Republic

For anyone acquainted with geometry who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth with regard to equals or doubles or any other ratio.” “How could it be otherwise than absurd?” he said. “Do you not think,” said I, “that one who was an astronomer in very truth would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes upon the movements of the stars? He will be willing to concede that the artisan[*](δημιουργῷ: an anticipation of the Timaeus.) of heaven fashioned it and all that it contains in the best possible manner for such a fabric; but when it comes to the proportions of day and night, and of their relation to the month, and that of the month to the year, and of the other stars to these and one another, do you not suppose that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man who believes that these things go on for ever without change[*](Cf. Bruno apud Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy, i. 125 and 128, and Galileo, ibid. i. 178; also Lucretius v. 302-305.) or the least deviation[*](Plato was right against the view that Aristotle imposed on the world for centuries. We should not therefore say with Adam that he would have attached little significance to the perturbations of Neptune and the consequent discovery of Uranus. It is to Plato that tradition attributes the problem of accounting by the simplest hypothesis for the movement of the heavenly bodies and saving the phenomena. The alleged contradiction between this and Laws 821 B ff. and Tim. 41 A is due to a misapprehension. That the stars in their movements do not perfectly express the exactness of mathematical conceptions is no more than modern astronomers say. In the Laws passage Plato protests against the idea that there is no law and order governing the movement of the planets, but that they are wandering stars, as irregular in their movements as they seem. In the Timaeus he is saying that astronomy or science took its beginning from the sight and observation of the heavenly bodies and the changing seasons. In the Republic Plato’s purpose is to predict and encourage a purely mathematical astronomy and the indicate its place in the type of education which he wishes to give his guardians. There is not the slightest contradiction or change of opinion in the three passages if interpreted rightly in their entire context.)—though they possess bodies and are visible objects—and that his unremitting quest[*](The meaning is not appreciably affected by a slight doubt as to the construction of ζητεῖν. It is usually taken with ἄτοπον (regarded as neuter), the meaning being that the Philosophic astronomer will think it strange to look for the absolute truth in these things. This double use of ἄτοπον is strained and it either makes παντὶ τρόπῳ awkward or attributes to Plato the intention of decrying the concrete study of astronomy. I think ζητεῖν etc. are added by a trailing anacoluthon such as occurs elsewhere in the Republic. Their subject is the real astronomer who, using the stars only as diagrams or patterns (529 D), seeks to learn a higher exacter mathematical truth than mere observation could yield. Madvig’s ζητήσει implies a like view of the meaning but smooths out the construction. But my interpretation of the passage as a whole does not depend on this construction. If we make ζητεῖν depend on ἄτοπον (neuter)ἡγήσεται, the meaning will be that he thinks it absurd to expect to get that higher truth from mere observation. At all events Plato is not here objecting to observation as a suggestion for mathematical studies but to its substitution for them, as the next sentence shows.) the realities of these things?” “I at least do think so,” he said, “now that I hear it from you.” “It is by means of problems,[*](That is just what the mathematical astronomy of today does, and it is a πολλαπλάσιον ἔργον compared with the merely observational astronomy of Plato’s day. Cf. the interesting remarks of Sir James Jeans, apud S. J. Woolf, Drawn from Life, p. 74: The day is gone when the astronomer’s work is carried on only at the eyepiece of a telescope. Naturally, observations must be made, but these must be recorded by men who are trained for that purpose, and I am not one of them, etc. Adam’s quotation of Browning’s Abt Vogler in connection with this passage will only confirm the opinion of those who regard Plato as a sentimental enemy of science.) then,” said I, “as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and we will let be the things in the heavens,[*](Cf. also Phileb. 59 A, Aristot. Met. 997 b 35 οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ ἀστρολογία τόνδε. This intentional Ruskinian boutade has given great scandal. The Platonist, we are told ad nauseam, deduces the world from his inner consciousness. This is of course not true (Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 45). But Plato, like some lesser writers, loves to emphasize his thought by paradox and surprise, and his postulation and of a mathematical astronomy required emphasis. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, pp. 171-174. This and similar passages cannot be used to prove that Plato was unscientific, as many hostile or thoughtless critics have attempted to do. Cf. e.g. the severe strictures of Arthur Platt, Nine Essays, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921, pp. 12-16, especially p. 16: Plato being first and foremost a metaphysician with a sort of religious system would not have us study anything but metaphysics and a kind of mystic religion. Woodbridge Riley, From Myth to Reason, p. 47: . . . Plato...was largely responsible for turning back the clock of scientific progress. To explain the wonders of the world he preferred imagination to observation. Cf. also Benn, Greek Philosophers, vol. i. pp. 173 and 327, Herrick, The Thinking Machine, p. 335, f. C. s. Schiller, Plato and he Predecessors, p. 81: . . . that Plato’s anti-empirical bias renders him profoundly anti-scientific, and that his influence has always, openly or subtly, counteracted and thwarted the scientific impulse, or at least diverted it into unprofitable channels. Dampier-Whetham, A History of Science, pp. 27-28: Plato was a great philosopher but in the history of experimental science he must be counted a disaster. Such statements disregard the entire context of the Platonic passages they exploit, and take no account of Plato’s purpose or of other passages which counteract his seemingly unscientific remarks. Equally unfair is the practice of comparing Plato unfavorably with Aristotle in this respect, as Grote e.g. frequently does (Cf. Aristotle, p. 233). Plato was an artist and Aristotle an encyclopaedist; but Plato as a whole is far nearer the point of view of recent science than Aristotle. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 163; also 532 A and on 529 A, p. 180, note a and What Plato Said, p. 236.) if we are to have a part in the true science of astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul.” “You enjoin a task,” he said, “that will multiply the labor[*](Cf. Phaedr. 272 B καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.) of our present study of astronomy many times.” “And I fancy,” I said, “that our other injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any use as lawgivers. “However, what suitable studies have you to suggest?” Nothing, he said, “thus off-hand.” “Yet, surely,” said I, “motion[*](Plato here generalizes motion as a subject of science.) in general provides not one but many forms or species, according to my opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the task of a wise man,[*](The modesty is in the tone of the Timaeus.) but even to us two of them are apparent.” “What are they?” “In addition to astronomy, its counterpart, I replied.” “What is that?” “We may venture to suppose,” I said, “that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the ears are framed,[*](For πέπηγεν cf. 605 A.) for the movements of harmony; and these are in some sort kindred sciences,[*](The similar statement attributed to Archytas, Diels i.3 p. 331, is probably an imitation of this.) as the Pythagoreans[*](Pythagoras is a great name, but little is known of him. Pythagoreans in later usage sometimes means mystics, sometimes mathematical physicists, sometimes both. Plato makes use of both traditions but is dominated by neither. For Erich Frank’s recent book, Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer, cf. my article in Class. Phil. vol. xxiii. (1928) pp. 347 ff. The student of Plato will do well to turn the page when he meets the name Pythagoras in a commentator.) affirm and we admit,[*](For this turn of phrase cf. Vol. I. p. 333, 424 C, Protag. 316 A, Symp. 186 E.) do we not, Glaucon?” “We do,” he said. Then, said I, since the task is, so great, shall we not inquire of them[*](For the reference to experts Cf. 400 B, 424 C. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 184 D-E.) what their opinion is and whether they have anything to add? And we in all this[*](παρά of course here means throughout and not contrary.) will be on the watch for what concerns us.” “What is that?” “To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn anything that does not conduce to the end[*](I take the word ἀτελές etymologically (cf. pp. 66-67, note b, on 500 A), with reference to the end in view. Others take it in the ordinary Greek sense, imperfect, incomplete.) we have in view, and does not always come out at what we said ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just now saying about astronomy.

Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure in the case of harmonies[*](This passage is often taken as another example of Plato’s hostility to science and the experimental method. It is of course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult. Glaucon at first misapprehends (cf. p. 180, note a, on 529 A) and gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in music. But Socrates says he does not mean these, but those who try to apply mathematics to the perception of sound instead of developing a (Kantian) a priori science of harmony to match the mathematical science of astronomy. Cf. also p. 193, note g, on 531 B, W. Whewell, Transaction of the Cabridge Philos. Soc. vol. ix. p. 389, and for music A. Rivaud, Platon et la musique, Rev. d’Histoire de la Philos. 1929, pp. 1-30; also Stallbaum ad loc., and E. Frank, Platon u. d. sog. Pyth., Anhang, on the history of Greek music. He expresses surprise (p. 199) that Glaucon knows nothing of Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove Socrates’ ignorance of music.)? They transfer it to hearing and measure audible concords and sounds against one another,[*](This hints at the distinction developed in the Politicus between relative measurement of one thing against another and measurement by a standard. Cf. Polit. 283 E, 284 B-C, Theat. 186 A.) expending much useless labor just as the astronomers do.” “Yes, by heaven,” he said, “and most absurdly too. They talk of something they call minims[*](πυκνώματα (condensed notes). The word is technical. Cf. Adam ad loc. But, as ἄττα shows, Plato is using it loosely to distinguish a measure of sense perception from a mathematically determined interval.) and, laying their ears alongside, as if trying to catch a voice from next door,[*](Cf. Pater, Renaissance, p. 157. The phrase, ἐκ γειτόνων, is colloquial and, despite the protest of those who insist that it only means in the neighborhood, suggests overhearing what goes on next door—as often in the New Comedy.) some affirm that they can hear a note between and that this is the least interval and the unit of measurement, while others insist that the strings now render identical sounds,[*](Cf. Aldous Huxley, Jesting Pilate, p. 152: Much is enthusiastically taught about the use of quarter tones in Indian music. I listened attentively at Lucknow in the hope of hearing some new and extraordinary kind of melody based on these celebrated fractions. But I listened in vain. Gomprez, Greek Thinkers, iii. pp. 334-335, n. 85, thinks that Plato shrugs his shoulders at experiments. He refers to Plutarch, Life of Marcellus, xiv. 65, and Quaest. Conv. viii. 2. 1, 7, where Plato is represented as having been angry with Eudoxus and Archytas because they employed instruments and apparatus for the solution of a problem, instead of relying solely on reasoning.) both preferring their ears to their minds.[*](So Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique, 3, x.: Je pense que nous vous moquez de moi. C’est la raison et non les sens qu’il faut consulter.)” You, said I, “are speaking of the worthies[*](For χρηστός in this ironical sense cf. also 479 A, Symp. 177 B.) who vex and torture the strings and rack them[*](The language of the imagery confounds the torture of slaves giving evidence on the rack with the strings and pegs of a musical instrument. For the latter cf. Horace, A.P. 348, nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem vult manus et mens Poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum. Stallbaum says that Plato here was imitated by Aristaenetus, Epist. xiv. libr. 1 τί πράγματα παρέχετε χορδαῖς;) on the pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the musician’s complaints of too responsive and too reluctant strings[*](This also may suggest a reluctant and a too willing witness.)—I drop the figure,[*](Cf. on 489 A, p. 23, note d.) and tell you that I do not mean these people, but those others[*](He distinguishes from the pure empirics just satirized those who apply their mathematics only to the data of observation. This is perhaps one of Plato’s rare errors. For though there may be in some sense a Kantian a priori mechanics of astronomy, there can hardly be a purely a priori mathematics of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious must always remain a fact of direct experience. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176.) whom we just now said we would interrogate about harmony. Their method exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for the numbers they seek are those found in these heard concords, but they do not ascend[*](Cf. Friedländer, Platon, p. 108, n. 1.) to generalized problems and the consideration which numbers are inherently concordant and which not and why in each case.” “A superhuman task,” he said. “Say, rather, useful,[*](Cf. Tim. 47 C-D. Plato always keeps to his point—Cf. 349 B-C, 564 A-B—or returns to it after a digression. Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note e.) said I, for the investigation of the beautiful and the good,[*](Cf. on 505 B, p. 88, note a.) but if otherwise pursued, useless.” “That is likely,” he said. “And what is more,” I said, I take it that if the investigation[*](μέθοδος, like πραγματείαν in D, is used almost in the later technical sense of treatise or branch of study. Cf. on 528 D, p. 178, note a.) of all these studies goes far enough to bring out their community and kinship[*](Cf. on 537 C, Epin. 991 E.) with one another, and to infer their affinities, then to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labor taken is not lost; but otherwise it is vain.” “I too so surmise,” said he; “but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates.” “Are you talking about the prelude,[*](Plato is fond of this image. It suggests here also the preamble of a law, as the translation more explicitly indicates. Cf. 532 D, anticipated in 457 C, and Laws 722 D-E, 723 A-B and E, 720 D-E, ;772 E, 870 D, 854 A, 932 A and passim.)” I said, “or what? Or do we not know that all this is but the preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain that we have to apprehend? For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners and dialecticians[*](Cf. Theaet. 146 B, and perhaps Euthyd. 290 C. Though mathematics quicken the mind of the student, it is, apart from metaphysics, a matter of common experience that mathematicians are not necessarily good reasoners on other subjects. Jowett’s wicked jest, I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason, misled an eminent professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in mental discipline (Yale Review, July 1917). Cf. also Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn, Mind, xii. (1903) p. 511; Charles Fox, Educational Psychology pp. 187-188: . . . a training in the mathematics may produce exactness of thought . . . provided that the training is of such a kind as to inculcate an ideal which the pupil values and strives to attain. Failing this, Glaucon’s observation that he had hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning is likely to be repeated. On the text cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 384-385, and Adam ad loc.)? “ “No, by Zeus,” he said, “except a very few whom I have met.” “But have you ever supposed,” I said, “that men who could not render and exact an account[*](λόγον . . . δοῦναι A commonplace Platonic plea for dialectics. Cf. 534 B, Prot. 336 C, Polit. 286 A, Theaet. 202 C, 175 C, 183 D, Soph. 230 A, Phaedo 78 C-D, 95 D, Charm. 165 B, Xen. Oecon. 11. 22. Cf. also λόγον λαβεῖν Rep. 402 A, 534 B, Soph. 246 C, Theaet. 208 D, and Thompson on Meno 76 D.) of opinions in discussion would ever know anything of the things we say must be known?” “No is surely the answer to that too.”

“This, then, at last, Glaucon,” I said, “is the very law which dialectics[*](Cf. Phileb. 58 D, Meno 75 C-D, Charm. 155 A, Cratyl. 390 C, and on 533 B, pp. 200 f., note f.) recites, the strain which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress[*](This is not a literal rendering, but gives the meaning.) of the faculty of vision, as we described[*](Cf. 516 A-B. Plato interprets his imagery again here and in B infra.) its endeavor to look at living things themselves and the stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense[*](Cf. p. 180, note a, and p. 187, note c. Cf. also 537 D, and on 476 A ff. Cf. Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 9: Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols; E. S. Robinson, Readings in General Psych. p. 295: A habit of suppressing mental imagery must therefore characterize men who deal much with abstract ideas; and as the power of dealing easily and firmly with these ideas is the surest criterion of a high order if intellect . . . ; Pear, Remembering and Forgetting, p. 57: He (Napoleon) is reported to have said that there are some who, from some physical or moral peculiarity of character, form a picture (tableau) of everything. No matter what knowledge, intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men are unfit to command; A. Bain, Mind, 1880, p. 570: Mr. Galton is naturally startled at finding eminent scientific men, by their own account, so very low in the visualizing power. His explanation, I have no doubt, hits the mark; the deficiency is due to the natural antagonism of pictorial aptitude and abstract thought.; Judd, Psychology of High School Subjects, p. 921: It did not appear on superficial examination of the standings of students that those who can draw best are the best students from the point of view of the teacher of science.) to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable, came to the goal of the visible.” “By all means,” he said. “What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic?” Surely. “And the release from bonds,” I said, “and the conversion from the shadows to the images[*](εἴδωλα: cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 238; also 516 A, Theaet. 150 C, Soph. 240 A, 241 E, 234 C, 266 B with 267 C, and Rep. 517 D ἀγαλμάτων.) that cast them and to the light and the ascent[*](ἐπάνοδος became almost technical in Neoplatonism. Cf. also 517 A, 529 A, and p. 124, note b.) from the subterranean cavern to the world above,[*](Lit. sun, i.e. the world illumined by the sun, not by the fire in the cave.) and there the persisting inability[*](See crit. note. The text of Iamblichus is the only reasonable one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible. For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 B οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία, Laws 638 B σφόδρα γυναικῶν, with England’s note, Theaet. 183 E πάνυ πρεσβύτης, Laws 791 C παντελῶς παίδων, 698 C σφόδρα φιλία, Rep. 564 A ἄγαν δουλείαν, with Stallbaum’s note.) to look directly at animals and plants and the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phantasms created by God[*](θεῖα because produced by God or nature and not by man with a mirror or a paintbrush. See crit. note and Class. Review, iv. p. 480. I quoted Sophist 266 B-D, and Adam with rare candor withdrew his emendation in his Appendix XIII. to this book. Apelt still misunderstands and emends, p.296 and note.) in water and shadows of objects that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows of images cast through a light which, compared with the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of the arts and sciences that we have described indicates their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities, as in our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned to the contemplation of what is brightest in the corporeal and visible region.” “I accept this,” he said, “as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard to reject.[*](This sentence is fundamental for the understanding of Plato’s metaphysical philosophy generally. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 30, n. 192, What Plato Said, p. 268 and 586 on Parmen. 135 C. So Tennyson says it is hard to believe in God and hard not to believe.) Nevertheless, since we have not to hear it at this time only, but are to repeat it often hereafter, let us assume that these things are as now has been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go through with it as we have gone through the prelude. Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying.”

“You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further,[*](This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact, the avoidance of dogmatism. but that is not all. Plato could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical method here, or risk an absolute definition which would only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the intelligent, whose own experience will help them to understand. As the Republic and Laws entire explain Plato’s idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. Cf. What Plato Said, Index s. v. Dialectics, and note f below.) though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill.[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι Cf. Symp. 210 A, Meno 77 A, Laws 961 C, Aesch. Prom. 343, Thucyd. viii. 22. 1, Eurip. Hippol. 285.) And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm.[*](On Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 B.) But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm.[*](On Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 B.) Is not that so?” Surely. “And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal[*](The mystical implications of φήνειεν are not to be pressed. It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact statement of the essential practical conclusion (γοῦν)that no man can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has not been educated to reason and argue straight.) this, and that only to one experienced[*](Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience.) in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?” “That, too,” he said, “we may properly affirm.” “This, at any rate,” said I, “no one will maintain in dispute against us[*](i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom. Cf. T.A.P.A. vol. xlvii. pp. 205-234. The meaning is that of Philebus 58 E, 59 A. Other science may be more interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Cf. Soph. 295 C, Phaedr. 265-266. Aristotle, Topics i. 2. 6, practically comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics. The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part of the Parmenides. The characteristic Platonic dialectic is the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant distinctions, divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms. When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on the leader’s voice or the reader’s attention, as in some of the later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form.): that there is any other way of inquiry[*](Cicero’s via et ratione. περὶ παντός is virtually identical with αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι. It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to his specialty. The dialectician, like his base counterfeit the sophist (Soph. 231 A), is prepared to argue about anything, Soph. 232 cf., Euthyd. 272 A-B.) that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said[*](Cf. 525 C, 527 B.) did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it— are, as we see, dreaming[*](The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparaging it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, as has been suggested. Cf. on 527 A. It is the nature of mathematics to fall short of dialectics.) about being, but the clear waking vision[*](Cf. Phileb. 20 B and on 520 C, p. 143, note g.) of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account[*](Cf. on 531 E.) of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,[*](The touch of humor is the expression may be illustrated by Lucian, Hermotimus 74, where it is used to justify Lucian’s skepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt’s remark on Coleridge, Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no premises and come to no conclusion.) what possibility is there that assent[*](Or admission. Plato thinks of even geometrical reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Cf. the exaggeration of this idea by the Epicureans in Cic. De fin. i. 21 quae et a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus. Dialectic proceeds διὰ συγχωρήσεων, the admission of the interlocutor. Cf. Laws 957 D, Phaedr. 237 C-D, Gorg. 487 E, Lysis 219 C, Prot. 350 E, Phileb. 12 A, Theaet. 162 A, 169 D-E, 164 C, Rep. 340 B. But such admissions are not valid unless when challenged they are carried back to something satisfactory—ἱκανόν—(not necessarily in any given case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such peremptorily demands the admission of his postulates and definitions. Cf. 510 B-D, 511 B.) in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?” None, said he. Then, said I, “is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul[*](Cf. on 519 B, p. 138, note a.) is sunk in the barbaric slough[*](Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato’s rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 463, n. 3.) of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit,[*](All writers and philosophers are compelled to speak with the vulgar. Cf. e.g. Meyerson, De l’explication dans les sciences, i. p. 329: Tout en sachant que la couleur n’est pas réellement une qualité de l’object, à se servir cependant, dans la vie de tous les jours, d’une locution qui l’affirme.) though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. Understanding,[*](Cf. on 511 D, pp. 116-117, note c.) I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name[*](This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 516 on Meno 78 B-C for numerous instances. Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. Diss. xxvii. p. 40 ἐγὼ γάρ τοι τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Πλάτωνι.) when things of such moment lie before us for consideration.” “No, indeed,” he said.[*](The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often considered an interpolation. The translation omits it. See Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, Journal of Phil. (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124.)---

“Are you satisfied, then,” said I, “as before,[*](Supra 511 D-E.) to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief,[*](Always avoid faith in translating Plato.) and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.): as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates[*](That is the meaning, though some critics will object to the phrase. Lit. the things over which these (mental states) are set, or to which they apply.) and the division into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,[*](There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective classification is nothing to Plato’s present purpose; (2) The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in mathematics. Cf. on 525 D, 526 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 83-84, and Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is no evidence in Plato’s own writings.) Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.” Well, he said, “I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow.” “And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account[*](Cf. on 531 E, p. 195, note f.) of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence[*](Cf. on 511 D, p. 117, note a.) about the matter?” “How could I say that he does?” he replied. “And is not this true of the good likewise[*](This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the ἱκανόν must always be the idea of good. What follows distinguishes the dialectician from the the eristic sophist. For the short cut, καὶ . . . ὡσαύτως, cf. 523 E, 580 D, 585 D, 346 A, etc.)—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet[*](It imports little whether the objections are in his own mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul with itself (Cf. Theaet. 189 E, Phileb. 38 E, Soph. 263 E), and when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by supplying both question and answer, e.g. Gorg. 506 C ff. Cf. further Phaedrus 278 C, Parman. 136 D-E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17.) of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping[*](Cf. Theaet. 160 D, Phileb. 45 A. The practical outcome=Laws 966 A-B, Phaedr. 278 C, Soph. 259 B-C. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc. iv. p. 283: There is no knowledge and no assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against confutation.) in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends any adumbration[*](For εἰδώλου cf. on 532 B, p. 197, not e. This may be one of the sources of Epist. vii. 342 B.) of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever?[*](For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man is something between sleep and waking. Cf. Apol. 31 A. Note the touch of humor in τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν. Cf. Bridges, Psychology, p. 382: There is really no clear-cut distinction between what is usually called sleeping and waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep.)” “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “all this I will stoutly affirm.” “But, surely,” said I, “if you should ever nurture in fact your children[*](Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic rulers.) whom you are now nurturing and educating in word,[*](Cf. 376 D, 369 C, 472 E, Critias 106 A.) you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational[*](A slight touch of humor. Cf. the schoolgirl who said, These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved.) as the lines so called in geometry.” “Why, no,” he said. “Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer[*](A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι Gorg. 461 E, Charm. 166 D, Prot. 338 D, Alc. I. 106 B.) questions in the most scientific manner?” “I will so legislate,” he said, “in conjunction with you.”

“Do you agree, then,” said I, “that we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were the coping-stone[*](For ὥσπερ θριγκός cf. Eur. Herc. Fur. 1280, Aesch. Ag. 1283: and Phileb. 38 C-D ff.)—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is now complete[*](Cf. 541 B.)” “I do,” he said. “The distribution, then, remains,” said I, “to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way.” Clearly, he said. “Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection[*](Cf. 412 D-E, 485-487, 503 A, C-E.) of rulers?” “Of course,” he said. “In most respects, then,” said I, “you must suppose that we have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising[*](Intellectually as well as physically. Cf. 357 A, Prot. 350 B f.) are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely.[*](Cf. Symp. 209 B-C, Phaedr. 252 E and Vol. I. p. 261 on 402 D. Ascham, The Schoolmaster, Bk. I. also approves of this qualification.) But in addition we must now require that they not only be virile and vigorous[*](For βλοσυρούς Cf. Theaet. 149 A.) in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education.” “What qualities are you distinguishing?” “They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint[*](Cf. 504 A, 364 E, Gorg. 480 C, Protag. 326 C, Euthyphro 15 C.) in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body.” True, he said. “And we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry[*](The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 A.) in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?” “No one could,” he said, “unless most happily endowed.” “Our present mistake,” said I, “and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before,[*](Cf. 495 C ff., pp. 49-51.) caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards[*](Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), les âmes boiteuses, les bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de Ia philosophie.) but true scions.” “What do you mean?” he said. “In the first place,” I said, “the aspirant to philosophy must not limp[*](Cf. Laws 634 A, Tim. 44 C.) in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labors of the body, yet is not fond of learning or of listening[*](Cf. 548 E, Lysis 206 C, Euthyd. 274 C, 304 C, and Vol. I. p. 515 on 475 D.) or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way.” “Most true,” he said. “Likewise in respect of truth,” I said, “we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood[*](Cf. 382 A-B-C.) and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.[*](Cf. Laws 819 D, Rep. 372 D, Politicus 266 C, and my note in Class. Phil. xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial ὗς γνοίη, Laches 196 D and Rivals 134 A; and Apelt’s emendation of Cratyl. 393 C, Progr. Jena, 1905, p. 19.)”

“By all means,” he said. “And with reference to sobriety,” said I, “and bravery and loftiness of soul[*](Cf. 487 A and vol. I. p. 261, note c on 402 C. The cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 E, vol. I. p. 346.) and all the parts of virtue,[*](Plato is using ordinary language and not troubling himself with the problem of Protag. 329 D (What Plato Said, p. 497) and Laws 633 A (What Plato Said, p. 624). Cf. also on 533 D.) we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the base-born from the true-born. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random[*](πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι lit. for whatsoever they happen to of these (services). Cf. Symp. 181 B, Prot. 353 A, Crito 44 D and 45 D, Gorg. 522 C, Laws 656 C, Rep. 332 B, 561 D, Dem. iv. 46, Isoc. Panath. 25, 74, 239, Aristot. Mat. 1013 a 6.) for any of these purposes the crippled and base-born natures, as their friends or rulers.” “It is so indeed,” he said. “But we,” I said, “must be on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find[*](Cf. 487 A. For δίκη cf. Hirzel, Dike, Themis und Verwandtes, p.116.) with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort, the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood[*](καταντλήσομεν: cf. 344 d.) of ridicule upon philosophy.” “That would indeed be shameful,” he said. “Most certainly,” said I: “but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous.” “In what way?” “I forgot,” said I, “that we were jesting,[*](Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabling about justice is an old man’s game, Laws 685 A, 769 A. Life itself is best treated as play, Laws 803 C. Science in Tim. 59 D is παιδιά, like literature in the Phaedrus 276 D-E, ibid. 278 B. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. pp. 38 and 160, and What Plato Said, pp. 553 and 601.) and I spoke with too great intensity.[*](For similar self-checks Cf. Laws 804 B, 832 B, 907 B-C, Phaedr. 260 D, 279 B. For ἐντεινάμενος cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 969.) For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy,[*](Cf. Isoc. Busiris 49. Whatever the difficulties of the chronology it is hard to believe that this is not one of Isocrates’ many endeavors to imitate Platonic effects.) and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault.” “No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me[*](Cf. Soph. 226 C, Sophocles, Ajax 397.) as a hearer.” “But too much so for me as a speaker,” I said. “But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon’s[*](γηράσκω δ’ ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, I grow old ever learning many things. Cf. Laches 188 A-B; Otto, p. 317.) word for it that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young[*](Cf. Theaet. 146 B. This has been misquoted to the effect that Plato said the young are the best philosophers.) belong all heavy and frequent labors.” Necessarily, he said. “Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction.[*](This and παίζοντας below (537 A) anticipate much modern Kindergarten rhetoric.)” “Why so?” Because, said I, “a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for while bodily labors[*](Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. 358, says Aristotle rejects this distinction, Pol. 1338 b 40 μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν.) performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind.” True, he said.

“Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play.[*](Cf. 424 E-425 A, Laws 819 B-C, 643 B-D, 797 A-B, Polit. 308 D. Cf. the naive statement in Colvin And Bagley, Human Behavior, p. 41: The discovery [sic!] by Karl Groos that play was actually a preparation for the business of later life was almost revolutionary from the standpoint of educational theory and practice.) That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each.” “There is reason in that,” he said. “And do you not remember,” I said, “that we also declared[*](Cf. 467, vol. I. pp. 485-487.) that we must conduct the children to war on horseback to be spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps?” “I do remember.” “And those who as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled on a list.[*](ἐγκριτέον cf. 413 D, 377 C, 486 D, Laws 802 B, 820 D, 936 A, 952 A.)” “At what age?” he said. “When they are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For that period, whether it be two or three years, incapacitates them for other occupations.[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1339 a 7 f. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, etc.; Plut. De Ed. Puer. 11, De Tuenda San. C. 25, quoted by Newman, Aristot. Pol. I. p. 359, are irrelevant to this passage, but could be referred to the balancing of music and gymnastics in 410-412.) For great fatigue and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be their behavior in their physical exercises.[*](Cf. Laws 829 B-C.)” “Surely it is,” he said. “After this period,” I said, “those who are given preference from the twenty-year class will receive greater honors than the others, and they will be required to gather the studies which they disconnectedly pursued as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey[*](σύνοψιν: cf. 531 D. This thought is endlessly repeated by modern writers on education. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc. iv. 336; Bagley, The Educative Process, p. 180: The theory of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize all the subject matter of instruction into a unifies system, the various units of which shall be consciously related to one another in the minds of the pupils; Haldane, The Philosophy of Humanism, p. 94: There was a conference attended by representatives of various German Universities . . . which took place at Hanstein, not far from Göttingen in May 1921. . . . The purpose of the movement is nominally the establishment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connection faculty does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic studies. . . . The real object is to bring these subjects into organic relation to one another. Cf. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, vol. i. p. 4 So true is it that, as Plato puts it, the metaphysician is a synoptical man. Cf. also Aristot. Soph. El. 167 a 38 διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Stenzel, Dialektik, misuses the passage to support the view that Plato’s dialectic still looks for unity and not for divisions and distinctions, as in the Sophist. Cf. also ibid. p.72.) of their affinities with one another and with the nature of things.” “That, at any rate, he said, is the only instruction that abides with those who receive it.” “And it is also,” said I, “the chief test of the dialectical nature and its opposite. For he who can view things in their connection is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not.” “I concur,” he said. “With these qualities in mind,” I said, “it will be your task to make a selection of those who manifest them best from the group who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth year to promote them, by a second selection from those preferred in the first,[*](For the technical meaning of the word προκρίτων Cf. Laws 753 B-D.) to still greater honors, and to prove and test them by the power of dialectic[*](For this periphrasis cf. Phaedr. 246 D, Tim. 85 E. Cf. also on 509 A.) to see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses[*](The reader of Plato ought not to misunderstand this now. Cf. on 532 A, pp. 196 f., note d, and 530 p. 187, note c.) and go on to being itself in company with truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest care[*](Plato returns to an idea suggested in 498 A, and warns against the mental confusion and moral unsettlement that result from premature criticism of life by undisciplined minds. In the terminology of modern education, he would not encourage students to discuss the validity of the Ten commandments and the Constitution of the United States before they could spell, construe, cipher, and had learned to distinguish an undistributed middle term from a petitio principii. Cf. Phaedo 89 D-E. We need not suppose with Grote and others that this involves any reaction or violent change of the opinion he held when he wrote the minor dialogues that portray such discussions. In fact, the still later Sophist, 230 B-C-D, is more friendly to youthful dialectics. Whatever the effect of the practice of Socrates or the Sophists, Plato himself anticipates Grote’s criticism in the Republic by representing Socrates as discoursing with ingenuous youth in a more simple and edifying style. Cf. Lysis 207 D ff., Euthydem. 278 E-282 C, 288 D-290 D. Yet again the Charmides might be thought an exception. Cf. also Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, ii. 1, p. 912, who seems to consider the Sophist earlier than the Republic. ) is requisite.” “How so?” he said. “Do you not note,” said I, “how great is the harm caused by our present treatment of dialectics?” “What is that?” he said. “Its practitioners are infected with lawlessness.[*](i.e. they call all restrictions on impulses and instincts tyrannical conventions. Cf. Gorg. 483-484, Aristoph. Clouds, passim, and on nature and law cf. Vol. I. p. 116, note a, on 359 C.)” “They are indeed.” “Do you suppose,” I said, “that there is anything surprising in this state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable[*](Cf. on 494 A, p. 43, note c.)?” “In what way, pray?” he said.