Republic

With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed[*](τῷ ὄντι verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf. Soph. 225 D, Polit. 299 B, and What Plato Said, p. 527 on Phaedo 70 C; Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1480.) be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?Quite so, said Adeimantus. You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof[*](Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf. 517 A-B, 531 B, 588 B, Gorg. 493 D, 517 D, Phaedo 87 B, Laws 644 C, Meno 72 A-B, Tim. 19 B, Polit. 297 E. Cf. also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but only what it is like, e.g. Rep. 506 E, Phaedr. 246 A, Symp. 215 A 5.) and show that the condition[*](διάθεσις and ἕξις are not discriminated by Plato as by Aristotle.) we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers. It is indeed, he said. To begin with, then, teach this parable[*](Cf. 476 D-E.) to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honored. I will teach him,[*](This passage illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato’s style, namely the representation of thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was, familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold’s account in God and the Bible of his quest for the meaning of god, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff’s New World. It lends vivacity and interest to Pascal’s Provinciales and many other examples of it can be found in modern literature. The classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates’ narrative in the Phaedo of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural phenomena, 96 A ff. In the Sophist the argument is represented as an effort to track and capture the sophist. And the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues (Cf. Vol. I. p. 365). Cf. also Rep. 455 A-B, 474 B, 588 C-D, 612 C, Euthyd. 291 A-B, 293 A, Phileb. 24 A ff., 43 A, 44 D, 45 A, Laws 892 D-E, Theaet. 169 D, 180 E, 196 D, Polit. 265 B, etc.) he said. And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirit among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,[*](Cf. 487 D. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 3 I am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our community rather than of the men of culture.) not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural[*](For the idiom φύσιν ἔχει cf. 473 A, Herod. ii. 45, Dem. ii. 26. Similarly ἔχει λόγον, Rep. 378 E, 491 D, 564 A, 610 A, Phaedo 62 B and D, Gorg. 501 A, etc.) course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich.[*](This saying was attributed to Simonides. Cf. schol. Hermann, Plato, vol. vi. p. 346, Joel, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates, ii.1 p .81, Aristot. Rhet. 1301 a 8 Cf. Phaedr. 245 A ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας, Thompson on Phaedr. 233 E, 364 B ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας, Laws 953 D ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, and for the idea cf. also 568 A and Theaet. 170 A, Timon of Athens IV iii. 17 The learned pate ducks to the golden fool.) The author of that epigram[*](For Plato’s attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 68-69.) was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be governed[*](Cf. Theaet. 170 B and 590 C-D.) to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything.[*](For the idiom with ὄφελος cf. 530 C, 567 B, Euthyphro 4 E, Apol. 36 C, Crito 46 A, Euthydem. 289 A, Soph. O. C. 259, where it is varied.) But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we are just describing, and those whom these call useless and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots. Just so, he said. Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders[*](Cf. Theaet. 173 C, why speak of unworthy philosophers? and 495 C ff.) to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers[*](Possibly wooers. Cf. 347 C, 521 B. Plato frequently employs the language of physical love in speaking of philosophy. Cf. 495-496, 490 B, Theaet. 148 E ff., Pheado 66 E, Meno 60 B, Phaedr. 266 B, etc.) are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted[*](Cf. Theaet. 169 D.) that what you said was true. Is not that so? Yes. Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort? We have. Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy is not to be blamed for this either? By all means.

Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be a scholar and gentleman[*](The quality of the καλὸς κἀγαθός gave rise to the abstraction καλοκἀγαθία used for the moral ideal in the Eudemian Ethics. Cf. Isoc. Demon. 6, 13, and 51, Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460).) must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of[*](For ἤ = or else Cf. Prot. 323 A and C, Phaedr. 237 C, 239 A, 245 D, Gorg. 494 A, Crat. 426 B, etc.) being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy.Yes, that was said.Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?It is indeed, he said. Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with[*](Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. For Plato cf. Campbell on Theaet. 150 B and 186 A. Cf. also on 489 D.) the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 E f., Symp. 211 E-212 A.) to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow,[*](Lit. be nourished. Cf. Protag. 313 C-D, Soph. 223 E, Phaedr. 248 B.) and so find surcease from his travail[*](a Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. Theaet. 148 E ff., 151 A, and passim, Symp. 206 E, Epist. ii. 313 A, Epictet. Diss. i. 22. 17.) of soul, but not before? No plea could be fairer. Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it? Hate it, he said. When truth led the way, no choir[*](For the figurative use of the word χορός cf. 560 E, 580 B, Euthydem. 279 C, Theaet. 173 B.) of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train. How could it? But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance. Right, he said. What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory.[*](For the list of virtues Cf. on 487 A.) And when you interposed the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements,[*](Cf. for the use of the dative Polit. 258 A συγχωρεῖς οὖν οἷς λέγει, Phaedo 100 C τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς, Horace, Sat. ii. 3. 305 stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris.) yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be? That is so, he said.

We have, then, I said, to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes,[*](Le petit nombre des élus. Cf. 496 A-B and Phaedo 69 C-D, Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14.) even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high[*](For the Greek double use of ἄξιος and ἀνάξιος Cf. Laws 943 E, Aesch. Ag. 1527. Cf. How worthily he died who died unworthily and Wyatt’s line Disdain me not without desert.) for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak. Of what corruptions are you speaking? I will try, I said, to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don’t you think so? Most emphatically. Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few. What are they? The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.[*](Cf. Burton, Anatomy, i. 1 This St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God’s good gifts, but he did not use them to his glory. Cf. Meno 88 A-C, and Seneca, Ep. v. 7 multa bona nostra nobis nocent.) That does sound like a paradox, said he. Furthermore, said I, all the so-called goods[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 479 on Charm. 158 A. For goods Cf. ibid. p. 629 on Laws 697 B. The minor or earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make us happy. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.) corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connections in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning? I do, he said, and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it. Well, said I, grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange. How do you bid me proceed? he said. We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.[*](This is for Plato’s purpose a sufficiently clear statement of the distinction between contradictory and contrary opposition. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern logician’s table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood it. Cf. Symp. 202 A-B, and on 437 A-B, What Plato Said, p. 595 on Soph. 257 B, and ibid. p. 563 on Rep. 436 B ff.) Of course. So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse[*](Corruptio optimi pessima. Cf. 495 A-B, Xen. Mem, i. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4. Cf. Livy xxxviii. 17 generosius in sua quidquid sede gignitur: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente se, degenerat, Pausanias vii. 17. 3.) than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it. It is. Then, said I, Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature[*](Cf. 495 B; La Rochefoucauld, Max. 130 Ia faiblesse est le seul défaut qu’on ne saurait corriger and 467 Ia faiblesse est plus opposée à Ia vertu que le vice.) and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil? No, he said, that is the case.

Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown[*](Cf. 107 B, Tim. 42 D.) and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.[*](This is the θεῖα μοῖρα of 493 A and Meno 99 E. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517.) Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,[*](See What Plato Said, pp. 12 ff. and on Meno 93-94. Plato again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf. Grote’s defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, Unity of Religion(Three essays on Religion, pp. 78, 84 ff.).) and that there are sophists in private life[*](ἰδιωτικούς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 D, 493 A, 494 A.) who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,[*](For καὶ ἄξιον λόγου Cf. Euthydem 279 C, Laches 192 A, Laws 908 B, 455 C, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 65.) and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart’s desire young and old, men and women?When? said he. Why, when, I said, the multitude are seated together[*](Cf. Gorg. 490 B, Emerson, Self-Reliance: It is easy . . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes . . . . But . . . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment, Carlyle, French Revolution: Great is the combined voice of men . . . . He who can resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time. For the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, Essays, p. 224 (The Angel in the House): The miserable view of life and its purposes which society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in Plato’s time, the sophist par excellence of which all individual talking and writing sophists are but feeble copies. Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. 4 II. 1. 601 Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Konsequenz der Gewöhnlichen. This is denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275. For Plato’s attitude toward the sophists see also Polit. 303 C, Phaedr, 260 C, What Plato Said, pp. 14-15, 158.) in assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.[*](Cf. Eurip. Orest. 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι, also Euthydem. 303 B οἱ κίονες, 276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, Odes i.20.7 datus in theatro cum tibi plausus, and also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326.) In such case how do you think the young man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?[*](What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. v. (1910) pp. 220-221, Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748 καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων; Symp. 219 D 3 τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν; Eurip. I.A. 1173 τίν’ ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἕξειν δοκεῖς;) What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm[*](Adam translates as if it were καὶ φήσει. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc. lxvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum ad loc.) the same things that they do to be honorable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they? That is quite inevitable, Socrates, he said. And, moreover, I said, we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion. What is it? said he. That which these educators and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don’t you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death? They most emphatically do, he said. What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think will prevail in opposition to these? None, I fancy, said he. No, said I, the very attempt[*](Cf. Protag. 317 A-B, Soph. 239 C, Laws 818 D.) is the height of folly.

For there is not, never has been and never will be,[*](Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedländer, Platon, ii. 386 n. who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only = ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, be made different.) a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs[*](Cf. 429 C for the idiom, and Laws 696 A οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν.)—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.[*](Cf. Symp. 176 C (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 B, Theaet. 162 D-E.) And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God[*](Cf. on 492 A, Apol. 33, Phaedo 58 E, Protag. 328 E, Meno 99 E, Phaedr. 244 C, Laws 642 C, 875 C, Ion 534 C.) preserves it you will not be speaking ill.Neither do I think otherwise, he said. Then, said I, think this also in addition. What? Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,[*](Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo 60 D, Laws 817 B, On Virtue 376 D.) inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast[*](Cf. Epist. v. 321 D ἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων, each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal (tr. L.A. Post). Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, ii. 1 If there be any among those common objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra, Horace, Epist. i. 1. 76 belua multorum es capitum. Also Hamilton’s Sir, your people is a great beast, Sidney, Arcadia, bk. ii. Many-headed multitude, Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, p. 172 . . . like Plato’s sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand the passions and desires of that huge and powerful brute, Shakes. Coriolanus iv. i. 2 The beast with many heads Butts me away, ibid. ii. iii. 18 The many-headed multitude. For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 B-C ff., Phaedr. 260 C 260 C, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, having studied the opinions of the multitude, Isoc. ii. 49-50.) which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable,[*](Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, ibid. xxiii. (1928) p. 361 (Tim. 75 D), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim. 47 E, Aristot. Eth. 1120 b 1 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emerson, Circle, Accept the actual for the necessary, Eurip, I. A. 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαίως τε. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss the meaning. Cf. Bk I. on 347 C, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, Protrept. Teubner 148 K. ἀγνοοῦντος . . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, not knowing how divergent have always been the good and the necessary.) never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator? I do, he said. Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry[*](Cf. Laws 659 B, 701 A, Gorg. 502 B.) or any other product of his craft or any political. service,[*](Cf. 371 C, Gorg. 517 B, 518 B.) and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,[*](Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. Cf. Phaedo 64 E καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, 558 D-E, 500 D, 383 C.) the proverbial necessity of Diomede[*](The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes’ binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph. Eccl. 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, Pausanias, ii. p. 264.) will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous[*](καταγέλαστον is a strong word. Make the very jack-asses laugh would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and Present, iv. impartial persons have to say with a sigh that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-asses weep. Cf. also Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247, Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g. Symp. 189 B.)? No, he said, and I fancy I never shall hear it either.

Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?Not in the least, he said. Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.[*](A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 E, 297 B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d’histoire relig. p. 403 La philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible minorité, etc.) Impossible. It is inevitable,[*](It is psychologically necessary. Cf. ibid, Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, Phaedr. 239 C, 271 B, Crito 49 D.) then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them. Inevitable. And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor[*](Cf. Gorg. 481 E, 510 D, 513 B.) with it. Obviously. From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed[*](In 487 A.) that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature. Yes. Then even as a boy[*](Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. Alc. I, 103 A ff, imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul. How could he fail to do so? he said. His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs. Of course. Then they will fawn[*](For ὑποκείσονται Cf. Gorg. 510 C, 576 A ὑποπεσόντες Eurip. Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν, Theaet. 173 A ὑπελθεῖν.) upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating[*](i.e. endeavoring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favor when he is still young and impressionable.) and flattering the power that will be his. That certainly is the usual way. How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 104 B-C ff.) and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 105 B-C.) and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense[*](ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.) He surely will, he said. And if to a man in this state of mind[*](Or perhaps subject to these influences. Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.) someone gently[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, Protag. 333 E, Phaedo 83 A, Crat. 413 A, Theaet. 154. E.) comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave[*](Cf. Phaedo 66 C, Symp. 184 C, Euthydem. 282 B.) to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear[*](Cf. Epin. 990 A, Epist. vii. 330 A-B.) to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E.) Far from it, said he. And even supposing, said I, that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at[*](For πᾶν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, E. 615.) to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,[*](Cf. 517 E.) both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?

That is inevitable, he said. Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize? None at all, he said. Do you see, then, said I, that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,[*](For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 C.) and so do the so-called goods—[*](Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a.) riches and all such instrumentalities[*](Cf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold’s machinery, Aristotle’s χορηγία)? No, he replied, it was rightly said. Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption[*](Cf. 491 B-E, Laws 951 B ἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,[*](For καὶ ἄλλως Cf. Il. ix. 699.) as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,[*](Cf. on 485 D ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα.) but a small nature[*](Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d.) never does anything great to a man or a city. Most true, said he. Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers[*](Cf. on 489 D, and Theaet. 173 C.) rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,[*](Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c’est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants. cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298. For the shame that has befallen philosophy Cf. Euthydem. 304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 E, Isoc. Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 E, Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 242 C.) and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils. Why, yes, he replied, that is what they do say. And plausibly, said I; for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical[*](Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 E.) arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.[*](τεχνίον is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι in C, and ψυχάριον in 519 A.) For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated[*](Cf. 611 C-D, Theaet. 173 A-B.) by their vulgar occupations[*](For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy Cf. 522 B and 590 C, Laws 919 C ff., and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 B. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts. Cf also Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . . ) even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable? Quite so, he said. Is not the picture which they present, I said, precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker[*](For a similar short vivid description Cf. Erastae 134 B, Euthyphro 2 B. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mercator 639.) who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master’s daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?

There is no difference at all, he said. Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard[*](It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also Theaet. 150 C, and Symp. 212 A.) and base? Inevitably. And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence[*](Cf. Euthydem. 306 D.)? Quite so, he said. There is a very small remnant,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 250 A ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται, and 404 A and on 490 E.) then, Adeimantus, I said, of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check[*](Perhaps overtaken. Cf. Goodwin on Dem. De cor. 107.) by exile,[*](It is possible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself or Dion.) and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns[*](Cf. Theaet. 173 B, 540 D.) and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages[*](This bridle has become proverbial. Cf. Plut. De san. tuenda 126 B, Aelian, Var. Hist. iv. 15. For Theages cf. also Apol. 33 E and the spurious dialogue bearing is name.) also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign,[*](The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Euthyphro 3 B, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285.) is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company[*](For τούτων . . . γενόμενοι cf. Aristoph. Clouds 107 τούτων γενοῦ μοι.) and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics,[*](The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato’s political and social speculations. Cf. 597 B, Laws 832 C f., Epist. vii. 326 A; Byron, apud Arnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195 I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments. This passage, Apol. 31 E ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato’s apology for not engaging in politics. Cf. J. V. Novak, Platon u. d. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442 Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören? There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato’s later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger’s Neue Phil. Untersuchungen, Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato’s own. Cf. also Theaet. 173 C ff., Hipp. Maj. 281 C, Euthydem. 306 B, Xen. Mem. i. 6. 15.) and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice[*](Cf. 368 b, Apol. 32 E εἰ . . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις and 32 A μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου.) could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts,[*](Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also εἷς πᾶσιν below; see too 520 B, 374 A, Menex. 241 B, Phaedr. 243 C, Laws 906 D, etc. More in the Utopia (Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher’s meddling with government) unwilling to share their misdeeds[*](Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.3 p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν· εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν, it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrongdoing.) and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall[*](Maximus of Tyre 21. 20 comments, Show me a safe wall. See Stallbaum ad loc. for references to this passage in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels 3 i. 67, J. Stenzel, Platon der Erzieher, p. 114, Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, p. 33, Renan, Souvenirs, xvii., P. E. More, Shelburne Essays, iii. pp. 280-281 Cf. also Epist. vii. 331 D, Eurip. Ion 598-601.) in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope,[*](Cf. Vol. I on 331 A, 621 C-D, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30 in fine. See my article Hope in Hasting’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.) serene and well content when the end comes.

Well, he said, that is no very slight thing to have achieved before taking his departure. He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 b 9 μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν, yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure (tr. F. H. Peters).) I replied, if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature[*](For αὐξήσεται Cf. Theaet. 163 C ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ and Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 68 As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις Spencer, Data of Ethics, xv. Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state. Cf. also 592 A-B, 520 A-C and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii.) and together with his own preserve the common weal. The causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.[*](An instance of Socrates’ Attic courtesy. Cf 430 B, Cratyl. 427 D, Theaet. 183 C, Gorg. 513 C, Phaedr. 235 A. But in Gorg. 462 C it is ironical and perhaps in Hipp. Maj. 291 A.) No, he said, I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy? None whatever, I said; but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity[*](κατάστασις = constitution in both senses. Cf. 414 A, 425 C, 464 A, 493 A, 426 C, 547 B. So also in the Laws. The word is rare elsewhere in Plato.) of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out[*](For ἐξίτηλον Cf. Critias 121 A.) into the native growth,[*](This need not be a botanical error. in any case the meaning is plain. Cf. Tim. 57 B with my emendation.) so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent[*](For the idiom cf. αὐτὸ δείξει Phileb. 20 C, with Stallbaum’s note, Theaet. 200 E, Hipp. Maj. 288 B, Aristoph. Wasps 994, Frogs 1261, etc., Pearson on Soph. fr. 388. Cf. αὐτὸ σημανεῖ, Eurip. Bacch. 476, etc.) that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government. Wrong, he said[*](Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 A, 451 B-C, 458 B.) I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another. In other respects it is this one, said I; but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.[*](Cf. on 412 A and What Plato Said, p. 647 on Laws 962; 502 D.) That was said, he replied. But it was not sufficiently explained, I said, from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.[*](Cf. Soph. 224 C. See critical note.) Just what do you mean? The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, fine things are hard.[*](So Adam. Others take τῷ ὄντι with χαλεπά as part of the proverb. Cf. 435 C, Crat. 384 A-B with schol.) All the same, he said, our exposition must be completed by making this plain. It will be no lack of will, I said, but if anything,[*](For the idiomatic ἀλλ’ εἴπερ Cf. Parmen. 150 B, Euthydem. 296 B, Thompson on Meno, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot. An. Post. 91 b 33, Eth. Nic. 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, Met. 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, Rhet. 1371 a 16.) a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.[*](What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias recommends, 484 C-D. For the danger of premature study of dialectic cf. 537 D-E ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in Plato’s Republic, p. 11. Milton develops the thought with characteristic exuberance, Of Education: They present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellective abstractions of logic and metaphysics . . . to be tossed an turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeds of controversy, etc.) In what way?

At present, said I, those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood,[*](Cf. 386 A, 395 C, 413 C, 485 D, 519 A, Demosth. xxi. 154, Xen. Ages. 10.4, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. xv. 289.) who in the interval[*](Cf. 450 C.) before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen[*](Cf. 475 D, Isoc. xii. 270 ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἄλλου δεικνύοντος καὶ πονήσαντος ἠθέλησεν ἀκροατὴς γενέσθαι would not even be willing to listen to one worked out and submitted by another (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).) to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age,[*](Cf. Antiphon’s devotion to horsemanship in the Parmenides, 126 C. For πρὸς τὸ γῆρας cf. 552 D, Laws 653 A.) with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely than the sun of Heracleitus,[*](Diels i. 3 p. 78, fr. 6. Cf. Aristot. Meteor. ii. 2. 90, Lucretius v. 662.) inasmuch as it is never rekindled. And what should they do? he said. Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support[*](Cf. 410 C and What Plato Said, p. 496 on Protag. 326 B-C.) for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture[*](Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favorite figure with Plato. Cf. Laws 635 A, Protag. 320 A. It is used literally in Critias 119 D.) and do nothing but philosophize,[*](Cf. 540 A-B, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 329-330. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 C to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato’s personal desire to be the philosopher in Athenian politics.) except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world. You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates, he said; yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus. Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born gain[*](A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality reserved for Bk. x. 608 D ff. It involves no contradiction and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of the Republic. Cf. Gomprez iii. 335. Cf. Emerson, Experience, in fine, which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him. Bayard Taylor (American Men of Letters, p. 113), who began to study Greek late in life, remarked, Oh, but I expect to use it in the other world. Even the sober positivist Mill says (Theism, pp. 249-250) The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life even when seemingly useless in this.) and meet with such discussions as these. A brief time[*](For εἰς here cf. Blaydes on Clouds 1180, Herod. vii. 46, Eurip. Heracleidae 270.) your forecast contemplates, he said. Nay, nothing at all, I replied, as compared with eternity.[*](Cf. on 486 A. see too Plut. Cons. Apol. 17. 111 C a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἀόριστος point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides says. Cf. also Lyra Graeca (L. C. L.), ii. p. 338, Anth. Pal. x. 78.) However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token,[*](γενόμενον . . . λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato’s parody of polyphonic prose. The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις is unmistakable. The subtlety of Plato’s style treats the accidental occurrence of a Gorgian between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists and the serious truth of his own ideals. Cf. Isoc. x. 18 λεγόμενος . . . γενόμενος What Plato Said, p. 544 on Symp. 185 C, F. Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis, p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. hoc nolueris et debueris te si minu delectat, quod τεχνίον Isocrateium est, etc.) but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here.

But the figure of a man equilibrated and assimilated to virtue’s self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in one case or in many. Do you think they have?By no means.Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth[*](As the Platonic dialectic does (Phileb. 58 C-D, Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611) in contrast with the rhetorician, the lawyer (Theaet. 172 D-E) and the eristic (Euthydem. 272 B, Hipp. Maj. 288 D).) at any cost for knowledge’s sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar[*](Cf. Eurip. Hippol. 102, Psalm cxxxviii. 6 the proud he knoweth afar off.) all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 D with Theaetet. 187 C, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 48.) and strife in court-room and in private talk.They have not, he said. For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears[*](Cf. on 489 A.) declared under compulsion of the truth[*](Cf. Aristot. Met. 984 b 10, 984 a 19.) that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration[*](Cf. Laws 757 E. But we must not attribute personal superstition to Plato. See What Plato Said, index, s. v. Superstition.) a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession[*](Cf. Laws 711 D, Thuc. vi. 24. 3; so iv. 4. 1 ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε.) either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are.[*](We might say, talking like vain Utopians or idly idealists. The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενήν φασι μακαρίαν. cf. ibid, Vol. I. on 458 A, and for εὐχαί on 450 D, and Novotny on Epist. vii. 331 D.) Is not that so? It is. If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,[*](Cf. Laws 782 A, 678 A-B, and What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 676 A-B; Also Isoc. Panath. 204-205, seven hundred years seemed a short time.) or now are in some barbaric region[*](Cf. Phaedo 78 A.) far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention[*](For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb Parmen. 137 C, Laches 180 A. The omission of the third person is very frequent.) that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be[*](Cf. 492 E, Laws 711 E, 739 C, 888 E.) realized[*](Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii, and ibid. on 472 B, and What Plato Said, p. 564, also 540 D, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 377.) when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state.[*](This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 E, Apol. 20 C, Phaedo 57 B, Laches 185 A, Protag. 344 C, Theaet. 185 A, 190 B, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary structure, Apology, pp. 204-217.) It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit. I also think so, he said. But the multitude—are you going to say?—does not think so, said I. That may be, he said. My dear fellow, said I, do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude.[*](It is uncritical to find contradictions in variations of mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn’t matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (Gal. i. 10) Do I seek to please men? for if I yet please men I should not be the servant of Christ, says also (Rom xiv. 16) Let no then your good be evil spoken of. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 646 on Laws 950 B.) They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking.

Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging[*](A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. ἄθυμον 411 B, Laws 888 A, εὐψυχίας Laws 791 C, Thompson on Meno 78 E, Aristot. Topics 112 a 32-38, Eurip. Heracleidae 730 ἀσθαλῶς, Shakes. Rich. III. v. v. 37 reduce these bloody days again.) and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found.And I, you may be assured, he said, concur. And do you not also concur[*](For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word cf. 517 C, 394 B, 449 C, 470 B-C.) in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in[*](For the figure of the κῶμος or revel rout cf. Theaet. 184A, Aesch. Ag. 1189, Eurip. Ion 1197, and, with a variation of the image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148.) where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc. and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 121.) filled with spite[*](Isoc. Antid. 260 seems to take this term to himself; Cf. Panath. 249, Peace 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων Demosth, xxiv, 6.) and always talking about persons,[*](i.e. gossip. cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1125 a 5 οὐδ’ ἀνθρωπολόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also Phileb. 59 b, Theaet. 173 D, 174 C.) a thing least befitting philosophy? Least of all, indeed, he said. For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities[*](Cf. on 486 A, also Phileb. 58 D, 59 A, Tim. 90 D, and perhaps Tim. 47 A and Phaedo 79. This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and ἐκεῖ in 500 D shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of them, though in Rep. 529 A-B ff. he protests against this identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα in C would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher’s mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Met. 1063 a 16 ταὐτὰ δ’ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Cf. also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl. (Teubner ii. p. 199), Boethius, Cons. iii. 8 respicite caeli spatium . . . et aliquando desinite vilia mirari.) has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate[*](ἀφομοιοῦσθαι suggests the ὁμοίωσις θέῳ Theaet. 176 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 578.) himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration? Impossible, he said. Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.[*](Cf. on 493 D, and for the idea 383 C.) But calumny[*](Cf. HamletIII. i. 141 thou shalt not escape calumny, Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203 βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἔγοις.) is plentiful everywhere. Yes, truly. If, then, I said, some compulsion[*](The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 E.) is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,[*](ἐκεῖ is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf. Phaedrus 250 A. Phaedo 109 E.) and not merely to mould[*](For the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver cf. 377 C, Laws 671 C, 712 B, 746 A, 800 B, Rep. 374 A, 377 c, 420 c, 466 A, 588 C, etc. For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to the pattern Cf. 540 A-B. Plato apples the language of the theory of ideas to the social tissue here exactly as he apples it to the making of a tool in the Cratylus 389 C. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle’s doctrine f matter and form. Cf. Met. 1044 a 25 De part. an. 630 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., De an. 403 b 3, Seller, Aristot. (Eng.) i. p. 356. Cf. also Gorg. 503 D-E, Polit. 306 C, 309 D and Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, Εἰσαγωγή ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153) ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη.) and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1329 a 21 ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. Cf. also 1275 b 29 with Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 229. Cf. 395 C δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας, Theages 125 A δημιουργὸν . . . τῆς σοφίας.) of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue[*](Cf. Laws 968 A πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς, Phaedo 82 A and ibid, Vol. I. on 430 C. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, L’Année Philosophique, xvi. (1905) p. 12 La justice est appelée une vertu populaire. This is a little misleading, if he means that justice itself is une vertu populaire.)? By no means, he said. But if the multitude become aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced[*](For διαγράψειαν cf. 387 B and Laws 778 A. See also Stallbaum ad loc.) by artists who used the heavenly model? They will not be harsh, he said, if they perceive that.

But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 426 B. This is one of the passages that may be used or misused to class Plato with the radicaIs. Cf. Laws 736 A-B, Polit. 293 D, Euthyphro 2 D-3 A. H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 36, says, Plato claimed that before his Republic could be established the adult population must be killed off. Cf. however Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxix, What Plato Said, p. 83, and infra, p. 76, note a on 502 B.) no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.And they would be right, he said. And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution? Surely. And then, I take it, in the course of the work they would glance[*](The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 C, and What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 37.) frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,[*](i.e. the idea of justice. For φύσις and the theory of ideas Cf. 597 C, Phaedo 103 b, Parmen. 132 D, Cratyl. 389 C-D, 390 E.) and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity[*](For ἀνδρείκελον Cf. Cratyl. 424 E.) which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.[*](Il. i. 131, Od. iii. 416. Cf. 589 D, 500 C-D, Laws 818 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 578 on Theaet. 176 B, Cic. Tusc. i. 26. 65 divina mallem ad not. Cf. also Tim. 90 A, Phaedr. 249 C. The modern reader may think of Tennyson, In Mem. cviii. What find I in place But mine own phantom chanting hymns? Cf. also Adam ad loc.) Right, he said. And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another until in the measure of the possible[*](Cf. 500 D and on 493 D.) they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be. That at any rate[*](For γοῦν cf. ibid, vol. I. on 334 A.) would be the fairest painting. Are we then making any impression on those who you said[*](Cf. 474 A.) were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying? Much gentler, he said, if they are reasonable. How can they controvert it[*](Cf. 591 A. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial or controversy is a motif frequent in the attic orators. Cf. Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.)? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth? That would be monstrous, he said. Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best? Not that either. Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded? Surely not. Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable[*](Cf. 376 D, Laws 632 E, 841 C, Phaedr. 276 E. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, p. 13, says Plato uses the word μῦθος only once of his own myths, Polit. 268 E.) in words be brought to pass in deed? They will perhaps be less so, he said.

Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?Certainly, said he. Let us assume, then, said I, that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature? Not one, he said. And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty[*](Cf. Laws 711 D τὸ χαλεπόν, and 495 A-B.) of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved,[*](Cf. 494 A.) will anyone maintain that? How could he? But surely, said I, the occurrence of one such is enough,[*](Cf. Epist. vii. 328 C and Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 170 Plato’s apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 A. Cf. also Laws 709 E, but note the qualification in 875 C, 713 E-714 A. 691 C-D. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say that the εἷς ἱκανός is the philosopher—Plato.) if he has a state which obeys him,[*](Note the different tone of 565 E λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ.) to realize[*](Cf. on 499 D, and Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 43.) all that now seems so incredible. Yes, one is enough, he said. For if such a ruler, I said, ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out. By no means. Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come[*](Cf. Epist. vii. 327 B-C, viii. 357 B ff.)? I think not, said he. And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown. Yes, sufficiently. Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult[*](Cf. 502 A, Campbell’s not on Theaet. 144 A, and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 208.) yet not impossible. That is the conclusion, he said. This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers[*](Cf. on 412 A-B and 497 C-D, Laws 960 B. 463 B is not quite relevant.) of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study. Yes, we have to speak of that, he said. I gained nothing, I said, by my cunning[*](For τὸ σοφόν Cf. Euthydem. 293 D, 297 D, Gorg. 493 A, Herod. v. 18 τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι σοφόν, Symp. 214 A τὸ σύφισμα, Laches 183 D.) in omitting heretofore[*](Cf. 423 E.) the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of,[*](In Bk. V.) but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point.

We were saying, if you recollect, that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested[*](Cf. 412 D-E, 413 C-414 A, 430 A-B, 537, 540 A, Laws 751 C.) in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon[*](Cf. on 412 E, 513 C, Soph. 230 B.) this fixed faith[*](τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is only implied. Cf. 373 C, 598 C. See my article in Transactions of the American Phil. Assoc. xlvii., (1916) pp. 205-236.) under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,[*](Cf. Theognis 417-318 παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολίβδῳ χρυσός, ibid., 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N.). Cf. Zechariah xii. 9 . . . will try them as gold is tried, Job xxiii. 10 When he hath tried me I shall come forth as Gold. Cf. also 1 Peter i. 7, Psalm xii. 6, lxvi. 10, Isaiah xlviii. 10.) is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well.[*](The translation preserves the intentional order of the Greek. For the idea cf. 414 A and 465 D-E and for ἆθλα cf. 460 B. Cobet rejects καὶ ἆθλα, but emendations are needless.) Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face[*](Cf. Phaedr. 237 A, Epist. vii. 340 A. For the personification of the λόγος Cf. What Plato Said, 500 on Protag. 361 A-B. So too Cic. Tusc. i. 45. 108 se ita tetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio.) in fear[*](Cf. 387 B.) of starting[*](Cf. the proverbial μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, do not move the immovable, let sleeping dogs lie, in Laws 684 D-E, 913 B. Cf. also Phileb. 16 C, and the American idiom start something.) our present debate.Most true, he said; I remember. We shrank, my friend, I said, from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect[*](Cf. 503 D. 341 B, 340 E, 342 D.) guardians we must establish philosophers. Yes, assume it to have been said, said he. Note, then, that they will naturally be few,[*](Cf. on 494 A.) for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart. What do you mean? he said. Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives;[*](The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of Plato’s style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely combine are Plato’s two temperaments. The description of the orderly temperament begins with οἷοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to the preceding description of the active temperament. The MSS. have καὶ before νεανικοί; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and Adam’s minor edition, put it before οἷοι. Burnet follows the MSS. Adam’s larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοὶ τε after ἕπεται. The right meaning can be got from any of the texts in a good viva voce reading. Plato’s contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. on 375 C, and What Plato Said, p. 573 on Theaet. 144 A-B, Cic. Tusc. v. 24.) but such men, by reason of their quickness,[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 A ff.) are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them. You speak truly, he said. And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way[*](A tough of humor in a teacher) when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,[*](For the figure Cf. Meno 80 A, 84 B and C.) and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them. It is so, he said. But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest[*](Lit. most precise. Cf. Laws 965 B ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν.) education nor in honors nor in rule. And rightly, he said. Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing? Of course. They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,[*](In 412 C ff.) and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch[*](Cf. 535 B, Protag. 326 C.) as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.

That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said. But what do you understand by the greatest studies? You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds[*](For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on Phaedo 68 C, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 B, and p. 563 on Rep. 435 B-C.) in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic(Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may means teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf.also Introd. p. xxxv.) was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,[*](Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 1 nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris. Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato’s distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things (What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A.) though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough[*](Cf. Menex. 234 A, Charm. 158 C, Symp. 204 A, Epist. vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.) and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around[*](Cf. Phaedr. 274 A.) the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline[*](i.e. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.) as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve[*](For πᾶν ποιεῖν cf. on 488 C, for συντεινομένους Euthydem. 288 D.) to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest[*](Such juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 B ἑνα ἕν, 466 D πάντα πάντῃ, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 C οὐδεὶς οὐδέν, Laws 835 C μόνῳ μόνος, 958 B ἑκόντα ἑκών. Cf. also Protag. 327 B, Gorg. 523 B, Symp. 217 B, Tim. 92 b, Phaedo 109 B, Apol. 232 C, and Laws passim.) matters? It would indeed,[*](The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, Crito 47 C, and D, Laches 195 D, Gorg. 467 E. See critical note.) he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question.

You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard[*](Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for the good in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. Vol. I. on 476 A and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567, does not understand.) that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good[*](Cf. 508 E, 517 C, Cratyl. 418 E. Cf. Phileb. 64 E and What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.) by reference to which[*](Lit. the use of which, i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.) just things[*](The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing color. It makes no difference.) and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος Cf. Euthyph. 4 E, Lysis 208 E, 365 B, Charm. 155 E, etc.) without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit[*](Cf. 427 A, Phaedr. 275 C, Cratyl. 387 A, Euthyd. 288 E, Laws 751 B, 944 C, etc.) in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good[*](καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκἀγαθόν in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Phileb. 65 A and Symp. 210-211 where because of the subject the καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν.)?No, by Zeus, I do not, he said. But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure[*](So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131; Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ’ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and on 329 A-B. There is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.) to be the good, and the finer[*](κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American sophisticated in recent use. See too Theaet. 156 A, Aristot. Eth. Nic 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες.) spirits intelligence or knowledge.[*](Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (Cf. Protag. 337 A ff.) and Aristotle (Cf. Eth. Nic. 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose.) Certainly. And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge[*](Cf. Euthyd. 281 D, Theaet. 288 D f., Laws 961 E ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph. 13 D, Laches 192 E, Gorg. 451 A, Charm. 165 C-E, Alc. I. 124 E ff.) it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good. Most absurdly, he said. Is it not absurd, said I, if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,[*](There is no the in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 B-C in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.) as if we understood their meaning when they utter[*](φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance.) the word good. Most true, he said. Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion[*](Lit. wandering, the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, Lysis 213 E, Phaedo 79 C, Soph. 230 B, Phaedr. 263 B, Parmen. 135 E, Laws 962 D.) of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner[*](καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 C, Gorg. 456 C-D, Phaedo 62 A.) compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures[*](A distinct reference to Callicles’ admission in Gorgias 499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους cf. 499 C, Rep. 561 C, and Phileb. 13 C πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι. Stenzel’s notion (Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in the Philebus Plato ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 C weit entfernt is uncritical. The Republic merely refers to the Gorgias to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.)? Most assuredly. The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? Certainly. Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes[*](ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, Cf. Theaet. 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, Sophist 233 B, 225 B, but less so than ἐρίζειν in Protag. 337 A.) about it? Of course. And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance[*](Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi (1921) pp. 164-168.) without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here? Quite so, he said. That, then, which every soul pursues[*](Cf. Gorg. 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες, 505 A-B, Phileb. 20 D, Symp. 206 A, Euthyd. 278 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129.) and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 A μαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold’s phrase, God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after.) of its reality, but yet baffled[*](As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.) and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,[*](Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 Toute aultre science est dommageable à celuy qui n’a Ia science de la bonté.) and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens[*](As in the longer way Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.) to whose hands we are to entrust all things?

Least of all, he said. I fancy, at any rate, said I, that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,[*](The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Cf. Theaet. 169 E.) will not have secured a guardian[*](the guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men. Cf. Laws 968 A, 964 C, 858 C-E, 817 C, Xen Mem. iii. 6. 8.) of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this. You surmise well, he said. Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization[*](For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B λελέξεται465 A προστετάξεται, Eurip. Heracleidae 980 πεπράξεται.) only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it. Necessarily, he said. But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different? What a man it is, said I; you made it very plain[*](For the personal construction 348 E, Isoc. To Nic. I. καταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also Theaet. 189 C, Symp. 221 B, Charm. 162 C, etc.) long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it. Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates, he said, to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one’s own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.[*](Cf. 367 D-E.) But then, said I, do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know? By no means, he said, as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines. Nay, said I, have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge[*](This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 B, Theaet. 201 B-C and Phileb. 62 A-B, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.) are ugly things? The best of them are blind.[*](Cf. on 484 C, Phaedr. 270 E.) Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way? They do not differ at all, he said. Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous[*](Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. Phaedr. 250 C, Phileb. 16 C, Rep. 518 C, 478 C, 479 D, 518 A. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.) and fair? Nay, in heaven’s name, Socrates, said Glaucon, do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 C ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις, we are now in the vestibule of the good.) For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues. It will right well[*](καὶ μάλα, jolly well, humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to define the conventional virtues than to explain the sanction. Cf. Symp. 189 A, Euthydem. 298 D-E, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 E.) content me, my dear fellow, I said, but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.[*](Excess of Zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks. Cf. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.) Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;[*](Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact.) for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.[*](This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 212. τὰ νῦν repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (Cf. Tim. 48 C), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 E and 430 C.) But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness[*](Cf. Laws 897 D-E, Phaedr. 246 A.) I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop. Well, speak on, he said, for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.

I could wish, I said, that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest[*](This playful interlude relieves the monotony of the argument and is a transition to the symbolism. τόκος means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 E, Polit. 267 A, Aristoph. Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Ol. x. 12. the equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article Usury in Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics. ) and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest. We will do our best, he said, to be on our guard. Only speak on. Yes, I said, after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.[*](Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 A ff., Phaedo 108 b ff.) What? said he. We predicate to be[*](The modern reader will never understand Plato from translations that talk about Being. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 605.) of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech. We do. And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.[*](ὃ ἔστιν is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. Phaedo 75 B, D, 78 D, Parmen. 129 B, Symp. 211 C, Rep. 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.) It is so. And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen. By all means. With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things? With sight, he said. And do we not, I said, hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses? Surely. Have you ever observed, said I, how much the greatest expenditure the creator[*](Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.) of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?[*](Cf. Phaedr. 259 D, Tim. 45 B.) Why, no, I have not, he said. Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium[*](This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, Tim. 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.) so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard? They need nothing, he said. Neither, I fancy, said I, do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any? Not I, he said. But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need? How? Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without the presence of a third thing[*](Lit. kind of thing, γένος. Cf. 507 C-D.) specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.[*](Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. there must also be a source of so-called light.) What[*](Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.) is this thing of which you speak? he said. The thing, I said, that you call light. You say truly, he replied.

The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form[*](The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 D καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος. Form over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.) that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor.It surely is far from being so, he said. Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven[*](Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (Cratyl. 397 D, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. Laws 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, Apol. 26 D, Epinomis 985 B, 988 B.) as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen? Why, the one that you too and other people mean, he said; for your question evidently refers to the sun.[*](Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to say of Platos mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses τἀγαθόν in much the same way. It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.) Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity? What? Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun. Why, no. But it is, I think, the most sunlike[*](Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9 οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. Tusc. i. 25. 73 in fine quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare, Manilius ii. 115: quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum? Goethe's Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,Die Sonne könnt es nic erblicken, and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben.) of all the instruments of sense. By far the most. And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun? Certainly. Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself? That is so, he said. This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good[*](i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with god or with the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p 512.) which the good begot to stand in a proportion[*](Cf. Gorg. 465 B-C, 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, Phaedo 111 A-B, Tim. 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, Phaedo 110 D.) with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision. How is that? he said; explain further. You are aware, I said, that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them. Yes, indeed, he said. But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes. Certainly. Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent[*](Plato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the sanction, and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.) it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason. Yes, it does, This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea[*](No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used o carry the notion of apprehended aspect which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.) of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.[*](The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.) Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still[*](Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον, 578 B, Symp. 180 A-B and Bury ad loc. The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic, Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 174, Introd. p. lxi. This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. Meno 81 D-E.) than these you will think rightly of it.