Laws

Ath.This is the special form of nurture to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the term education whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name education. Let us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, that those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good, and that one should in no case disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are given to the best men; and if ever it errs from the right path, but can be put straight again, to this task every man, so long as he lives, must address himself with all his might.

Clin. You are right, and we agree with what you say.

Ath. Further, we agreed long ago that if men are capable of ruling themselves, they are good, but if incapable, bad.

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. Let us, then, re-state more clearly what we meant by this. With your permission, I will make use of an illustration in the hope of explaining the matter.

Clin. Go ahead.

Ath. May we assume that each of us by himself is a single unit?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And that each possesses within himself two antagonistic and foolish counsellors, whom we call by the names of pleasure and pain?

Clin. That is so.

Ath. And that, besides these two, each man possesses opinions about the future, which go by the general name of expectations; and of these, that which precedes pain bears the special name of fear, and that which precedes pleasure the special name of confidence; and in addition to all these there is calculation, pronouncing which of them is good, which bad; and calculation, when it has become the public decree of the State, is named law.

Clin. I have some difficulty in keeping pace with you: assume, however, that I do so, and proceed.

Meg. I am in exactly the same predicament.

Ath. Let us conceive of the matter in this way. Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing; but this we do know, that these inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions; and herein lies the dividing line between goodness and badness.

Ath.For, as our argument declares, there is one of these pulling forces which every man should always follow and nohow leave hold of, counteracting thereby the pull of the other sinews: it is the leading-string, golden and holy, of calculation, entitled the public law of the State; and whereas the other cords are hard and steely and of every possible shape and semblance, this one is flexible and uniform, since it is of gold. With that most excellent leading-string of the law we must needs co-operate always; for since calculation is excellent, but gentle rather than forceful, its leading-string needs helpers to ensure that the golden kind within us may vanquish the other kinds. In this way our story comparing ourselves to puppets will not fall flat, and the meaning of the terms self-superior and self-inferior will become somewhat more clear, and also how necessary it is for the individual man to grasp the true account of these inward pulling forces and to live in accordance therewith, and how necessary for the State (when it has received such an account either from a god or from a man who knows) to make this into a law for itself and be guided thereby in its intercourse both with itself and with all other States. Thus both badness and goodness would be differentiated for us more clearly; and these having become more evident, probably education also and the other institutions will appear less obscure; and about the institution of the wine-party in particular it may very likely be shown that it is by no means, as might be thought, a paltry matter which it is absurd to discuss at great length but rather a matter which folly merits prolonged discussion.

Clin. Quite right: let us go through with every topic that seems important for the present discussion.

Ath. Tell me now: if we give strong drink to this puppet of ours, what effect will it have on its character?

Clin. In reference to what particular do you ask this question?

Ath. To no particular, for the moment: I am putting the question in general terms—when this shares in that, what sort of thing does it become in consequence? I will try to convey my meaning still more clearly: what I ask is this—does the drinking of wine intensify pleasures and pains and passions and lusts?

Clin. Yes, greatly.

Ath. And how about sensations and recollections and opinions and thoughts? Does it make them likewise more intense? Or rather, do not these quit a man entirely if he becomes surfeited with drink?

Clin. Yes, they quit him entirely.

Ath. He then arrives at the same condition of soul as when he was a young child?

Clin. He does.

Ath. So at that moment he will have very little control of himself?

Clin. Very little.

Ath. And such a man is, we say, very bad?

Clin. Very, indeed.

Ath. It appears, then, that not the grey-beard only may be in his second childhood, but the drunkard as well.

Clin. An admirable observation, Stranger.

Ath. Is there any argument which will undertake to persuade us that this is a practice we ought to indulge in, instead of shunning it with all our might so far as we possibly can?

Clin. It appears that there is: at any rate you assert this, and you were ready just now to argue it.

Ath. You are right in your reminder, and I am still ready to do so, now that you and Megillus have both expressed your willingness to listen to me.

Clin. Of course we shall listen, if only on account of the surprising paradox that, of his own free will, a man ought to plunge into the depths of depravity.

Ath. Depravity of soul, you mean, do you not?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. And how about plunging into a bad state of body, such as leanness or ugliness or impotence? Should we be surprised if a man of his own free will ever got into such a state?

Clin. Of course we should.

Ath. Well then, do we suppose that persons who go of themselves to dispensaries to drink medicines are not aware that soon afterwards, and for many days to come, they will find themselves in a bodily condition such as would make life intolerable[*](Evidently, drastic purgatives were commonly prescribed.) if it were to last for ever? And we know, do we not, that men who go to the gymnasia for hard training commence by becoming weaker?

Clin. All this we know.

Ath. We know also that they go there voluntarily for the sake of the subsequent benefit ?

Clin. Quite true.

Ath. Should one not take the same view of the other institutions also?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Then one must also take the same view of the practice of wine-drinking, if one can rightly class it amongst the others.

Clin. Of course one must.

Ath. If then this practice should be shown to be quite as beneficial for us as bodily training, certainly at the outset it is superior to it, in so far as it is not, like bodily training, accompanied by pain.

Clin. That is true; but I should be surprised if we succeeded in discovering in it any benefit.

Ath. That is precisely the point which we must at once try to make plain. Tell me now: can we discern two kinds of fear, of which the one is nearly the opposite of the other?

Clin. What kinds do you mean?

Ath. These: when we expect evils to occur, we fear them.

Clin. Yes.