Republic

And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honorable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical[*](ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and the state. Cf. my Idea of Justice, Ethical Record,Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.) fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself richYes indeed, he said. Have we any further doubt, then, I said, as to the correspondence and resemblance[*](ὁμοιότητι: cf. 576 C.) between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchical state? None, he said. We have next to consider, it seems, the origin and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement.[*](Cf. Phileb. 55 C εἰς τὴν κρίσιν, Laws 856 C, 943 C.) That would at least be a consistent procedure. Then, said I, is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good,[*](The σκοπός or ὅρος. Cf. on 551 A, p. 263, note e, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 2.) the attainment of the greatest possible wealth? In what way? Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed. By all means. And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honoring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship,[*](Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Plato, compares Luke xvi.13 Ye cannot serve God and Mammon. Cf. also Laws 742 D-E, 727 E f., 831 C.) but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected. That is pretty clear, he said. And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness[*](ἀκολασταίνεινCf. Gorg. 478 A, Phileb. 12 D.) in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality.[*](Cf. Laws 832 A οὐκ ἀφυεῖς. For the men reduced to poverty swelling the number of drones cf. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592, and Wilamowitz ad loc.) It surely has. And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution.[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 b 40-41, 1266 b 14.) ’Tis so.

But these money-makers with down-bent heads,[*](Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes, Cf. 586 A κεκυφότες. Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.) pretending not even to see[*](Cf. Euthyph. 5 C, Polit. 287 A, Aristoph. Peace 1051, Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, I. T. 956, Medea 67, Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 6.) them, but inserting the sting of their money[*](Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, the poison of their money.τιτρώσκοντες suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν, implanting madness. In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest,. cf. 507 A, p. 96.) into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state.They do indeed multiply it, he said. And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,[*](Cf. on 552 A, Laws 922 E-923 A.) or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses. What law? The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.[*](Cf. Protag. 327 D ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Symp. 185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Cf. What Plato Said, p. 464, on Apol. 29 D-E.) For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts[*](For refusing to enforce monetary contracts Cf. Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 21.) should be at the contractor’s risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there. Much fewer, he said. But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-spring, do they not make the young spoiled[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 D, and Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23.) wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain,[*](Cf. 429 C-D, Laches 191 D-E, Laws 633 D.) and mere idlers? Surely. And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit? Little they care. And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt[*](Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.) pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,[*](Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα.) and sees him panting and helpless[*](For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098. Cf. also Gorg. 518 C, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25.)—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice[*](The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν, Rhesus 813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ, Phaedrus 248 B, Symp. 182 D, Crito 45 E, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ κοράκων πονηρίᾳ.) of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another our men are good for nothing? Nay, I know very well that they do, said he. And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse[*](Cf. Soph. O. T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ’ εὐνάζει ῥοπή a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep, Demosth. Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.) from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,[*](Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Höffding, i. 30 Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile, with Tim. 89 B.) the one party bringing in[*](Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.) allies from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises[*](στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, grievously ill of faction. Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.)?

Most emphatically.And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out[*](Cf. 488 C, 560 A, Gorg. 466 C, 468 D, Prot. 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.) others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share[*](ἐξ ἴσου: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B and C, 599 B, 617 C, Laws 919 D, Alc. I. 115 D, Crito 50 E, Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.) in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.[*](But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc. For the use of the lot in Plato Cf. Laws 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, Rep. 460 A, 461 E. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.)Why, yes, he said, that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism[*](Cf. 551 B.) resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties. What, then, said I, is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man. It is plain, he said. To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence[*](ἐξουσία: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ’ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.) to do as he likes? So it is said, he replied. And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan[*](κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, Gorg. 455 E, 477 B, etc.) for leading his own life in the way that pleases him. Obvious. All sorts[*](παντοδαπός usually has an unfavorable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-C, 561 D, 567 E, 550 D, Symp. 198 B, Gorg. 489 C, Laws 788 C, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favorable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. for the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and Laws 681 D. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state. De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.) and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other? Of course. Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps, I said, many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women[*](For the idea that women and children like many colors cf. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled with all manner of colors (Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys Cf. Laws 658 D, Shakes. As You Like It,III. ii. 435 As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this color, Faguet, Nineteenth CenturyLamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées.) when they see bright-colored things. Yes indeed, he said. Yes, said I, and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution. Why so? Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar[*](Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species. Cf. Laws 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, misquotes this saying The Athenians sold justice . . . , which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold.) of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own. Perhaps at any rate, he said, he would not be at a loss for patterns.

And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 a 12 δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 B-C.) or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,[*](Cf. Laws 955 B-C, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. Acharn. passim.) or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment[*](διαγωγή: cf. 344 E, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 A, Polit. 274 D, Tim. 71 D, Laws 806 E, Aristot. Met. 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.) for the time being?Perhaps, he said, for so long. And is not the placability[*](Cf. 562 D. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51 Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, Hel. 27; also Menex. 243 E and also Euthydem. 303 D δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word πρᾳότης is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.) of some convicted criminals exquisite[*](κομψή: cf. 376 A, Theaet. 171 A.)? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out[*](For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Acc. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 121, 494, Peace 762.) like a revenant[*](His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering spirit, one returned from the dead (a perfectly possible meaning for ἥρως. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 435 translates Geist) than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam ad loc.)? Yes, many, he said. And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority[*](For οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία cf. on 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία.) to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain or our solemn[*](σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—high-brow, top-lofty.) pronouncements[*](Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, Laws 643 B, Delacroix, Psychologie de l’art, p. 46.) made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent[*](For ὑπερβεβλημένη Cf. Laws 719 D, Eurip. Alcest. 153.) natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good,—how superbly[*](μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 C, Symp. 199 C, Charm. 175 C, Theaet. 161 C, Meno 94 B, Polit. 277 B, Hipp. Maj. 291 E.) it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices[*](In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.) and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him if only he says that he loves the people It is a noble[*](For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 C, Soph. 231 B, Theaet. 209 E.) polity, indeed! he said. These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful[*](ἡδεῖα: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government,τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίους.) form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike Yes, he said, everybody knows that. Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type? Yes, he said. Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty[*](Cf. 572 C, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democr. fr. 227 and 228, DieIs ii.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45, Diels i.3 126.) oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p.485, on Laches 190 B, and p. 551, on Phaedr. 237 E.) our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites[*](Cf. 554 A, 571 B, Phaedo 64 D-E, Phileb. 62 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 13. 45, Tusc. v. 33, 93, Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.)? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so ? Most assuredly.

Then we shall rightly use the word necessary of them?Rightly.And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?Fairly indeed.Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.[*](Or grasp them in outline.)Let us do so.Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes[*](For ὄψον cf. on 372 C, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.) be necessary?I think so.The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die.Yes.And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?By all means.And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction[*](For κολαζομένη cf. 571 B, Gorg. 505 B, 491 E, 507 D. For the thought cf. also 519 A-B.) and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul’s attainment of intelligence and sobriety?Nay, most rightly.And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,[*](Lit. money-making. Cf. 558 D.) because they help production?Surely.And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?The same.And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems[*](For γέμοντα cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, Gorg. 525 A, 522 E, etc.) with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man?Why, surely.To return, then, said I, we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way. How? When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce[*](αἴθων occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar and tragedy. Ernst Maass, Die Ironie des Sokrates,Sokrates, 11, p. 94 Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats, von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche Fuchsbestien genannt. (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.)) and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety[*](Cf. on 557 C, p. 286, note a.) and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy. Quite inevitably, he said. May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred[*](Cf. 554 D.) group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul? By all means, he said.

And if, I take it, a counter-alliance[*](For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν, they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions. (Loeb tr.)) comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction[*](Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.) and counter-faction and internal strife in the man with himself.Surely.And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others[*](τινες . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δὲ. For the partitive apposition cf. 566 E, 584 D, Gorg. 499 C. Cf. also Protag. 330 A, Gorg. 450 C, Laws 626 E, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186.) expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man’s soul and order is restored.That sometimes happens, he said. And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father’s ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong. Yes, that is wont to be the way of it. And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude. Yes indeed. And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel[*](Cf. Tim. 90 A.) of the young man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians[*](For the idea of guardians of the soul Cf. Laws 961 D, 549 B Cf. also on Phaedo 113 D, What Plato Said, p. 536.) in the minds of men who are dear to the gods. Much the best, he said. And then false and braggart words[*](Cf. Phaedo 92 D.) and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth. They do indeed. And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters[*](Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for classes of people: Cf. Rep. 415 D γηγενεῖς, Theaet. 181 A ῥέοντας, Soph. 248 A εἰδῶν φίλους, Phileb. 44 E τοῖς δυσχερέσιν. So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3.) and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support[*](βοήθεια: cf. Aristot. De an. 404 a 12.) comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe folly[*](Cf. 474 D, Thucyd. iii. 82 Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid. 284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι, etc., Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat.C 52 iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus, etc.) thrust it forth, a dishonored fugitive. And temperance they call want of manhood and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are rusticity and illiberality, and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.[*](ὑπερορίζουσι: Cf. Laws 855 C ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα, 866 D.) They do indeed. And when they have emptied and purged[*](Cf. 567 C and 573 B where the word is also used ironically, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 D, Soph. 226 D.) of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed[*](κατέχομαι is used of divine possession or inspiration in Phaedr. 244 E, Ion 533 E, 536 B, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10.) and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites,[*](Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 C, Symp. 210 A and 218 B, Theaet. 155 E-156 A, Laws 666 B, 870 D-E, Phaedr. 250 B-C, 249 C, Phaedo 81 A, 69 C, Rep. 378 A, etc., and Thompson on Meno 76 E.) they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent[*](Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130.) in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence good breeding, licence liberty, prodigality magnificence, and shamelessness manly spirit.

And is it not in some such way as this, said I, that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires? Yes, your description is most vivid, said he. Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth,[*](For the ironical δή cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D, 374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h.) and so lives turning over the guard-house[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ. For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray’s Barnes Newcome. For the lot cf. ibid, p. 285, note d, on 557 A.) of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.[*](Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. Cf. 557 A.) Quite so. And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base,[*](An obvious reference to the Gorgias. Cf. Gorg. 494 E, Phileb. 13 B ff., Protag. 353 D ff., Laws 733.) and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head[*](The Greek Says throws back his head—the characteristic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. Acharn. 115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.) at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed. Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct. And does he not, said I, also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute[*](For the word καταυλούμενος cf. 411 A, Laws 790 E, Lucian, Bis acc. 17, and for the passive Eur. I. T. 367. Cf. also Philetaerus, Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. fr. 187. 3 μολπαῖσι δ’ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ θηρεύεται. For the type cf. Theophrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph. Wasps 1475 ff.) and again drinking only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up[*](Cf. Protag. 319 D.) and says and does whatever enters his head.[*](For ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ cf. on 536 A, p. 213, note f,ὅταν τύχῃEurip. Hippol. 428, I. T. 722, Eurip. Fr. 825 (Didot),ὅπου ἂν τύχωσινXen. Oec. 20. 28,ὃν ἂν τύχῃςEurip. Tor. 68.) And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end. That is a perfect description, he said, of a devotee of equality. I certainly think, said I, that he is a manifold[*](παντοδαπόν: cf. on 557 C.) man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city[*](Cf. 557 D.) he is the fair and many-colored one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities. Yes, that is so, he said.

Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?Let that be his place, he said. And now, said I, the fairest[*](For the irony cf. 607 E τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν, 544 C γενναία, 558 C ἡδεῖα.) polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant. Certainly, he said. Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.[*](τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 D, Epist. vii. 324 B. A. G. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy) develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident. That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlook in their classification of polities.) That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain. Yes, plain. Is it, then, in a sense, in the same way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy? How is that? The good that they proposed to themselves[*](Their idea of good. Cf. 555 b προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ. Cf. Laws 962 E with Aristot. Pol. 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 20 αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. Cf. also p. 263, note e on 551 B (ὅρος) and p. 139, note c on 519 C (σκοπός).) and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth,[*](Cf. 552 B, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, note b, on 550 E.) was it not? Yes. Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing. True, he said. And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it[*](Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with the Platonic thought that every form of government brings ruin on itself by its own excess.) too? What do you say its criterion to be? Liberty,[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 43 The central idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty.) I replied; for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.[*](Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato’s Republic. ) Why, yes, he replied, you hear that saying everywhere. Then, as I was about to observe,[*](ᾖα . . . ἐρῶν: cf. 449 A, Theaet. 180 C.) is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship? How? he said. Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders[*](Or protectors, tribunes,προστατούντων. Cf. on 565 C, p. 318, note d.) and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine,[*](Cf. Livy xxxix. 26 velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem, Seneca, De benefic. i. 10 male dispensata libertas, Taine, Letter,Jan. 2, 1867 nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’égalité . . . C’est un vin pur et généreux; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre.) and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly,it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed[*](μιαρούς is really stronger, pestilential fellows. Cf. Apol. 23 D, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.) oligarchs.[*](For the charge of oligarchical tendencies cf. Isoc. Peace 51 and 133, Areop. 57, Antid. 318, Panath. 158.) Yes, that is what they do, he replied. But those who obey the rulers, I said, it reviles as willing slaves[*](Cf. Symp. 184 C, 183 A. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for Music, 6 Servitude that hugs her chain.) and men of naught,[*](For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 C, Apol. 41 E, Symp. 216 E, Gorg. 512 C, Erastae 134 C, Aristoph. Eccles. 144, Horace, Sat. ii. 7. 102 nil ego, Eurip. I. A. 371, Herod. ix. 58 οὐδένες ἐόντες.) but it commends and honors in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths[*](Cf. Laws 699 E ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, Aristoph. Lysistr. 543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἰέναι, Soph. El. 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον.)? Of course. And this anarchical temper, said I, my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.[*](Cf. 563 C, Laws 942 D.) Just what do we mean by that? he said.

Why, I said, the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents,[*](A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 49, Aristoph. Clouds, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10, Mem. iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, Souvenirs, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and liberty; Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, Modern Democracies, in Methods of Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family relations depend much more on the social, structural and religious ideas of a race than on forms of government; Whitman, Where the men and women think lightly of the laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves . . . there the great city stands.) so that he may be forsooth a free man.[*](For the ironical ἵνα δή cf. on 561 B. Cf. Laws 962 E ἐλεύθερον δή, Meno 86 and Aristoph. Clouds 1414.) And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise. Yes, these things do happen, he said. They do, said I, and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating[*](Cf. Protag. 336 A, Theaet. 174 A, 168 B.) themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry[*](For εὐτραπελίας cf. Isoc. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1108 a 23. In Rhet. 1389 b 11 he defnes it as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.) and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative. By all means, he said. And the climax of popular liberty, my friend, I said, is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free[*](Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10. τῶν δούλων δ’ αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία, Aristoph. Clouds init., and on slavery Laws 777 E, p. 249, note g on 547 C and 549 A.) than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men. Shall we not, then, said he, in Aeschylean phrase,[*](Nauck fr. 351. Cf. Plut. Amat. 763 C, Themist. Orat. iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam ad loc.) say whatever rises to our lips? Certainly, I said, so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts[*](Cf. 562 E, Julian, Misopogon, 355 B . . . μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν καμήλων; ἄγουσί τοι καὶ ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας . . . what great independence exists among the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though they were brides. (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pythag.Teubner, p. 22, 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων διικνεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἡ νουθέτησις ) subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage[*](Otto, p. 119. Cf. Like mistress, like maid.) and like their mistresses become. And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside.[*](Eurip. Ion 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city life.) And so all things everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty.[*](Cf. the reflections in Laws 698 f., 701 A-C, Epist. viii. 354 D, Gorg. 461 E; Isoc. Areop. 20, Panath. 131, Eurip. Cyclops 120 ἀκούει δ’ οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός, Aristot. Pol. 1295 b 15 f. Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth liberty in the style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with Goethe (Eckermann i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) Nicht das macht frei, das vir nichts über uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist. Libby, Introd. to Hist. of Science, p. 273, not understanding the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling tribute of a hostile critic. In Gorg. 484 A Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman. Cf. also on 558 C, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, Leviathan xxi. and Theopompus’s account of democracy in Byzantium, fr. 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American city street or Pullman club car.) It is my own dream[*](Cf Callimachus, Anth. Pal. vi. 310, and xii. 148 μὴ λέγε . . . τοὐμὸν ὄνειρον ἐμοί, Cic. Att. vi. 9. 3, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 7 ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὐμὸν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών, Tennyson, Lucretius: That was mine, my dream, I knew it.) you are telling me, he said; for it often happens to me when I go to the country. And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive[*](This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. also Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 51 And so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy.) that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude[*](Cf. Gorg. 491 E δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν, Laws 890 A.) and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws[*](Cf. Laws 701 B νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι ) written or unwritten,[*](For unwritten law Cf. What Plato Said, p. 637, on Laws 793 A.) so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them. I know it very well, said he. This, then, my friend, said I, is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion. Vigorous indeed, he said; but what next?

The same malady, I said, that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction[*](Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. De rep. i. 44 nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum . . . etc.) to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies,[*](For the generalization Cf. Symp. 188 A-B.) and most especially in political societies. Probably, he said. And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state. Yes, that is probable. Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution[*](Cf. 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by ApeIt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.) than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude. That is reasonable, he said. That, however, I believe, was not your question,[*](Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 C, p. 193, note i.) but what identical[*](ταὐτόν implies the concept. Cf. Parmen. 130 D, Phileb. 34 E, 13 B, Soph. 253 D. Cf. also Tim. 83 C, Meno 72 C, Rep. 339 A.) malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it? You say truly, he replied. That then, I said, was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones,[*](Cf. 555 D-E.) some equipped with stings and others stingless. And rightly too, he said. These two kinds, then, I said, when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body[*](Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 C f., Soph. 227Crito 47 D f., Gorg. 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D. For φλέγμα Cf. Tim. 83 C, 85 A-B.) by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly[*](μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δέ: cf. 378 A, 414 C, 461 C, 473 B, Apol. 34 A, Soph. 246 D.) to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all. Yes, by Zeus, he said, by all means. Then let us take it in this way, I said, so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.[*](For εὐκρινέστερον Cf. Soph. 246 D.) How? Let us in our theory make a tripartite[*](Cf. Phileb. 23 C, which Stenzel says argues an advance over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.) division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state. That is so. But it is far fiercer in this state than in that. How so? There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker’s stand and keeps up a buzzing[*](Cf. 573 A.) and tolerates[*](ἀνέχεται cf. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 305 οὐκ ἀνασχήσομαι, Wasps 1337.) no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state. Quite so, he said. And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort. What sort? he said. When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest. It is likely. Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.[*](For βλίττεται cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 794.) Why, yes, he said, how could one squeeze it out of those who have little? The capitalistic[*](That is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. the rich.) class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones. Pretty much so, he said.

And the third class,[*](For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 151-163, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97) composing the people, would comprise all quiet[*](ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 C, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot. Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoc. Antid. 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.) cultivators of their own farms[*](αὐτουργοί: Cf. Soph. 223 D, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.) who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.Yes, it is, he said, but it will not often do that,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 b 12.) unless it gets a share of the honey. Well, does it not always share, I said, to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing[*](Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.) to the people what they take from the well-to-do,[*](For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. Areop. 32 ff., Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592.) to keep the lion’s share for themselves[*](Cf. Aristoph. Knights 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in Il. ix. 363.)? Why, yes, he said, it shares in that sense. And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power. Of course. And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.[*](i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 C μισόδημος. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the disharmony between Plato’s upperclass sympathies and his liberal philosophy.) Surely. And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will[*](So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn. 515-516.) but through misapprehension,[*](Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (δι’ ἄγνοιαν) are involuntary.) and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,[*](For τότ’ ἢδη cf. 569 A, Phaedo 87 E, Gorg. 527 D, Laches 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.) whether they wish it or not,[*](So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 30 ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις.) they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them. Precisely. And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side. Yes, indeed. And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector[*](Cf. 562 D, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S. I. G. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.) and cherish and magnify him? Yes, it is. This, then, is plain, said I, that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 b 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν, etc., ibid. 1304 b 20 ff.) and from nothing else. Very plain. What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia[*](Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook’s Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato’s feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff.)? What is that? he said. The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale? I have.

And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,[*](Note the difference of tone from 502 B. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C.) does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood,[*](Cf. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 32; Lucan i. 331: nullus semel ore receptus Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.) but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out[*](For ἀφανίζων Cf. Gorg. 471 B.) a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands[*](The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another disharmony. Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst. 88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timocr. 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath at Itanos.)—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate[*](Cf. 619 C.) that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?It is quite inevitable, he said. He it is, I said, who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.[*](Cf. 565 A.) Yes, he. May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant? Obviously. And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth. That is certainly wont to happen, said he. And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition[*](Cf Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον Cf. Phaedo 100 B.) of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe[*](For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 Vol. I. p. 65, note c.) for the friend of democracy. They do indeed, he said. And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves. Yes, indeed. And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy,[*](For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph. Knights 787, Clouds 1187.) then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus,

By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.

mighty with far-flung limbs,

And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?Obviously.And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars[*](For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη, Soph. Antig. 795 νεῖκος . . . ταράξας.)?Yes, he is compelled to do so.And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?Of course.And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish[*](ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen Ages. 2.31, Isoc. 4.126.) and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?Yes, it is likely.Then the tyrant must do away[*](Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή, as often in the Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. Tim. 67 C, 69 A, 77 C, 82 B, and passim.) with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe.Obviously.He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men Cf. Laws 832 C, Gorg. 510 B-C, Xen. Hiero 5. I, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Ion 626-628. But cf. Pindar, Pyth, iii, 71, of Hiero,οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.)A fine purgation, he said. Yes, said I, just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse. Yes, for apparently he must, he said, if he is to keep his power. Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him, said I, which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life. Such it is, he said. And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards? Of course. Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them? Unbidden, he said, they will wing their way[*](Cf. Laws 952 E, Rep. 467 D.) to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage. Drones, by the dog, I said, I think you are talking of again, an alien[*](Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies.) and motley crew.[*](παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 C.) You think rightly, he said. But what of the home supply,[*](For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος, Thuc. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28.) would he not choose to employ that? How? By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard. Assuredly, he said, since these are those whom he can most trust.

Truly, said I, this tyrant business[*](For the idiomatic and colloquial χρῆμα cf. Herod. i. 36, Eurip. Androm. 181, Theaet. 209 E, Aristoph. Clouds 1, Birds 826, Wasps 933, Lysistr. 83, 1085, Acharn. 150, Peace 1192, Knights 1219, Frogs 1278.) is a blessed[*](For the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. p. 368, note a.) thing on your showing, if such are the friends and trusties he must employ after destroying his former associates. But such are indeed those he does make use of, he said. And these companions admire him, I said, and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him. Why should they not? Not for nothing,[*](For οὐκ ἐτός cf. 414 E. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph. Cf. e.g. Acharn. 411, 413, Birds 915, Thesm. 921, Plut. 404, 1166, Eccl. 245.) said I, is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.[*](This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the admirers of Euripides.) Why, pray? Because among other utterances of pregnant thought[*](Cf. πυκιναὶ φρένες Iliad xiv. 294, πυκινὸς νόος xv. 41 etc.) he said,

Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.[*](Cf. Theages 125 B f. The line is also attributed to Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Dümmler, Akademika, p. 16. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 119 thinks this an allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus of Macedon. Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 3-5 contrasts their education unfavorably with that of the ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of Plato.)

And what have you to say, I said, in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called better classes,[*](For καλῶν κἀγαθῶν cf. Aristoph. Knights 185, and Blaydes on 735. See also on 489 E, p. 27, note d.) and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels[*](Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 123.) from his house a son together with troublesome revellers? The demos, by Zeus, he said, will then learn to its cost[*](For the threatening γνώσεται cf. 362 A, 466 C, Il. xviii. 270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 τάχα γνώσῃ, and Lucian, Timon 33 εἴσεται.) what it is and what[*](For the juxtaposition οἷος οἷον Cf. Symp. 195 A, Sophocles El. 751, Ajax 557, 923, Trach. 995, 1045.) a creature it begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger. What do you mean? said I; will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him[*](Cf. on 574 C, pp. 346-347, note e.)? Yes, he said, after he has once taken from him his arms. A very parricide, said I, you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire[*](As we say, Out of the frying-pan into the fire. Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 17. 5 ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς αἶνος ’πεσες ἐς φλόγα, Theodoret, Therap. iii. p. 773 καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ὡς ἔοικε, φύγοντες, εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν. See Otto, p. 137; also Solon 7 (17) (Anth. Lyr.,Bergk-Hiller, 9 in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 122, Loeb Classical Library) εἰς δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρείῃ δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν, Herod. iii. 81 τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν, and for the idea Epist. viii. 354 D.) of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty[*](Cf. Epist. viii. 354 D.) has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.[*](For the rhetorical style Cf. Tim. 41 θεοὶ θεῶν, Polit. 303 C σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς, and the biblical expressions, God of Gods and Lord of Lords, e.g. Deut. x. 17, Ps. cxxxvi. 2-3, Dan. xi. 36, Rev. xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1063 τρίδουλος.) Yes indeed, he said, that is just what happens. Well, then, said I, shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself? Quite sufficiently, he said.

There remains for consideration, said I, the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy. Why, yes, he still remains, he said. Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss? What? In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness. Well, said he, will our consideration of them not still be opportune[*](For ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971, Aristoph. Eccl. 321, Thesm. 292.)? By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures[*](Cf. on 558 D.) and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled[*](For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.) by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous. What desires do you mean? he said. Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ’ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes We are not hypocrites in our sleep, a modern novelist, In sleep all barriers are down. The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: It has been perhaps Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field. The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . . Cf. ibid. p. 95: The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable. Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful. (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart’s Myths of Plato, Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.) when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.[*](The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.) You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b.) and shamelessness. Most true, he said. But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep[*](Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, And body gets its sop and holds its noise. Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, Was Plato an Ascetic? Philos. Re., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.) and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;

and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep[*](Cf. Ephesians iv. 26 Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.) with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case[*](ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, Lysis 212 C, Laws 625 D.) he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.[*](This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, Pater’s complaint that Plato’s sentences are long may be regarded as Pater’s single excursion into humor. But Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato’s example. He calls this passage Plato’s evening prayer.)I certainly think so, he said. This description has carried us too far,[*](Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 177 C, Protag. 359 A, Crat. 438 A, Polit. 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, Laws 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Demosth. De cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93 A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.) but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,[*](For the irony of the expression Cf. Laws 693 D, Aesch. Eumen. 373.) a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it. Well, I do. Now recall[*](Cf. 559 D f.) our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so? Yes. And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise[*](εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.) between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,[*](Ironical. δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on moderate drinking and moderate preparedness.) as he supposes,[*](ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα, etc.) he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat. That was and is our belief about this type. Assume,[*](θές: Cf. Theaet. 191 C, Phileb. 33 D.) then, again, said I, that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn[*](This is the αὖ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.) in his ways of life. I so assume. And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to[*](Cf. 559 E.) these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.

And when these dread magi[*](An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.) and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion[*](Cf. Symp. 205 D.) to be the protector[*](προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.) of his idle and prodigal[*](For τὰ ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 D and E, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 frui paratis.) appetites, a monstrous winged[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ’ ὑπόπτερον ) drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?Nothing but that, he said. And when the other appetites, buzzing[*](Cf. 564 D.) about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 E.) why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,[*](For οἰστρᾷ Cf. Phaedr. 240 D.) and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted[*](For ποιουμένας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.) worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.) him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.[*](ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 B, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 583, Soph. Trach. 259.) A perfect description, he said, of the generation of the tyrannical man. And is not this analogy, said I, the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant[*](Cf. 573 D, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck)θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.)? That may well be, he said. And does not a drunken man,[*](For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr, 238 B.) my friend, I said, have something of this tyrannical temper? Yes, he has. And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods. Yes indeed, he does, he said. Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend, I said, when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal. Assuredly. Such, it seems, is his origin and character,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before.) but what is his manner of life? As the wits say, you shall tell me.[*](Cf. Phileb. 25 B and perhaps Rep. 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus. ) I do, I said; for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans[*](Cf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.) and all the doings of those whose[*](ὦν ἄν: cf. 441 D-E ὅτου, etc., 583 A ἐν ᾧ and my review of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.) souls are entirely swayed[*](Cf. Phaedr. 238 B-C.) by the indwelling tyrant Eros. Inevitably, he said. And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things? Many indeed. And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended. Of course.

And after this there are borrowings and levyings[*](For παραιρέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.) upon the estate?Of course.And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings[*](ἐννενεοττευμένας Cf. Alc. I. 135 E, Laws 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. Birds 699, 1108.) of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?Most certainly.And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source[*](Cf. Aesch. Eumen. 544.) or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.[*](Cf. Gorg. 494 A ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.)He is.And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better[*](Cf. Vol. I. 349 B f.) of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father’s estate.Of course, he said, what else? And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them? Certainly. And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force? I think so, he said. And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant? I am not without my fears, he said, for the parents of such a one. Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity[*](The word ἀναγκαῖαν means both necessary and akin. Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους.) and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows[*](For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι Cf. Phaedr. 254 E ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 C θανάτῳ δέδοται. For striking his father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff.) upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof? Yes, by Zeus, he said. A most blessed lot it seems to be, said I, to be the parent of a tyrant son. It does indeed, he said. And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted[*](For ἐπιλείπῃ cf. 568 E, 573 E.) and fail such a one, and the swarm[*](Cf. Meno 72 A, Cratyl. 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 297.) of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall[*](He becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph. Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831 E.) of someone’s house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep[*](νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the preceding line.) of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,[*](For ποιουμένας cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C.) will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated[*](Cf. 567 E.) and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul.

But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,[*](Cf. on 591 E.) so to speak, of him in whom it dwells[*](τὸν ἔχοντα: Cf. Phaedr. 239 C, Laws 837 B, Soph. Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 C and E.) to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,[*](For the tyrant’s companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1.) in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?It is this, he said. And if, I said, there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils. What kind of evils do you mean? Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,[*](Cf. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508 E, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 62.) and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes. Yes, small evils indeed,[*](So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.) he said, if the men of this sort are few. Why, yes, I said, for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail[*](οὐδ’ ἴκταρ βάλλει was proverbial, doesn’t strike near, doesn’t come within range. Cf. Aelian, N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ’ ἐγγύς, Symp. 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. De cor. 97.) of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul. Naturally, he said, for he would be the most tyrannical. Then if the people yield willingly—’tis well,[*](In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. Protag. 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, Mn. xix. pp. 338 f.) but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland[*](So also the Hindus of Bengal, The Nation,July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18 μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 E (An seni resp.) ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, Menex. 239 A.)—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man’s desire.[*](Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne’s refrain, This is the end of every man’s desire (Ballad of Burdens).) Yes, he said, this, just this.