Republic

That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said. But what do you understand by the greatest studies? You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds[*](For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on Phaedo 68 C, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 B, and p. 563 on Rep. 435 B-C.) in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic(Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may means teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf.also Introd. p. xxxv.) was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,[*](Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 1 nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris. Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato’s distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things (What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A.) though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough[*](Cf. Menex. 234 A, Charm. 158 C, Symp. 204 A, Epist. vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.) and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around[*](Cf. Phaedr. 274 A.) the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline[*](i.e. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.) as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve[*](For πᾶν ποιεῖν cf. on 488 C, for συντεινομένους Euthydem. 288 D.) to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest[*](Such juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 B ἑνα ἕν, 466 D πάντα πάντῃ, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 C οὐδεὶς οὐδέν, Laws 835 C μόνῳ μόνος, 958 B ἑκόντα ἑκών. Cf. also Protag. 327 B, Gorg. 523 B, Symp. 217 B, Tim. 92 b, Phaedo 109 B, Apol. 232 C, and Laws passim.) matters? It would indeed,[*](The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, Crito 47 C, and D, Laches 195 D, Gorg. 467 E. See critical note.) he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question.

You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard[*](Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for the good in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. Vol. I. on 476 A and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567, does not understand.) that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good[*](Cf. 508 E, 517 C, Cratyl. 418 E. Cf. Phileb. 64 E and What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.) by reference to which[*](Lit. the use of which, i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.) just things[*](The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing color. It makes no difference.) and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος Cf. Euthyph. 4 E, Lysis 208 E, 365 B, Charm. 155 E, etc.) without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit[*](Cf. 427 A, Phaedr. 275 C, Cratyl. 387 A, Euthyd. 288 E, Laws 751 B, 944 C, etc.) in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good[*](καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκἀγαθόν in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Phileb. 65 A and Symp. 210-211 where because of the subject the καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν.)?No, by Zeus, I do not, he said. But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure[*](So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131; Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ’ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and on 329 A-B. There is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.) to be the good, and the finer[*](κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American sophisticated in recent use. See too Theaet. 156 A, Aristot. Eth. Nic 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες.) spirits intelligence or knowledge.[*](Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (Cf. Protag. 337 A ff.) and Aristotle (Cf. Eth. Nic. 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose.) Certainly. And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge[*](Cf. Euthyd. 281 D, Theaet. 288 D f., Laws 961 E ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph. 13 D, Laches 192 E, Gorg. 451 A, Charm. 165 C-E, Alc. I. 124 E ff.) it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good. Most absurdly, he said. Is it not absurd, said I, if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,[*](There is no the in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 B-C in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.) as if we understood their meaning when they utter[*](φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance.) the word good. Most true, he said. Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion[*](Lit. wandering, the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, Lysis 213 E, Phaedo 79 C, Soph. 230 B, Phaedr. 263 B, Parmen. 135 E, Laws 962 D.) of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner[*](καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 C, Gorg. 456 C-D, Phaedo 62 A.) compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures[*](A distinct reference to Callicles’ admission in Gorgias 499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους cf. 499 C, Rep. 561 C, and Phileb. 13 C πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι. Stenzel’s notion (Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in the Philebus Plato ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 C weit entfernt is uncritical. The Republic merely refers to the Gorgias to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.)? Most assuredly. The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? Certainly. Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes[*](ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, Cf. Theaet. 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, Sophist 233 B, 225 B, but less so than ἐρίζειν in Protag. 337 A.) about it? Of course. And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance[*](Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi (1921) pp. 164-168.) without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here? Quite so, he said. That, then, which every soul pursues[*](Cf. Gorg. 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες, 505 A-B, Phileb. 20 D, Symp. 206 A, Euthyd. 278 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129.) and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 A μαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold’s phrase, God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after.) of its reality, but yet baffled[*](As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.) and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,[*](Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 Toute aultre science est dommageable à celuy qui n’a Ia science de la bonté.) and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens[*](As in the longer way Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.) to whose hands we are to entrust all things?

Least of all, he said. I fancy, at any rate, said I, that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,[*](The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Cf. Theaet. 169 E.) will not have secured a guardian[*](the guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men. Cf. Laws 968 A, 964 C, 858 C-E, 817 C, Xen Mem. iii. 6. 8.) of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this. You surmise well, he said. Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization[*](For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B λελέξεται465 A προστετάξεται, Eurip. Heracleidae 980 πεπράξεται.) only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it. Necessarily, he said. But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different? What a man it is, said I; you made it very plain[*](For the personal construction 348 E, Isoc. To Nic. I. καταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also Theaet. 189 C, Symp. 221 B, Charm. 162 C, etc.) long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it. Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates, he said, to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one’s own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.[*](Cf. 367 D-E.) But then, said I, do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know? By no means, he said, as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines. Nay, said I, have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge[*](This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 B, Theaet. 201 B-C and Phileb. 62 A-B, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.) are ugly things? The best of them are blind.[*](Cf. on 484 C, Phaedr. 270 E.) Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way? They do not differ at all, he said. Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous[*](Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. Phaedr. 250 C, Phileb. 16 C, Rep. 518 C, 478 C, 479 D, 518 A. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.) and fair? Nay, in heaven’s name, Socrates, said Glaucon, do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 C ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις, we are now in the vestibule of the good.) For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues. It will right well[*](καὶ μάλα, jolly well, humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to define the conventional virtues than to explain the sanction. Cf. Symp. 189 A, Euthydem. 298 D-E, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 E.) content me, my dear fellow, I said, but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.[*](Excess of Zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks. Cf. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.) Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;[*](Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact.) for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.[*](This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 212. τὰ νῦν repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (Cf. Tim. 48 C), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 E and 430 C.) But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness[*](Cf. Laws 897 D-E, Phaedr. 246 A.) I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop. Well, speak on, he said, for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.

I could wish, I said, that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest[*](This playful interlude relieves the monotony of the argument and is a transition to the symbolism. τόκος means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 E, Polit. 267 A, Aristoph. Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Ol. x. 12. the equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article Usury in Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics. ) and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest. We will do our best, he said, to be on our guard. Only speak on. Yes, I said, after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.[*](Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 A ff., Phaedo 108 b ff.) What? said he. We predicate to be[*](The modern reader will never understand Plato from translations that talk about Being. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 605.) of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech. We do. And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.[*](ὃ ἔστιν is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. Phaedo 75 B, D, 78 D, Parmen. 129 B, Symp. 211 C, Rep. 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.) It is so. And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen. By all means. With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things? With sight, he said. And do we not, I said, hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses? Surely. Have you ever observed, said I, how much the greatest expenditure the creator[*](Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.) of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?[*](Cf. Phaedr. 259 D, Tim. 45 B.) Why, no, I have not, he said. Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium[*](This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, Tim. 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.) so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard? They need nothing, he said. Neither, I fancy, said I, do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any? Not I, he said. But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need? How? Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without the presence of a third thing[*](Lit. kind of thing, γένος. Cf. 507 C-D.) specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.[*](Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. there must also be a source of so-called light.) What[*](Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.) is this thing of which you speak? he said. The thing, I said, that you call light. You say truly, he replied.

The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form[*](The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 D καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος. Form over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.) that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor.It surely is far from being so, he said. Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven[*](Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (Cratyl. 397 D, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. Laws 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, Apol. 26 D, Epinomis 985 B, 988 B.) as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen? Why, the one that you too and other people mean, he said; for your question evidently refers to the sun.[*](Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to say of Platos mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses τἀγαθόν in much the same way. It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.) Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity? What? Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun. Why, no. But it is, I think, the most sunlike[*](Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9 οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. Tusc. i. 25. 73 in fine quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare, Manilius ii. 115: quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum? Goethe's Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,Die Sonne könnt es nic erblicken, and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben.) of all the instruments of sense. By far the most. And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun? Certainly. Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself? That is so, he said. This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good[*](i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with god or with the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p 512.) which the good begot to stand in a proportion[*](Cf. Gorg. 465 B-C, 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, Phaedo 111 A-B, Tim. 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, Phaedo 110 D.) with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision. How is that? he said; explain further. You are aware, I said, that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them. Yes, indeed, he said. But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes. Certainly. Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent[*](Plato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the sanction, and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.) it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason. Yes, it does, This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea[*](No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used o carry the notion of apprehended aspect which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.) of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.[*](The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.) Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still[*](Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον, 578 B, Symp. 180 A-B and Bury ad loc. The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic, Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 174, Introd. p. lxi. This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. Meno 81 D-E.) than these you will think rightly of it.

But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,[*](ἀγαθοειδῆ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.) but to think that either of them is the good[*](There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note f.) is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit[*](ἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian habit. However Protag. 344 C approaches it. Cf. also Phileb. 11 D, 41 C, Ritter-Preller, p. 285. Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. ἕξις Laws 625 C, γένεσις Laws 691 B, Tim. 73 B, 76 E, μοῖρα Phaedr. 255 B, 274 E, Menex. 249 B,φύσις Phaedo 109 E, Symp. 186 B, Laws 729 C, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen ἕξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless.) of the good.An inconceivable beauty you speak of, he said, if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely[*](For οὐ γὰρ δήπου Cf. Apol. 20 C, Gorg. 455 A, Euthyph. 13 A.) cannot mean that it is pleasure. Hush, said I, but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.[*](i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God’s mind for the universe, man’s mind for political institutions. this, being the only interpretation that makes sense o the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν with the ἕν, one, and Aristotle’s statement, Met. 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas. the remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.) How? The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation. Of course not. In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence[*](It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato’s sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. De divinis nominibus, ii. 2, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 87.) in dignity and surpassing power. And Glaucon very ludicrously[*](He is amused at Socrates’ emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz’ notion (Platon, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon’s losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. Birds 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265. The dramatic humor of Glaucon’s surprise is Plato’s way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, Lysis 223 B, Protag. 340 E, Charm. 175 E, Cratyl. 426 B, Theaet. 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 172 on the Phaedo. ) said, Heaven save us, hyperbole[*](What a comble! would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne’s remark that nothing can be said hyperbolically of God. The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato’s manner.) can no further go. The fault is yours, I said, for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it. And don’t desist, he said, but at least[*](Cf. 502 A, Symp. 222 E, Meno 86 E.) expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting. Why, certainly, I said, I am omitting a great deal. Well, don’t omit the least bit, he said. I fancy, I said, that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out. Do not, he said. Conceive then, said I, as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,[*](Cf. the similar etymological pun in Cratyl. 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.) but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible. I do. Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided[*](The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxi for my interpretation of the passage.) into two unequal[*](Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἀν’ ἴσα. It is a little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honorable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut. Plat. Quest. 3.) sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images.

By images[*](Cf. 402 B, Soph. 266 B-C.) I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend.I do.As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man.I so assume it, he said. Would you be willing to say, said I, that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103. note b.) as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness? I certainly would. Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section. In what way? By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,[*](Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s republic, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its relation to ultimate Good, To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.) and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas[*](The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii.) only and progressing systematically through ideas. I don’t fully understand[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 A and p. 47, not f on 338 D; What Plato Said, p. 503 on Gorg. 463 D.) what you mean by this, he said. Well, I will try again, said I, for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them[*](Aristot. Top. 100 b 2-3 οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval contra principium negantem non est disputandum. A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is real.) to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out. Certainly, he said, I know that. And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw[*](Cf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkely and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.)? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn[*](i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.) as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.[*](Stenzel, Handbuch, 118 das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sieht is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special sense (understanding. See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.)

True, he said. This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,[*](For the concessive μέν cf. 546 E, 529 D, Soph. 225 C.) but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter[*](The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 A. Wilamowitz’ emendation (Platon, ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.) are esteemed as clear and held in honor.[*](The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad loc.) I understand, said he, that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts. Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason[*](λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.) itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,[*](Cf. 533 A. Phileb. 57 E.) treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,[*](τῷ ὄντι emphasized the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, Phaedo 80 D, Phileb. 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson on Meno 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry.) underpinnings, footings,[*](Cf. Symp. 211 C ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, like steps of a stair.) and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,[*](παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally leads support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a.) and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense[*](This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.) but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.[*](The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234.) I understand, he said; not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding[*](διανοίᾳ here as in 511 A is general and not technical.) and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence[*](νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means have not sense for its higher meaning Cf. Meno 99 C, Laws 962 A.) about them although[*](Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετά here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. the meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quiet as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.) the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding[*](Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a faculty inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.) and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason. Your interpretation is quite sufficient, I said; and now, answering to[*](For ἐπί Cf. Polit. 280 A, Gorg. 463 B.) these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief[*](πίστις is of course not faith in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.) to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,[*](εἰκασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.) and arrange them in a proportion,[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.) considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality. I understand, he said; I concur and arrange them as you bid.

Next, said I, “compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern[*](The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion the contrast between the world of sense-perception and the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of ordinary experience for the other two members of the proportion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire and shadows cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun and the real objects of sense. In such a proportion our real world becomes the symbol of Plato’s ideal world. Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the Platonic antithesis of the real and the ideal. It has even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension. But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in doubt as to his own intended meaning. there may be at the most a little uncertainty as to which are merely indispensable parts of the picture. The source and first suggestion of Plato’s imagery is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, The Origin of Plato’s Cave in Harvard Studies in Class. Phil. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also Wright, loc. cit. pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world to a cave, Diels i.3 269. Cf. Wright, loc. cit. Wright refers it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diès in Bulletin Budé, No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f. The suggestiveness of the image has been endless. The most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle’s early writings is derived from it, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. 37. It is the source of Bacon’s idols of the den. Sir Thomas Browne writes in Urne-Buriall: We yet discourse in Plato’s den and are but embryo philosophers. Huxley’s allegory of Jack and the Beanstalk in Evolution and Ethics, pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, Siris, 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic interpretations. Cf. Jung, Analytic Psych. p. 232. Eddington perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics the frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows) with a long entrance open[*](Cf. Phaedo 111 C ἀναπεπταμένους) to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered[*](Cf. Phaedo 67 E.) from childhood, so that they remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows[*](H. Rackham, Class. Rev. xxix. pp. 77-78, suggests that the τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς should be translated at the marionettes and be classed with καινοῖς τραγῳδοῖς (Pseph. ap. Dem. xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth, II. i. p. 445.) have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets.” “All that I see,” he said. “See also, then, men carrying[*](The men are merely a part of the necessary machinery of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of reflections, εἰκόνες.) past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent.”

“A strange image you speak of,” he said, “and strange prisoners.” “Like to us,” I said; “for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?” “How could they,” he said, “if they were compelled to hold their heads unmoved through life?” “And again, would not the same be true of the objects carried past them?” Surely. “If then they were able to talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things that they saw[*](Cf. Parmen. 130 C, Tim. 51 B, 52 A, and my De Platonis Idearum doctrina, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann in Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil. xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197. As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the reality (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak of the shadows as the world, though the real reference unknown to them would be to the objects that cause the shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the real world of which they are copies. The general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they wold suppose the shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. παριόντα is intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are homonymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get somewhat the same meaning from the text ταὐτά. Do you not think that they would identify the passing objects (which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they saw? Cf. also P. Corssen, Philologische Wochenschrift, 1913, p. 286. He prefers οὐκ αὐτά and renders: Sie würden in dem, was sie sähen, das Vorübergehende selbst zu benennen glauben.) they were naming the passing objects?” Necessarily. “And if their prison had an echo[*](The echo and the voices (515 A) merely complete the picture.) from the wall opposite them, when one of the passersby uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?” “By Zeus, I do not,” said he. “Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects.” “Quite inevitably,” he said. “Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release[*](Phaedo 67 D λύειν, and 82 D λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ. λύσις became technical in Neoplatonism.) and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature[*](Lit. by nature. φύσις in Plato often suggests reality and truth.) something of this sort should happen to them: When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss[*](The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful experience of one whose false conceit of knowledge is tested by the Socratic elenchus. Cf. Soph. 230 B-D, and for ἀπορεῖν Meno 80 A, 84 B-C, Theaet. 149 A, Apol. 23 D. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 5123 on Meno 80 A, Eurip. Hippol. 247 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν ὀδυνᾷ, it is painful to have one’s opinions set right, and 517 A, 494 D.) and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?” “Far more real,” he said. “And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?” “It is so,” he said.

“And if,” said I, “someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent[*](Cf. Theaet. 175 B, Boethius, Cons. iii. 12 quicunque in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis; 529 A, 521 C, and the Neoplatonists’ use of ἀνάγειν and their anagogical virtue and interpretation. Cf. Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt, vii. 270.) which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see[*](Cf. Laws 897 D, Phaedo 99 D.) even one of the things that we call real?” “Why, no, not immediately,” he said. “Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water[*](Cf. Phaedo 99 D. Stallbaum says this was imitated by Themistius, Orat. iv. p. 51 B.) of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the sun’s light.[*](It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the details of this description. There are more stages of progress than the proportion of four things calls for all that Plato’s thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good, Cf. 517 B-C.)” Of course. “And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,[*](i.e. a foreign medium.) but in and by itself in its own place.” Necessarily, he said. “And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region, and is in some sort the cause[*](Cf. 508 B, and for the idea of good as the cause of all things cf. on 509 B, and Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. P. Corssen, Philol. Wochenschrift, 1913, pp. 287-299, unnecessarily proposes to emend ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων to ὧν σκιὰς ἑ. or ὧν σφεῖς σκιὰς ἑ., ne sol umbrarum, quas videbant, auctor fuisse dicatur, cum potius earum rerum, quarum umbras videbant, fuerit auctor.) of all these things that they had seen.” Obviously, he said, “that would be the next step.” “Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them[*](Cf. on 486 a, p. 10, note a.)?” “He would indeed.” “And if there had been honors and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences and co-existences,[*](Another of Plato’s anticipations of modern thought. This is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist, pragmatist view of causation. Cf. Gorg. 501 A τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰθότος γίγνεσθαι relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result. (Loeb tr.)) and so most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honored by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer[*](The quotation is almost as apt as that at the beginning of the Crito. ) and

greatly prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man,

“Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in evaluating these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter,[*](Like the philosopher in the court-room. Cf. Theaet. 172 C, 173 C ff., Gorg. 484 D-E. Cf. also on 387 C-D. 515 D, 517 D, Soph. 216 D, Laches 196 B, Phaedr. 249 D.) and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him[*](An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other stinging allusions to this Cf. Gorg. 486 B, 521 C, Meno 100 B-C. Cf. Hamlet’s Wormwood, wormwood (III. ii. 191). The text is disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, Zu Platons Staat, Hermes, 1926, p. 110, thinks that an οἴει or something like it must be understood as having preceded, at least in Plato’s thought, and that ἀποκτείνειν can be taken as a gloss or variant of ἀποκτεινύναι and the correct reading must be λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν. See also Adam ad loc.)?” “They certainly would,” he said. “This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul’s ascension to the intelligible region,[*](Cf. 508 B-C, where Arnou (Le Désir de dieu dans la philos. de Plotin, p. 48 and Robin (La Théorie plat. de l’amour, pp. 83-84) make τόπος νοητός refer to le ciel astronomique as opposed to the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος of the Phaedrus 247 A-E, 248 B, 248 D-249 A. The phrase νοητὸς κόσμος, often attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings.) you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows[*](Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about metaphysical ultimates than interpreters who take his myths literally have supposed. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515, on Meno 86 B.) whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth[*](Cf. 506 E.) in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely[*](This is the main point for the Republic. The significance of the idea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and reserved for the Timaeus. Cf. on 508 B, p. 102, note a and p. 505-506. For the practical application Cf. Meno 81 D-E. See also Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.) in private or public must have caught sight of this.” “I concur,” he said, “so far as I am able.” “Come then,” I said, “and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing[*](Cf. 521 A, 345 E, and Vol. I. on 347 D, p. 81, note d.) to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of our image holds” “Yes, it is likely.” “And again, do you think it at all strange,” said I, “if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries[*](Cf. 346 E.) of men cuts a sorry figure[*](Cf. Theaet. 174 C ἀσχημοσύνη.) and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms[*](For the contrast between the philosophical and the pettifogging soul Cf. Theaet. 173 C-175 E. Cf. also on 517 A, p 128, note b.) or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images[*](For ἀγαλμάτων cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 237, Soph. 234 C, Polit. 303 C.) that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?” “It would be by no men strange,” he said.

“But a sensible man,” I said, “would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,[*](Aristotle, De an. 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is ἀόρατον but otherwise than the dark.) and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh[*](Cf. Theaet. 175 D-E.) unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.[*](Lit. or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a greater light.) And so[*](i.e. only after that. For οὕτω δή in this sense cf. 484 D, 429 D, 443 E, Charm. 171 E.) he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above.” “That is a very fair statement,” he said. “Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their professions.[*](ἐπαγγελλόμενοι connotes the boastfulness of their claims. Cf. Protag. 319 A, Gorg. 447 c, Laches 186 C, Euthyd. 273 E, Isoc. Soph. 1, 5, 9, 10, Antid. 193, Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 1, i. 2. 8, Aristot. Rhet. 1402 a 25.) What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting[*](Cf. Theognis 429 ff. Stallbaum compares Eurip. Hippol. 917 f. Similarly Anon. Theaet. Comm. (Berlin, 1905), p. 32, 48. 4 καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως μαθημάτων, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνήσεως. Cf. also St. Augustine: Nolite putare quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae; and Emerson’s strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from another soul.) vision into blind eyes.” “They do indeed,” he said. “But our present argument indicates,” said I, “that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periact[*](περιακτέον is probably a reference to the περίακτοι or triangular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces. Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence, as a number of classical plays seem to have required something of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio s. v. Machine, p. 1469.) in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good,[*](Hard-headed distaste for the unction or seeming mysticism of Plato’s language should not blind us to the plain meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature. Some teachers will concur.) do we not?” Yes. “Of this very thing, then,” I said, “there might be an art,[*](Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 E p. 22, note b. Adam is mistaken in taking it Education (ἡ παιδεία) would be an art, etc.) an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about.” “Yes, that seems likely,” he said. “Then the other so-called virtues[*](This then is Plato’s answer (intended from the first) to the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the Protagoras and Meno. The intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle’s term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are a gift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from rightly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by the grace of God. In a reformed state it could be systematically inculcated and taught. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 51-512 on Meno 70 A. but we need not infer that Plato did not believe in mental discipline. cf. Charles Fox, Educational Psychology, p. 164 The conception of mental discipline is a least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the seventh book of the Republic . . .) of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 a 14-17 ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. Plato does not explicitly name ethical and intellectual virtues. Cf. Fox, op. cit. p. 104 Plato correctly believed . . . ) and practice. But the excellence of thought,[*](Plato uses such synonyms as φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια, etc., as suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristotelian meticulousness.) it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent, or, again, useless and harmful.

Have you never observed in those who are popularly spoken of as bad, but smart men,[*](Cf. Theaet. 176 D, Laws 689 C-D, Cic. De offic. i. 19, and also Laws 819 A.) how keen is the vision of the little soul,[*](Cf. Theaet. 195 A, ibid. 173 A σμικροὶ . . . τὰς ψυχάς, Marcus Aurelius’ ψυχάριον εἶ βαστάζων νεκρόν, Swinburne’s A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man (Hymn to Proserpine, in fine), Tennyson’s If half the little soul is dirt.) how quick it is to discern the things that interest it,[*](Lit. Toward which it is turned.) a proof that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it accomplishes?” “I certainly have,” he said. “Observe then,” said I, “that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and had thus been struck free[*](The meaning is plain, the precise nature of the image that carries it is doubtful. Jowett’s circumcision was suggested by Stallbaum’s purgata ac circumcisa, but carries alien associations. The whole may be compared with the incrustation of the soul, 611 C-D, and with Phaedo 81 B f.) of the leaden weights, so to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul[*](Or eye of the mind. Cf. 533 D, Sym. 219 A, Soph. 254 A, Aristot. Eth. 1144 a 30 , and the parallels and imitations collected by Gomperz, Apol. der Heilkunst, 166-167. cf. also What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 E, Ovid, Met. 15.64: . . . quae natura negabat Visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit. Cf. Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 12-13, 15, and perhaps Odyssey, i. 115, Marc. Aurel. iv. 29 καταμύειν τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι.)—If, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a conversion towards the things that are real and true, that same faculty of the same men would have been most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as it is for the things toward which it is now turned.” “It is likely,” he said. “Well, then,” said I, “is not this also likely[*](For likely and necessary cf. on 485 C, p. 6, note c.) and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately preside over a state, nor could those who had been permitted to linger on to the end in the pursuit of culture—the one because they have no single aim[*](σκοπόν: this is what distinguishes the philosophic statesman from the opportunist politician. Cf. 452 E, Laws 962 A-B, D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 18 n. 102.) and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest.[*]( Cf. 540 B, Gorg. 526 C, 520 D ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ and Phaedo 114 C, 109 B. Because they will still suppose that they are building Jerusalem in England’s green and pleasant land (Blake).)” True, he said. “It is the duty of us, the founders, then,” said I, “to compel the best natures to attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted.” “What is that?” “That they should linger there,” I said, “and refuse to go down again[*](Cf. 539 E and Laws 803 B-C, and on 520 C, Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 53 the hero of our story descended the bean-stalk and came back to the common world, etc.) among those bondsmen and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less or of greater worth.” “Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?” “You have again forgotten,[*](Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315 on 419.) my friend,” said I, “that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition[*](i.e. happiness, not of course exceptional happiness.) in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion,[*](Persuasion and compulsion are often bracketed or contrasted. Cf. also Laws 661 C, 722 B, 711 C, Rep. 548 B.) and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit[*](Cf. 369 C ff. The reference there however is only to the economic division of labor. For the idea that laws should be for the good of the whole state cf. 420 B ff., 466 A, 341-342, Laws 715 B, 757 D, 875 A.) which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth.”

True, he said, “I did forget it.” “Observe, then, Glaucon,” said I, “that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians.[*](Noblesse oblige. This idea is now a commonplace of communist orations.) For we will say to them that it is natural that men of similar quality who spring up in other cities should not share in the labors there. For they grow up spontaneously[*](αὐτόματοι Cf. Protag. 320 A, Euthyd. 282 C. For the thought that there are a few men naturally good in any state cf. also Laws 951 B, 642 C-D.) from no volition of the government in the several states, and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay to anyone the price of its nurture.[*](Cf. Isoc. Archidamus 108 ἀποδῶμεν τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι. Stallbaum refers also to Phoenissae 44. For the country as τροφός see Vol. I. p. 303, note e on 414 E.) But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees[*](Cf. Polit. 301 D-E, Xen. Cyr. v.1.24, Oecon. 7.32-33.) and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education[*](For τελεώτερον . . . πεπαιδευμένους Cf. Prot. 342 E τελέως πεπαιδευμένου.) than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go[*](They must descend into the cave again. Cf. 539 E and Laws 803 B-C. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philos. 89-90: it was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which they had been released and coming to the help of their former fellow-prisoners. He agrees with Stewart (Myths of Plato, p. 252, n. 2) that Plato had in mind the Orphic κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου to rescue the spirits in prison. Cf. Wright, Harvard Studies, xvii. p. 139 and Complete Poems of Henry More, pp. xix-xx All which is agreeable to that opinion of Plato: That some descend hither to declare the Being and Nature of the Gods; and for the greater Health, Purity and Perfection of this Lower World. This is taking Plato somewhat too literally and confusing him with Plotinus.) then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely[*](For μυρίῳ cf. Eurip. Androm. 701.) better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the idols[*](i.e. images, Bacon’s idols of the den.) is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream[*](Plato is fond of the contrast, ὕπαρ . . . ὄναρ. Cf. 476 C, Phaedr. 277 D, Phileb. 36 E, 65 E, Polit. 277 D, 278 E, Theaet. 158 B, Rep. 574 D, 576 B, Tim. 71 E, Laws 969 B, also 533 B-C.) by men who fight one another for shadows[*](Cf. on 586 C, p. 393.) and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office[*](Cf. on 517 C, p. 131, note 3.) must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.” “By all means,” he said. “Will our alumni, then, disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labors of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the time with one another in that purer world[*](The world of ideas, the upper world as opposed to that of the cave. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.)?” Impossible, he said: “for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable necessity,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 80, note b on 347 C.) and in the opposite temper from that of the present rulers in our cities.”

“For the fact is, dear friend,” said I, “if you can discover a better way of life than office-holding for your future rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. For only in such a state will those rule who are really rich,[*](Cf. Phaedrus in fine, ibid 416 E-417 A, 547 B.) not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happiness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and starvelings[*](Stallbaum refers to Xen. Cyr. viii. 3. 39 οἴομαί σε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἥδιον πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας, for you must enjoy tour riches much more, I think, for the very reason that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became rich. (Loeb tr.) Cf. also 577 E-578 A, and Adam ad loc.) from lack of goods of their own, they turn to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. For when office and rule become the prizes of contention,[*](Cf. 347 D, Laws 715 A, also 586 C and What Plato Said, p. 627, on Laws 678 E, Isoc. Areop. 24, Pan. 145 and 146.) such a civil and internecine strife[*](Cf. Eurip. Heracleidae 415 οἰκεῖος ἤδη πόλεμος ἐξαρτεύεται.) destroys the office-seekers themselves and the city as well.” “Most true,” he said. “Can you name any other type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political office except the life of true philosophers[*](Cf. 580 d ff., pp. 370 ff.)?” I asked. “No, by Zeus,” he said. “But what we require,” I said, “is that those who take office[*](ἰέναι ἐπί in erotic language means to woo. Cf. on 489 C, p. 26, note b, also 347 C, 588 B, 475 C.) should not be lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with rival lovers.” Surely. “What others, then, will you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city than those who have most intelligence of the principles that are the means of good government and who possess distinctions of another kind and a life that is preferable to the political life?” “No others,” he said. “Would you, then, have us proceed to consider how such men may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward[*](Cf. on 515 E, p. 124, note b.) to the light even as some[*](This has been much debated. Cf. Adam ad loc. Professor Linforth argues from Pausanias i. 34 that Amphiaraus is meant.) are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?” “Of course I would.” “So this, it seems, would not be the whirling of the shell[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 B; also the description of the game in Plato Comicus, Fr. 153 apud Norwood, Greek Comedy, p. 167. The players were divided into two groups. A shell or potsherd, black on one side and white on the other, was thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one group fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on Aristoph. Knights 855.) in the children’s game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascension[*](Much quoted by Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc. Again we need to remember that Plato’s main and explicitly reiterated purpose is to describe a course of study that will develop the power of consecutive consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and mystical suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are secondary and subordinate. So, e.g. Urwick, The Message of Plato, pp. 66-67, is mistaken when he says . . . Plato expressly tells us that his education is designed simply and solely to awaken the spiritual faculty which every soul contains, by wheeling the soul round and turning it away from the world of change and decay. He is not concerned with any of those excellences of mind which may be produced by training and discipline, his only aim is to open the eye of the soul . . . The general meaning of the sentence is plain but the text is disputed. See crit. note.) to reality of our parable which we will affirm to be true philosophy.” “By all means.” “Must we not, then, consider what studies have the power to effect this?” Of course. “What, then, Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being? A thought strikes me while I speak[*](A frequent pretence in Plato. Cf. 370 A, 525 C, Euthyphro 9 C, Laws 686 C, 702 B, Phaedr. 262 C with Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 498, Laws 888 D with Tayler Lewis, Plato against the Atheists, pp. 118-119. Cf. also Vol. I. on 394 D-E, and Isoc. Antid. 159 ἐνθυμοῦμαι δὲ μεταξὺ λέγων, Panath. 127.): Did we not say that these men in youth must be athletes of war[*](Cf. 416 D, 422 B, 404 A, and Vol. I. p. 266, note a, on 403 E.)” “We did.” “Then the study for which we are seeking must have this additional[*](προσέχειν is here used in its etymological sense. Cf. pp. 66-67 on 500 A.) qualification.” “What one?” “That it be not useless to soldiers.[*](This further prerequisite of the higher education follows naturally from the plan of the Republic; but it does not interest Plato much and is, after one or two repetitions, dropped.)” “Why, yes, it must,” he said, “if that is possible.” “But in our previous account they were educated in gymnastics and music.[*](Cf. 376 E ff.)” “They were, he said. “And gymnastics, I take it, is devoted[*](For τετεύτακε Cf. Tim. 90 B τετευτακότι ) to that which grows and perishes; for it presides over the growth and decay of the body.[*](Cf. 376 E. This is of course no contradiction of 410 C.)” Obviously. “Then this cannot be the study that we seek.”

No. “Is it, then, music, so far as we have already described it?[*](The ordinary study of music may cultivate and refine feeling. Only the mathematics of music would develop the power of abstract thought.)” “Nay, that,” he said, “was the counterpart of gymnastics, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, imparting by the melody a certain harmony of spirit that is not science,[*](Knowledge in the true sense, as contrasted with opinion or habit.) and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are fables and those that are more nearly true. But it included no study that tended to any such good as you are now seeking.” “Your recollection is most exact,” I said; “for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven’s name, Glaucon, what study could there be of that kind? For all the arts were in our opinion base and mechanical.[*](Cf. ibid, p. 49 note e on 495 E. This idea is the source of much modern prejudice against Plato.)” “Surely; and yet what other study is left apart from music, gymnastics and the arts?” Come, said I, “if we are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us take something that applies to all alike.[*](Cf. Symp. 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν τείνει.)” What? “Why, for example, this common thing that all arts and forms of thought[*](διάνοιαι is not to be pressed in the special sense of 511 D-E.) and all sciences employ, and which is among the first things that everybody must learn.” What? he said. “This trifling matter,[*](A playful introduction to Plato’s serious treatment of the psychology of number and the value of the study of mathematics.)” I said, “of distinguishing one and two and three. I mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is it not true of them that every art and science must necessarily partake of them?” “Indeed it is,” he said. “The art of war too?” said I. “Most necessarily,” he said. “Certainly, then,” said I, “Palamedes[*](Palamedes, like Prometheus, is a culture hero, who personifies in Greek tragedy the inventions and discoveries that produced civilization. Cf. the speech of Prometheus in Aesch. Prom. 459 ff. and Harvard Studies, xii. p. 208, n. 2.) in the play is always making Agamemnon appear a most ridiculous[*](Quoted by later writers in praise of mathematics. Cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 7 ed. Gelder. For the necessity of mathematics Cf. Laws 818 C.) general. Have you not noticed that he affirms that by the invention of number he marshalled the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies and enumerated the ships and everything else as if before that they had not been counted, and Agamemnon apparently did not know how many feet he had if he couldn’t count? And yet what sort of a General do you think he would be in that case?” “A very queer one in my opinion,” he said, “if that was true.” “Shall we not, then,” I said, “set down as a study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and number?” “Most certainly, if he is to know anything whatever of the ordering of his troops—or rather if he is to be a man at all.[*](Cf. Laws 819 D.)” “Do you observe then,” said I, “in this study what I do?” What?

“It seems likely that it is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awakening of thought, but that no one makes the right use[*](Plato’s point of view here, as he will explain, is precisely the opposite of that of modern educators who would teach mathematics concretely and not puzzle the children with abstract logic. But in the Laws where he is speaking of primary and secondary education for the entire population he anticipates the modern kindergarten ideas (819 B-C).) of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality.” “What do you mean?” he said. “I will try,” I said, “to show you at least my opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things I distinguish in my mind as being or not being conducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent, in order that here too we may see more clearly[*](For σαφέστερον cf. 523 C. Cf. Vol. I. p. 47, note f, on 338 D, and What Plato Said, p. 503, on Gorg. 463 D.) whether my surmise is right.” “Point them out,” he said. “I do point them out,” I said, “if you can discern that some reports of our perceptions do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgement[*](Cf. Phileb. 38 C. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 337.) of them by sensation seems adequate,[*](ἱκανῶς is not to be pressed here.) while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted.[*](For οὐδὲν ὑγιές cf. 496 C, 584 A, 589 C, Phaedo 69 B, 89 E, 90 E, Gorg. 524 E, Laws 776 E, Theaet. 173 B, Eurip. Phoen. 201, Bacch. 262, Hel.. 746, etc.)” “You obviously mean distant[*](The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. Laws 663 B.) appearances,” he said, “and shadow-painting.[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 137 on 365 C.)” “You have quite missed my meaning,[*](The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato’s methods for enforcing his meaning. Cf. on 529 A, p. 180, note a, Laws 792 B-C.)” said I. “What do you mean?” he said. “The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not at the same time issue in a contradictory perception.[*](Cf. Jacks, Alchemy of Thought, p. 29: The purpose of the world, then, being to attain consciousness of itself as a rational or consistent whole, is it not a little strange that the first step, so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment of this end is that of presenting itself in the form of contradictory experience? αἴσθησις is not to be pressed. Adam’s condescending apology for the primitive character of Plato’s psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies. Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear. Cf. 524 D. No modern psychologists are able to use sensation, perception, judgement, and similar terms with perfect consistency.) Those that do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when the perception no more manifests one thing than its contrary, alike whether its impact[*](For προσπίπτουσα Cf. Tim. 33 A, 44 A, 66 A, Rep. 515 A, 561 C, Laws 791 C, 632 A, 637 A, Phileb. 21 C; also accidere in Lucretius, e.g. iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236 and iii. 841, and Goethe’s Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an unsere Sinne drängt.) comes from nearby or afar. An illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the second and the middle.” “Quite so,” he said. “Assume that I speak of them as seen near at hand. But this is the point that you are to consider.” What? “Each one of them appears to be equally a finger,[*](This anticipates Aristotle’s doctrine that substances do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.) and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite of a finger.” “Why, no, it does not,” he said. Then, said I, “it is to be expected that such a perception will not provoke or awaken[*](We should never press synonyms which Plato employs for ποικιλία of style or to avoid falling into a rut of terminology.) reflection and thought.” “It is.” “But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision’s view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated[*](κεῖσθαι perhaps anticipates the Aristotelian category.) outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things?

Or is the operation of each of them as follows? In the first place, the sensation that is set over the hard is of necessity related also to the soft,[*](Cf. Theaet. 186 ff., Tim. 62 B, Taylor, Timaeus, p. 233 on 63 D-E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 222 and 225, Diels, Dialex. 5 (ii.3 p. 341). Protag. 331 D anticipates this thought, but Protagoras cannot follow it out. Cf. also Phileb. 13 A-B. Stallbaum also compares Phileb. 57 D and 56 C f.) and it reports to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft to its perception.” “It is so,” he said. Then, said I, “is not this again a case where the soul must be at a loss[*](Plato gives a very modern psychological explanation. Thought is provoked by the contradictions in perceptions that suggest problems. The very notion of unity is contradictory of uninterpreted experience. This use of ἀπορεῖν (Cf. 515 D) anticipates much modern psychology supposed to be new. Cf. e.g. Herbert Spencer, passim, and Dewey, How We Think, p. 12 we may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt; also ibid, p. 62. Meyerson, Déduction relativiste p. 142, says Mais Platon . . . n’avait-il pas dit qu’il était impossible de raisonner si ce n’est en partant d’une perception? citing Rep. 523-524, and Rodier, Aristot. De anima, i. p. 191. But that is not Plato’s point here. Zeller, Aristot. i. p. 166 (Eng.), also misses the point when he says Even as to the passage from the former to the latter he had only the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass to the pure treatment of ideas.) as to what significance for it the sensation of hardness has, if the sense reports the same thing as also soft? And, similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as light, and the light as heavy?” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “these communications[*](For ἑρμηνεῖαι Cf. Theaet. 209 A.) to the soul are strange and invite reconsideration.” “Naturally, then,” said I, “it is in such cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason[*](Cf. Parmen. 130 A τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις.) and tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.[*](Cf. Theaet. 185 B, Laws 963 C, Sophist 254 D, Hipp. Major 301 D-E, and, for the dialectic here, Parmen. 143 D.)” Of course. “And if it appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.[*](Or, as the Greek puts it, both one and other. Cf. Vol. 1. p. 516, note f on 416 A. For ἕτερον Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 522, 580, 587-588.)” Yes. “If, then, each is one and both two, the very meaning[*](γεvi termini Cf. 379 B, 576 C, Parmen. 145 A, Protag. 358 C.) of two is that the soul will conceive them as distinct.[*](κεχωρισμένα and ἀχώριστα suggest the terminology of Aristotle in dealing with the problem of abstraction.) For if they were not separable, it would not have been thinking of two, but of one.” Right. “Sight too saw the great and the small, we say, not separated but confounded.[*](Plato’s aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists who say that teaching should deal integrally with the total experience and not with the artificial division of abstraction.) “Is not that so?” Yes. “And for[*](The final use of διά became more frequent in later Greek. Cf. Aristot. Met. 982 b 20, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 4. Gen. an. 717 a 6, Poetics 1450 b 3, 1451 b 37. Cf. Lysis 218 B, Epin. 975 A, Olympiodorus, Life of Plato,Teubner vi. 191, ibid. p. 218, and schol.passim, Apsines, Spengel i. 361, line 18.) the clarification of this, the intelligence is compelled to contemplate the great and small,[*](Plato merely means that this is the psychological origin of our attempt to form abstract and general ideas. My suggestion that this passage is the probable source of the notion which still infests the history of philosophy, that the great-and-the-small was a metaphysical entity or principle in Plato’s later philosophy, to be identified with indeterminate dyad, has been disregarded. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, 84. But it is the only plausible explanation that has ever been proposed of the attribution of that clotted nonsense to Plato himself. For it is fallacious to identify μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον in Philebus 24 C, 25 C, 21 E, and elsewhere with the μέγα καὶ σμικρόν. But there is no limit to the misapprehension of texts by hasty or fanciful readers in any age.) not thus confounded but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from sensation.” True. “And is it not in some such experience as this that the question first occurs to us, what in the world, then, is the great and the small?” “By all means.” “And this is the origin of the designation intelligible for the one, and visible for the other.” “Just so,” he said. “This, then, is just what I was trying to explain a little while ago when I said that some things are provocative of thought and some are not, defining as provocative things that impinge upon the senses together with their opposites, while those that do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection.” “Well, now I understand,” he said, “and agree.” “To which class, then, do you think number and the one belong[*](To waive metaphysics, unity is, as modern mathematicians say, a concept of the mind which experience breaks up. The thought is familiar to Plato from the Meno to the Parmenides. But it is not true that Plato derived the very notion of the concept from the problem of the one and the many. Unity is a typical concept, but the consciousness of the concept was developed by the Socratic quest for the definition.)?” “I cannot conceive,” he said. “Well, reason it out from what has already been said. For, if unity is adequately[*](Cf. 523 B. The meaning must be gathered from the context.) seen by itself or apprehended by some other sensation, it would not tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence, as we were explaining in the case of the finger.

But if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally with it, so that it no more appears to be one than the opposite, there would forthwith be need of something to judge between them, and it would compel the soul to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in itself, and to ask, whatever then is the one as such, and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being.” “But surely,” he said, “the visual perception of it[*](See crit. note and Adam ad loc.) does especially involve this. For we see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite plurality.[*](This is the problem of the one and the many with which Plato often plays, which he exhaustively and consciously illustrates in the Parmenides, and which the introduction to the Philebus treats as a metaphysical nuisance to be disregarded in practical logic. We have not yet got rid of it, but have merely transferred it to psychology.)” “Then if this is true of the one,” I said, “the same holds of all number, does it not?” Of course. “But, further, reckoning and the science of arithmetic[*](Cf. Gorg. 450 D, 451 B-C.) are wholly concerned with number.” “They are, indeed.” “And the qualities of number appear to lead to the apprehension of truth.” “Beyond anything,” he said. “Then, as it seems, these would be among the studies that we are seeking. For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops, and a philosopher, because he must rise out of the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner.[*](Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 365. My view there is adopted by Adam ad loc., and Apelt translates in the same way.)” “It is so,” he said. “And our guardian is soldier and philosopher in one.” Of course. “It is befitting, then, Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be prescribed by our law and that we should induce those who are to share the highest functions of state to enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain to the contemplation of the nature of number,[*](It is not true as Adam says that the nature of numbers cannot be fully seen except in their connection with the Good. Plato never says that and never really meant it, though he might possibly have affirmed it on a challenge. Numbers are typical abstractions and educate the mind for the apprehension of abstractions if studied in their nature, in themselves, and not in the concrete form of five apples. There is no common sense nor natural connection between numbers and the good, except the point made in the Timaeus 53 B, and which is not relevant here, that God used numbers and forms to make a cosmos out of a chaos.) by pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and selling,[*](Instead of remarking on Plato’s scorn for the realities of experience we should note that he is marking the distinctive quality of the mind of the Greeks in contrast with the Egyptians and orientals from whom they learned and the Romans whom they taught. Cf. 525 D καπηλεύειν, and Horace, Ars Poetica 323-332, Cic. Tusc. i. 2. 5. Per contra Xen. Mem. iv. 7, and Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 49: In this the writer did not aim at the mental discipline of the students, but sought to confine himself to what is easiest and most useful in calculation, such as men constantly require in cases of inheritance, legacies, partition, law-suits, and trade, and in all their dealings with one another, or where the measuring of lands, the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned.) as if they were preparing to be merchants or hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth.” “Excellently said,” he replied. “And, further,” I said, “it occurs to me,[*](Cf. on 521 D, p. 147, note e.) now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge[*](Cf. Aristot. Met. 982 a 15 τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν, and Laws 741 C. Montesquieu apud Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 6: The first motive which ought to impel us to study is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature and to render an intelligent being more intelligent.) and not for huckstering.” “In what respect?” he said. “Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers,[*](Lit. numbers (in) themselves, i.e. ideal numbers or the ideas of numbers. For this and the following as one of the sources of the silly notion that mathematical numbers are intermediate between ideal and concrete numbers, cf. my De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, p. 33, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 83-84, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218.) never acquiescing if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are doubtless aware that experts in this study, if anyone attempts to cut up the one in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it; but if you mince it up,[*](Cf. Meno 79 C κατακερματίζῃς, Aristot. Met. 1041 a 19 ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὑτὸ ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι, Met. 1052 b a ff., 15 ff. and 1053 a 1 τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντῃ ἀδιαίρετον. κερματίζειν is also the word used of breaking money into small change.) they multiply, always on guard lest the one should appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.[*](Numbers are the aptest illustration of the principle of the Philebus and the Parmenides that thought has to postulate unities which sensation (sense perception) and also dialectics are constantly disintegrating into pluralities. Cf. my Ideas of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 222. Stenzel, Dialektik, p. 32, says this dismisses the problem of the one and the many das ihn (Plato) später so lebhaft beschäftigen sollte. But that is refuted by Parmen. 159 C οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν. The problem was always in Plato’s mind. He played with it when it suited his purpose and dismissed it when he wished to go on to something else. Cf. on 525 A, Phaedr. 266 B, Meno 12 C, Laws 964 A, Soph. 251.)” “Most true,” he replied.