Laws

Ath.Further, things increase when combined and decrease when separated in all cases where the regular constitution[*](i.e. as solid, liquid, or gaseous substance.) of each persists; but if this does not remain, then both these conditions cause them to perish. And what is the condition which must occur in everything to bring about generation? Obviously whenever a starting-principle receiving increase comes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on coming to the third admits of perception by percipients.[*](This account of the derivation of the sense-world from the starting-principle (ἀρχή) is obscure. It is generally interpreted as a geometrical allegory, the stages of development being from point to line, from line to surface, from surface to solid,—this last only being perceptible by the senses (cp. Aristot. Soul 404 b 18 ff.).) Everything comes into being by this process of change and alteration; and a thing is really existent whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed. Have we now, my friends, mentioned all the forms of motion, capable of numerical classification,[*](The 8 kinds of motion here indicated are—(1) circular motion round a fixed center; (2) locomotion (gliding or rolling); (3) combination; (4) separation; (5) increase; (6) decrease; (7) becoming; (8) perishing. The remaining two kinds (as described below) are—(9) other-affecting motion (or secondary causation); and (10) self-and-other-affecting motion (or primary causation).) save only two?

Clin. What two?

Ath. Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken.

Clin. Explain more clearly.

Ath. It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. As one of the two let us count that motion which is always able to move other things, but unable to move itself; and that motion which always is able to move both itself and other things,—by way of combination and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation and corruption,—let us count as another separate unit in the total number of motions.

Clin. Be it so.

Ath. Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another; while that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of action and passion, and is termed the real change and motion of all that really exists,—it, I presume, we shall call the tenth.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and excelling in effectiveness?

Clin. We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest come after it.

Ath. Well said. Must we, then, alter one or two of the wrong statements we have now made?

Clin. Which do you mean?

Ath. Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.

Clin. How?

Ath. Logically it is first in point of origin and power; and the next one is second to it, although we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible.

Ath. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things, will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?

Clin. Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.

Ath. Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still,—as most of these thinkers[*](E.g. Anaxagoras, who taught, originally, all things were together (ὁμοῦ); and the Eleatic School (Parmenides, etc.) asserted that the Real World (τὸ ὄν) is One and motionless; cp. Plat. Theaet. 180e.) venture to maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing, since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. Now that we have come to this point in our discourse, here is a question we may answer.

Clin. What is it?

Ath. If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?

Clin. What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as alive when it moves itself?

Ath. Yes.

Clin. It is alive, to be sure.

Ath. Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?

Clin. We must.

Ath. Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name;[*](Cp. Epistles 7, 342 A, B.) and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.

Clin. How two?

Ath. At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.

Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?

Ath. Of what kind?

Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is the even, and the definition is a number divisible into two equal parts.

Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name even, and by the definition a number divisible into two halves?

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name soul? Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—the motion able to move itself?

Clin. Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has soul as the name we universally apply to it?

Ath. That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clin. We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.

Ath. Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?

Clin. True.

Ath. Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.

Clin. Yes, most veracious.

Ath. We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed[*](Plat. Laws 892a, Plat. Laws 892b.) that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.

Clin. Certainly we do.

Ath. Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?

Clin. Of course we must.

Ath. And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—several. Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.

Clin. You are perfectly right.

Ath. Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 894b, Plat. Laws 894c.) and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?

Clin. By no means.

Ath. Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which has neither quality? To this shall we make reply as follows?

Clin. How?

Ath. If, my good sir, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason,[*](i.e. the uniform revolution of a sphere in the same spot and on its own axis: cp. Plat. Laws 898a; Plat. Tim. 34a ff, Plat. Tim. 34b ff; Plat. 90c, d.) and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course, which is of the kind described.

Clin. You are right.

Ath. But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way.

Clin. That also is right.

Ath. Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you should now call me in to assist you with the answer.

Clin. Very good.

Ath. In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun,[*](Cp.Plat. Rep. 516a ff.) as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully; the safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of which[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 893b.; the motion to which reason is likened is the first of the ten.) I, along with you, will make answer.

Clin. You will probably speak admirably.

Ath. Do we still recollect thus much about the things then described, that we assumed that, of the total, some were in motion, others at rest?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And further, that, of those in motion, some move in one place, others move in several places?

Clin. That is so.

Ath. And that, of these two motions, the motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels; and that this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason?[*](Cp.Plat. Tim. 33b ff, Plat. Tim. 34a ff; Plat. Rep. 436b ff.)

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system—reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place (likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order or system or rule—will not this motion be akin to absolute unreason?

Clin. It will, in very truth.

Ath. So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite.

Clin. But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is actually impious to make any other assertion than that these things are driven round by one or more souls endowed with all goodness.

Ath. You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias. Now attend to this further point.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. If soul drives round the sum total of sun, moon and all other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars which will evidently apply equally to them all.

Clin. About which one?

Ath. The sun’s body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, has grown round all the senses of the body,[*](i.e. envelopes the body and its sense-organs (like circum-ambient air).) and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—

Clin. What fact?

Ath. If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.

Clin. What things?

Ath. That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside; or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body.

Clin. Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things.

Ath. Here, I pray you, pause. This soul,—whether it is by riding in the car of the sun,[*](Cp.Plat. Tim. 41d ff, Plat. Tim. 41e ff, where the Creator is said to apportion a soul to each star, in which it rides as though in a chariot.) or from outside, or otherwise, that it brings light to us all—every man is bound to regard as a god. Is not that so?

Clin. Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the uttermost verge of folly.

Ath. Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that

all things are full of gods

Clin. There is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.

Ath. Let us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man who up till now disbelieves in gods, O Megillus and Clinias, and so be quit of him.

Clin. What conditions?

Ath. That either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is of all things the first production, together with all the consequential statements we made,—or, if he is unable to improve on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of his life live in veneration of the gods. Let us, then, consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods addressed to those who disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or defectively.

Clin. Anything rather than defectively, Stranger.

Ath. Then let our argument have an end, in so far as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs,—him we must admonish. My good sir, let us say, the fact that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honor it and recognize its existence; but the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both private and public,—which, though not really happy, are excessively and improperly lauded as happy by public opinion,—drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every kind.

Ath.Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of old age, and leaving behind them children’s children in the highest offices, very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover—whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation—some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well. And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now, and convey you across the stream.[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 892d, Plat. Laws 892e.)

Clin. A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.

Ath. Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course, he was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.

Clin. Most certainly he heard that.

Ath. Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?

Clin. We do say so.

Ath. And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?

Clin. To this, too, everyone would assent.

Ath. Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?

Clin. How could we?

Ath. As the opposite, then?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?

Clin. Of the opposite quality.

Ath. What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described[*](Hes. WD 303.:τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς|ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὁρμήν.)—

a man most like to sting-less drones

Clin. A most true description.

Ath. That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.

Clin. We could not possibly allow that.

Ath. When a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for some object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety? Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?

Clin. What forms?

Ath. Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole, or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.

Clin. Of course not.

Ath. Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small. First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things,[*](Cp. Plat. Laws 641e.) and that nothing of all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?

Clin. That is what we assert.[*](Here, and in what follows, Clinias is answering on behalf of the two misbelievers.)

Ath. And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?

Clin. They will, of course, admit that this also is the case.

Ath. And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, yea, exceeding good.

Clin. Most certainly.

Ath. Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and indolence.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness and laziness, seeing that none has any part in cowardice.

Clin. You are very right.

Ath. Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things or—well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing?

Clin. There is none.

Ath. Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care,—or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not, owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?

Clin. Impossible.

Ath. Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living creatures?

Clin. That is certainly probable.

Ath. We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.

Clin. Of course.

Ath. That being so, it matters not whether a man says that these things are small or great in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it behove those who are our owners to be neglectful, seeing that they are most careful and most good. For let us notice this further fact—

Clin. What is it?

Ath. In regard to perception and power,—are not these two naturally opposed in respect of ease and difficulty?

Clin. How do you mean?

Ath. It is more difficult to see and hear small things than great; but everyone finds it more easy to move, control and care for things small and few than their opposites.

Clin. Much more.

Ath. When a physician is charged with the curing of a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition?

Clin. Certainly not.

Ath. No more will pilots or generals or house-managers, nor yet statesmen or any other such persons, find that the many and great thrive apart from the few and small; for even masons say that big stones are not well laid without little stones.

Clin. They cannot be.

Ath. Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal craftsmen who, the better they are, the more accurately and perfectly do they execute their proper tasks, small and great, by one single art,—or that God, who is most wise, and both willing and able to care, cares not at all for the small things which are the easier to care for—like one who shirks the labor because he is idle and cowardly,—but only for the great.

Clin. By no means let us accept such an opinion of the gods, Stranger: that would be to adopt a view that is neither pious nor true at all.

Ath. And now, as I think, we have argued quite sufficiently with him who loves to censure the gods for neglect.

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And it was by forcing him by our arguments to acknowledge that what he says is wrong. But still he needs also, as it seems to me, some words of counsel to act as a charm upon him.

Clin. What kind of words, my good sir?

Ath. Let us persuade the young man by our discourse that all things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World—all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, whereof also each part, so far as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it. To each of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of their action and passion are appointed to bring about fulfillment even to the uttermost fraction; whereof thy portion also, O perverse man, is one, and tends therefore always in its striving towards the All, tiny though it be. But thou failest to perceive that all partial generation is for the sake of the Whole, in order that for the life of the World-all blissful existence may be secured,—it not being generated for thy sake, but thou for its sake. For every physician and every trained craftsman works always for the sake of a Whole, and strives after what is best in general, and he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part; but thou art vexed, because thou knowest not how what is best in thy case for the All turns out best for thyself also, in accordance with the power of your common origin. And inasmuch as soul, being conjoined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul, there is left for the draughts-player no further task,—save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to each may be allotted its appropriate destiny.

Clin. In what way do you mean?