Republic

Do you recall, said I, that in the preceding[*](Cf. 419 E-20.) argument the objection of somebody or other rebuked us for not making our guardians happy, since, though it was in their power to have everything of the citizens, they had nothing, and we, I believe, replied that this was a consideration to which we would return if occasion offered, but that at present we were making our guardians guardians and the city as a whole as happy as possible, and that we were not modelling[*](Cf. 420 C. Omitting τό, translate that we were not fixing our eyes on any one class, and portraying that as happy.) our ideal of happiness with reference to any one class? I do remember, he said. Well then, since now the life of our helpers[*](ἐπικούρων: the word here includes the rulers.) has been shown to be fairer and better than that of the victors at Olympia, need we compare[*](κατά, comparable to, on a level with. Cf. Apology 17 B, Gorgias 512 B.) it with the life of cobblers and other craftsmen and farmers? I think not, he said. But further, we may fairly repeat what I was saying then also, that if the guardian shall strive for a kind of happiness that will unmake[*](μηδέ: cf. 420 D.) him as a guardian and shall not be content with the way of life that is moderate and secure and, as we affirm, the best, but if some senseless and childish opinion about happiness shall beset him and impel him to use his power to appropriate everything in the city for himself, then he will find out that Hesiod[*](Hes. WD 40. So Plat. Laws 690 E.) was indeed wise, who said that

the half was in some sort more than the whole.

and in addition to looking on they must assist and minister in all the business of war and serve their fathers and mothers. Or have you never noticed the practice in the arts, how for example the sons of potters look on as helpers a long time before they put their hands to the clay?They do, indeed.Should these then be more concerned than our guardians to train the children by observation and experience of what is to be their proper business?That would be ridiculous, he said. But, further, when it comes to fighting, every creature will do better in the presence of its offspring? That is so, but the risk, Socrates, is not slight, in the event of disasters such as may happen in war, that, losing their children as well as themselves, they make it impossible for the remnant of the state to recover. What you say is true, I replied; but, in the first place, is it your idea that the one thing for which we must provide is the avoidance of all danger? By no means. And, if they are to take chances, should it not be for something success in which will make them better? Clearly. Do you think it makes a slight difference and not worth some risk whether men who are to be warriors do or do not observe war as boys? No, it makes a great difference for the purpose of which you speak. Starting, then, from this assumption that we are to make the boys spectators of war, we must further contrive[*](προσμηχανᾶσθαι: Cf. on 414 B.) security for them and all will be well, will it not? Yes. To begin with, then, said I, will not the fathers be, humanly speaking, not ignorant of war and shrewd judges of which campaigns are hazardous and which not? Presumably, he said. They will take the boys with them to the one and avoid the others? Rightly. And for officers, I presume, said I, they will put in charge of them not those who are good for nothing else but men who by age and experience are qualified to serve at once as leaders and as caretakers of children. Yes, that would be the proper way. Still, we may object, it is the unexpected[*](παρὰ δόξαν: cf. Thucydides i. 122 ἥκιστα ὁ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, ii. 11, iii. 30, iv. 102, vii. 61.) that happens to many in many cases. Yes, indeed. To provide against such chances, then, we must wing[*](πτεροῦν: metaphorical. In Aristophanes Birds 1436-1438 literal.) the children from the start so that if need arises they may fly away and escape. What do you mean? he said. We must mount them when very young, said I, and first have them taught to ride, and then conduct them to the scene of war, not on mettlesome war-steeds, but on the swiftest and gentlest horses possible; for thus they will have the best view of their own future business and also, if need arises, will most securely escape to safety in the train of elder guides. I think you are right, he said.

But now what of the conduct of war? What should be the attitude of the soldiers to one another and the enemy? Am I right in my notions or not?Tell me what notions, he said. Anyone of them who deserts his post, or flings away his weapons,[*](The terms are technical. Cf. Laws 943 D ff., Lipsius, Das attische Recht (1908), ii. pp. 452 ff.) or is guilty of any similar act of cowardice, should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class, should he not? By all means. And anyone who is taken alive by the enemy[*](εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους: technical. Cf. inscription in Bulletin de corr. hellénique, xii. p. 224, n. 1 τῶν ἁλόντων εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους.) we will make a present of to his captors, shall we not, to deal with their catch[*](ἄγρᾳ: the word is chosen to give a touch of Spartan, or, as we should say, Roman severity. Cf. Sophist 235 C, Aeschylus Eumenides 148, Horace, Odes, iii. 5. 33 ff. Plutarch, De aud. poet. 30, says that in Homer no Greeks are taken prisoners, only Trojans.) as they please? Quite so. And don’t you agree that the one who wins the prize of valor and distinguishes himself shall first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys each in turn? I do. And be greeted with the right hand? That, too. But I presume you wouldn’t go as far as this? What? That he should kiss and be kissed by everyone[*](The deplorable facetiousness of the following recalls the vulgarity of Xenophon’s guard-house conversations. It is almost the only passage in Plato that one would wish to blot. Helvetius, otherwise anything but a Platonist, characteristically adopts it, Lange, History of Materialism, ii. p. 86.)? By all means, he said, and I add to the law the provision that during that campaign none whom he wishes to kiss be allowed to refuse, so that if one is in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more eager to win the prize. Excellent, said I, and we have already said that the opportunity of marriage will be more readily provided for the good man, and that he will be more frequently selected than the others for participation in that sort of thing, in order that as many children as possible may be born from such stock. We have, he replied. But, furthermore, we may cite Homer[*](Hom. Il. 7.321-322. Cf. also viii. 162, xii. 311.) too for the justice of honoring in such ways the valiant among our youth. For Homer says that Ajax, who had distinguished himself in the war, was honored with the long chine,[*](I.e, the back. Hom. Il. 7.321-322.) assuming that the most fitting meed for a brave man in the prime of his youth is that from which both honor and strength will accrue to him. Most rightly, he said. We will then, said I, take Homer as our guide in this at least. We, too, at sacrifices and on other like occasions, will reward the good so far as they have proved themselves good with hymns and the other privileges of which we have just spoken, and also with

seats of honor and meat and full cups

And shall we not believe Hesiod[*](Cf. Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 437.) who tells us that when anyone of this race dies, so it is that they become

1. Hallowed spirits dwelling on earth, averters of evil,
2. Guardians watchful and good of articulate-speaking mortals?

And again, we will not take weapons to the temples for dedicatory[*](For the practice cf. Aeschylus Septem 275-279 and Agamemnon 577-579. Italian cities and American states have restored to one another the flags so dedicated from old wars. Cf. Cicero De inventione ii. 70 at tamen aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Graiis statuere non oportet.) offerings, especially the weapons of Greeks, if we are at all concerned to preserve friendly relations with the other Greeks. Rather we shall fear that there is pollution in bringing such offerings to the temples from our kind unless in a case where the god bids otherwise[*](For similar caution cf. on 427 B-C.).Most rightly, he said. And in the matter of devastating the land of Greeks and burning their houses, how will your soldiers deal with their enemies. I would gladly hear your opinion of that. In my view, said I, they ought to do neither, but confine themselves to taking away the annual harvest. Shall I tell you why? Do. In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae.[*](I have so translated in order to imply that the Plato of the Republic is already acquainted with the terminology of the Sophist. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, notes 375 and 377, followed by Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 504. But most editors take διαφορά here as dissension, and construe applied to the disagreements of two things, which may be right. Cf. Sophist 228 A στάσιν . . . τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν.) The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war. What you say is in nothing beside the mark, he replied. Consider, then, if this goes to the mark. I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian. Rightly, he said. We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature,[*](Plato shared the natural feeling of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and all patriotic Greeks. Cf. Isocrates Panegyricus 157, 184, Panath. 163; Menexenus 237 ff., Laws 692 C and 693 A. It is uncritical then with Newman (op. cit. p. 430) and many others to take as a recantation of this passage the purely logical observation in Politicus 262 D that Greek and barbarinan is an unscientific dichotomy of mankind. Cf. on the whole question the dissertation of Friedrich Weber, Platons Stellung zu den Barbaren.) and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity. I will allow you that habit of speech, he said. Then observe, said I, that when anything of this sort occurs in faction, as the word is now used, and a state is divided against itself, if either party devastates the land and burns the houses of the other such factional strife is thought to be an accursed thing and neither party to be true patriots. Otherwise, they would never have endured thus to outrage their nurse and mother.[*](Cf. 414 E, Menexenus 237 E, Timaeus 40 B, Laws 740 A, Aeschylus Septem 16.) But the moderate and reasonable thing is thought to be that the victors shall take away the crops of the vanquished, but that their temper shall be that of men who expect to be reconciled and not always to wage war. That way of feeling, he said, is far less savage than the other. Well, then, said I, is not the city that you are founding to be a Greek city? It must be, he said. Will they then not be good and gentle? Indeed they will. And won’t they be philhellenes,[*](Cf. Epistles 354 A, Herodotus ii. 178, Isocrates Phil. 122, Panegyricus 96, Evagoras 40, Panath. 241. The word is still significant for international politics, and must be retained in the translation.) lovers of Greeks, and will they not regard all Greece as their own and not renounce their part in the holy places common to all Greeks ? Most certainly.

Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks who are their own people as a form of faction and refuse even to speak of it as war?Most certainly.And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation?By all means.They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement[*](Cf. Newman, op. cit. p. 143.) or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies.They will, he said. They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes,[*](The same language was frequently used in the recent World War, but the practice was sometimes less civilized than that which Plato recommends. Hobhouse (Mind in Evolution, p. 384), writing earlier, said, Plato’s conclusions (Republic 469-471) show how narrow was the conception of humanitarian duties in the fourth century. It is, I think, only modern fancy that sees irony in the conclusion: treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks.) those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent. I, he said, agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks. Shall we lay down this law also, then, for our guardians that they are not to lay waste the land or burn the houses? Let us so decree, he said, and assume that this and our preceding prescriptions are right. But[*](It is a mistaken ingenuity that finds a juncture between two distinct versions here.) I fear, Socrates,that if you are allowed to go on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which it could be brought to pass. I too am ready to admit that if it could be realized everything would be lovely[*](πάντ’ . . . ἀγαθά: idiomatically colloquial. Cf. Politicus 284 B, Laws 711 D, 757 D, 780 D, Aristophanes Acharnians 978, 982, Frogs 302.) for the state that had it, and I will add what you passed by, that they would also be most successful in war because they would be least likely to desert one another, knowing and addressing each other by the names of brothers, fathers, sons. And if the females should also join in their campaigns, whether in the ranks or marshalled behind to intimidate the enemy,[*](Cf. Laws 806 B.) or as reserves in case of need, I recognize that all this too would make them irresistible. And at home, also, I observe all the benefits that you omit to mention. But, taking it for granted that I concede these and countless other advantages, consequent on the realization of this polity, don’t labor that point further; but let us at once proceed to try to convince ourselves of just this, that it is possible and how it is possible, dismissing everything else.

This is a sudden assault,[*](ὥσπερ marks the figurative use as τινα in Aeschines, Tim. 135 τινα καταδρομήν.) indeed, said I, that you have made on my theory, without any regard for my natural hesitation. Perhaps you don’t realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves, you are now rolling up against me the great third wave[*](Cf. Introduction p. xvii. The third wave, sometimes the ninth, was proverbially the greatest. Cf. Euthydemus 293 A, Lucan v. 672 decimus dictu mirabile fluctus, and Swineburne: Who swims in sight of the third waveThat never a swimmer shall cross or climb.) of paradox, the worst of all. When you have seen and heard that, you will be very ready to be lenient,[*](συγγνώμην: L. and S. wrongly with ὅτι, to acknowledge that . . .) recognizing that I had good reason after all for shrinking and fearing to enter upon the discussion of so paradoxical a notion. The more such excuses you offer, he said, the less you will be released by us from telling in what way the realization of this polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off. The first thing to recall, then, I said, is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice that brought us to this pass.[*](Cf. Introduction p. xii. and note d. Plato seems to overlook the fact that the search was virtually completed in the fourth book.) Yes; but what of it? he said. Oh, nothing,[*](οὐδέν: idiomatic, like the English of the translation. Cf. Charmides 164 A, Gorgias 498 A, 515 E. The emphatic statement that follows of the value of ideals as ideals is Plato’s warning hint that he does not expect the literal realization of his Utopia, though it would be disillusionizing to say so too explicitly. Cf. introduction p. xxxi-xxxii, and my paper on Plato’s Laws, Class. Phil. ix. (1914) pp. 351 and 353. This is one of the chief ideas that Cicero derived from Plato. He applies it to his picture of the ideal orator, and the mistaken ingenuity of modern scholarship has deduced from this and attributed to the maleficent influence of Plato the post-Renaissancee and eighteenth-century doctrine of fixed literary kinds. Cf. my note in the New York Nation, vol. ciii. p. 238, Sept. 7, 1916.) I replied, only this: if we do discover what justice is, are we to demand that the just man shall differ from it in no respect, but shall conform in every way to the ideal? Or will it suffice us if he approximate to it as nearly as possible and partake of it more than others? That will content us, he said. A pattern, then, said I, was what we wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to injustice and the completely unjust man. We wished to fix our eyes upon them as types and models, so that whatever we discerned in them of happiness or the reverse would necessarily apply to ourselves in the sense that whosoever is likest them will have the allotment most like to theirs. Our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of these ideals. In that, he said, you speak truly. Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter,[*](An ideal in the plastic arts is used to illustrate the thought. Cf. Aristotle Poetics 1461 b 14, Politics 1281 b 10, Cicero, Orator ii. 3, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 10, Finsler, Platon u. d. aristotelische Poetik, p. 56. Polyb. vi. 47. 7 gives a different turn to the comaprison of the Republic to a statue. Plato is speaking from the point of view of ordinary opinion, and it is uncritical to find here and in 501 an admission that the artist copies the idea, which is denied in Book X. 597 E ff. Apelt, Platonische Aufsätze, p. 67.) who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist? Not I, by Zeus, he said. Then were not we, as we say, trying to create in words the pattern of a good state? Certainly. Do you think, then, that our words are any the less well spoken if we find ourselves unable to prove that it is possible for a state to be governed in accordance with our words? Of course not, he said. That, then, said I, is the truth[*](Cf. 372 E.) of the matter. But if, to please you, we must do our best to show how most probably and in what respect these things would be most nearly realized, again, with a view to such a demonstration, grant me the same point.[*](The point is so important that Plato repeats it more specifically.) What?