Republic

And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness[*](Cf. Theaet. 159 A.) and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity wherever they arise.

Of this lineage, look you,

Yes.Such men, said I, will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish a fierce secret lust for gold[*](This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 13, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14, 203 and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps, The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization, pp. 180-184.) and silver, owning storehouses[*](Cf. 416 D.) and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures[*](Cf. Laws 681 A, Theaet. 174 E.) of their homes, literal private love-nests[*](νεοττιάς suggests Horace’s tu nidum servas (Epist. i. 10.6). Cf also Laws 776 A.) in which they can lavish their wealth on their women[*](Cf. Laws 806 A-C, 637 B-C, Aristot. Pol. 1269 b 3, and Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, op. cit. pp. 322-346.) and any others they please with great expenditure. Most true, he said. And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others’ wealth[*](φιλαναλωταί, though different, suggests Sallust’s alieni appetens sui profusus (Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam.) because of their appetites, enjoying[*](Cf. 587 A, Laws 636 D, Symp. 187 E, Phaedr. 251 E.) their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1270 b 34 with Newman’s note; and Euthyphro 2 C tell his mother the state.) since they have not been educated by persuasion[*](Cf. Laws 720 D-E. This is not inconsistent with Polit. 293 A, where the context and the point of view are different.) but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and because of their preference of gymnastics to music? You perfectly describe, he said, a polity that is a mixture[*](This is of course not the mixed government which Plato approves Laws 691-692, 712 D-E, 759 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 629.) of good and evil. Why, yes, the elements have been mixed, I said, but the most conspicuous[*](For διαφανέστατον cf. 544 D. The expression διαφανέστατον . . . ἕν τι μόνον, misunderstood and emended by Apelt, is colored by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius i. 877-878: illud Apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta. Anaxag. Fr. 12. Diels 1.3, p. 405 ἀλλ’ ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστον ἐστι καὶ ἦν. Cf. Phaedr. 238 A, Cratyl. 393 misunderstood by Dümmler and emended (ἐναργής for ἐγκρατής) with the approval of Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 350.) feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honor.[*](There is no contradiction between this and Laws 870 C if the passage is read carefully.) Very much so, said he. Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms[*](Cf. on 544 D, p. 240, note a.) of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men. Quite right, he said. What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature? I fancy, Adeimantus said, that he comes rather close[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Porphyry, De abst. i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας.) to Glaucon here in point of contentiousness. Perhaps, said I, in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects. In what?

He will have to be somewhat self-willed[*](αὐθαδέστερον. The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 1034, 1937) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon.) and lacking in culture,[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, who imitates or parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 A little inaccessible to ideas and light, and pp. 54-55 The peculiar serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their never having had any ideas to trouble them.) yet a lover of music and fond of listening[*](Cf. 475 D, 535 D, Lysis 206 C.) to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician; and to slaves such a one would be harsh,[*](Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 C, and Newman ii. p. 317. In i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal state, in spite of 547 C.) not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honor,[*](Cf. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical φιλότιμος. Cf Phaedr. 256 C, Eurip. I. A. 527. He is a Xenophontic type. Cf Xen. Oecon. 14. 10, Hiero 7. 3, Agesil. 10. 4. Isoc. Antid. 141 and 226 uses the word in a good sense. Cf. But if it be a sin to covet honor, Shakes. Henry V. iv. iii. 28.) not basing his claim to office[*](Cf. the ἀξιώματα of Laws 690 A, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 8 ff., 1282 b 26, 1283-1284.) on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.[*](Cf. Arnold on the barbarians in Culture and Anarchy, pp. 78, 82, 84.)Why, yes, he said, that is the spirit of that polity.[*](For the ἦθος of a state cf. Isoc. Nic. 31.) And would not such a man be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian? What guardian? said Adeimantus. Reason, said I, blended with culture,[*](The Greek words λόγος and μουσική are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 B. For μουσική cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that his is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of music in 522 A. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of Plato’s opinions.) which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it. Well said, he replied. This is the character, I said, of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name. By all means. His origin[*](δέ γ’ marks the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf. 547 E, 553 C, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 561 E, 563 B, 566 E. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There are no cases in the first five pages.) is somewhat on this wise: Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honors and office and law-suits and all such meddlesomeness[*](Cf. Lysias xix. 18 ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, with the contrasted type ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι, Isoc. Antid. 227 ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει. Cf. πολυπραγμοσύνη 444 B, 434 B, Isoc. Antid. 48, Peace 108, 30, and 26, with Norlin’s note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. Knights 261.) and is willing to forbear something of his rights[*](ἐλαττοῦσθαι cf. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1198 b 26-32, Pol. 1319 a 3.) in order to escape trouble.[*](For πράγματα ἔχειν cf. 370 A, Gorg. 467 D, Alc. I. 119 B, Aristoph. Birds 1026, Wasps 1392. Cf. πράγματα παρέχειν, Rep. 505 A, 531 B, Theages 121 D, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph. Birds 931, Plutus 20, 102.) How does he originate? he said. Why, when, to begin with, I said, he hears his mother complaining[*](Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, Gött. Gel. Anz. 1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, Four Years in Germany, p. 115 Now if a lawyer gets to be about forty years old and is not some kind of a Rat his wife begins to nag him . . .) that her husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private lawsuits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-absorbed[*](Cf. Symp. 174 D, Isoc. Antid. 227.) in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch,[*](Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6.) and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack[*](λίαν ἀνειμένος: one who has grown too slack or negligent. Cf. Didot, Com. Fr. p. 728 τίς ὧδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος; Porphyry, De abst. ii. 58.) and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints with which women[*](Cf. Phaedo 60 A.For Plato’s attitude towards women Cf. What Plato Said, p. 632, on Laws 631 D.) nag[*](ὑμνεῖν. Cf. Euthydem. 296 D, Soph. Ajax 292. Commentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato’s style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 385.) in such cases. Many indeed, said Adeimantus, and after their kind.[*](Cf. Aristoph. Thesm. 167 ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει.)

You are aware, then, said I, that the very house-slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing.[*](ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: cf. on 488 B; also Gorg. 481 E, 482 A, 514 D, Euthyd. 298 E, Protag. 326 A, Phaedo 58 D, 80 D, Symp. 201 E, etc.) Men who mind their own affairs[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 B.) in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people’s affairs are honored and praised. Then it is[*](τότε δή cf. 551 A, 566 C, 330 E, 573 A, 591 A, Phaedo 85 A, 96 B and D, Polit. 272 E. Cf. also τότ’ ἤδη, on 565 C.) that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle[*](Cf. on 439 D, Vol. I. p. 397, note d.) in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate[*](For these three principles of the soul cf. on 435 A ff., 439 D-E ff., 441 A.); and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,[*](Cf. the fragment of Menander,φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ’ ὁμιλίαι κακαί, quoted in 1Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F. iii. No. 218). Cf. also Phaedr. 250 A ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν, Aesch. Seven Against Thebes 599 ἔσθ’ ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν.) under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise[*](Cf. p. 249, note f.) and turns over the government in his soul[*](Cf. 553 B-C, 608 B.) to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul[*](ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. I. A. 919.) and covetous of honor.[*](Cf. p. 255, note f.) You have, I think, most exactly described his origin. Then, said I, we have our second polity and second type of man. We have, he said. Shall we then, as Aeschylus: would say,

tell of another champion before another gate,

So, when wealth is honored in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honored.Obviously.And that which men at any time honor they practise,[*](This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 2 honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque inprobantur. Themistius and Libanius worked it into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, The Emperor Julian, p. 70, n. 3. Cf. also Stallbaum ad loc. For ἀσκεῖται cf. Pindar, Ol. viii. 22.) and what is not honored is neglected.It is so.Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honor they become lovers of gain-getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor.Quite so.And is it not then that they pass a law defining the limits[*](ὅρον: cf. 551 C, Laws 714 C, 962 D, 739 D, 626 B, Menex. 238 D, Polit. 293 E, 296 E, 292 C, Lysis 209 C, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220, Eth. Nic. 1138 b 23. Cf. also τέλος Rhet. 1366 a 3. For the true criterion of office-holding see Laws 715 C-D and Isoc. xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion cf. Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37.) of an oligarchical polity, prescribing[*](For ταξάμενοι cf. Vol. I. p. 310, note c, on 416 E.) a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 13-14.) of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization.[*](Cf. 557 A.) Is not that the way of it?It is.The establishment then, one may say, is in this wise.Yes, he said, but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said it had? To begin with, said I, consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots[*](Cf. 488, and Polit. 299 B-C, What Plato Said, p. 521, on Euthydem. 291 D.) of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow[*](Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in 575 D, Symp. 213 E, Lysis 210 B, etc. Similarly Latin permitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett’s translation of Meno 92 A-B, A. J. P. xiii. p. 367. See too Diog. L. i. 65.) a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot. A sorry voyage they would make of it, he said. And is not the same true of any other form of rule? I think so. Except of a city, said I, or does it hold for a city too? Most of all, he said, by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult[*](Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. Polit. 292 D, and What Plato Said, p. 635, on Laws 766 A.) rule of all. Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy. So it appears. Well, and is this a smaller one? What? That such a city should of necessity be not one,[*](For the idea that a city should be a unity Cf. Laws 739 D and on 423 A-B. Cf. also 422 E with 417 A-B, Livy ii. 24 adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat. Aristot. Pol. 1316 b 7 comments ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων . . . and tries to prove the point by his topical method.) but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting[*](Cf. 417 B.) against one another. No, by Zeus, said he, it is not a bit smaller. Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and employing the multitude,[*](For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people cf. Thuc. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 consules et armare pIebem et inermem pati timebant.) and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,[*](He plays on the word. In 565 C ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς is used in a different sense. Cf. Symp. 181 A ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδημος, Phaedo 80 D εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.) and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money. No, indeed, that is not admirable.

And what of the trait we found fault with long ago[*](Cf. 374 B, 434 A, 443 D-E. For the specialty of function Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 E.)—the fact that in such a state the citizens are busy-bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right?By no manner of means.Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils.What?The allowing a man to sell all his possessions,[*](So in the Laws the householder may not sell his lot, Laws 741 B-C, 744 D-E. Cf. 755 A, 857 A, Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 19, Newman i. p. 376.) which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it,[*](Cf Aristot. Pol. 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109. Cf Leslie Stephen, Util. ii. 111 A vast populace has grown up outside of the old order.) neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1266 b 13.) and a dependent.This is the first, he said. There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, and others out and out paupers. Right. But observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods[*](ἑτοίμωνthings ready at hand. Cf. 573 A, Polyb. vi. (Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace Epist. i. 2. 27 fruges consumere nati.)? It is so, he said; he only seemed, but was just a spendthrift. Shall we, then, say of him that as the drone[*](Cf. Laws 901 A, Hesiod, Works and Days 300 f., Aristoph. Wasps 1071 ff., Eurip. Suppl. 242, Xen. Oecon. 17. 15, and Virgil, Georg. iv. 168 ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent. the sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to Ruhnken on Tim. 157 ff. for many illustration, and to Petavius ad Themist. Orat. xxiii. p. 285 D.) springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state? By all means, Socrates, he said. And has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age,[*](Cf 498 A, Laws 653 A; also the modern distinction between defectives and delinquents.) but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated[*](κέκληνται: Cf. 344 B-C.) malefactors? Most true, he said. It is plain, then, said I, that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighborhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime. Clearly, he said. Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see beggars? Nearly all are such, he said, except the ruling class. Are we not to suppose, then, that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly[*](βίᾳ is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελείᾳ as an adverb.) restrain? We must think so, he said. And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state? We shall. Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict it. Pretty nearly these, he said.

Then, I said, let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification.[*](Cf. on 550 C. p. 261, note h.) And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is. Quite so, he said. Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise? How? When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps[*](Cf. 410 B, Homer Od. xix. 436 ἴχνη ἐρευνῶντος, ii. 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 μετ’ ἴχνια βαῖνε.) and then sees him suddenly dashed,[*](For πταίσαντα cf. Aesch. Prom. 926, Ag. 1624 (Butl. emend.).) as a ship on a reef,[*](Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1007, Eumen. 564, Thuc. vii. 25. 7, and Thompson on Phaedr. 255 D.) against the state, and making complete wreckage[*](Lit. spilling. Cf. Lucian, Timon 23.) of both his possessions and himself perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished[*](For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 A, 566 A. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13 it is used of shipwreck. Cf. εκ̓βάλλοντες 488 C.) or outlawed and has lost all his property— It is likely, he said. And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong[*](Cf. Herod. vii. 136.) from his bosom’s throne[*](Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983. Cf. 550 B.) that principle of love of honor and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily[*](For γλίσχρως cf. on 488 A, Class. Phil. iv. p. 86 on Diog. L. iv. 59, Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18 γλίσχρως τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγον.) and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword? I do, he said. And under this domination he will force the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left[*](ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν: Cf. Protag. 315 B, Tim. 46 C, Critias 117 C, etc., Herod. iv. 175.) as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little,[*](Cf. 554 A, 556 C, Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ, and Aristot. Pol. 1257 b 407, and 330 C. See too Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 220: The Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. Money-making is an art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole man, etc. For the phrase σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν cf. Isoc. Areop. 83, Panegyr. 133-134 σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν.) and the other to admire and honor nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that? There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type. Is this, then, our oligarchical man? said I. He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang. Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character.

Let us see.Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything?Inevitably.And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only his own necessary[*](Cf. on 558 D, p. 291, note i.) appetites and desires and not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable?By all means.He would be a squalid[*](αὐχμηρός: Cf. Symp. 203 D.) fellow, said I, looking for a surplus of profit[*](For περιουσίαν cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 50 and Theaet. 154 E.) in everything, and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves.[*](Cf. Phaedr. 256 E, Meno 90 A-B by implication. Numenius (ed. Mullach iii. 159) relates of Lacydes that he was a bit greedy (ὑπογλισχρότερος) and after a fashion a thrifty manager (οἰκονομικός)—as the expression is—the sort approved by most people. Emerson, The Young American, they recommend conventional virtues, whatever will earn and preserve property. But this is not always true in an envious democracy: cf. Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America today.) Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity? I certainly think so, he said. Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man. That, I take it, said I, is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture. I think not, he said, else he would not have made the blind[*](Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf. Aristoph. Plutus,Eurip. fr. 773, Laws 631 C πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός which was often quoted. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 624, Otto, p. 60.) one leader of his choir and first in honor.[*](Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.) Well said, I replied. But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self- control[*](Cf. 552 E ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ. For ἄλλης cf. 368 B ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου.)? We shall indeed, he said. Do you know, then, said I, to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men? To what? he said. To guardianships of orphans,[*](For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a test of character Cf. Laws 777 D-E, Hesiod, Works and Days, 330, and Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, pp. 84-85, who, however, errs on the meaning of αἰδώς. For orphans cf. also Laws 926-928, 766 C, 877 C, 909 C-D.) and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity. True. And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better[*](ἐπιεικεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense of sweet reasonableness.) element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within,[*](For ἐνούσας Cf. Phileb. 16 D, Symp. 187 E.) not persuading them that it is better not[*](Cf. 463 D. For the idea here Cf. Phaedo 68-69, What Plato Said, p. 527.) nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally. Quite so, he said. Yes, by Zeus, said I, my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites. Most emphatically. Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension.[*](For the idea at war with himself, Cf. 440 B and E (στάσις), Phaedr. 237 D-E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1099 a 12 f.) He would not be really one, but in some sort a double[*](Cf. 397 E.) man. Yet for the most part, his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse. It is so. And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony[*](Cf. on 443 D-E, Vol. I. p. 414, note e; also Phaedo 61 A, and What Plato Said, p. 485 on Laches 188 D.) with itself would escape him and dwell afar. I think so.

And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honorable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical[*](ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and the state. Cf. my Idea of Justice, Ethical Record,Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.) fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself richYes indeed, he said. Have we any further doubt, then, I said, as to the correspondence and resemblance[*](ὁμοιότητι: cf. 576 C.) between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchical state? None, he said. We have next to consider, it seems, the origin and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement.[*](Cf. Phileb. 55 C εἰς τὴν κρίσιν, Laws 856 C, 943 C.) That would at least be a consistent procedure. Then, said I, is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good,[*](The σκοπός or ὅρος. Cf. on 551 A, p. 263, note e, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 2.) the attainment of the greatest possible wealth? In what way? Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed. By all means. And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honoring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship,[*](Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Plato, compares Luke xvi.13 Ye cannot serve God and Mammon. Cf. also Laws 742 D-E, 727 E f., 831 C.) but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected. That is pretty clear, he said. And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness[*](ἀκολασταίνεινCf. Gorg. 478 A, Phileb. 12 D.) in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality.[*](Cf. Laws 832 A οὐκ ἀφυεῖς. For the men reduced to poverty swelling the number of drones cf. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592, and Wilamowitz ad loc.) It surely has. And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution.[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 b 40-41, 1266 b 14.) ’Tis so.

But these money-makers with down-bent heads,[*](Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes, Cf. 586 A κεκυφότες. Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.) pretending not even to see[*](Cf. Euthyph. 5 C, Polit. 287 A, Aristoph. Peace 1051, Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, I. T. 956, Medea 67, Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 6.) them, but inserting the sting of their money[*](Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, the poison of their money.τιτρώσκοντες suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν, implanting madness. In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest,. cf. 507 A, p. 96.) into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state.They do indeed multiply it, he said. And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,[*](Cf. on 552 A, Laws 922 E-923 A.) or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses. What law? The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.[*](Cf. Protag. 327 D ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Symp. 185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Cf. What Plato Said, p. 464, on Apol. 29 D-E.) For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts[*](For refusing to enforce monetary contracts Cf. Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 21.) should be at the contractor’s risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there. Much fewer, he said. But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-spring, do they not make the young spoiled[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 D, and Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23.) wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain,[*](Cf. 429 C-D, Laches 191 D-E, Laws 633 D.) and mere idlers? Surely. And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit? Little they care. And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt[*](Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.) pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,[*](Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα.) and sees him panting and helpless[*](For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098. Cf. also Gorg. 518 C, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25.)—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice[*](The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν, Rhesus 813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ, Phaedrus 248 B, Symp. 182 D, Crito 45 E, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ κοράκων πονηρίᾳ.) of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another our men are good for nothing? Nay, I know very well that they do, said he. And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse[*](Cf. Soph. O. T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ’ εὐνάζει ῥοπή a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep, Demosth. Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.) from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,[*](Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Höffding, i. 30 Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile, with Tim. 89 B.) the one party bringing in[*](Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.) allies from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises[*](στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, grievously ill of faction. Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.)?

Most emphatically.And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out[*](Cf. 488 C, 560 A, Gorg. 466 C, 468 D, Prot. 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.) others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share[*](ἐξ ἴσου: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B and C, 599 B, 617 C, Laws 919 D, Alc. I. 115 D, Crito 50 E, Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.) in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.[*](But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc. For the use of the lot in Plato Cf. Laws 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, Rep. 460 A, 461 E. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.)Why, yes, he said, that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism[*](Cf. 551 B.) resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties. What, then, said I, is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man. It is plain, he said. To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence[*](ἐξουσία: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ’ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.) to do as he likes? So it is said, he replied. And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan[*](κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, Gorg. 455 E, 477 B, etc.) for leading his own life in the way that pleases him. Obvious. All sorts[*](παντοδαπός usually has an unfavorable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-C, 561 D, 567 E, 550 D, Symp. 198 B, Gorg. 489 C, Laws 788 C, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favorable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. for the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and Laws 681 D. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state. De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.) and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other? Of course. Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps, I said, many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women[*](For the idea that women and children like many colors cf. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled with all manner of colors (Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys Cf. Laws 658 D, Shakes. As You Like It,III. ii. 435 As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this color, Faguet, Nineteenth CenturyLamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées.) when they see bright-colored things. Yes indeed, he said. Yes, said I, and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution. Why so? Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar[*](Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species. Cf. Laws 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, misquotes this saying The Athenians sold justice . . . , which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold.) of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own. Perhaps at any rate, he said, he would not be at a loss for patterns.

And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 a 12 δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 B-C.) or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,[*](Cf. Laws 955 B-C, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. Acharn. passim.) or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment[*](διαγωγή: cf. 344 E, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 A, Polit. 274 D, Tim. 71 D, Laws 806 E, Aristot. Met. 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.) for the time being?Perhaps, he said, for so long. And is not the placability[*](Cf. 562 D. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51 Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, Hel. 27; also Menex. 243 E and also Euthydem. 303 D δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word πρᾳότης is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.) of some convicted criminals exquisite[*](κομψή: cf. 376 A, Theaet. 171 A.)? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out[*](For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Acc. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 121, 494, Peace 762.) like a revenant[*](His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering spirit, one returned from the dead (a perfectly possible meaning for ἥρως. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 435 translates Geist) than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam ad loc.)? Yes, many, he said. And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority[*](For οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία cf. on 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία.) to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain or our solemn[*](σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—high-brow, top-lofty.) pronouncements[*](Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, Laws 643 B, Delacroix, Psychologie de l’art, p. 46.) made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent[*](For ὑπερβεβλημένη Cf. Laws 719 D, Eurip. Alcest. 153.) natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good,—how superbly[*](μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 C, Symp. 199 C, Charm. 175 C, Theaet. 161 C, Meno 94 B, Polit. 277 B, Hipp. Maj. 291 E.) it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices[*](In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.) and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him if only he says that he loves the people It is a noble[*](For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 C, Soph. 231 B, Theaet. 209 E.) polity, indeed! he said. These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful[*](ἡδεῖα: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government,τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίους.) form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike Yes, he said, everybody knows that. Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type? Yes, he said. Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty[*](Cf. 572 C, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democr. fr. 227 and 228, DieIs ii.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45, Diels i.3 126.) oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p.485, on Laches 190 B, and p. 551, on Phaedr. 237 E.) our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites[*](Cf. 554 A, 571 B, Phaedo 64 D-E, Phileb. 62 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 13. 45, Tusc. v. 33, 93, Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.)? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so ? Most assuredly.

Then we shall rightly use the word necessary of them?Rightly.And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?Fairly indeed.Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.[*](Or grasp them in outline.)Let us do so.Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes[*](For ὄψον cf. on 372 C, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.) be necessary?I think so.The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die.Yes.And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?By all means.And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction[*](For κολαζομένη cf. 571 B, Gorg. 505 B, 491 E, 507 D. For the thought cf. also 519 A-B.) and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul’s attainment of intelligence and sobriety?Nay, most rightly.And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,[*](Lit. money-making. Cf. 558 D.) because they help production?Surely.And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?The same.And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems[*](For γέμοντα cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, Gorg. 525 A, 522 E, etc.) with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man?Why, surely.To return, then, said I, we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way. How? When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce[*](αἴθων occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar and tragedy. Ernst Maass, Die Ironie des Sokrates,Sokrates, 11, p. 94 Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats, von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche Fuchsbestien genannt. (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.)) and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety[*](Cf. on 557 C, p. 286, note a.) and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy. Quite inevitably, he said. May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred[*](Cf. 554 D.) group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul? By all means, he said.

And if, I take it, a counter-alliance[*](For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν, they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions. (Loeb tr.)) comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction[*](Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.) and counter-faction and internal strife in the man with himself.Surely.And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others[*](τινες . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δὲ. For the partitive apposition cf. 566 E, 584 D, Gorg. 499 C. Cf. also Protag. 330 A, Gorg. 450 C, Laws 626 E, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186.) expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man’s soul and order is restored.That sometimes happens, he said. And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father’s ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong. Yes, that is wont to be the way of it. And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude. Yes indeed. And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel[*](Cf. Tim. 90 A.) of the young man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians[*](For the idea of guardians of the soul Cf. Laws 961 D, 549 B Cf. also on Phaedo 113 D, What Plato Said, p. 536.) in the minds of men who are dear to the gods. Much the best, he said. And then false and braggart words[*](Cf. Phaedo 92 D.) and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth. They do indeed. And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters[*](Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for classes of people: Cf. Rep. 415 D γηγενεῖς, Theaet. 181 A ῥέοντας, Soph. 248 A εἰδῶν φίλους, Phileb. 44 E τοῖς δυσχερέσιν. So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3.) and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support[*](βοήθεια: cf. Aristot. De an. 404 a 12.) comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe folly[*](Cf. 474 D, Thucyd. iii. 82 Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid. 284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι, etc., Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat.C 52 iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus, etc.) thrust it forth, a dishonored fugitive. And temperance they call want of manhood and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are rusticity and illiberality, and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.[*](ὑπερορίζουσι: Cf. Laws 855 C ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα, 866 D.) They do indeed. And when they have emptied and purged[*](Cf. 567 C and 573 B where the word is also used ironically, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 D, Soph. 226 D.) of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed[*](κατέχομαι is used of divine possession or inspiration in Phaedr. 244 E, Ion 533 E, 536 B, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10.) and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites,[*](Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 C, Symp. 210 A and 218 B, Theaet. 155 E-156 A, Laws 666 B, 870 D-E, Phaedr. 250 B-C, 249 C, Phaedo 81 A, 69 C, Rep. 378 A, etc., and Thompson on Meno 76 E.) they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent[*](Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130.) in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence good breeding, licence liberty, prodigality magnificence, and shamelessness manly spirit.

And is it not in some such way as this, said I, that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires? Yes, your description is most vivid, said he. Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth,[*](For the ironical δή cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D, 374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h.) and so lives turning over the guard-house[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ. For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray’s Barnes Newcome. For the lot cf. ibid, p. 285, note d, on 557 A.) of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.[*](Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. Cf. 557 A.) Quite so. And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base,[*](An obvious reference to the Gorgias. Cf. Gorg. 494 E, Phileb. 13 B ff., Protag. 353 D ff., Laws 733.) and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head[*](The Greek Says throws back his head—the characteristic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. Acharn. 115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.) at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed. Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct. And does he not, said I, also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute[*](For the word καταυλούμενος cf. 411 A, Laws 790 E, Lucian, Bis acc. 17, and for the passive Eur. I. T. 367. Cf. also Philetaerus, Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. fr. 187. 3 μολπαῖσι δ’ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ θηρεύεται. For the type cf. Theophrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph. Wasps 1475 ff.) and again drinking only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up[*](Cf. Protag. 319 D.) and says and does whatever enters his head.[*](For ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ cf. on 536 A, p. 213, note f,ὅταν τύχῃEurip. Hippol. 428, I. T. 722, Eurip. Fr. 825 (Didot),ὅπου ἂν τύχωσινXen. Oec. 20. 28,ὃν ἂν τύχῃςEurip. Tor. 68.) And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end. That is a perfect description, he said, of a devotee of equality. I certainly think, said I, that he is a manifold[*](παντοδαπόν: cf. on 557 C.) man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city[*](Cf. 557 D.) he is the fair and many-colored one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities. Yes, that is so, he said.

Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?Let that be his place, he said. And now, said I, the fairest[*](For the irony cf. 607 E τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν, 544 C γενναία, 558 C ἡδεῖα.) polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant. Certainly, he said. Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.[*](τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 D, Epist. vii. 324 B. A. G. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy) develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident. That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlook in their classification of polities.) That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain. Yes, plain. Is it, then, in a sense, in the same way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy? How is that? The good that they proposed to themselves[*](Their idea of good. Cf. 555 b προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ. Cf. Laws 962 E with Aristot. Pol. 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 20 αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. Cf. also p. 263, note e on 551 B (ὅρος) and p. 139, note c on 519 C (σκοπός).) and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth,[*](Cf. 552 B, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, note b, on 550 E.) was it not? Yes. Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing. True, he said. And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it[*](Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with the Platonic thought that every form of government brings ruin on itself by its own excess.) too? What do you say its criterion to be? Liberty,[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 43 The central idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty.) I replied; for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.[*](Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato’s Republic. ) Why, yes, he replied, you hear that saying everywhere. Then, as I was about to observe,[*](ᾖα . . . ἐρῶν: cf. 449 A, Theaet. 180 C.) is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship? How? he said. Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders[*](Or protectors, tribunes,προστατούντων. Cf. on 565 C, p. 318, note d.) and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine,[*](Cf. Livy xxxix. 26 velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem, Seneca, De benefic. i. 10 male dispensata libertas, Taine, Letter,Jan. 2, 1867 nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’égalité . . . C’est un vin pur et généreux; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre.) and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly,it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed[*](μιαρούς is really stronger, pestilential fellows. Cf. Apol. 23 D, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.) oligarchs.[*](For the charge of oligarchical tendencies cf. Isoc. Peace 51 and 133, Areop. 57, Antid. 318, Panath. 158.) Yes, that is what they do, he replied. But those who obey the rulers, I said, it reviles as willing slaves[*](Cf. Symp. 184 C, 183 A. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for Music, 6 Servitude that hugs her chain.) and men of naught,[*](For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 C, Apol. 41 E, Symp. 216 E, Gorg. 512 C, Erastae 134 C, Aristoph. Eccles. 144, Horace, Sat. ii. 7. 102 nil ego, Eurip. I. A. 371, Herod. ix. 58 οὐδένες ἐόντες.) but it commends and honors in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths[*](Cf. Laws 699 E ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, Aristoph. Lysistr. 543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἰέναι, Soph. El. 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον.)? Of course. And this anarchical temper, said I, my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.[*](Cf. 563 C, Laws 942 D.) Just what do we mean by that? he said.

Why, I said, the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents,[*](A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 49, Aristoph. Clouds, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10, Mem. iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, Souvenirs, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and liberty; Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, Modern Democracies, in Methods of Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family relations depend much more on the social, structural and religious ideas of a race than on forms of government; Whitman, Where the men and women think lightly of the laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves . . . there the great city stands.) so that he may be forsooth a free man.[*](For the ironical ἵνα δή cf. on 561 B. Cf. Laws 962 E ἐλεύθερον δή, Meno 86 and Aristoph. Clouds 1414.) And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise. Yes, these things do happen, he said. They do, said I, and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating[*](Cf. Protag. 336 A, Theaet. 174 A, 168 B.) themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry[*](For εὐτραπελίας cf. Isoc. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1108 a 23. In Rhet. 1389 b 11 he defnes it as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.) and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative. By all means, he said. And the climax of popular liberty, my friend, I said, is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free[*](Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10. τῶν δούλων δ’ αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία, Aristoph. Clouds init., and on slavery Laws 777 E, p. 249, note g on 547 C and 549 A.) than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men. Shall we not, then, said he, in Aeschylean phrase,[*](Nauck fr. 351. Cf. Plut. Amat. 763 C, Themist. Orat. iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam ad loc.) say whatever rises to our lips? Certainly, I said, so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts[*](Cf. 562 E, Julian, Misopogon, 355 B . . . μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν καμήλων; ἄγουσί τοι καὶ ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας . . . what great independence exists among the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though they were brides. (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pythag.Teubner, p. 22, 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων διικνεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἡ νουθέτησις ) subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage[*](Otto, p. 119. Cf. Like mistress, like maid.) and like their mistresses become. And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside.[*](Eurip. Ion 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city life.) And so all things everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty.[*](Cf. the reflections in Laws 698 f., 701 A-C, Epist. viii. 354 D, Gorg. 461 E; Isoc. Areop. 20, Panath. 131, Eurip. Cyclops 120 ἀκούει δ’ οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός, Aristot. Pol. 1295 b 15 f. Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth liberty in the style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with Goethe (Eckermann i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) Nicht das macht frei, das vir nichts über uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist. Libby, Introd. to Hist. of Science, p. 273, not understanding the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling tribute of a hostile critic. In Gorg. 484 A Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman. Cf. also on 558 C, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, Leviathan xxi. and Theopompus’s account of democracy in Byzantium, fr. 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American city street or Pullman club car.) It is my own dream[*](Cf Callimachus, Anth. Pal. vi. 310, and xii. 148 μὴ λέγε . . . τοὐμὸν ὄνειρον ἐμοί, Cic. Att. vi. 9. 3, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 7 ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὐμὸν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών, Tennyson, Lucretius: That was mine, my dream, I knew it.) you are telling me, he said; for it often happens to me when I go to the country. And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive[*](This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. also Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 51 And so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy.) that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude[*](Cf. Gorg. 491 E δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν, Laws 890 A.) and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws[*](Cf. Laws 701 B νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι ) written or unwritten,[*](For unwritten law Cf. What Plato Said, p. 637, on Laws 793 A.) so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them. I know it very well, said he. This, then, my friend, said I, is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion. Vigorous indeed, he said; but what next?

The same malady, I said, that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction[*](Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. De rep. i. 44 nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum . . . etc.) to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies,[*](For the generalization Cf. Symp. 188 A-B.) and most especially in political societies. Probably, he said. And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state. Yes, that is probable. Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution[*](Cf. 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by ApeIt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.) than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude. That is reasonable, he said. That, however, I believe, was not your question,[*](Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 C, p. 193, note i.) but what identical[*](ταὐτόν implies the concept. Cf. Parmen. 130 D, Phileb. 34 E, 13 B, Soph. 253 D. Cf. also Tim. 83 C, Meno 72 C, Rep. 339 A.) malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it? You say truly, he replied. That then, I said, was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones,[*](Cf. 555 D-E.) some equipped with stings and others stingless. And rightly too, he said. These two kinds, then, I said, when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body[*](Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 C f., Soph. 227Crito 47 D f., Gorg. 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D. For φλέγμα Cf. Tim. 83 C, 85 A-B.) by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly[*](μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δέ: cf. 378 A, 414 C, 461 C, 473 B, Apol. 34 A, Soph. 246 D.) to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all. Yes, by Zeus, he said, by all means. Then let us take it in this way, I said, so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.[*](For εὐκρινέστερον Cf. Soph. 246 D.) How? Let us in our theory make a tripartite[*](Cf. Phileb. 23 C, which Stenzel says argues an advance over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.) division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state. That is so. But it is far fiercer in this state than in that. How so? There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker’s stand and keeps up a buzzing[*](Cf. 573 A.) and tolerates[*](ἀνέχεται cf. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 305 οὐκ ἀνασχήσομαι, Wasps 1337.) no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state. Quite so, he said. And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort. What sort? he said. When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest. It is likely. Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.[*](For βλίττεται cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 794.) Why, yes, he said, how could one squeeze it out of those who have little? The capitalistic[*](That is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. the rich.) class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones. Pretty much so, he said.

And the third class,[*](For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 151-163, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97) composing the people, would comprise all quiet[*](ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 C, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot. Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoc. Antid. 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.) cultivators of their own farms[*](αὐτουργοί: Cf. Soph. 223 D, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.) who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.Yes, it is, he said, but it will not often do that,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 b 12.) unless it gets a share of the honey. Well, does it not always share, I said, to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing[*](Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.) to the people what they take from the well-to-do,[*](For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. Areop. 32 ff., Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592.) to keep the lion’s share for themselves[*](Cf. Aristoph. Knights 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in Il. ix. 363.)? Why, yes, he said, it shares in that sense. And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power. Of course. And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.[*](i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 C μισόδημος. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the disharmony between Plato’s upperclass sympathies and his liberal philosophy.) Surely. And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will[*](So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn. 515-516.) but through misapprehension,[*](Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (δι’ ἄγνοιαν) are involuntary.) and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,[*](For τότ’ ἢδη cf. 569 A, Phaedo 87 E, Gorg. 527 D, Laches 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.) whether they wish it or not,[*](So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 30 ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις.) they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them. Precisely. And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side. Yes, indeed. And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector[*](Cf. 562 D, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S. I. G. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.) and cherish and magnify him? Yes, it is. This, then, is plain, said I, that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 b 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν, etc., ibid. 1304 b 20 ff.) and from nothing else. Very plain. What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia[*](Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook’s Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato’s feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff.)? What is that? he said. The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale? I have.

And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,[*](Note the difference of tone from 502 B. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C.) does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood,[*](Cf. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 32; Lucan i. 331: nullus semel ore receptus Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.) but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out[*](For ἀφανίζων Cf. Gorg. 471 B.) a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands[*](The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another disharmony. Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst. 88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timocr. 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath at Itanos.)—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate[*](Cf. 619 C.) that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?It is quite inevitable, he said. He it is, I said, who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.[*](Cf. 565 A.) Yes, he. May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant? Obviously. And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth. That is certainly wont to happen, said he. And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition[*](Cf Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον Cf. Phaedo 100 B.) of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe[*](For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 Vol. I. p. 65, note c.) for the friend of democracy. They do indeed, he said. And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves. Yes, indeed. And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy,[*](For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph. Knights 787, Clouds 1187.) then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus,

By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.

mighty with far-flung limbs,