Republic

So now, Glaucon, I said, our argument after winding[*](The argument is slightly personified. Cf. on 503 A.) a long[*](It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the philosopher occupies only a few pages.) and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not. Yes, he said, a shorter way is perhaps not feasible. Apparently not, I said. I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose[*](This is the main theme of the Republic, of which Plato never loses sight.) of discerning the difference between the just and the unjust life requires us to discuss. What, then, he said, comes next? What else, said I, but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging,[*](For κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος Cf. Phaedo 78 C, Soph. 248 A, Tim. 41 D, 82 B, Epin. 982 B and E.) while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander[*](Cf. p. 89, note h, on 505 C.) amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state? What, then, he said, would be a fair statement of the matter? Whichever, I said, appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, these we should establish as guardians. Right, he said. Is this, then, said I, clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight? Of course it is clear, he said. Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind[*](Cf. Luke vi. 39, Matt. xv. 14, John xix. 39-41.) and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern[*](Cf. Polit. 277 B, 277 D f., etc., Soph. 226 C, Parmen. 132 D.) in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes[*](ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas. Cf. 472 C, Cratyl. 389 A, Gorg. 503 E, Tim. 28 A, Prot. 354 C, and my What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 E.) on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established? No, by heaven, he said, there is not much difference. Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience[*](Cf. 539 E, 521 B, Phileb. 62. Cf. Introd. p. xl; Apelt, Republic, p. 490.) and are not second to them in any part of virtue? It would be strange indeed, he said, to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.

Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not? Quite so.Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these.How so?We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.[*](Lit. is not made to wander by generation and decay. Cf. Crat. 411 C, Phaedo 95 E, whence Aristotle took his title. See Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) pp. 334-352.)Let us take that as agreed.And, further, said I, that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration[*](Supra 474 C-D.) drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor. You are right, he said. Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures. What quality? The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth. It is likely, he said. It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity[*](For similar expressions cf. 519 B, Laws 656 B, 965 C, Symp. 200 A.) that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love. Right, he said. Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth[*](This and many other passages prove Plato’s high regard for the truth. Cf Laws 730 C, 861 D, Crat. 428 D, 382 A. In 389 B he only permits falsehood to the rulers as a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. Cf. Vol. I. on 382 C and D.)? Impossible, he said. Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood? By no means. Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form. By all means. But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel.[*](For this figure Cf. Laws 844 A and 736 B, Eurip. Suppl. 1111 παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετόν, Empedocles, Diels1 195 λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων Lucretius ii. 365 derivare queunt animum; and for the idea cf. also Laws 643 C-D.) Surely. So, when a man’s desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument,[*](Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 45-46, esp. n. 330, followed by Apelt, Republic, pp. 490-491. Cf. also Friedlander, Platon, ii. pp. 579-580, 584.) if the man is a true and not a sham[*](For πεπλασμένως Cf. Soph. 216 C μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ’ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι.) philosopher. That is quite necessary. Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he. It is so.

And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.What point?You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 D χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα.) For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness[*](Cf. Goethe’s Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben.) in all things human and divine.Most true, he said. Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence[*](Cf. Theaet. 174 E, of the philosopher, εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν, and 173 E, 500 B-C. Cf. Marc. Aurel. vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 Archimedes is erat unicus spectator caeli siderumque, Mayor, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. p. 128. For πᾶς χρόνος cf. infra 498 D, 608 C, Phaedo 107 C, Gorg. 525 C, Apol. 40 E, Tim. 36 E, 47 B, 90 D. Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, Pyth. i. 46.) can deem this life of man a thing of great concern[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1123 b 32, the great-souled man, ᾦ γ’ οὐδὲν μέγα, Diog. Laert. vii. 128 πάντων ὑπεράνω, Cic. De fin. iii. 8 infra se omnia humana ducens. Cf. on 500 B-C. For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and mankind Cf. 604 B-C, 496 D-E, 500 B-C, 516 D, Laws 803 B. Cf. also Laws 708 E-709 B.)? Impossible, said he. Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?[*](Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 B-C; Laws 727 D, 828 D, 881 A, Gorg. 522 E, Phaedo 77 E, Crito 43 B, Apol. 35 A, 40 C. Cf. Spinoza’s There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little as death.) Least of all. Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy. I think not. What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains[*](Cf. ibid, Vol. I. on 442 E.)? Impossible. This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.[*](Cf. 375 B.) Assuredly. Nor will you overlook this, I fancy. What? Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully[*](Cf. Laches 189 A-B ἀηδῶς μανθάνων ) and with little result[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 B.) from much toil? That could not be. And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 B λήθης γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra’s Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony (Ant. and Cleo. I. iii. 90).) could he fail to be void of knowledge? How could he? And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation? Of course. The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory. By all means. But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion. Certainly. And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal[*](ἰδέαν is not exactly idea. Cf. Cratyl. 389 B, What Plato Said, p. 358 on Euthyph. 6 D, ibid. p. 560 on Rep. 369 A and p. 585 on Parmen. 130 C-D. Cf. Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.) reality in all things. Assuredly. Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible[*](Lit. following on upon the other. Cf. Tim. 27 C ἑπομένως, Laws 844 E.) with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?

Nay, most necessary, he said. Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent,[*](μεγαλοπρεπής is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. For the list of qualities of the ideal student cf. also 503 C, Theaet. 144 A-B, and Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 418. Cf. Laws 709 E on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic. Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education.) gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety? Momus[*](The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in Lucian’s dialogues. Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208, n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, s. v. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4: αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος φθέγξεται, Ἄκρητος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη, Momus himself will cry out Father Zeus, this was perfect skill. (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, Chiliad, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. Epist. i. I, p. 239, ed. Boissonade.) himself, he said, could not find fault with such a combination. Well, then, said I, when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them? And Adeimantus said, No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you[*](Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35 n. 236, and What Plato Said, p. 488 on Crito 48 B. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz’ suggested emendation (Platon, ii. p. 205) ἃ ἂν λέγῃς is due to a misunderstanding of this.) argue thus feel in this way[*](A locus classicus for Plato’s anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B, Theaet. 166 A-B, Rep. 609 C, 438-439, and Apelt, Republic, p. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g. Demon. 44.): They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer[*](Cf. Apelt, Aufsätze, p. 73, Minto, Logic, Induction and Deduction, pp. 4 ff.; also Gorg. 461 D, 462 A, Soph. 230 B.) they are at every question led astray[*](Cf. Phaedrus 262 B.) a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall[*](Cf. 451 A, and Theaet. 166 A, 168 A, 534 C ἀπτῶτι.) and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said[*](Cf. Phaedr. 262 B, Cleitophon 410 A, Gorg. 495 A, schol.,τοὺς πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι, Gorg. 457 E οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in Symp. 201 B.); and that just as by expert draught-players[*](For this figure cf. Laws 739 A, 820 C-D, 903 D, Eryxias 395 A-B, Hipparchus 220 E, Eurip. Suppl. 409. Aristotle, Soph. El. 165 a 10 ff., borrows the metaphor, but his ψῆφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. Cf. also Dem. De cor. 227 f.) the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome.[*](Cf. Hipp. Minor 369 B-C and Grote ii. p. 64 Though Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the conclusion also Apelt, p. 492, 357 A-B and Laws 903 A βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also Hipparchus 232 B for the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In the Ion, 533 C, Ion says he cannot ἀντιλέγειν, but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf. also 536 D. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon’s Novum Organum,App. XIII. (syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque constringit, non res. Cf. Cic. De fin. iv. 3, Tusc. i. 8. 16, and the proverbial οὐ γὰρ πείσεις, οὐδ’ ἢν πείσῃς,, Aristoph. Plutus 600.) I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts[*](See Soph. 234 E for a different application of the same idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid against eristic but not against dialectic. See What Plato Said, p. 534 on Phaedo 99 E, and on 473 A; also What Plato Said, p. 625 on Laws 636 A. A favorite formula of Aristotle runs, This is true in theory and is confirmed by facts. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099 b 25, 1123 b 22, 1131 a 13, Pol. 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 1334 a 5-6.) he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,[*](Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular view of philosophers Cf. Theaet. 173 C ff., 174 C-D, Gorg. 484-486 C, Phaedo 64 B. Cf. also Isoc. passim, e. g. Antid. 250, 312.) not merely touching upon it to complete their education[*](The perfect tense is ironical in Crat. 384 B, serious in Laws 670 A-B. In Gorg. 485 A it is replaced by ὅσον παιδείας χάριν.) and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 506 on Gorg. 484 C.) in the study of it, the majority become cranks,[*](Cf. Euthydem. 306 E, Protag. 346 A, and for the idea without the word, Soph. 216 C.) not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless[*](Cf. Eurip. Medea 299, and on 489 B.) to society by the pursuit[*](Cf. 497 A. In Euthydem. 307 B Plato uses both ἐπιτήδευμα and πρᾶγμα ) which you commend. And I, on hearing this, said, Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so? I don’t know, said he, but I would gladly hear your opinion. You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true. How, then, he replied, can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers? Your question, I said, requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.[*](Cf. Gory. 517 D, Laws 644 C, Symp. 215 A with Bury’s note. Cf. the parable of the great beast 493, and of the many-headed beast, 588-589.) And you, he said, of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!

So, said I, you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison so that you may still better see how I strain after[*](The word γλίσχρως is untranslatable, and often misunderstood. In 553 C it means stingily; in Cratyl. 414 C it is used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 C, usually misunderstood; in Crito 53 E of clinging to life; Cf. Phaedo 117 A; in Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 28 of a strained allegory and ibid. 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. Peace 482 of a dog.) imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing[*](Cf. Laws 747 B.) like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them one must bring together many things in such a combination as painters mix when they portray goat-stags[*](Cf. Horace, Ars Poetica, init.; What Plato Said, p. 550 on Phaedr. 229 D-E, and 588 c f. The expression is still used, or revived, in Modern Greek newspapers.) and similar creatures.[*](The syntax of this famous allegory is anacoluthic and perhaps uncertain: but there need be no doubt about the meaning. Cf. my article in the Classical Review, xx. (1906) p. 247. Huxley commends the Allegory, Methods and Results, p. 313. Cf. also Carlyle’s famous metaphor of the ship doubling Cape Horn by ballot. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 362.) Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a shipmaster[*](The Athenian demos, as portrayed e.g. in Aristophanes’ Knights 40 ff. and passim. Cf. Aristot. Rhet. 1406 b 35 καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ, Polyb.vi. 44 ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παραπλήσιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀδεσπότοις σκάφεσι, etc. Cf. the old sailor in Joseph Conrad’s Chance, ch. i. No ship navigated . . . in the happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive into port. For the figure of the ship of state Cf. Polit. 302 A ff., 299 B, Euthydem. 291 D, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 2-3, Theognis 670-685, Horace, Odes i. 15 with my note, Urwick, The Message of Plato, pp. 110-111, Ruskin, Time and Tide, xiii: That the governing authority should be in the hands of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant. In none of these conditions is there any difference between a nation and a boat’s company. Cf. Longfellow’s The Building of the Ship, in fine. Cf. Laws 758 A, 945 C. For the criticism of democracy by a figure cf. also Polit. 297 E ff.) in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, but who is slightly deaf[*](Cf. Aristoph. Knights 42-44.) and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with[*](Cf. 390 C, 426 D, 498 B, Theaetet. 167 B, and Milton’s unknown and like esteemed, Comus 630.) his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher[*](For this and similar checks on pretenders to knowledge Cf. Laches 185 E, 186 A and C, Alc. I. 109 D and Gorg. 514 B-C.) or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all,[*](Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art can be taught in a reformed state, but practically was not taught at Athens. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 14, on 518 D, What Plato Said, pp. 70 and 511, Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 397, Thompson on Meno 70 A.) but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone[*](A hint of the fate of Socrates. Cf. 517 A, 494 E and Euthyphro 3 E.) who says that it can be taught, and meanwhile they are always clustered about[*](The participle περικεχυμένους occurs in Polit. 268 C, but is avoided here by anacoluthon.) the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing[*](For the idiom πάντα ποιεῖν Cf. Euthyph. 8 C, 504 D-E, 471 C, 575 E, 494 E, Gorg. 479 C, Phaedr. 252 E, Apol. 39 A, and, slightly varied, Eurip. Heracleidae 841.) to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out[*](The word ἐκβάλλοντας helps the obvious allegory, for it also means banish.) from the ship, and then, after binding[*](Here figurative. Cf. Gorg. 482 E, Theaet. 165 E. Infra 615 E it is used literally.) and stupefying the worthy shipmaster[*](Cf. Polit. 297 E. The expression is slightly ironical. Such is frequently the tone of γενναῖος in Plato. Cf. Rep. 454 A, 363 A, 544 C, 348 CHipp. Min. 370 D, Soph. 231 B, Hipp. Maj. 290 , Polit. 274 E.) with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage[*](Cf. Polit. 302 A, Laws 906 E, Jebb on Soph. Antig. 189-190.) of it as is to be expected[*](Cf. 407 D with Thucyd. iv. 26, vi 69, vii. 25.) from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand[*](Cf. 427 E, Laws 905 C, Eryx. 396 E, Aristoph. Knights 229.) in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule,[*](Neither here nor in D-E can ὅπως with the future mean in what way, and all interpretations based on that refers to getting control. Cf. 338 E, Laws 757 D, 714 C, 962 D-E, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14. 5. Cf. Class. Phil. ix.(1914) pp. 358 and 362.) while the man who lacks this craft[*](For τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον Cf. Alc. II. 145 C.) they censure as useless. They have no suspicions[*](The ppl. must refer to the sailors; hence the acc. (see crit. note). Whatever the text and the amount of probable anacoluthon in this sentence, the meaning is that the unruly sailors (the mob) have no true conception of the state of mind of the real pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is he (adopting Sidgwick’s οἰομένῳ for the MS. οἰόμενοι in E) who does not believe that the trick of getting possession of the helm is an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to practise it. Those who read οἰόμενοι attribute the idea of the incompatibility of the two things to the sailors. But that overlooks the points I have already made about ὅπως, and τέχνη and is in any case improbable, because the sentence as a whole is concerned with the attitude of the true pilot (statesman), which may be represented by the words of Burke to his constituents, I could hardly serve you as I have done and court you too. Cf. Sidgwick, On a Passage in Plato’s Republic, Journal of Philology, v. pp. 274-276, and my notes in A.J.P. xiii. p. 364 and xvi. p. 234.) that the true pilot must give his attention[*](For the force of the article cf. Thucyd. ii. 65 τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, and my article in T.A.P.A. 1893, p. 81, n. 6. Cf. also Charm. 156 E and Rep. 496 E.) to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm[*](ὅπως . . . κυβερνήσει. Cf. p. 20, note h.) with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art[*](The translation gives the right meaning. Cf. 518 D, and the examples collected in my emendation of Gorgias 503 D in Class. Phil. x. (1915) 325-326. The contrast between subjects which do and those which do not admit of constitution as an art and science is ever present to Plato’s mind, as appears from the Sophist, Politicus, Gorgias, and Phaedrus. And he would normally express the idea by a genitive with τέχνη. Cf. Protag. 357 A, Phaedrus 260 E, also Class. Rev. xx. (1906) p. 247. See too Cic. De or. I. 4 neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrarentur, and 518 D.) and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation.

With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed[*](τῷ ὄντι verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf. Soph. 225 D, Polit. 299 B, and What Plato Said, p. 527 on Phaedo 70 C; Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1480.) be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?Quite so, said Adeimantus. You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof[*](Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf. 517 A-B, 531 B, 588 B, Gorg. 493 D, 517 D, Phaedo 87 B, Laws 644 C, Meno 72 A-B, Tim. 19 B, Polit. 297 E. Cf. also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but only what it is like, e.g. Rep. 506 E, Phaedr. 246 A, Symp. 215 A 5.) and show that the condition[*](διάθεσις and ἕξις are not discriminated by Plato as by Aristotle.) we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers. It is indeed, he said. To begin with, then, teach this parable[*](Cf. 476 D-E.) to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honored. I will teach him,[*](This passage illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato’s style, namely the representation of thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was, familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold’s account in God and the Bible of his quest for the meaning of god, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff’s New World. It lends vivacity and interest to Pascal’s Provinciales and many other examples of it can be found in modern literature. The classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates’ narrative in the Phaedo of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural phenomena, 96 A ff. In the Sophist the argument is represented as an effort to track and capture the sophist. And the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues (Cf. Vol. I. p. 365). Cf. also Rep. 455 A-B, 474 B, 588 C-D, 612 C, Euthyd. 291 A-B, 293 A, Phileb. 24 A ff., 43 A, 44 D, 45 A, Laws 892 D-E, Theaet. 169 D, 180 E, 196 D, Polit. 265 B, etc.) he said. And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirit among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,[*](Cf. 487 D. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 3 I am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our community rather than of the men of culture.) not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural[*](For the idiom φύσιν ἔχει cf. 473 A, Herod. ii. 45, Dem. ii. 26. Similarly ἔχει λόγον, Rep. 378 E, 491 D, 564 A, 610 A, Phaedo 62 B and D, Gorg. 501 A, etc.) course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich.[*](This saying was attributed to Simonides. Cf. schol. Hermann, Plato, vol. vi. p. 346, Joel, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates, ii.1 p .81, Aristot. Rhet. 1301 a 8 Cf. Phaedr. 245 A ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας, Thompson on Phaedr. 233 E, 364 B ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας, Laws 953 D ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, and for the idea cf. also 568 A and Theaet. 170 A, Timon of Athens IV iii. 17 The learned pate ducks to the golden fool.) The author of that epigram[*](For Plato’s attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 68-69.) was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be governed[*](Cf. Theaet. 170 B and 590 C-D.) to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything.[*](For the idiom with ὄφελος cf. 530 C, 567 B, Euthyphro 4 E, Apol. 36 C, Crito 46 A, Euthydem. 289 A, Soph. O. C. 259, where it is varied.) But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we are just describing, and those whom these call useless and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots. Just so, he said. Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders[*](Cf. Theaet. 173 C, why speak of unworthy philosophers? and 495 C ff.) to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers[*](Possibly wooers. Cf. 347 C, 521 B. Plato frequently employs the language of physical love in speaking of philosophy. Cf. 495-496, 490 B, Theaet. 148 E ff., Pheado 66 E, Meno 60 B, Phaedr. 266 B, etc.) are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted[*](Cf. Theaet. 169 D.) that what you said was true. Is not that so? Yes. Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort? We have. Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy is not to be blamed for this either? By all means.

Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be a scholar and gentleman[*](The quality of the καλὸς κἀγαθός gave rise to the abstraction καλοκἀγαθία used for the moral ideal in the Eudemian Ethics. Cf. Isoc. Demon. 6, 13, and 51, Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460).) must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of[*](For ἤ = or else Cf. Prot. 323 A and C, Phaedr. 237 C, 239 A, 245 D, Gorg. 494 A, Crat. 426 B, etc.) being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy.Yes, that was said.Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?It is indeed, he said. Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with[*](Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. For Plato cf. Campbell on Theaet. 150 B and 186 A. Cf. also on 489 D.) the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 E f., Symp. 211 E-212 A.) to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow,[*](Lit. be nourished. Cf. Protag. 313 C-D, Soph. 223 E, Phaedr. 248 B.) and so find surcease from his travail[*](a Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. Theaet. 148 E ff., 151 A, and passim, Symp. 206 E, Epist. ii. 313 A, Epictet. Diss. i. 22. 17.) of soul, but not before? No plea could be fairer. Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it? Hate it, he said. When truth led the way, no choir[*](For the figurative use of the word χορός cf. 560 E, 580 B, Euthydem. 279 C, Theaet. 173 B.) of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train. How could it? But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance. Right, he said. What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory.[*](For the list of virtues Cf. on 487 A.) And when you interposed the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements,[*](Cf. for the use of the dative Polit. 258 A συγχωρεῖς οὖν οἷς λέγει, Phaedo 100 C τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς, Horace, Sat. ii. 3. 305 stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris.) yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be? That is so, he said.

We have, then, I said, to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes,[*](Le petit nombre des élus. Cf. 496 A-B and Phaedo 69 C-D, Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14.) even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high[*](For the Greek double use of ἄξιος and ἀνάξιος Cf. Laws 943 E, Aesch. Ag. 1527. Cf. How worthily he died who died unworthily and Wyatt’s line Disdain me not without desert.) for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak. Of what corruptions are you speaking? I will try, I said, to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don’t you think so? Most emphatically. Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few. What are they? The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.[*](Cf. Burton, Anatomy, i. 1 This St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God’s good gifts, but he did not use them to his glory. Cf. Meno 88 A-C, and Seneca, Ep. v. 7 multa bona nostra nobis nocent.) That does sound like a paradox, said he. Furthermore, said I, all the so-called goods[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 479 on Charm. 158 A. For goods Cf. ibid. p. 629 on Laws 697 B. The minor or earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make us happy. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.) corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connections in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning? I do, he said, and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it. Well, said I, grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange. How do you bid me proceed? he said. We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.[*](This is for Plato’s purpose a sufficiently clear statement of the distinction between contradictory and contrary opposition. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern logician’s table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood it. Cf. Symp. 202 A-B, and on 437 A-B, What Plato Said, p. 595 on Soph. 257 B, and ibid. p. 563 on Rep. 436 B ff.) Of course. So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse[*](Corruptio optimi pessima. Cf. 495 A-B, Xen. Mem, i. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4. Cf. Livy xxxviii. 17 generosius in sua quidquid sede gignitur: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente se, degenerat, Pausanias vii. 17. 3.) than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it. It is. Then, said I, Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature[*](Cf. 495 B; La Rochefoucauld, Max. 130 Ia faiblesse est le seul défaut qu’on ne saurait corriger and 467 Ia faiblesse est plus opposée à Ia vertu que le vice.) and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil? No, he said, that is the case.

Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown[*](Cf. 107 B, Tim. 42 D.) and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.[*](This is the θεῖα μοῖρα of 493 A and Meno 99 E. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517.) Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,[*](See What Plato Said, pp. 12 ff. and on Meno 93-94. Plato again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf. Grote’s defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, Unity of Religion(Three essays on Religion, pp. 78, 84 ff.).) and that there are sophists in private life[*](ἰδιωτικούς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 D, 493 A, 494 A.) who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,[*](For καὶ ἄξιον λόγου Cf. Euthydem 279 C, Laches 192 A, Laws 908 B, 455 C, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 65.) and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart’s desire young and old, men and women?When? said he. Why, when, I said, the multitude are seated together[*](Cf. Gorg. 490 B, Emerson, Self-Reliance: It is easy . . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes . . . . But . . . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment, Carlyle, French Revolution: Great is the combined voice of men . . . . He who can resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time. For the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, Essays, p. 224 (The Angel in the House): The miserable view of life and its purposes which society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in Plato’s time, the sophist par excellence of which all individual talking and writing sophists are but feeble copies. Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. 4 II. 1. 601 Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Konsequenz der Gewöhnlichen. This is denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275. For Plato’s attitude toward the sophists see also Polit. 303 C, Phaedr, 260 C, What Plato Said, pp. 14-15, 158.) in assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.[*](Cf. Eurip. Orest. 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι, also Euthydem. 303 B οἱ κίονες, 276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, Odes i.20.7 datus in theatro cum tibi plausus, and also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326.) In such case how do you think the young man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?[*](What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. v. (1910) pp. 220-221, Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748 καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων; Symp. 219 D 3 τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν; Eurip. I.A. 1173 τίν’ ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἕξειν δοκεῖς;) What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm[*](Adam translates as if it were καὶ φήσει. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc. lxvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum ad loc.) the same things that they do to be honorable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they? That is quite inevitable, Socrates, he said. And, moreover, I said, we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion. What is it? said he. That which these educators and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don’t you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death? They most emphatically do, he said. What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think will prevail in opposition to these? None, I fancy, said he. No, said I, the very attempt[*](Cf. Protag. 317 A-B, Soph. 239 C, Laws 818 D.) is the height of folly.

For there is not, never has been and never will be,[*](Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedländer, Platon, ii. 386 n. who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only = ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, be made different.) a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs[*](Cf. 429 C for the idiom, and Laws 696 A οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν.)—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.[*](Cf. Symp. 176 C (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 B, Theaet. 162 D-E.) And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God[*](Cf. on 492 A, Apol. 33, Phaedo 58 E, Protag. 328 E, Meno 99 E, Phaedr. 244 C, Laws 642 C, 875 C, Ion 534 C.) preserves it you will not be speaking ill.Neither do I think otherwise, he said. Then, said I, think this also in addition. What? Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,[*](Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo 60 D, Laws 817 B, On Virtue 376 D.) inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast[*](Cf. Epist. v. 321 D ἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων, each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal (tr. L.A. Post). Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, ii. 1 If there be any among those common objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra, Horace, Epist. i. 1. 76 belua multorum es capitum. Also Hamilton’s Sir, your people is a great beast, Sidney, Arcadia, bk. ii. Many-headed multitude, Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, p. 172 . . . like Plato’s sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand the passions and desires of that huge and powerful brute, Shakes. Coriolanus iv. i. 2 The beast with many heads Butts me away, ibid. ii. iii. 18 The many-headed multitude. For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 B-C ff., Phaedr. 260 C 260 C, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, having studied the opinions of the multitude, Isoc. ii. 49-50.) which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable,[*](Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, ibid. xxiii. (1928) p. 361 (Tim. 75 D), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim. 47 E, Aristot. Eth. 1120 b 1 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emerson, Circle, Accept the actual for the necessary, Eurip, I. A. 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαίως τε. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss the meaning. Cf. Bk I. on 347 C, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, Protrept. Teubner 148 K. ἀγνοοῦντος . . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, not knowing how divergent have always been the good and the necessary.) never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator? I do, he said. Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry[*](Cf. Laws 659 B, 701 A, Gorg. 502 B.) or any other product of his craft or any political. service,[*](Cf. 371 C, Gorg. 517 B, 518 B.) and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,[*](Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. Cf. Phaedo 64 E καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, 558 D-E, 500 D, 383 C.) the proverbial necessity of Diomede[*](The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes’ binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph. Eccl. 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, Pausanias, ii. p. 264.) will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous[*](καταγέλαστον is a strong word. Make the very jack-asses laugh would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and Present, iv. impartial persons have to say with a sigh that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-asses weep. Cf. also Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247, Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g. Symp. 189 B.)? No, he said, and I fancy I never shall hear it either.

Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?Not in the least, he said. Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.[*](A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 E, 297 B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d’histoire relig. p. 403 La philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible minorité, etc.) Impossible. It is inevitable,[*](It is psychologically necessary. Cf. ibid, Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, Phaedr. 239 C, 271 B, Crito 49 D.) then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them. Inevitable. And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor[*](Cf. Gorg. 481 E, 510 D, 513 B.) with it. Obviously. From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed[*](In 487 A.) that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature. Yes. Then even as a boy[*](Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. Alc. I, 103 A ff, imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul. How could he fail to do so? he said. His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs. Of course. Then they will fawn[*](For ὑποκείσονται Cf. Gorg. 510 C, 576 A ὑποπεσόντες Eurip. Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν, Theaet. 173 A ὑπελθεῖν.) upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating[*](i.e. endeavoring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favor when he is still young and impressionable.) and flattering the power that will be his. That certainly is the usual way. How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 104 B-C ff.) and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 105 B-C.) and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense[*](ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.) He surely will, he said. And if to a man in this state of mind[*](Or perhaps subject to these influences. Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.) someone gently[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, Protag. 333 E, Phaedo 83 A, Crat. 413 A, Theaet. 154. E.) comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave[*](Cf. Phaedo 66 C, Symp. 184 C, Euthydem. 282 B.) to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear[*](Cf. Epin. 990 A, Epist. vii. 330 A-B.) to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E.) Far from it, said he. And even supposing, said I, that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at[*](For πᾶν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, E. 615.) to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,[*](Cf. 517 E.) both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?

That is inevitable, he said. Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize? None at all, he said. Do you see, then, said I, that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,[*](For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 C.) and so do the so-called goods—[*](Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a.) riches and all such instrumentalities[*](Cf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold’s machinery, Aristotle’s χορηγία)? No, he replied, it was rightly said. Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption[*](Cf. 491 B-E, Laws 951 B ἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,[*](For καὶ ἄλλως Cf. Il. ix. 699.) as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,[*](Cf. on 485 D ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα.) but a small nature[*](Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d.) never does anything great to a man or a city. Most true, said he. Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers[*](Cf. on 489 D, and Theaet. 173 C.) rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,[*](Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c’est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants. cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298. For the shame that has befallen philosophy Cf. Euthydem. 304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 E, Isoc. Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 E, Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 242 C.) and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils. Why, yes, he replied, that is what they do say. And plausibly, said I; for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical[*](Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 E.) arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.[*](τεχνίον is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι in C, and ψυχάριον in 519 A.) For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated[*](Cf. 611 C-D, Theaet. 173 A-B.) by their vulgar occupations[*](For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy Cf. 522 B and 590 C, Laws 919 C ff., and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 B. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts. Cf also Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . . ) even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable? Quite so, he said. Is not the picture which they present, I said, precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker[*](For a similar short vivid description Cf. Erastae 134 B, Euthyphro 2 B. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mercator 639.) who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master’s daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?