Republic

And the third class,[*](For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 151-163, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97) composing the people, would comprise all quiet[*](ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 C, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot. Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoc. Antid. 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.) cultivators of their own farms[*](αὐτουργοί: Cf. Soph. 223 D, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.) who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.Yes, it is, he said, but it will not often do that,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 b 12.) unless it gets a share of the honey. Well, does it not always share, I said, to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing[*](Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.) to the people what they take from the well-to-do,[*](For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. Areop. 32 ff., Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592.) to keep the lion’s share for themselves[*](Cf. Aristoph. Knights 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in Il. ix. 363.)? Why, yes, he said, it shares in that sense. And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power. Of course. And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.[*](i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 C μισόδημος. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the disharmony between Plato’s upperclass sympathies and his liberal philosophy.) Surely. And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will[*](So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn. 515-516.) but through misapprehension,[*](Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (δι’ ἄγνοιαν) are involuntary.) and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,[*](For τότ’ ἢδη cf. 569 A, Phaedo 87 E, Gorg. 527 D, Laches 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.) whether they wish it or not,[*](So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 30 ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις.) they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them. Precisely. And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side. Yes, indeed. And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector[*](Cf. 562 D, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S. I. G. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.) and cherish and magnify him? Yes, it is. This, then, is plain, said I, that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 b 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν, etc., ibid. 1304 b 20 ff.) and from nothing else. Very plain. What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia[*](Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook’s Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato’s feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff.)? What is that? he said. The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale? I have.

And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,[*](Note the difference of tone from 502 B. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C.) does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood,[*](Cf. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 32; Lucan i. 331: nullus semel ore receptus Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.) but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out[*](For ἀφανίζων Cf. Gorg. 471 B.) a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands[*](The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another disharmony. Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst. 88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timocr. 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath at Itanos.)—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate[*](Cf. 619 C.) that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?It is quite inevitable, he said. He it is, I said, who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.[*](Cf. 565 A.) Yes, he. May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant? Obviously. And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth. That is certainly wont to happen, said he. And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition[*](Cf Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον Cf. Phaedo 100 B.) of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe[*](For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 Vol. I. p. 65, note c.) for the friend of democracy. They do indeed, he said. And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves. Yes, indeed. And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy,[*](For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph. Knights 787, Clouds 1187.) then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus,

By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.

mighty with far-flung limbs,

And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?Obviously.And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars[*](For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη, Soph. Antig. 795 νεῖκος . . . ταράξας.)?Yes, he is compelled to do so.And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?Of course.And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish[*](ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen Ages. 2.31, Isoc. 4.126.) and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?Yes, it is likely.Then the tyrant must do away[*](Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή, as often in the Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. Tim. 67 C, 69 A, 77 C, 82 B, and passim.) with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe.Obviously.He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men Cf. Laws 832 C, Gorg. 510 B-C, Xen. Hiero 5. I, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Ion 626-628. But cf. Pindar, Pyth, iii, 71, of Hiero,οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.)A fine purgation, he said. Yes, said I, just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse. Yes, for apparently he must, he said, if he is to keep his power. Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him, said I, which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life. Such it is, he said. And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards? Of course. Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them? Unbidden, he said, they will wing their way[*](Cf. Laws 952 E, Rep. 467 D.) to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage. Drones, by the dog, I said, I think you are talking of again, an alien[*](Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies.) and motley crew.[*](παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 C.) You think rightly, he said. But what of the home supply,[*](For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος, Thuc. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28.) would he not choose to employ that? How? By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard. Assuredly, he said, since these are those whom he can most trust.

Truly, said I, this tyrant business[*](For the idiomatic and colloquial χρῆμα cf. Herod. i. 36, Eurip. Androm. 181, Theaet. 209 E, Aristoph. Clouds 1, Birds 826, Wasps 933, Lysistr. 83, 1085, Acharn. 150, Peace 1192, Knights 1219, Frogs 1278.) is a blessed[*](For the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. p. 368, note a.) thing on your showing, if such are the friends and trusties he must employ after destroying his former associates. But such are indeed those he does make use of, he said. And these companions admire him, I said, and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him. Why should they not? Not for nothing,[*](For οὐκ ἐτός cf. 414 E. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph. Cf. e.g. Acharn. 411, 413, Birds 915, Thesm. 921, Plut. 404, 1166, Eccl. 245.) said I, is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.[*](This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the admirers of Euripides.) Why, pray? Because among other utterances of pregnant thought[*](Cf. πυκιναὶ φρένες Iliad xiv. 294, πυκινὸς νόος xv. 41 etc.) he said,

Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.[*](Cf. Theages 125 B f. The line is also attributed to Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Dümmler, Akademika, p. 16. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 119 thinks this an allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus of Macedon. Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 3-5 contrasts their education unfavorably with that of the ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of Plato.)

And what have you to say, I said, in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called better classes,[*](For καλῶν κἀγαθῶν cf. Aristoph. Knights 185, and Blaydes on 735. See also on 489 E, p. 27, note d.) and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels[*](Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 123.) from his house a son together with troublesome revellers? The demos, by Zeus, he said, will then learn to its cost[*](For the threatening γνώσεται cf. 362 A, 466 C, Il. xviii. 270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 τάχα γνώσῃ, and Lucian, Timon 33 εἴσεται.) what it is and what[*](For the juxtaposition οἷος οἷον Cf. Symp. 195 A, Sophocles El. 751, Ajax 557, 923, Trach. 995, 1045.) a creature it begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger. What do you mean? said I; will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him[*](Cf. on 574 C, pp. 346-347, note e.)? Yes, he said, after he has once taken from him his arms. A very parricide, said I, you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire[*](As we say, Out of the frying-pan into the fire. Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 17. 5 ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς αἶνος ’πεσες ἐς φλόγα, Theodoret, Therap. iii. p. 773 καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ὡς ἔοικε, φύγοντες, εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν. See Otto, p. 137; also Solon 7 (17) (Anth. Lyr.,Bergk-Hiller, 9 in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 122, Loeb Classical Library) εἰς δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρείῃ δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν, Herod. iii. 81 τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν, and for the idea Epist. viii. 354 D.) of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty[*](Cf. Epist. viii. 354 D.) has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.[*](For the rhetorical style Cf. Tim. 41 θεοὶ θεῶν, Polit. 303 C σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς, and the biblical expressions, God of Gods and Lord of Lords, e.g. Deut. x. 17, Ps. cxxxvi. 2-3, Dan. xi. 36, Rev. xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1063 τρίδουλος.) Yes indeed, he said, that is just what happens. Well, then, said I, shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself? Quite sufficiently, he said.

There remains for consideration, said I, the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy. Why, yes, he still remains, he said. Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss? What? In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness. Well, said he, will our consideration of them not still be opportune[*](For ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971, Aristoph. Eccl. 321, Thesm. 292.)? By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures[*](Cf. on 558 D.) and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled[*](For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.) by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous. What desires do you mean? he said. Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ’ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes We are not hypocrites in our sleep, a modern novelist, In sleep all barriers are down. The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: It has been perhaps Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field. The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . . Cf. ibid. p. 95: The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable. Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful. (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart’s Myths of Plato, Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.) when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.[*](The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.) You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b.) and shamelessness. Most true, he said. But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep[*](Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, And body gets its sop and holds its noise. Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, Was Plato an Ascetic? Philos. Re., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.) and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;

and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep[*](Cf. Ephesians iv. 26 Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.) with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case[*](ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, Lysis 212 C, Laws 625 D.) he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.[*](This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, Pater’s complaint that Plato’s sentences are long may be regarded as Pater’s single excursion into humor. But Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato’s example. He calls this passage Plato’s evening prayer.)I certainly think so, he said. This description has carried us too far,[*](Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 177 C, Protag. 359 A, Crat. 438 A, Polit. 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, Laws 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Demosth. De cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93 A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.) but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,[*](For the irony of the expression Cf. Laws 693 D, Aesch. Eumen. 373.) a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it. Well, I do. Now recall[*](Cf. 559 D f.) our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so? Yes. And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise[*](εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.) between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,[*](Ironical. δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on moderate drinking and moderate preparedness.) as he supposes,[*](ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα, etc.) he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat. That was and is our belief about this type. Assume,[*](θές: Cf. Theaet. 191 C, Phileb. 33 D.) then, again, said I, that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn[*](This is the αὖ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.) in his ways of life. I so assume. And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to[*](Cf. 559 E.) these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.

And when these dread magi[*](An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.) and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion[*](Cf. Symp. 205 D.) to be the protector[*](προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.) of his idle and prodigal[*](For τὰ ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 D and E, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 frui paratis.) appetites, a monstrous winged[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ’ ὑπόπτερον ) drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?Nothing but that, he said. And when the other appetites, buzzing[*](Cf. 564 D.) about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 E.) why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,[*](For οἰστρᾷ Cf. Phaedr. 240 D.) and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted[*](For ποιουμένας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.) worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.) him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.[*](ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 B, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 583, Soph. Trach. 259.) A perfect description, he said, of the generation of the tyrannical man. And is not this analogy, said I, the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant[*](Cf. 573 D, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck)θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.)? That may well be, he said. And does not a drunken man,[*](For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr, 238 B.) my friend, I said, have something of this tyrannical temper? Yes, he has. And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods. Yes indeed, he does, he said. Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend, I said, when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal. Assuredly. Such, it seems, is his origin and character,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before.) but what is his manner of life? As the wits say, you shall tell me.[*](Cf. Phileb. 25 B and perhaps Rep. 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus. ) I do, I said; for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans[*](Cf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.) and all the doings of those whose[*](ὦν ἄν: cf. 441 D-E ὅτου, etc., 583 A ἐν ᾧ and my review of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.) souls are entirely swayed[*](Cf. Phaedr. 238 B-C.) by the indwelling tyrant Eros. Inevitably, he said. And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things? Many indeed. And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended. Of course.

And after this there are borrowings and levyings[*](For παραιρέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.) upon the estate?Of course.And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings[*](ἐννενεοττευμένας Cf. Alc. I. 135 E, Laws 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. Birds 699, 1108.) of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?Most certainly.And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source[*](Cf. Aesch. Eumen. 544.) or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.[*](Cf. Gorg. 494 A ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.)He is.And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better[*](Cf. Vol. I. 349 B f.) of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father’s estate.Of course, he said, what else? And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them? Certainly. And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force? I think so, he said. And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant? I am not without my fears, he said, for the parents of such a one. Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity[*](The word ἀναγκαῖαν means both necessary and akin. Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους.) and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows[*](For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι Cf. Phaedr. 254 E ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 C θανάτῳ δέδοται. For striking his father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff.) upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof? Yes, by Zeus, he said. A most blessed lot it seems to be, said I, to be the parent of a tyrant son. It does indeed, he said. And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted[*](For ἐπιλείπῃ cf. 568 E, 573 E.) and fail such a one, and the swarm[*](Cf. Meno 72 A, Cratyl. 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 297.) of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall[*](He becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph. Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831 E.) of someone’s house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep[*](νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the preceding line.) of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,[*](For ποιουμένας cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C.) will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated[*](Cf. 567 E.) and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul.