Laws

Ath.Further, things increase when combined and decrease when separated in all cases where the regular constitution[*](i.e. as solid, liquid, or gaseous substance.) of each persists; but if this does not remain, then both these conditions cause them to perish. And what is the condition which must occur in everything to bring about generation? Obviously whenever a starting-principle receiving increase comes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on coming to the third admits of perception by percipients.[*](This account of the derivation of the sense-world from the starting-principle (ἀρχή) is obscure. It is generally interpreted as a geometrical allegory, the stages of development being from point to line, from line to surface, from surface to solid,—this last only being perceptible by the senses (cp. Aristot. Soul 404 b 18 ff.).) Everything comes into being by this process of change and alteration; and a thing is really existent whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed. Have we now, my friends, mentioned all the forms of motion, capable of numerical classification,[*](The 8 kinds of motion here indicated are—(1) circular motion round a fixed center; (2) locomotion (gliding or rolling); (3) combination; (4) separation; (5) increase; (6) decrease; (7) becoming; (8) perishing. The remaining two kinds (as described below) are—(9) other-affecting motion (or secondary causation); and (10) self-and-other-affecting motion (or primary causation).) save only two?

Clin. What two?

Ath. Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken.

Clin. Explain more clearly.

Ath. It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. As one of the two let us count that motion which is always able to move other things, but unable to move itself; and that motion which always is able to move both itself and other things,—by way of combination and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation and corruption,—let us count as another separate unit in the total number of motions.

Clin. Be it so.

Ath. Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another; while that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of action and passion, and is termed the real change and motion of all that really exists,—it, I presume, we shall call the tenth.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and excelling in effectiveness?

Clin. We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest come after it.

Ath. Well said. Must we, then, alter one or two of the wrong statements we have now made?

Clin. Which do you mean?

Ath. Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.

Clin. How?

Ath. Logically it is first in point of origin and power; and the next one is second to it, although we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible.

Ath. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things, will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?

Clin. Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.

Ath. Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still,—as most of these thinkers[*](E.g. Anaxagoras, who taught, originally, all things were together (ὁμοῦ); and the Eleatic School (Parmenides, etc.) asserted that the Real World (τὸ ὄν) is One and motionless; cp. Plat. Theaet. 180e.) venture to maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing, since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. Now that we have come to this point in our discourse, here is a question we may answer.

Clin. What is it?

Ath. If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?

Clin. What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as alive when it moves itself?

Ath. Yes.

Clin. It is alive, to be sure.

Ath. Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?

Clin. We must.

Ath. Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name;[*](Cp. Epistles 7, 342 A, B.) and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.

Clin. How two?

Ath. At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.

Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?

Ath. Of what kind?

Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is the even, and the definition is a number divisible into two equal parts.

Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name even, and by the definition a number divisible into two halves?

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name soul? Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—the motion able to move itself?

Clin. Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has soul as the name we universally apply to it?

Ath. That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clin. We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.

Ath. Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?

Clin. True.

Ath. Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.

Clin. Yes, most veracious.

Ath. We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed[*](Plat. Laws 892a, Plat. Laws 892b.) that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.

Clin. Certainly we do.

Ath. Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?

Clin. Of course we must.

Ath. And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—several. Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.

Clin. You are perfectly right.

Ath. Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 894b, Plat. Laws 894c.) and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?

Clin. By no means.

Ath. Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which has neither quality? To this shall we make reply as follows?

Clin. How?

Ath. If, my good sir, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason,[*](i.e. the uniform revolution of a sphere in the same spot and on its own axis: cp. Plat. Laws 898a; Plat. Tim. 34a ff, Plat. Tim. 34b ff; Plat. 90c, d.) and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course, which is of the kind described.

Clin. You are right.

Ath. But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way.

Clin. That also is right.

Ath. Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you should now call me in to assist you with the answer.

Clin. Very good.

Ath. In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun,[*](Cp.Plat. Rep. 516a ff.) as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully; the safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of which[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 893b.; the motion to which reason is likened is the first of the ten.) I, along with you, will make answer.

Clin. You will probably speak admirably.

Ath. Do we still recollect thus much about the things then described, that we assumed that, of the total, some were in motion, others at rest?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And further, that, of those in motion, some move in one place, others move in several places?

Clin. That is so.

Ath. And that, of these two motions, the motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels; and that this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason?[*](Cp.Plat. Tim. 33b ff, Plat. Tim. 34a ff; Plat. Rep. 436b ff.)

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system—reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place (likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order or system or rule—will not this motion be akin to absolute unreason?

Clin. It will, in very truth.

Ath. So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite.

Clin. But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is actually impious to make any other assertion than that these things are driven round by one or more souls endowed with all goodness.

Ath. You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias. Now attend to this further point.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. If soul drives round the sum total of sun, moon and all other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars which will evidently apply equally to them all.

Clin. About which one?

Ath. The sun’s body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, has grown round all the senses of the body,[*](i.e. envelopes the body and its sense-organs (like circum-ambient air).) and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—

Clin. What fact?

Ath. If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.

Clin. What things?

Ath. That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside; or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body.

Clin. Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things.

Ath. Here, I pray you, pause. This soul,—whether it is by riding in the car of the sun,[*](Cp.Plat. Tim. 41d ff, Plat. Tim. 41e ff, where the Creator is said to apportion a soul to each star, in which it rides as though in a chariot.) or from outside, or otherwise, that it brings light to us all—every man is bound to regard as a god. Is not that so?

Clin. Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the uttermost verge of folly.

Ath. Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that

all things are full of gods

Clin. There is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.

Ath. Let us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man who up till now disbelieves in gods, O Megillus and Clinias, and so be quit of him.

Clin. What conditions?

Ath. That either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is of all things the first production, together with all the consequential statements we made,—or, if he is unable to improve on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of his life live in veneration of the gods. Let us, then, consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods addressed to those who disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or defectively.

Clin. Anything rather than defectively, Stranger.

Ath. Then let our argument have an end, in so far as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs,—him we must admonish. My good sir, let us say, the fact that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honor it and recognize its existence; but the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both private and public,—which, though not really happy, are excessively and improperly lauded as happy by public opinion,—drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every kind.

Ath.Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of old age, and leaving behind them children’s children in the highest offices, very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover—whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation—some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well. And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now, and convey you across the stream.[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 892d, Plat. Laws 892e.)

Clin. A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.

Ath. Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course, he was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.

Clin. Most certainly he heard that.

Ath. Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?

Clin. We do say so.

Ath. And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?

Clin. To this, too, everyone would assent.

Ath. Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?

Clin. How could we?

Ath. As the opposite, then?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?

Clin. Of the opposite quality.

Ath. What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described[*](Hes. WD 303.:τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς|ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὁρμήν.)—

a man most like to sting-less drones

Clin. A most true description.

Ath. That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.

Clin. We could not possibly allow that.

Ath. When a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for some object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety? Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?

Clin. What forms?

Ath. Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole, or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.

Clin. Of course not.

Ath. Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small. First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 641e.) and that nothing of all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?

Clin. That is what we assert.[*](Here, and in what follows, Clinias is answering on behalf of the two misbelievers.)

Ath. And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?

Clin. They will, of course, admit that this also is the case.

Ath. And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, yea, exceeding good.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and indolence.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness and laziness, seeing that none has any part in cowardice.

Clin. You are very right.

Ath. Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things or—well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing?

Clin. There is none.

Ath. Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care,—or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not, owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?

Clin. Impossible.

Ath. Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living creatures?

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. That being so, it matters not whether a man says that these things are small or great in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it behove those who are our owners to be neglectful, seeing that they are most careful and most good. For let us notice this further fact—

Clin. What is it?

Ath. In regard to perception and power,—are not these two naturally opposed in respect of ease and difficulty?

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. It is more difficult to see and hear small things than great; but everyone finds it more easy to move, control and care for things small and few than their opposites.

Clin. Much more.

Ath. When a physician is charged with the curing of a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition?

Clin. Certainly not.

Ath. No more will pilots or generals or house-managers, nor yet statesmen or any other such persons, find that the many and great thrive apart from the few and small; for even masons say that big stones are not well laid without little stones.

Clin. They cannot be.

Ath. Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal craftsmen who, the better they are, the more accurately and perfectly do they execute their proper tasks, small and great, by one single art,—or that God, who is most wise, and both willing and able to care, cares not at all for the small things which are the easier to care for—like one who shirks the labor because he is idle and cowardly,—but only for the great.

Clin. By no means let us accept such an opinion of the gods, Stranger: that would be to adopt a view that is neither pious nor true at all.

Ath. And now, as I think, we have argued quite sufficiently with him who loves to censure the gods for neglect.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And it was by forcing him by our arguments to acknowledge that what he says is wrong. But still he needs also, as it seems to me, some words of counsel to act as a charm upon him.

Clin. What kind of words, my good sir?

Ath. Let us persuade the young man by our discourse that all things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World—all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, whereof also each part, so far as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it. To each of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of their action and passion are appointed to bring about fulfillment even to the uttermost fraction; whereof thy portion also, O perverse man, is one, and tends therefore always in its striving towards the All, tiny though it be. But thou failest to perceive that all partial generation is for the sake of the Whole, in order that for the life of the World-all blissful existence may be secured,—it not being generated for thy sake, but thou for its sake. For every physician and every trained craftsman works always for the sake of a Whole, and strives after what is best in general, and he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part; but thou art vexed, because thou knowest not how what is best in thy case for the All turns out best for thyself also, in accordance with the power of your common origin. And inasmuch as soul, being conjoined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul, there is left for the draughts-player no further task,—save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to each may be allotted its appropriate destiny.

Clin. In what way do you mean?

Ath. The way I am describing is, I believe, that in which supervision of all things is most easy for the gods. For if one were to shape all things, without a constant view to the Whole, by transforming them (as, for instance, fire into water), instead of merely converting one into many or many into one, then when things had shared in a first, or second, or even third generation,[*](This seems to refer to three stages of the soul’s incarnation; see p. 367, n. 2.) they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations; but as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wondrous easy.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Thus:—Since our King saw that all actions involve soul, and contain much good and much evil, and that body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but not eternal,[*](Cp.Plat. Tim 37c ff.) as are the gods ordained by law (for if either soul or body had been destroyed, there would never have been generation of living creatures), and since He perceived that all soul that is good naturally tends always to benefit, but the bad to injure,—observing all this, He designed a location for each of the parts, wherein it might secure the victory of goodness in the Whole and the defeat of evil most completely, easily, and well. For this purpose He has designed the rule which prescribes what kind of character should be set to dwell in what kind of position and in what regions;[*](Cp.Plat. Tim 42b ff. where it is said that the soul of the good man returns at death to its native star, while that of the bad takes the form of a woman in its second, and that of a beast in its third incarnation.) but the causes of the generation of any special kind he left to the wills of each one of us men.[*](Cp. Plat. Rep. 617e.) For according to the trend of our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us generally becomes of a corresponding character.

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. All things that share in soul change, since they possess within themselves the cause of change, and in changing they move according to the law and order of destiny; the smaller the change of character, the less is the movement over surface in space, but when the change is great and towards great iniquity, then they move towards the deep and the so-called lower regions, regarding which—under the names of Hades and the like—men are haunted by most fearful imaginings, both when alive and when disparted from their bodies. And whenever the soul gets a specially large share of either virtue or vice, owing to the force of its own will and the influence of its intercourse growing strong, then, if it is in union with divine virtue, it becomes thereby eminently virtuous, and moves to an eminent region, being transported by a holy road to another and a better region; whereas, if the opposite is the case, it changes to the opposite the location of its life’s abode.

Ath.

1. This is the just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus,

Clin. Admirably spoken: let us do as you say.

Ath. Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I ask—in what way would they come to be seduced by us, if seduced they were? Being what in their essence and character? Necessarily they must be rulers, if they are to be in continual control of the whole heaven.

Clin. True.

Ath. But to which kind of rulers are they like? Or which are like to them, of those rulers whom we can fairly compare with them, as small with great? Would drivers of rival teams resemble them, or pilots of ships? Or perhaps they might be likened to rulers of armies; or possibly they might be compared to physicians watching over a war against bodily disease, or to farmers fearfully awaiting seasons of wonted difficulty for the generation of plants, or else to masters of flocks. For seeing that we have agreed[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 904a ff., Plat. Laws 896c ff., Plat. Rep. 379c.) among ourselves that the heaven is full of many things that are good, and of the opposite kind also, and that those not good are the more numerous, such a battle, we affirm, is undying, and needs a wondrous watchfulness,—the gods and daemons being our allies, and we the possession[*](Cp.Plat. Phaedo 62b.) of the gods and daemons; and what destroys us is iniquity and insolence combined with folly, what saves us, justice and temperance combined with wisdom, which dwell in the animate powers of the gods, and of which some small trace may be clearly seen here also residing in us. But there are certain souls that dwell on earth and have acquired unjust gain which, being plainly bestial, beseech the souls of the guardians—whether they be watch-dogs or herdsmen or the most exalted of masters—trying to convince them by fawning words and prayerful incantations that (as the tales of evil men relate) they can profiteer among men on earth without any severe penalty: but we assert that the sin now mentioned, of profiteering or over-gaining, is what is called in the case of fleshly bodies disease,[*](Cp.Plat. Rep. 609 ff, Plat. Sym. 188a ff., where the theory is stated that health depends upon the harmony, or equal balance, of the constituent elements of the body (heat and cold, moisture and dryness,); when any of these (opposite) elements is in excess (πλεονεκτεῖ), disease sets in. So, too, in the body politic, the excess of due measure by any element, or member, is injustice.) in that of seasons and years pestilence, and in that of States and polities, by a verbal change, this same sin is called injustice.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Such must necessarily be the account of the matter given by the man who says that the gods are always merciful to unjust men and those who act unjustly, provided that one gives them a share of one’s unjust gains; it is just as if wolves were to give small bits of their prey to watch-dogs, and they being mollified by the gifts were to allow them to go ravening among the flocks. Is not this the account given by the man who asserts that the gods are open to bribes?

Clin. It is.

Ath. To which of the guardians aforementioned might a man liken the gods without incurring ridicule? Is it to pilots, who, when warped themselves by wine’s

flow and flavor,

Clin. By no means.

Ath. And surely not to drivers ranged up for a race and seduced by a gift to lose it in favor of other teams?

Clin. If that was the account you gave of them, it would indeed be a horrible comparison.

Ath. Nor, surely, to generals or physicians or farmers or herdsmen; nor yet to dogs charmed by wolves?

Clin. Hush! That is quite impossible.

Ath. Are not all gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest things?

Clin. Yes, by far.

Ath. Shall we say that those who watch over the fairest things, and who are themselves eminently good at keeping watch, are inferior to dogs and ordinary men, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts impiously offered by unjust men?

Clin. By no means; it is an intolerable thing to say, and whoever embraces such an opinion would most justly be adjudged the worst and most impious of all the impious men who practice impiety in all its forms.

Ath. May we now say that we have fully proved our three propositions,—namely, that the gods exist, and that they are careful, and that they are wholly incapable of being seduced to transgress justice?

Clin. Certainly we may; and in these statements you have our support.

Ath. And truly they have been made in somewhat vehement terms, in our desire for victory over those wicked men; and our desire for victory was due to our fear lest haply, if they gained the mastery in argument, they should suppose they had gained the right to act as they chose—those men who wickedly hold all those false notions about the gods. On this account we have been zealous to speak with special honor; and if we have produced any good effect, however small, in the way of persuading the men to hate themselves and to feel some love for an opposite kind of character, then our prelude to the laws respecting impiety will not have been spoken amiss.

Clin. Well, there is hope; and if not, at any rate no fault will be found with the lawgiver in respect of the nature of the argument.

Ath. After the prelude it will be proper for us to have a statement of a kind suitable to serve as the laws’ interpreter, forewarning all the impious to quit their ways for those of piety. For those who disobey, this shall be the law concerning impiety:—If anyone commits impiety either by word or deed, he that meets with him shall defend the law by informing the magistrates, and the first magistrates who hear of it shall bring the man up before the court[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 767c, Plat. Laws 767d, Plat. Laws 855c.) appointed to decide such cases as the laws direct; and if any magistrate on hearing of the matter fail to do this, he himself shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of him who wishes to punish him on behalf of the laws.

Ath. And if a man be convicted, the court shall assess one penalty for each separate act of impiety. Imprisonment shall be imposed in every case; and since there are three prisons in the State (namely, one public prison near the market for most cases, to secure the persons of the average criminals; a second, situated near the assembly-room of the officials who hold nightly assemblies,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 909a, Plat. Laws 961a.) and named the reformatory; and a third, situated in the middle of the country, in the wildest and loneliest spot possible, and named after retribution[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 704b.)), and since men are involved in impiety from the three causes which we have described, and from each such cause two forms of impiety result—consequently those who sin in respect of religion fall into six classes which require to be distinguished, as needing penalties that are neither equal nor similar. For while those who, though they utterly disbelieve in the existence of the gods, possess by nature a just character, both hate the evil and, because of their dislike of injustice, are incapable of being induced to commit unjust actions, and flee from unjust men and love the just, on the other hand, those who, besides holding that the world is empty of gods, are afflicted by incontinence in respect of pleasures and pains, and possess also powerful memories and sharp wits—though both these classes share alike in the disease of atheism, yet in respect of the amount of ruin they bring on other people, the latter class would work more and the former less of evil. For whereas the one class will be quite frank in its language about the gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and by ridiculing other people will probably convert others to its views, unless it meets with punishment, the other class, while holding the same opinions as the former, yet being specially gifted by nature and being full of craft and guile, is the class out of which are manufactured many diviners and experts in all manner of jugglery; and from it, too, there spring sometimes tyrants and demagogues and generals, and those who plot by means of peculiar mystic rites of their own, and the devices of those who are called sophists. Of these there may be many kinds; but those which call for legislation are two, of which the ironic[*](i.e. hypocritical, hiding impiety under a cloak of religion.) kind commits sins that deserve not one death only or two, while the other kind requires both admonition and imprisonment.

Ath. Likewise also the belief that the gods are neglectful breeds two other kinds of impiety; and the belief in their being open to bribes, other two. These kinds being thus distinguished, those criminals who suffer from folly,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 863b, Plat. Laws 863c.) being devoid of evil disposition and character, shall be placed by the judge according to law in the reformatory for a period of not less than five years, during which time no other of the citizens shall hold intercourse with them, save only those who take part in the nocturnal assembly,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 908a.) and they shall company with them to minister to their souls’ salvation by admonition; and when the period of their incarceration has expired, if any of them seems to be reformed, he shall dwell with those who are reformed, but if not, and if he be convicted again on a like charge, he shall be punished by death. But as to all those who have become like ravening beasts, and who, besides holding that the gods are negligent or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of many of the living, and claiming that they charm the souls of the dead, and promising to persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers and incantations,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 933a,, Plat. Rep. 364b ff.) and who try thus to wreck utterly not only individuals, but whole families and States for the sake of money,—if any of these men be pronounced guilty, the court shall order him to be imprisoned according to law in the mid-country jail, and shall order that no free man shall approach such criminals at any time, and that they shall receive from the servants a ration of food as fixed by the Law-wardens. And he that dies shall be cast outside the borders without burial; and if any free man assist in burying him, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who chooses to prosecute. And if the dead man leaves children fit for citizenship, the guardians of orphans shall take them also under their charge from the day of their father’s conviction, just as much as any other orphans. For all these offenders one general law must be laid down, such as will cause the majority of them not only to offend less against the gods by word and deed, but also to become less foolish, through being forbidden to trade in religion illegally. To deal comprehensively with all such cases the following law shall be enacted:—No one shall possess a shrine in his own house: when any one is moved in spirit to do sacrifice, he shall go to the public places to sacrifice, and he shall hand over his oblations to the priests and priestesses to whom belongs the consecration thereof; and he himself, together with any associates he may choose, shall join in the prayers.

Ath. This procedure shall be observed for the following reasons—It is no easy task to found temples and gods, and to do this rightly needs much deliberation; yet it is customary for all women especially, and for sick folk everywhere, and those in peril or in distress (whatever the nature of the distress), and conversely for those who have had a slice of good fortune, to dedicate whatever happens to be at hand at the moment, and to vow sacrifices and promise the founding of shrines to gods and demi-gods and children of gods; and through terrors caused by waking visions or by dreams, and in like manner as they recall many visions and try to provide remedies for each of them, they are wont to found altars and shrines, and to fill with them every house and every village, and open places too, and every spot which was the scene of such experiences. For all these reasons their action should be governed by the law now stated; and a further reason is this—to prevent impious men from acting fraudulently in regard to these matters also, by setting up shrines and altars in private houses, thinking to propitiate the gods privily by sacrifices and vows, and thus increasing infinitely their own iniquity, whereby they make both themselves and those better men who allow them guilty in the eyes of the gods, so that the whole State reaps the consequences of their impiety in some degree—and deserves to reap them. The lawgiver himself, however, will not be blamed by the god; for this shall be the law laid down:—Shrines of the gods no one must possess in a private house; and if anyone is proved to possess and worship at any shrine other than the public shrines—be the possessor man or woman,—and if he is guilty of no serious act of impiety, he that notices the fact shall inform the Law-wardens, and they shall give orders for the private shrines to be removed to the public temples, and if the owner disobeys the order, they shall punish him until he removes them. And if anyone be proved to have committed an impious act, such as is not the venial offence of children, but the serious irreligion of grown men, whether by setting up a shrine on private ground, or on public ground, by doing sacrifice to any gods whatsoever, for sacrificing in a state of impurity he shall be punished with death. And the Law-wardens shall judge what is a childish or venial offence and what not, and then shall bring the offenders before the court, and shall impose upon them the due penalty for their impiety.

Ath. In the next place our business transactions one with another will require proper regulation. The following will serve for a comprehensive rule:—as far as possible, no one shall touch my goods nor move them in the slightest degree, if he has in no wise at all got my consent; and I must act in like manner regarding the goods of all other men, keeping prudent mind. As the first of such things let us mention treasure: that which a man has laid by in store for himself and his family (he not being one of my parents), I must never pray to the gods to find, nor, if I do find it, may I move it, nor may I ever tell of it to the soothsayers (so-called), who are certain to counsel me to take up what is laid down in the ground. For never should I gain so much pecuniary profit by its removal, as I should win increase in virtue of soul and in justice by not removing it; and by preferring to gain justice in my soul rather than money in my purse, I should be winning a greater in place of a lesser gain, and that too in a better part of me. The rule,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 684e, Plat. Laws 843a.) Thou shalt not move the immovable, is rightly applicable to many cases; and the case before us is one of them. And men ought also to believe the stories told about these matters,—how that such conduct is injurious to the getting of children. But if any man proves to be both regardless of children and neglectful of the legislator, and, without the consent of the depositor, takes up a treasure which neither he himself nor any of his forefathers has deposited, and thus breaks a law most fair, and that most comprehensive ordinance of the noble man[*](Solon.) who said, Take not up what you laid not down,—the man who despises these two lawgivers and takes up what he has not laid down himself, it being no small thing but sometimes a vast quantity of treasure,—what penalty should such a man suffer?

Ath. God knows what, at the hands of gods; but the man that first notices an act of this kind shall report it, if it occur in the city, to the city-stewards, or if in a public market, to the market-stewards; and if it occur in the country outside, he shall declare it to the rural stewards and their officers. And when such declarations are made, the State shall send to Delphi;[*]( Cp. Plat. Laws 759c., Plat. Laws 772d.) and whatever the god pronounces concerning the goods and him that moved them, that the State shall execute, acting as agent on behalf of the oracles of the god. And if the informer be a free man, he shall win a reputation for virtue, but for vice if he fail to inform; and if he be a slave, as a reward for informing it will be right that he should be set free, by the State offering his price to his master, whereas he shall be punished by death if he fail to give information. Following on this there should come next a similar rule about matters great and small, to reinforce it. If a man, whether willingly or unwillingly, leaves any of his goods behind, he that happens on them shall let them lie, believing that the Goddess of the Wayside[*](Hecate (=Artemis)) guards them, as things dedicated to her divinity by the law. Should anyone transgress this rule and disobediently take such things and carry them home, he being a slave and the article of small value, then the man who meets with him, being over thirty years old, shall scourge him with many stripes; but if he be a free man, he shall not only be accounted illiberal and a rebel against the laws, but he shall in addition buy back ten times the value of the article moved to the man who left it behind. And if one man charges another with possessing any of his goods, be it great or small, and the man so charged allows that he has the article, but denies that it is the other man’s,—then, if the article in question has been registered[*]( Cp. Plat. Laws 745a, Plat. Laws 745b.) with the magistrates according to law, the plaintiff shall summon the man who possesses it before the magistrate, and he shall produce it in court. And the article being thus exhibited, if it be clearly recorded in the records to which of the disputants it belongs, he shall take it and depart; but should it belong to another third party, not then present, whichever of the two claimants produces a sufficient guarantor shall take it away on behalf of the absent party, in pursuance of his right of removal, to hand it over to him. But if the article in dispute be not registered with the magistrates, it will be kept in charge of the three senior magistrates up to the time of the trial; and if the article in pledge be a beast, the man that loses the case concerning it shall pay the magistrates for its keep; and the magistrates shall decide the case within three days. Any person—provided that he be in his senses—may lay hands, if he wishes, on his own slave, to employ him for any lawful purpose; and on behalf of another man (one of his relatives or friends) he may lay hands on the runaway slave, to secure his safe-keeping. And if a man tries to remove to freedom anyone who is being carried off as a slave, the man who is carrying him off shall let him go, and he that is removing him shall do so on the production of three substantial sureties, but not otherwise;

Ath. and if anyone removes a slave contrary to these conditions, he shall be liable for assault, and if convicted he shall pay double his registered due to the man deprived. And a man may arrest also a freedman, if in any case he fails to attend, or to attend sufficiently, on those who have freed him; and such tendance shall consist in the coming of the freedman three times a month to the home of the man that freed him, and there undertaking to do those duties which are both just and feasible, and in regard to marriage also to act as may seem good also to his former master. The freedman shall not be permitted to be more wealthy than the man who freed him; and, if he is, the excess shall be made to his master. He that is let go free shall not remain in the country more than twenty years, but shall depart, like all other foreigners,[*]( Cp. Plat. Laws 850b.) taking with him all the property he owns, unless he gains the consent of the magistrates and also of the man who freed him. And if a freedman, or any other foreigner, acquired property exceeding in amount the third evaluation,[*]( Cp. Plat. Laws 744c, Plat. Laws 744e, Plat. Laws 756d.) within thirty days from the day on which he acquires this excess he shall take his own property and depart, and he shall have no further right to request from the magistrates permission to remain; and if he disobeys these rules and is summoned before the court and convicted, he shall be punished by death, and his goods shall be confiscated. Such cases shall be tried before the tribal courts, unless the parties first get a settlement of their charges against one another before neighbors or chosen jurors. If anyone claims as his own the beast of any other man, or any other of his chattels, the man who holds it shall refer the matter to the person who, as being its substantial and lawful owner, sold it, or gave it, or made it over to him in some other way; and this he shall do within thirty days, if the reference be made to a citizen or metic in the city, or, in the case of a foreign delivery, within three months, of which the middle month shall be at which includes the summer solstice.[*]( Cp. Plat. Laws 952e.) And when the man makes an exchange with another by an act buying or selling, the exchange shall be made by transfer of the article in the place appointed therefore in the market, and nowhere else, and by payment the price on the spot, and no purchase or sale shall be made on credit;[*]( Cp. Plat. Laws 849e.) and if anyone makes an exchange with another otherwise or in other places, trusting the man with whom he is dealing, he shall do so on the understanding that there are no suits by law touching things not sold according to the laws now prescribed.[*]( Cp. Plat. Rep. 556b.) As regards club-collections,[*]( i.e. of subscriptions due from members of a (dining) club, or of money raised as a loan to a member in time of need.) whoso wishes may collect as a friend among friends; but if any dispute arises concerning the collection, they must act on the understanding that in regard to these matters no legal actions are possible.