Republic

Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?We have to assume it as a third, he said. Yes, said I, provided[*](It still remains to distinguish the λογιστικόν from θυμός, which is done first by pointing out that young children and animals possess θυμός (Cf. Laws 963 E, Aristotle Politics 1334 b 22 ff.), and by quoting a line of Homer already cited in 390 D, and used in Phaedo 94 E, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct from the passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the mortal soul of the Timaeus. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 42-43.) it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive. That is not hard to be shown, he said; for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late. Yes, by heaven, excellently said, I replied; and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above:

1. He smote his breast and chided thus his heart.

Then is it not, as we said,[*](Cf. 411 E, 412 A.) the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?Quite so, said he. And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,[*](Cf. on 433 B-E, 443 D, and Charmides 161 B.) will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass[*](Cf. on 431 A-B, Laws 689 A-B.) of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body[*](Strictly speaking, pleasure is in the mind, not in the body. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 330. καλουμένων implies the doctrine of the Gorgias 493 E, 494 C, Philebus 42 C, Phaedrus 258 E, and 583 B-584 A, that the pleasures of appetite are not pure or real. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 152. Cf. on λεγομένων431 C.) and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to[*](Cf. on 426 E, 606 B.) its own work but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting[*](προσῆκον: sc. ἐστὶν ἄρχειν. γένει, by affinity, birth or nature. Cf. 444 B. q reads γενῶν.) that it should, and so overturn[*](Cf. 389 D.) the entire life of all. By all means, he said. Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without[*](Cf. 415 E.) also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel,[*](Cf. Isocrates xii. 138 αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ ἁπάντων.) the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler’s designs? That is so. Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures[*](Cf. 429 C-D) the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared. Right, he said. But wise by that small part that[*](Cf. Goodwin’s Greek Grammar, 1027.) ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession[*](ἔχον: anacoluthic epexegesis, corresponding to ὅταν . . . διασώζῃ. αὖ probably marks the correspondence.) in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three. By all means. And again, was he not sober by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it? The virtue of soberness certainly, said he, is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual. But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often[*](ᾧ πολλάκις: that is, by the principle of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.) described. That is altogether necessary. Well then, said I, has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge[*](ἀπαμβλύνεται: is the edge or outline of the definition blunted or dimmed when we transfer it to the individual?) of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state? I think not, he said. We might, I said, completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar[*](The transcendental or philosophical definition is confirmed by vulgar tests. The man who is just in Plato’s sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1178 b 16 ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος. . . to say that the gods are σώφρονες. Similarly Plato feels that there is a certain vulgarity in applying the cheap tests of prudential morality (Cf. Phaedo 68 C-D) to intrinsic virtue. Be this, is the highest expression of the moral law. Do this, eventually follows. Cf. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 376 and 385, and Emerson, Self-Reliance: But I may also neglect the reflex standard, and absolve me to myself . . . If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day. The Xenophontic Socrates (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 4. 10-11 and iv. 4. 17) relies on these vulgar tests.) tests to it. What are these?