Republic

The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form[*](The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 D καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος. Form over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.) that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor.It surely is far from being so, he said. Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven[*](Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (Cratyl. 397 D, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. Laws 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, Apol. 26 D, Epinomis 985 B, 988 B.) as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen? Why, the one that you too and other people mean, he said; for your question evidently refers to the sun.[*](Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to say of Platos mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses τἀγαθόν in much the same way. It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.) Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity? What? Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun. Why, no. But it is, I think, the most sunlike[*](Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9 οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. Tusc. i. 25. 73 in fine quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare, Manilius ii. 115: quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum? Goethe's Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,Die Sonne könnt es nic erblicken, and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben.) of all the instruments of sense. By far the most. And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun? Certainly. Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself? That is so, he said. This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good[*](i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with god or with the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p 512.) which the good begot to stand in a proportion[*](Cf. Gorg. 465 B-C, 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, Phaedo 111 A-B, Tim. 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, Phaedo 110 D.) with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision. How is that? he said; explain further. You are aware, I said, that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them. Yes, indeed, he said. But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes. Certainly. Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent[*](Plato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the sanction, and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.) it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason. Yes, it does, This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea[*](No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used o carry the notion of apprehended aspect which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.) of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.[*](The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.) Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still[*](Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον, 578 B, Symp. 180 A-B and Bury ad loc. The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic, Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 174, Introd. p. lxi. This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. Meno 81 D-E.) than these you will think rightly of it.

But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,[*](ἀγαθοειδῆ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.) but to think that either of them is the good[*](There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note f.) is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit[*](ἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian habit. However Protag. 344 C approaches it. Cf. also Phileb. 11 D, 41 C, Ritter-Preller, p. 285. Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. ἕξις Laws 625 C, γένεσις Laws 691 B, Tim. 73 B, 76 E, μοῖρα Phaedr. 255 B, 274 E, Menex. 249 B,φύσις Phaedo 109 E, Symp. 186 B, Laws 729 C, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen ἕξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless.) of the good.An inconceivable beauty you speak of, he said, if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely[*](For οὐ γὰρ δήπου Cf. Apol. 20 C, Gorg. 455 A, Euthyph. 13 A.) cannot mean that it is pleasure. Hush, said I, but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.[*](i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God’s mind for the universe, man’s mind for political institutions. this, being the only interpretation that makes sense o the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν with the ἕν, one, and Aristotle’s statement, Met. 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas. the remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.) How? The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation. Of course not. In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence[*](It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato’s sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. De divinis nominibus, ii. 2, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 87.) in dignity and surpassing power. And Glaucon very ludicrously[*](He is amused at Socrates’ emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz’ notion (Platon, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon’s losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. Birds 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265. The dramatic humor of Glaucon’s surprise is Plato’s way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, Lysis 223 B, Protag. 340 E, Charm. 175 E, Cratyl. 426 B, Theaet. 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 172 on the Phaedo. ) said, Heaven save us, hyperbole[*](What a comble! would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne’s remark that nothing can be said hyperbolically of God. The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato’s manner.) can no further go. The fault is yours, I said, for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it. And don’t desist, he said, but at least[*](Cf. 502 A, Symp. 222 E, Meno 86 E.) expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting. Why, certainly, I said, I am omitting a great deal. Well, don’t omit the least bit, he said. I fancy, I said, that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out. Do not, he said. Conceive then, said I, as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,[*](Cf. the similar etymological pun in Cratyl. 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.) but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible. I do. Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided[*](The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxi for my interpretation of the passage.) into two unequal[*](Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἀν’ ἴσα. It is a little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honorable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut. Plat. Quest. 3.) sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images.

By images[*](Cf. 402 B, Soph. 266 B-C.) I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend.I do.As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man.I so assume it, he said. Would you be willing to say, said I, that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103. note b.) as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness? I certainly would. Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section. In what way? By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,[*](Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s republic, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its relation to ultimate Good, To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.) and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas[*](The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii.) only and progressing systematically through ideas. I don’t fully understand[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 A and p. 47, not f on 338 D; What Plato Said, p. 503 on Gorg. 463 D.) what you mean by this, he said. Well, I will try again, said I, for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them[*](Aristot. Top. 100 b 2-3 οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval contra principium negantem non est disputandum. A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is real.) to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out. Certainly, he said, I know that. And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw[*](Cf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkely and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.)? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn[*](i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.) as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.[*](Stenzel, Handbuch, 118 das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sieht is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special sense (understanding. See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.)

True, he said. This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,[*](For the concessive μέν cf. 546 E, 529 D, Soph. 225 C.) but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter[*](The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 A. Wilamowitz’ emendation (Platon, ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.) are esteemed as clear and held in honor.[*](The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad loc.) I understand, said he, that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts. Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason[*](λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.) itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,[*](Cf. 533 A. Phileb. 57 E.) treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,[*](τῷ ὄντι emphasized the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, Phaedo 80 D, Phileb. 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson on Meno 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry.) underpinnings, footings,[*](Cf. Symp. 211 C ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, like steps of a stair.) and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,[*](παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally leads support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a.) and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense[*](This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.) but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.[*](The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234.) I understand, he said; not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding[*](διανοίᾳ here as in 511 A is general and not technical.) and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence[*](νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means have not sense for its higher meaning Cf. Meno 99 C, Laws 962 A.) about them although[*](Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετά here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. the meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quiet as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.) the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding[*](Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a faculty inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.) and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason. Your interpretation is quite sufficient, I said; and now, answering to[*](For ἐπί Cf. Polit. 280 A, Gorg. 463 B.) these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief[*](πίστις is of course not faith in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.) to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,[*](εἰκασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.) and arrange them in a proportion,[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.) considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality. I understand, he said; I concur and arrange them as you bid.

Next, said I, “compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern[*](The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion the contrast between the world of sense-perception and the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of ordinary experience for the other two members of the proportion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire and shadows cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun and the real objects of sense. In such a proportion our real world becomes the symbol of Plato’s ideal world. Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the Platonic antithesis of the real and the ideal. It has even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension. But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in doubt as to his own intended meaning. there may be at the most a little uncertainty as to which are merely indispensable parts of the picture. The source and first suggestion of Plato’s imagery is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, The Origin of Plato’s Cave in Harvard Studies in Class. Phil. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also Wright, loc. cit. pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world to a cave, Diels i.3 269. Cf. Wright, loc. cit. Wright refers it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diès in Bulletin Budé, No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f. The suggestiveness of the image has been endless. The most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle’s early writings is derived from it, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. 37. It is the source of Bacon’s idols of the den. Sir Thomas Browne writes in Urne-Buriall: We yet discourse in Plato’s den and are but embryo philosophers. Huxley’s allegory of Jack and the Beanstalk in Evolution and Ethics, pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, Siris, 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic interpretations. Cf. Jung, Analytic Psych. p. 232. Eddington perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics the frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows) with a long entrance open[*](Cf. Phaedo 111 C ἀναπεπταμένους) to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered[*](Cf. Phaedo 67 E.) from childhood, so that they remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows[*](H. Rackham, Class. Rev. xxix. pp. 77-78, suggests that the τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς should be translated at the marionettes and be classed with καινοῖς τραγῳδοῖς (Pseph. ap. Dem. xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth, II. i. p. 445.) have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets.” “All that I see,” he said. “See also, then, men carrying[*](The men are merely a part of the necessary machinery of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of reflections, εἰκόνες.) past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent.”

“A strange image you speak of,” he said, “and strange prisoners.” “Like to us,” I said; “for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?” “How could they,” he said, “if they were compelled to hold their heads unmoved through life?” “And again, would not the same be true of the objects carried past them?” Surely. “If then they were able to talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things that they saw[*](Cf. Parmen. 130 C, Tim. 51 B, 52 A, and my De Platonis Idearum doctrina, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann in Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil. xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197. As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the reality (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak of the shadows as the world, though the real reference unknown to them would be to the objects that cause the shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the real world of which they are copies. The general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they wold suppose the shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. παριόντα is intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are homonymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get somewhat the same meaning from the text ταὐτά. Do you not think that they would identify the passing objects (which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they saw? Cf. also P. Corssen, Philologische Wochenschrift, 1913, p. 286. He prefers οὐκ αὐτά and renders: Sie würden in dem, was sie sähen, das Vorübergehende selbst zu benennen glauben.) they were naming the passing objects?” Necessarily. “And if their prison had an echo[*](The echo and the voices (515 A) merely complete the picture.) from the wall opposite them, when one of the passersby uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?” “By Zeus, I do not,” said he. “Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects.” “Quite inevitably,” he said. “Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release[*](Phaedo 67 D λύειν, and 82 D λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ. λύσις became technical in Neoplatonism.) and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature[*](Lit. by nature. φύσις in Plato often suggests reality and truth.) something of this sort should happen to them: When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss[*](The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful experience of one whose false conceit of knowledge is tested by the Socratic elenchus. Cf. Soph. 230 B-D, and for ἀπορεῖν Meno 80 A, 84 B-C, Theaet. 149 A, Apol. 23 D. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 5123 on Meno 80 A, Eurip. Hippol. 247 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν ὀδυνᾷ, it is painful to have one’s opinions set right, and 517 A, 494 D.) and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?” “Far more real,” he said. “And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?” “It is so,” he said.

“And if,” said I, “someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent[*](Cf. Theaet. 175 B, Boethius, Cons. iii. 12 quicunque in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis; 529 A, 521 C, and the Neoplatonists’ use of ἀνάγειν and their anagogical virtue and interpretation. Cf. Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt, vii. 270.) which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see[*](Cf. Laws 897 D, Phaedo 99 D.) even one of the things that we call real?” “Why, no, not immediately,” he said. “Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water[*](Cf. Phaedo 99 D. Stallbaum says this was imitated by Themistius, Orat. iv. p. 51 B.) of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the sun’s light.[*](It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the details of this description. There are more stages of progress than the proportion of four things calls for all that Plato’s thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good, Cf. 517 B-C.)” Of course. “And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,[*](i.e. a foreign medium.) but in and by itself in its own place.” Necessarily, he said. “And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region, and is in some sort the cause[*](Cf. 508 B, and for the idea of good as the cause of all things cf. on 509 B, and Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. P. Corssen, Philol. Wochenschrift, 1913, pp. 287-299, unnecessarily proposes to emend ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων to ὧν σκιὰς ἑ. or ὧν σφεῖς σκιὰς ἑ., ne sol umbrarum, quas videbant, auctor fuisse dicatur, cum potius earum rerum, quarum umbras videbant, fuerit auctor.) of all these things that they had seen.” Obviously, he said, “that would be the next step.” “Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them[*](Cf. on 486 a, p. 10, note a.)?” “He would indeed.” “And if there had been honors and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences and co-existences,[*](Another of Plato’s anticipations of modern thought. This is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist, pragmatist view of causation. Cf. Gorg. 501 A τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰθότος γίγνεσθαι relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result. (Loeb tr.)) and so most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honored by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer[*](The quotation is almost as apt as that at the beginning of the Crito. ) and

greatly prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man,

“Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in evaluating these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter,[*](Like the philosopher in the court-room. Cf. Theaet. 172 C, 173 C ff., Gorg. 484 D-E. Cf. also on 387 C-D. 515 D, 517 D, Soph. 216 D, Laches 196 B, Phaedr. 249 D.) and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him[*](An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other stinging allusions to this Cf. Gorg. 486 B, 521 C, Meno 100 B-C. Cf. Hamlet’s Wormwood, wormwood (III. ii. 191). The text is disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, Zu Platons Staat, Hermes, 1926, p. 110, thinks that an οἴει or something like it must be understood as having preceded, at least in Plato’s thought, and that ἀποκτείνειν can be taken as a gloss or variant of ἀποκτεινύναι and the correct reading must be λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν. See also Adam ad loc.)?” “They certainly would,” he said. “This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul’s ascension to the intelligible region,[*](Cf. 508 B-C, where Arnou (Le Désir de dieu dans la philos. de Plotin, p. 48 and Robin (La Théorie plat. de l’amour, pp. 83-84) make τόπος νοητός refer to le ciel astronomique as opposed to the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος of the Phaedrus 247 A-E, 248 B, 248 D-249 A. The phrase νοητὸς κόσμος, often attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings.) you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows[*](Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about metaphysical ultimates than interpreters who take his myths literally have supposed. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515, on Meno 86 B.) whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth[*](Cf. 506 E.) in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely[*](This is the main point for the Republic. The significance of the idea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and reserved for the Timaeus. Cf. on 508 B, p. 102, note a and p. 505-506. For the practical application Cf. Meno 81 D-E. See also Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.) in private or public must have caught sight of this.” “I concur,” he said, “so far as I am able.” “Come then,” I said, “and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing[*](Cf. 521 A, 345 E, and Vol. I. on 347 D, p. 81, note d.) to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of our image holds” “Yes, it is likely.” “And again, do you think it at all strange,” said I, “if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries[*](Cf. 346 E.) of men cuts a sorry figure[*](Cf. Theaet. 174 C ἀσχημοσύνη.) and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms[*](For the contrast between the philosophical and the pettifogging soul Cf. Theaet. 173 C-175 E. Cf. also on 517 A, p 128, note b.) or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images[*](For ἀγαλμάτων cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 237, Soph. 234 C, Polit. 303 C.) that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?” “It would be by no men strange,” he said.

“But a sensible man,” I said, “would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,[*](Aristotle, De an. 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is ἀόρατον but otherwise than the dark.) and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh[*](Cf. Theaet. 175 D-E.) unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.[*](Lit. or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a greater light.) And so[*](i.e. only after that. For οὕτω δή in this sense cf. 484 D, 429 D, 443 E, Charm. 171 E.) he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above.” “That is a very fair statement,” he said. “Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their professions.[*](ἐπαγγελλόμενοι connotes the boastfulness of their claims. Cf. Protag. 319 A, Gorg. 447 c, Laches 186 C, Euthyd. 273 E, Isoc. Soph. 1, 5, 9, 10, Antid. 193, Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 1, i. 2. 8, Aristot. Rhet. 1402 a 25.) What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting[*](Cf. Theognis 429 ff. Stallbaum compares Eurip. Hippol. 917 f. Similarly Anon. Theaet. Comm. (Berlin, 1905), p. 32, 48. 4 καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως μαθημάτων, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνήσεως. Cf. also St. Augustine: Nolite putare quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae; and Emerson’s strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from another soul.) vision into blind eyes.” “They do indeed,” he said. “But our present argument indicates,” said I, “that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periact[*](περιακτέον is probably a reference to the περίακτοι or triangular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces. Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence, as a number of classical plays seem to have required something of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio s. v. Machine, p. 1469.) in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good,[*](Hard-headed distaste for the unction or seeming mysticism of Plato’s language should not blind us to the plain meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature. Some teachers will concur.) do we not?” Yes. “Of this very thing, then,” I said, “there might be an art,[*](Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 E p. 22, note b. Adam is mistaken in taking it Education (ἡ παιδεία) would be an art, etc.) an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about.” “Yes, that seems likely,” he said. “Then the other so-called virtues[*](This then is Plato’s answer (intended from the first) to the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the Protagoras and Meno. The intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle’s term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are a gift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from rightly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by the grace of God. In a reformed state it could be systematically inculcated and taught. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 51-512 on Meno 70 A. but we need not infer that Plato did not believe in mental discipline. cf. Charles Fox, Educational Psychology, p. 164 The conception of mental discipline is a least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the seventh book of the Republic . . .) of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 a 14-17 ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. Plato does not explicitly name ethical and intellectual virtues. Cf. Fox, op. cit. p. 104 Plato correctly believed . . . ) and practice. But the excellence of thought,[*](Plato uses such synonyms as φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια, etc., as suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristotelian meticulousness.) it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent, or, again, useless and harmful.

Have you never observed in those who are popularly spoken of as bad, but smart men,[*](Cf. Theaet. 176 D, Laws 689 C-D, Cic. De offic. i. 19, and also Laws 819 A.) how keen is the vision of the little soul,[*](Cf. Theaet. 195 A, ibid. 173 A σμικροὶ . . . τὰς ψυχάς, Marcus Aurelius’ ψυχάριον εἶ βαστάζων νεκρόν, Swinburne’s A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man (Hymn to Proserpine, in fine), Tennyson’s If half the little soul is dirt.) how quick it is to discern the things that interest it,[*](Lit. Toward which it is turned.) a proof that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it accomplishes?” “I certainly have,” he said. “Observe then,” said I, “that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and had thus been struck free[*](The meaning is plain, the precise nature of the image that carries it is doubtful. Jowett’s circumcision was suggested by Stallbaum’s purgata ac circumcisa, but carries alien associations. The whole may be compared with the incrustation of the soul, 611 C-D, and with Phaedo 81 B f.) of the leaden weights, so to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul[*](Or eye of the mind. Cf. 533 D, Sym. 219 A, Soph. 254 A, Aristot. Eth. 1144 a 30 , and the parallels and imitations collected by Gomperz, Apol. der Heilkunst, 166-167. cf. also What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 E, Ovid, Met. 15.64: . . . quae natura negabat Visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit. Cf. Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 12-13, 15, and perhaps Odyssey, i. 115, Marc. Aurel. iv. 29 καταμύειν τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι.)—If, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a conversion towards the things that are real and true, that same faculty of the same men would have been most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as it is for the things toward which it is now turned.” “It is likely,” he said. “Well, then,” said I, “is not this also likely[*](For likely and necessary cf. on 485 C, p. 6, note c.) and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately preside over a state, nor could those who had been permitted to linger on to the end in the pursuit of culture—the one because they have no single aim[*](σκοπόν: this is what distinguishes the philosophic statesman from the opportunist politician. Cf. 452 E, Laws 962 A-B, D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 18 n. 102.) and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest.[*]( Cf. 540 B, Gorg. 526 C, 520 D ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ and Phaedo 114 C, 109 B. Because they will still suppose that they are building Jerusalem in England’s green and pleasant land (Blake).)” True, he said. “It is the duty of us, the founders, then,” said I, “to compel the best natures to attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted.” “What is that?” “That they should linger there,” I said, “and refuse to go down again[*](Cf. 539 E and Laws 803 B-C, and on 520 C, Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 53 the hero of our story descended the bean-stalk and came back to the common world, etc.) among those bondsmen and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less or of greater worth.” “Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?” “You have again forgotten,[*](Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315 on 419.) my friend,” said I, “that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition[*](i.e. happiness, not of course exceptional happiness.) in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion,[*](Persuasion and compulsion are often bracketed or contrasted. Cf. also Laws 661 C, 722 B, 711 C, Rep. 548 B.) and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit[*](Cf. 369 C ff. The reference there however is only to the economic division of labor. For the idea that laws should be for the good of the whole state cf. 420 B ff., 466 A, 341-342, Laws 715 B, 757 D, 875 A.) which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth.”

True, he said, “I did forget it.” “Observe, then, Glaucon,” said I, “that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians.[*](Noblesse oblige. This idea is now a commonplace of communist orations.) For we will say to them that it is natural that men of similar quality who spring up in other cities should not share in the labors there. For they grow up spontaneously[*](αὐτόματοι Cf. Protag. 320 A, Euthyd. 282 C. For the thought that there are a few men naturally good in any state cf. also Laws 951 B, 642 C-D.) from no volition of the government in the several states, and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay to anyone the price of its nurture.[*](Cf. Isoc. Archidamus 108 ἀποδῶμεν τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι. Stallbaum refers also to Phoenissae 44. For the country as τροφός see Vol. I. p. 303, note e on 414 E.) But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees[*](Cf. Polit. 301 D-E, Xen. Cyr. v.1.24, Oecon. 7.32-33.) and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education[*](For τελεώτερον . . . πεπαιδευμένους Cf. Prot. 342 E τελέως πεπαιδευμένου.) than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go[*](They must descend into the cave again. Cf. 539 E and Laws 803 B-C. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philos. 89-90: it was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which they had been released and coming to the help of their former fellow-prisoners. He agrees with Stewart (Myths of Plato, p. 252, n. 2) that Plato had in mind the Orphic κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου to rescue the spirits in prison. Cf. Wright, Harvard Studies, xvii. p. 139 and Complete Poems of Henry More, pp. xix-xx All which is agreeable to that opinion of Plato: That some descend hither to declare the Being and Nature of the Gods; and for the greater Health, Purity and Perfection of this Lower World. This is taking Plato somewhat too literally and confusing him with Plotinus.) then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely[*](For μυρίῳ cf. Eurip. Androm. 701.) better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the idols[*](i.e. images, Bacon’s idols of the den.) is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream[*](Plato is fond of the contrast, ὕπαρ . . . ὄναρ. Cf. 476 C, Phaedr. 277 D, Phileb. 36 E, 65 E, Polit. 277 D, 278 E, Theaet. 158 B, Rep. 574 D, 576 B, Tim. 71 E, Laws 969 B, also 533 B-C.) by men who fight one another for shadows[*](Cf. on 586 C, p. 393.) and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office[*](Cf. on 517 C, p. 131, note 3.) must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.” “By all means,” he said. “Will our alumni, then, disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labors of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the time with one another in that purer world[*](The world of ideas, the upper world as opposed to that of the cave. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.)?” Impossible, he said: “for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable necessity,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 80, note b on 347 C.) and in the opposite temper from that of the present rulers in our cities.”

“For the fact is, dear friend,” said I, “if you can discover a better way of life than office-holding for your future rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. For only in such a state will those rule who are really rich,[*](Cf. Phaedrus in fine, ibid 416 E-417 A, 547 B.) not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happiness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and starvelings[*](Stallbaum refers to Xen. Cyr. viii. 3. 39 οἴομαί σε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἥδιον πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας, for you must enjoy tour riches much more, I think, for the very reason that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became rich. (Loeb tr.) Cf. also 577 E-578 A, and Adam ad loc.) from lack of goods of their own, they turn to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. For when office and rule become the prizes of contention,[*](Cf. 347 D, Laws 715 A, also 586 C and What Plato Said, p. 627, on Laws 678 E, Isoc. Areop. 24, Pan. 145 and 146.) such a civil and internecine strife[*](Cf. Eurip. Heracleidae 415 οἰκεῖος ἤδη πόλεμος ἐξαρτεύεται.) destroys the office-seekers themselves and the city as well.” “Most true,” he said. “Can you name any other type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political office except the life of true philosophers[*](Cf. 580 d ff., pp. 370 ff.)?” I asked. “No, by Zeus,” he said. “But what we require,” I said, “is that those who take office[*](ἰέναι ἐπί in erotic language means to woo. Cf. on 489 C, p. 26, note b, also 347 C, 588 B, 475 C.) should not be lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with rival lovers.” Surely. “What others, then, will you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city than those who have most intelligence of the principles that are the means of good government and who possess distinctions of another kind and a life that is preferable to the political life?” “No others,” he said. “Would you, then, have us proceed to consider how such men may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward[*](Cf. on 515 E, p. 124, note b.) to the light even as some[*](This has been much debated. Cf. Adam ad loc. Professor Linforth argues from Pausanias i. 34 that Amphiaraus is meant.) are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?” “Of course I would.” “So this, it seems, would not be the whirling of the shell[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 B; also the description of the game in Plato Comicus, Fr. 153 apud Norwood, Greek Comedy, p. 167. The players were divided into two groups. A shell or potsherd, black on one side and white on the other, was thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one group fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on Aristoph. Knights 855.) in the children’s game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascension[*](Much quoted by Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc. Again we need to remember that Plato’s main and explicitly reiterated purpose is to describe a course of study that will develop the power of consecutive consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and mystical suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are secondary and subordinate. So, e.g. Urwick, The Message of Plato, pp. 66-67, is mistaken when he says . . . Plato expressly tells us that his education is designed simply and solely to awaken the spiritual faculty which every soul contains, by wheeling the soul round and turning it away from the world of change and decay. He is not concerned with any of those excellences of mind which may be produced by training and discipline, his only aim is to open the eye of the soul . . . The general meaning of the sentence is plain but the text is disputed. See crit. note.) to reality of our parable which we will affirm to be true philosophy.” “By all means.” “Must we not, then, consider what studies have the power to effect this?” Of course. “What, then, Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being? A thought strikes me while I speak[*](A frequent pretence in Plato. Cf. 370 A, 525 C, Euthyphro 9 C, Laws 686 C, 702 B, Phaedr. 262 C with Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 498, Laws 888 D with Tayler Lewis, Plato against the Atheists, pp. 118-119. Cf. also Vol. I. on 394 D-E, and Isoc. Antid. 159 ἐνθυμοῦμαι δὲ μεταξὺ λέγων, Panath. 127.): Did we not say that these men in youth must be athletes of war[*](Cf. 416 D, 422 B, 404 A, and Vol. I. p. 266, note a, on 403 E.)” “We did.” “Then the study for which we are seeking must have this additional[*](προσέχειν is here used in its etymological sense. Cf. pp. 66-67 on 500 A.) qualification.” “What one?” “That it be not useless to soldiers.[*](This further prerequisite of the higher education follows naturally from the plan of the Republic; but it does not interest Plato much and is, after one or two repetitions, dropped.)” “Why, yes, it must,” he said, “if that is possible.” “But in our previous account they were educated in gymnastics and music.[*](Cf. 376 E ff.)” “They were, he said. “And gymnastics, I take it, is devoted[*](For τετεύτακε Cf. Tim. 90 B τετευτακότι ) to that which grows and perishes; for it presides over the growth and decay of the body.[*](Cf. 376 E. This is of course no contradiction of 410 C.)” Obviously. “Then this cannot be the study that we seek.”