Republic

That is. How could that which is not be known?We are sufficiently assured of this, then, even if we should examine it from every point of view, that that which entirely[*](παντελῶς: cf. μηδαμῇ and 478 D πάντως. Not foreseeing modern philology Plato did not think it necessary to repeat these qualifying adverbs in 478 B ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, which is still sometimes quoted to prove that Plato was yet naively unaware of the distinction between is-not-at-all (does not exist) and is-not-this-or-that.)is is entirely knowable, and that which in no way is is in every way unknowable.Most sufficiently.Good. If a thing, then, is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that which in no way is?Between.Then if knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not, for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience and science, if such a thing there be.By all means.Is there a thing which we call opinion?Surely.Is it a different faculty from science or the same?A different.Then opinion is set over one thing and science over another, each by virtue of its own distinctive power or faculty.That is so.May we say, then, that science is naturally related to that which is,[*](Apart from the metaphysical question of the relativity of all knowledge, the word ἐπιστήμη in Greek usage connotes certainty, and so Plato and Aristotle always take it. But more specifically that which (always) is, for Plato, is the idea which is not subject to change and therefore always is what it is, while a particular material thing subject to change and relativity both is and is not any and every predicate that can be applied to it. And since knowledge in the highest sense is for Plato knowledge of abstract and general ideas, both in his and in our sense of the word idea, knowledge is said to be of that which is. It is uncritical to ignore Plato’s terminology and purpose and to talk condescendingly of his confusing subjective with objective certainty in what follows.) to know that and how that which is is? But rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following distinctions.What ones?Shall we say that faculties,[*](The history of the word δύναμις has been studied in recent monographs and its various meanings, from potentiality to active power, discriminated. Cf. J. Souilhé, Etude sur le terme δύναμις dans les Dialogues de Platon, Paris, 1919, pp. 96, 163 ff. But Plato makes his simple meaning here quite plain, and it would be irrelevant to bring in modern denunciations of the old faculty psychology.) powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe.I understand, he said. Hear, then, my notion about them. In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing from another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only—that to which it is related and what it effects,[*](Cf. my note on Simplic. De An. 146. 21, Class. Phil . xvii. p. 143.) and it is in this way that I come to call[*](Cf. Ion 537 D οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην.) each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to[*](ἐπί: Cf. Parmenides 147 D-E ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς;) the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. How about you, what is your practice? The same, he said. To return, then, my friend, said I, to science or true knowledge, do you say that it is a faculty and a power, or in what class do you put it? Into this, he said, the most potent of all[*](Cf. Protagoras 352 B, Aristotle Eth. 1145 b 24.) faculties. And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than faculty. By no means, he said, for that by which we are able to opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.[*](For the various meanings of δόξα Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47 the word δόξα may be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavorably to denote mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favorably when true opinions and beliefs are set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts.) But not long ago you agreed that science and opinion are not identical. How could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the fallible?

Excellent, said I, and we are plainly agreed that opinion is a different[*](Plato reaffirms this strongly Timaeus 51 E, where, however, νοῦς is used, not ἐπιστήμη. Of course where distinctions are irrelevant Plato may use many of the terms that denote mental processes as virtual synonyms. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought pp. 47-49.) thing from scientific knowledge. Yes, different. Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different object. Of necessity. Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is. But opinion, we say, opines. Yes. Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible? Impossible by our admissions,[*](Cf. Symposium 200 B, 201 D.) he said. If different faculties are naturally related to different objects and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say—these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable. Then, if that which is is knowable, something other than that which is would be the opinable.[*](Cf. on 447 C.) Something else. Does it opine that which is not,[*](Plato is, of course, aware that this is true only if μὴ ὄν be taken in the absolute sense. We cannot suppose that he himself is puzzled by a fallacy which he ironically attributes to the Sophists and to Protagoras (Theaetetus 167 A), and ridicules in the Cratylus 188 D and Euthydemus 286 C. Cf. Unity of Platos’ Thought, pp. 53, 54. As Aristotle explicitly puts it, De interpr. 11. 11 τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ὅτι δοξαστὸν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὄν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι.) or is it impossible even to opine that which is not? Reflect: Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing? That is impossible. Then he who opines opines some one thing. Yes. But surely that which is not could not be designated as some one thing, but most rightly as nothing at all. To that which is not we of necessity assigned nescience, and to that which is, knowledge. Rightly, he said. Then neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion. It seems not. Then opinion would be neither nescience nor knowledge. So it seems. Is it then a faculty outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in lucidity or ignorance in obscurity? It is neither. But do you deem opinion something darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance? Much so, he said. And does it lie within the boundaries of the two? Yes. Then opinion would be between the two. Most assuredly. Were we not saying a little while ago[*](Cf. 477 A.) that if anything should turn up[*](Cf. 477 A-B. This is almost a standardized method with Plato. Cf. 609 B, Charmides 168 B, Gorgias 496 C, 346 B, Philebus 11 D, 66 E, Laws 896 C.) such that it both is and is not, that sort of thing would lie between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not, and that the faculty correlated with it would be neither science or nescience, but that which should appear to hold a place correspondingly between nescience and science. Right. And now there has turned up between these two the thing that we call opinion. There has. It would remain, then, as it seems, for us to discover that which partakes of both, of to be and not to be, and that could not be rightly designated either in its exclusive purity; so that, if it shall be discovered, we may justly pronounce it to be the opinable, thus assigning extremes to extremes and the intermediate to the intermediate. Is not that so? It is.

This much premised, let him tell me, I will say, let him answer me, that good[*](Ironical. Cf. Phaedrus 266 E.) fellow who does not think there is a beautiful in itself or any[*](τινὰ does not mean that the theory of Ideas is a novelty here or that the terminology is new and strange. It merely says that the type of mind that is absorbed in the concrete cannot apprehend any general aspect of things. αὐτό and κατὰ ταὐτά are the technical designation of the Idea here. Cf. my note on Philebus 64 A, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.) idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things—the lover of spectacles, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things—and this will be our question: My good fellow, is there any one of these many fair-and-honorable things that will not sometimes appear ugly and base[*](Plato consciously uses mere logic to lend the emphasis and dignity of absolute metaphysics to his distinction between the two types of mind, which is for all practical purposes his main point here. If you cannot correctly define the beautiful, all your imperfect definitions will be refuted by showing that they sometimes describe what is ugly. Cf. Hippias Major 289 C and note on Republic i. 333 E. The many concrete objects are this and are not that, and so with conscious use of the ambiguity of the copula may be said to tumble about between being and not-being. That this is the consciously intended meaning may be inferred from the fact that in Timaeus 37 E, where Plato must have had in mind the conclusions of the Sophist, he still avails himself of this ambiguity to suggest an absolute being behind phenomena. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 55, 56, 60, De Platonis Idearum Doctrina pp. 48, 49.)? And of the just things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious things, that will not seem impious?No, it is inevitable, he said, that they would appear to be both beautiful in a way and ugly, and so with all the other things you asked about. And again, do the many double things[*](Cf. on 524 A, B.) appear any the less halves than doubles? None the less. And likewise of the great and the small things, the light and the heavy things—will they admit these predicates any more than their opposites? No, he said, each of them will always hold of, partake of, both. Then is each of these multiples rather than it is not that which one affirms it to be? They are like those jesters who palter with us in a double sense at banquets, he replied, and resemble the children’s riddle[*](The scholiast (Hermann vi. 34) quotes the riddle in two forms. It might run in English—A tale there is, a man not yet a man,Seeing, saw not, a bird and not a bird,Perching upon a bough and not a bough,And hit it—not, with a stone and not a stone. The key words of the answer are eunuch, bat, reed, pumice-stone. Cf. also Athenaeus 448 E, 452 E, Gifford on Euthydemus 300 D. It was used in the Stoic schools of logic, and Epicurus is said to have used it to disprove Plato’s statement that either the negative or the affirmative of a proposition must be true or false. Cf. Usener, Epicurea, p. 348.) about the eunuch and his hitting of the bat—with what and as it sat on what they signify that he struck it. For these things too equivocate, and it is impossible to conceive firmly[*](Cf. Theaetetus 157 A.) any one of them to be or not to be or both or neither. Do you know what to do with them, then? said I, and can you find a better place to put them than that midway between existence or essence and the not-to-be? For we shall surely not discover a darker region than not-being[*](Cf. Sophist 254 A εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα.) that they should still more not be, nor brighter than being that they should still more be. Most true, he said. We would seem to have found, then, that the many conventions[*](A further thought is developed here, suggested in 479 A, B. Just as the many particular horses, trees, or tables shift and change, and are and are not in comparision with the unchanging multitude of each, so the many opinions of the multitude about justice and the good and the beautiful and other moral conceptions change, and both are and are not in comparison with the unalterable ideas of justice and beauty, which the philosopher more nearly apprehends. Thus, for the purposes of this contrast, notions, opinions, and what English usage would call ideas, fall into the same class as material objects. Cf. Euthyphro 6 D, Phaedo 78 D, Parmenides 131 D, Gorgias 488 D τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα, Laws 715 B τὰ τούτων δίκαια, 860 C τοῖς μὲν τοίνυν πολλοῖς etc., 962 D τὰ τῶν πόλεων (of states) νόμιμα. The practical truth of this distinction is unaffected by our metaphysics. Plato is speaking of what he elsewhere calls the εἴδωλα of justice, beauty and the like. Cf. 517 D, 532 D, Theaetetus 150 B, and The Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, i. p. 238.) of the many about the fair and honorable and other things are tumbled about in[*](Cf. Phaedrus 275 E, Phaedo 81 C, 82 E. Isocrates uses καλινδέομαι in similar contemptuous connotation, v. 82, xiii. 20, xv. 30.) the mid-region between that which is not and that which is in the true and absolute sense. We have so found it. But we agreed in advance that, if anything of that sort should be discovered, it must be denominated opinable, not knowable, the wanderer between being caught by the faculty that is betwixt and between. We did. We shall affirm, then, that those who view many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to follow another’s guidance[*](Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics 989 a 33 τοῖς ἐπάγουσιν αὐτόν.) to it, and many just things, but not justice itself, and so in all cases—we shall say that such men have opinions about all things, but know nothing of the things they opine. Of necessity. And, on the other hand, what of those who contemplate the very things themselves in each case, ever remaining the same and unchanged—shall we not say that they know and do not merely opine? That, too, necessarily follows.

Shall we not also say that the one welcomes to his thought and loves the things subject to knowledge and the other those to opinion? Do we not remember that we said that those loved and regarded tones and beautiful colours and the like, but they could not endure the notion of the reality of the beautiful itself?We do remember.Shall we then offend their ears if we call them doxophilists[*](Plato coins a word which means lovers of opinion.) rather than philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak?Not if they heed my counsel, he said, for to be angry with truth is not lawful. Then to those who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion[*](Isocrates xv. 271 is conceivably an answer to this.) is the name we must give. By all means.

So now, Glaucon, I said, our argument after winding[*](The argument is slightly personified. Cf. on 503 A.) a long[*](It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the philosopher occupies only a few pages.) and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not. Yes, he said, a shorter way is perhaps not feasible. Apparently not, I said. I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose[*](This is the main theme of the Republic, of which Plato never loses sight.) of discerning the difference between the just and the unjust life requires us to discuss. What, then, he said, comes next? What else, said I, but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging,[*](For κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος Cf. Phaedo 78 C, Soph. 248 A, Tim. 41 D, 82 B, Epin. 982 B and E.) while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander[*](Cf. p. 89, note h, on 505 C.) amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state? What, then, he said, would be a fair statement of the matter? Whichever, I said, appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, these we should establish as guardians. Right, he said. Is this, then, said I, clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight? Of course it is clear, he said. Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind[*](Cf. Luke vi. 39, Matt. xv. 14, John xix. 39-41.) and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern[*](Cf. Polit. 277 B, 277 D f., etc., Soph. 226 C, Parmen. 132 D.) in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes[*](ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas. Cf. 472 C, Cratyl. 389 A, Gorg. 503 E, Tim. 28 A, Prot. 354 C, and my What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 E.) on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established? No, by heaven, he said, there is not much difference. Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience[*](Cf. 539 E, 521 B, Phileb. 62. Cf. Introd. p. xl; Apelt, Republic, p. 490.) and are not second to them in any part of virtue? It would be strange indeed, he said, to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.

Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not? Quite so.Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these.How so?We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.[*](Lit. is not made to wander by generation and decay. Cf. Crat. 411 C, Phaedo 95 E, whence Aristotle took his title. See Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) pp. 334-352.)Let us take that as agreed.And, further, said I, that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration[*](Supra 474 C-D.) drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor. You are right, he said. Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures. What quality? The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth. It is likely, he said. It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity[*](For similar expressions cf. 519 B, Laws 656 B, 965 C, Symp. 200 A.) that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love. Right, he said. Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth[*](This and many other passages prove Plato’s high regard for the truth. Cf Laws 730 C, 861 D, Crat. 428 D, 382 A. In 389 B he only permits falsehood to the rulers as a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. Cf. Vol. I. on 382 C and D.)? Impossible, he said. Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood? By no means. Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form. By all means. But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel.[*](For this figure Cf. Laws 844 A and 736 B, Eurip. Suppl. 1111 παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετόν, Empedocles, Diels1 195 λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων Lucretius ii. 365 derivare queunt animum; and for the idea cf. also Laws 643 C-D.) Surely. So, when a man’s desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument,[*](Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 45-46, esp. n. 330, followed by Apelt, Republic, pp. 490-491. Cf. also Friedlander, Platon, ii. pp. 579-580, 584.) if the man is a true and not a sham[*](For πεπλασμένως Cf. Soph. 216 C μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ’ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι.) philosopher. That is quite necessary. Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he. It is so.

And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.What point?You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 D χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα.) For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness[*](Cf. Goethe’s Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben.) in all things human and divine.Most true, he said. Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence[*](Cf. Theaet. 174 E, of the philosopher, εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν, and 173 E, 500 B-C. Cf. Marc. Aurel. vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 Archimedes is erat unicus spectator caeli siderumque, Mayor, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. p. 128. For πᾶς χρόνος cf. infra 498 D, 608 C, Phaedo 107 C, Gorg. 525 C, Apol. 40 E, Tim. 36 E, 47 B, 90 D. Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, Pyth. i. 46.) can deem this life of man a thing of great concern[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1123 b 32, the great-souled man, ᾦ γ’ οὐδὲν μέγα, Diog. Laert. vii. 128 πάντων ὑπεράνω, Cic. De fin. iii. 8 infra se omnia humana ducens. Cf. on 500 B-C. For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and mankind Cf. 604 B-C, 496 D-E, 500 B-C, 516 D, Laws 803 B. Cf. also Laws 708 E-709 B.)? Impossible, said he. Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?[*](Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 B-C; Laws 727 D, 828 D, 881 A, Gorg. 522 E, Phaedo 77 E, Crito 43 B, Apol. 35 A, 40 C. Cf. Spinoza’s There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little as death.) Least of all. Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy. I think not. What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains[*](Cf. ibid, Vol. I. on 442 E.)? Impossible. This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.[*](Cf. 375 B.) Assuredly. Nor will you overlook this, I fancy. What? Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully[*](Cf. Laches 189 A-B ἀηδῶς μανθάνων ) and with little result[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 B.) from much toil? That could not be. And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 B λήθης γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra’s Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony (Ant. and Cleo. I. iii. 90).) could he fail to be void of knowledge? How could he? And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation? Of course. The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory. By all means. But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion. Certainly. And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal[*](ἰδέαν is not exactly idea. Cf. Cratyl. 389 B, What Plato Said, p. 358 on Euthyph. 6 D, ibid. p. 560 on Rep. 369 A and p. 585 on Parmen. 130 C-D. Cf. Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.) reality in all things. Assuredly. Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible[*](Lit. following on upon the other. Cf. Tim. 27 C ἑπομένως, Laws 844 E.) with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?

Nay, most necessary, he said. Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent,[*](μεγαλοπρεπής is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. For the list of qualities of the ideal student cf. also 503 C, Theaet. 144 A-B, and Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 418. Cf. Laws 709 E on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic. Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education.) gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety? Momus[*](The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in Lucian’s dialogues. Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208, n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, s. v. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4: αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος φθέγξεται, Ἄκρητος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη, Momus himself will cry out Father Zeus, this was perfect skill. (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, Chiliad, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. Epist. i. I, p. 239, ed. Boissonade.) himself, he said, could not find fault with such a combination. Well, then, said I, when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them? And Adeimantus said, No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you[*](Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35 n. 236, and What Plato Said, p. 488 on Crito 48 B. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz’ suggested emendation (Platon, ii. p. 205) ἃ ἂν λέγῃς is due to a misunderstanding of this.) argue thus feel in this way[*](A locus classicus for Plato’s anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B, Theaet. 166 A-B, Rep. 609 C, 438-439, and Apelt, Republic, p. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g. Demon. 44.): They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer[*](Cf. Apelt, Aufsätze, p. 73, Minto, Logic, Induction and Deduction, pp. 4 ff.; also Gorg. 461 D, 462 A, Soph. 230 B.) they are at every question led astray[*](Cf. Phaedrus 262 B.) a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall[*](Cf. 451 A, and Theaet. 166 A, 168 A, 534 C ἀπτῶτι.) and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said[*](Cf. Phaedr. 262 B, Cleitophon 410 A, Gorg. 495 A, schol.,τοὺς πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι, Gorg. 457 E οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in Symp. 201 B.); and that just as by expert draught-players[*](For this figure cf. Laws 739 A, 820 C-D, 903 D, Eryxias 395 A-B, Hipparchus 220 E, Eurip. Suppl. 409. Aristotle, Soph. El. 165 a 10 ff., borrows the metaphor, but his ψῆφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. Cf. also Dem. De cor. 227 f.) the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome.[*](Cf. Hipp. Minor 369 B-C and Grote ii. p. 64 Though Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the conclusion also Apelt, p. 492, 357 A-B and Laws 903 A βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also Hipparchus 232 B for the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In the Ion, 533 C, Ion says he cannot ἀντιλέγειν, but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf. also 536 D. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon’s Novum Organum,App. XIII. (syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque constringit, non res. Cf. Cic. De fin. iv. 3, Tusc. i. 8. 16, and the proverbial οὐ γὰρ πείσεις, οὐδ’ ἢν πείσῃς,, Aristoph. Plutus 600.) I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts[*](See Soph. 234 E for a different application of the same idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid against eristic but not against dialectic. See What Plato Said, p. 534 on Phaedo 99 E, and on 473 A; also What Plato Said, p. 625 on Laws 636 A. A favorite formula of Aristotle runs, This is true in theory and is confirmed by facts. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099 b 25, 1123 b 22, 1131 a 13, Pol. 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 1334 a 5-6.) he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,[*](Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular view of philosophers Cf. Theaet. 173 C ff., 174 C-D, Gorg. 484-486 C, Phaedo 64 B. Cf. also Isoc. passim, e. g. Antid. 250, 312.) not merely touching upon it to complete their education[*](The perfect tense is ironical in Crat. 384 B, serious in Laws 670 A-B. In Gorg. 485 A it is replaced by ὅσον παιδείας χάριν.) and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 506 on Gorg. 484 C.) in the study of it, the majority become cranks,[*](Cf. Euthydem. 306 E, Protag. 346 A, and for the idea without the word, Soph. 216 C.) not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless[*](Cf. Eurip. Medea 299, and on 489 B.) to society by the pursuit[*](Cf. 497 A. In Euthydem. 307 B Plato uses both ἐπιτήδευμα and πρᾶγμα ) which you commend. And I, on hearing this, said, Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so? I don’t know, said he, but I would gladly hear your opinion. You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true. How, then, he replied, can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers? Your question, I said, requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.[*](Cf. Gory. 517 D, Laws 644 C, Symp. 215 A with Bury’s note. Cf. the parable of the great beast 493, and of the many-headed beast, 588-589.) And you, he said, of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!