes into the State, or one who calls himself a trainer of youth, to be accounted evidently superior to him that has won prizes for all the virtues? In a State like that, where there are no wardens who are competent both in word and deed, and possessed of a competent knowledge of virtue,—is it surprising, I ask, if such a State, all unwarded as it is, suffers the same fate as do many of the States which exist today?

Clin. Not at all, I should say.

Ath. Well then, must we do what we now propose, or what? Must we contrive how our wardens shall have a more accurate grasp of virtue, both in word and deed, than the majority of men? For otherwise, how shall our State resemble a wise man’s head and senses, on the ground that it possesses within itself a similar kind of wardenship?

Clin. What is this resemblance we speak of and wherein does it consist?

Ath. Evidently we are comparing the State itself to the skull; and, of the wardens, the younger ones, who are selected as the most intelligent and nimble in every part of their souls, are set, as it were, like the eyes, in the top of the head, and survey the State all round;

Ath. and as they watch, they pass on their perceptions to the organs of memory,—that is, they report to the elder wardens all that goes on in the State,— while the old men, who are likened to the reason because of their eminent wisdom in many matters of importance, act as counsellors, and make use of the young men as ministers and colleagues also in their counsels, so that both these classes by their co-operation really effect the salvation of the whole State. Is this the way, or ought we to contrive some other? Should the State, do you think, have all its members equal instead of having some more highly trained and educated?

Clin. Nay, my good sir, that were impossible.

Ath. We must proceed, then, to expound a type of education that is higher than the one previously described.

Clin. I suppose so.

Ath. Will the type which we hinted at just now[*](Plat. Laws 962e, Plat. Laws 963b ff.) prove to be that which we require?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Did we not say[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 903c, Plat. Laws 903d, Plat. Laws 961e.) that he who is a first-class craftsman or warden, in any department, must not only be able to pay regard to the many, but must be able also to press towards the One[*](Cp. Plat. Rep. 537b ff., where the dialectic method is described as a kind of induction (συναγωγή) whereby the mind ascends from the many particulars to the one universal concept or idea: a comprehensive view (σύνοψις) of the whole is what marks the dialectician (ὁ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός).) so as to discern it and, on discerning it, to survey and organize all the rest with a single eye to it?

Clin. Quite right.

Ath. Can any man get an accurate vision and view of any object better than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar to the one unifying form?

Clin. Probably not.

Ath. It is certain, my friend, rather than probable, that no man can possibly have a clearer method than this.

Clin. I believe you, Stranger, and I assent; so let us employ this method in our subsequent discourse.

Ath. Naturally we must compel the wardens also of our divine polity to observe accurately, in the first place, what that identical element is which pervades all the four virtues, and which,—since it exists as a unity in courage, temperance, justice and wisdom,— may justly be called, as we assert, by the single name of virtue. This element, my friends, we must now (if we please) hold very tight, and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object to be aimed at—whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Else, if this eludes us, can we possibly suppose that we shall adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we are unable to state whether it is many or four or one? Accordingly, if we follow our own counsel, we shall contrive somehow, by hook or by crook, that this knowledge shall exist in our State. Should we decide, however, to pass it over entirely—pass it over we must.

Clin. Nay, Stranger, in the name of the Stranger’s God, we must by no means pass over a matter such as this, since what you say seems to us most true. But how is this to be contrived?

Ath. It is too early to explain how we are to contrive it: let us first make sure that we agree among ourselves as to whether or not we ought to do so.

Clin. Well, surely we ought, if we can.

Ath. Very well then; do we hold the same view about the fair and the good? Ought our wardens to know only that each of these is a plurality, or ought they also to know how and wherein they are each a unity?

Clin. It is fairly obvious that they must necessarily also discern how these are a unity.

Ath. Well then, ought they to discern it, but be unable to give a verbal demonstration of it?

Clin. Impossible! The state of mind you describe is that of a slave.

Ath. Well then, do we hold the same view about all forms of goodness, that those who are to be real wardens of the laws must really know the true nature of them, and be capable both of expounding it in word and conforming to it in deed, passing judgment on fair actions and foul according to their real character?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And is not one of the fairest things the doctrine about the gods, which we expounded earnestly,[*](In Book X.)—to know both that they exist, and what power they manifestly possess, so far as a man is capable of learning these matters; so that while one should pardon the mass of the citizens if they merely follow the letter of the law, one must exclude from office those who are eligible for wardenship, unless they labor to grasp all the proofs there are about the existence of gods? Such exclusion from office consists in refusing ever to choose as a Law-warden, or to number among those approved for excellence, a man who is not divine himself, nor has spent any labor over things divine.

Clin. It is certainly just, as you say, that the man who is idle or incapable in respect of this subject should be strictly debarred from the ranks of the noble.

Ath. Are we assured, then, that there are two causes, amongst those we previously discussed,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 893b.) which lead to faith in the gods?

Clin. What two?

Ath. One is our dogma about the soul,—that it is the most ancient and divine of all the things whose motion, when developed into becoming, provides an ever-flowing fount of being; and the other is our dogma concerning the ordering of the motion of the stars[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 898c.) and all the other bodies under the control of reason, which has made a cosmos of the All.

Ath. For no man that views these objects in no careless or amateurish way has ever proved so godless as not to be affected by them in a way just the opposite of that which most people expect. For they imagine that those who study these objects in astronomy and the other necessary allied arts become atheists through observing, as they suppose, that all things come into being by necessary forces and not by the mental energy of the will aiming at the fulfillment of good.

Clin. What in fact is the real state of the case?

Ath. The position at present is, as I said, exactly the opposite of what it was when those who considered these objects considered them to be soulless. Yet even then they were objects of admiration, and the conviction which is now actually held was suspected by all who studied them accurately—namely, that if they were soulless, and consequently devoid of reason, they could never have employed with such precision calculations so marvellous; and even in those days there were some who dared to hazard the statement[*](An allusion to the saying of Anaxagoras, All things were together; then Reason (νοῦς) came and set them in order. But A. ascribed to Reason only the initiation of a world-order; in all other respects his doctrine was materialistic, and he used purely physical causes and processes in explaining the world, regarding the stars as fiery masses of matter (full of earth, stones, etc.). Cp.Phaedo 91 B ff.) that reason is the orderer of all that is in the heavens. But the same thinkers, through mistaking the nature of the soul and conceiving her to be posterior, instead of prior, to body, upset again (so to say) the whole universe, and most of all themselves; for as regards the visible objects of sight, all that moves in the heavens appeared to them to be full of stones, earth and many other soulless bodies which dispense the causes of the whole cosmos. These were the views which, at that time, caused these thinkers to incur many charges of atheism and much odium, and which also incited the poets to abuse them[*](Cp. Plat. Rep. 607b, c.) by likening philosophers to dogs howling at the moon, with other such senseless slanders. But today, as we have said, the position is quite the reverse.

Clin. How so?

Ath. It is impossible for any mortal man to become permanently god-fearing if he does not grasp the two truths now stated,—namely, how that the soul is oldest of all things that partake of generation, and is immortal, and rules over all bodies,—and in addition to this, he must also grasp that reason which, as we have often affirmed, controls what exists among the stars, together with the necessary preliminary sciences;[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 818a ff.) and he must observe also the connection therewith of musical theory, and apply it harmoniously to the institutions and rules of ethics;[*](Cp. Plat. Rep. 401d ff, Plat. Rep. 500d ff, Plat. Rep. 531 ff.) and he must be able to give a rational explanation of all that admits of rational explanation.

Ath. He that is unable to master these sciences, in addition to the popular virtues,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 710a.) will never make a competent magistrate of the whole State, but only a minister to other magistrates. And now, O Megillus and Clinias, it is time at last to consider whether, in addition to all the previous laws which we have stated, we shall add this also—that the nocturnal synod of magistrates shall be legally established, and shall participate in all the education we have described, to keep ward over the State, and to secure its salvation; or what are we to do?

Clin. Of course we shall add this law, my excellent sir, if we can possibly do so, even to a small extent.

Ath. Then, verily, let us all strive to do so. And herein you will find me a most willing helper, owing to my very long experience and study of this subject; and perhaps I shall discover other helpers also besides myself.

Clin. Well, Stranger, we most certainly must proceed on that path along which God too, it would seem, is conducting us. But what is the right method for us to employ,— that is what we have now got to discover and state.

Ath. It is not possible at this stage, Megillus and Clinias, to enact laws for such a body, before it has been duly framed; when it is, its members must themselves ordain what authority they should possess; but it is already plain that what is required in order to form such a body, if it is to be rightly formed, is teaching by means of prolonged conferences.

Clin. How so? What now are we to understand by this observation?

Ath. Surely we must first draw up a list of all those who are fitted by age, intellectual capacity, and moral character and habit for the office of warden; but as regards the next point, the subjects they should learn,—these it is neither easy to discover for oneself[*](Cp. Plat. Rep. 528b ff.) nor is it easy to find another who has made the discovery and learn from him. Moreover, with respect to the limits of time, when and for how long they ought to receive instruction in each subject, it were idle to lay down written regulations;[*](Cp.Epp. 7. 341 C.) for even the learners themselves could not be sure that they were learning at the opportune time until each of them had acquired within his soul some knowledge of the subject in question. Accordingly, although it would be wrong to term all these matters indescribable, they should be termed imprescribable, seeing that the prescribing of them beforehand does nothing to elucidate the question under discussion.

Clin. What then must we do, Stranger, under these circumstances?

Ath. Apparently, my friends, we must take our chance with the crowd (as the saying is), and if we are willing to put the whole polity to the hazard and throw (as men say) three sixes or three aces, so it must be done; and I will go shares with you in the hazard by declaring and explaining my views concerning education and nurture, the subject now started anew in our discourse; but truly the hazard will be no small one, nor comparable to any others. And you, Clinias, I specially exhort to take good heed to this matter. For as concerns the State of the Magnesians—or whoever else, by the god’s direction, gives your State its name,[*](i.e. if the god should direct the State to be named, not after the Magnetes, but after some other person or place: cp. Plat. Laws 704a, Plat. Laws 919d.)—if you frame it aright, you will achieve most high renown, or at any rate you will inevitably gain the reputation of being the boldest of all your successors. If so be that this divine synod actually comes into existence, my dear colleagues, we must hand over to it the State; and practically all our present lawgivers agree to this without dispute. Thus we shall have as an accomplished fact and waking reality that result which we treated but a short while ago in our discourse as a mere dream, when we constructed a kind of picture of the union of the reason and the head,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 964dx.)—if, that is to say, we have the members carefully selected and suitably trained, and after their training quartered in the acropolis of the country, and thus finally made into wardens, the like of whom we have never before seen in our lives for excellence in safeguarding.

Meg. My dear Clinias, from all that has now been said it follows that either we must forgo the idea of settling the State, or else we must detain this Stranger here, and by prayers and every possible means secure his cooperation in the task of settling the State.

Clin. That is most true, Megillus; I will do as you say, and do you yourself assist me.

Meg. Assist you I will.