Republic

No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation to suffer, be,[*](εἴη, the reading of most Mss., should stand. It covers the case of contradictory predicates, especially of relation, that do not readily fall under the dichotomy ποιεῖν πάσχειν. So Phaedo 97 C ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν.) or do opposites.They will not me, I am sure, said he. All the same, said I, that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentions[*](ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly contemptuous. Cf. Aristotle , ἐνοχλήσεις, and Theaetetus 158 C τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν.) and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesis[*](It is almost a Platonic method thus to emphasize the dependence of one conclusion on another already accepted. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 471, Politicus 284 D, Phaedo 77 A, 92 D, Timaeus 51 D, Parmenides 149 A. It may be used to cut short discussion (Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 471) or divert it into another channel. Here, however, he is aware, as Aristotle is, that the maximum of contradiction can be proved only controversially against an adversary who says something. (cf. my De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, pp. 7-9, Aristotle Met. 1012 b 1-10); and so, having sufficiently guarded his meaning, he dismisses the subject with the ironical observation that, if the maxim is ever proved false, he will give up all that he bases on the hypothesis of its truth. Cf. Sophist 247 E.) that this is so, with the understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the assumption shall be invalidated. That is what we must do, he said. Will you not then, said I, set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavor after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?[*](Cf. Gorgias 496 E, and on 435 D.) None, said he, but they are opposites. What then, said I, of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting[*](ἐθέλειν in Plato normally means to be willing, and βούλεσθαι to wish or desire. But unlike Prodicus, Plato emphasizes distinctions of synonyms only when relevant to his purpose. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47 and n. 339, Philebus 60 D. προσάγεσθαι below relates to ἐπιθυμία and ἐπινεύειν to ἐθέλειν . . . βούλεσθαι.) and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question,[*](Cf. Aristotle De anima 434 a 9. The Platonic doctrine that opinion,δόξα, is discussion of the soul with herself, or the judgement in which such discussion terminates (Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47) is here applied to the specific case of the practical reason issuing in an affirmation of the will.) striving towards its attainment? I would say so, he said. But what of not-willing[*](ἀβουλεῖν recalls the French coinage nolonté, and the southern mule’s won’t-power. Cf. Epistle vii. 347 A, Demosthenes Epistle ii. 17.) and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul’s rejection[*](Cf. Aristotle’s ἀνθέλκειν, De anima 433 b 8. All willing is either pushing or pulling, Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology, p. 336. Cf. the argument in Spencer’s First Principles 80, that the phrase impelled by desires is not a metaphor but a physical fact. Plato’s generalization of the concepts attraction and repulsion brings about a curious coincidence with the language of a materialistic, physiological psychology (cf. Lange, History of Materialism, passim), just as his rejection in the Timaeus of attraction and actio in distans allies his physics with that of the most consistent materialists.) and repulsion from itself and generally into the opposite class from all the former? Of course. This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a class[*](Cf. on 349 E.) and that the most conspicuous members of that class[*](Cf. 412 B and Class. Phil. vii. (1912) pp. 485-486.) are what we call thirst and hunger? We shall, said he. Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food? Yes. Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul?[*](The argument might proceed with 439 A τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. All that intervenes is a digression on logic, a caveat against possible misunderstandings of the proposition that thirst qua thirst is a desire for drink only and unqualifiedly. We are especially warned (438 A) against the misconception that since all men desire the good, thirst must be a desire not for mere drink but for good drink. Cf. the dramatic correction of a misconception, Phaedo 79 B, 529 A-B.) I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat[*](In the terminology of the doctrine of ideas the presence of cold is the cause of cool, and that of heat, of hot. Cf. The Origin of the Syllogism, Class. Phil . vol. xix. p. 10. But in the concrete instance heat causes the desire of cool and vice versa. Cf. Philebus 35 A ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. If we assume that Plato is here speaking from the point of view of common sense (Cf. Lysis 215 E τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ), there is no need of Hermann’s transposition of ψυχροῦ and θερμοῦ, even though we do thereby get a more exact symmetry with πλήθους παρουσίαν . . . τοῦ πολλοῦ below.) is attached[*](προσῇ denotes that the presence is an addition. Cf. προσείη in Parmenides 149 E.) to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink,[*](Philebus 35 A adds a refinement not needed here, that thirst is, strictly speaking, a desire for repletion by drink.) and so hunger of food. That is so, he said; each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such.[*](Cf. 429 B. But (the desires) of such or such a (specific) drink are (due to) that added qualification (of the thirst).)

Let no one then,[*](μήτοι τις=look you to it that no one, etc.) said I, disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because (the argument will run[*](ἄρα marks the rejection of this reasoning. Cf 358 C, 364 E, 381 E, 499 C. Plato of course is not repudiating his doctrine that all men really will the good, but the logic of this passage requires us to treat the desire of good as a distinct qualification of the mere drink.)) all men desire good, and so, if thirst is desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires. Why, he said, there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection. But I need hardly remind you, said I, that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.[*](ὅσα γ’ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα etc.: a palmary example of the concrete simplicity of Greek idiom in the expression of abstract ideas. ὅσα etc. (that is, relative terms) divide by partitive apposition into two classes, τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ. The meaning is that if one term of the relation is qualified, the other must be, but if one term is without qualification, the other is also taken absolutely. Plato, as usual (Cf. on 347 B), represents the interlocutor as not understandiong the first general abstract statement, which he therefore interprets and repeats. I have varied the translation in the repetition in order to bring out the full meaning, and some of the differences between Greek and English idiom.) I don’t understand, he said. Don’t you understand, said I, that the greater[*](The notion of relative terms is familiar. Cf. Charmides 167 E, Theaetetus 160 A, Symposium 199 D-E, Parmenides 133 C ff., Sophist 255 D, Aristotle Topics vi. 4, and Cat. v. It is expounded here only to insure the apprehension of the further point that the qualifications of either term of the relation are relative to each other. In the Politicus 283 f. Plato adds that the great and small are measured not only in relation to each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 61, 62, and 531 A.) is such as to be greater than something? Certainly. Is it not than the less? Yes. But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so? Yes. And may we add the one time greater than the one time less and that which will be greater than that which will be less? Surely. And similarly of the more towards the fewer, and the double towards the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier towards the lighter, the swifter towards the slower, and yet again of the hot towards the cold and all cases of that kind,[*](καὶ . . . καὶ αὖ . . . καὶ ἔτι γε etc. mark different classes of relations, magnitudes, precise quantites, the mechanical properties of matter and the physical properties.) does not the same hold? By all means. But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoever[*](Plato does not wish to complicate his logic with metaphysics. The objective correlate of ἐπιστήμη is a difficult problem. In the highest sense it is the ideas. Cf. Parmenides 134 A.But the relativity of ἐπιστήμη (Aristotle Topics iv. 1. 5) leads to psychological difficulties in Charmides 168 and to theological in Parmenides 134 C-E, which are waived by this phrase. Sceince in the abstract is of knowledge in the abstract, architectural science is of the specific knowledge called architecture. Cf. Sophist 257 C.) we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind. I mean something like this: As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture. Certainly. Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kind[*](Cf. Philebus 37 C.) such as no other of all the rest? Yes. And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences? That is so. This then, said I, if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don’t at all mean[*](Cf. Cratylus 393 B, Phaedo 81 D, and for the thought Aristotle Met. 1030 b 2 ff. The added determinants need not be the same. The study of useful things is not necessarily a useful study, as opponents of the Classics argue. In Gorgias 476 B this principle is violated by the wilful fallacy that if to do justice is fine, so must it be to suffer justice, but the motive for this is explained in Laws 859-860.) that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thing[*](αὐτοῦ οὗπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν is here a mere periphrasis for μαθήματος, αὐτοῦ expressing the idea abstract, mere, absolute, or per se, but ὅπερ or ἥπερ ἐστίν is often a synonym of αὐτός or αὐτή in the sense of abstract, absolute, or ideal. Cf. Thompson on Meno 71 B, Sophist 255 D τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.) of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, namely, of health and disease, the result[*](δή marks the application of this digression on relativity, for δῖψος is itself a relative term and is what it is in relation to something else, namely drink.) was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but with the addition of the particular kind, medical science. I understand, he said, and agree that it is so.

To return to thirst, then, said I, will you not class it with the things[*](τῶν τινὸς εἶναι: if the text is sound, εἶναι seems to be taken twice, (1) with τοῦτο etc., (2)τῶν τινός as predicates. This is perhaps no harsher than τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι in Aeschylus Agamemnon 788. Cf. Tennyson’s How sweet are the looks that ladies bendOn whom their favors fall, and Pope’s And virgins smiled at what they blushed before. Possibly θήσεις τῶν τινός is incomplete in itself (cf. 437 B) and εἶναι τοῦτο etc. is a loose epexegesis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam’s insertion of καὶ τινὸς between τινὸς and εἶναι, which yields a smooth, but painfully explicit, construction.) that are of something and say that it is what it is[*](Cf. further Sophist 255 D, Aristotle Met. 1021 a 27. Aristotle Cat. v., Top. vi. 4. So Plotinus vi. 1. 7 says that relative terms are those whose very being is the relation καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι.) in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst? I will, said he, —namely of drink. Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only. By all means. The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is towards this. Obviously. Then if anything draws it back[*](Cf. on 437 C, Aristotle, De anima 433 b 8, Laws 644 E, 604 B, Phaedrus 238 C. The practical moral truth of this is independent of our metaphysical psychology. Plato means that the something which made King David refuse the draught purchased by the blood of his soldiers and Sir Philip Sidney pass the cup to a wounded comrade is somehow different than the animal instinct which it overpowers. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 b 24, Laws 863 E.) when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast[*](Cf. 589, Epistle 335 B. Cf. Descartes, Les Passions de l’âme, article xlvii: En quoi consistent les combats qu’on a coutume d’imaginer entre la partie inférieure et la supérieure de l’âme. He says in effect that the soul is a unit and the lower soul is the body. Cf. ibid. lxviii, where he rejects the concupiscible and the irascible.) to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing. We must admit that it does not. So I fancy it is not well said of the archer[*](Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 68: Plato . . . delights to prick the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric, and antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that the one is united by disunion (Symposium 187 A) or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow. But the epigram vanishes under logical analysis. For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler’s lines: He that will win his dame must doAs love does when he bends his bow,With one hand thrust his lady fromAnd with the other pull her home.) that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to. By all means, he said. Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink? We are indeed, he said, many and often. What then, said I, should one affirm about them? Is it not that there is[*](ἐνεῖναι μὲν . . . ἐνεῖναι δέ: the slight artificiality of the anaphora matches well with the Gorgian jingle κελεῦον . . . κωλῦον. Cf. Iambl. Protrept. p. 41 Postelli ἔστι γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὃ κελεύει καὶ κωλύει.) something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids? I think so. And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections[*](The pulls are distinguished verbally from the passions that are their instruments. νοσημάτων suggests the Stoic doctrine that passions are diseases. Cf. Cicero Tusc. iii. 4 perturbationes, and passim, and Philebus 45 C.) and diseases? Apparently. Not unreasonably, said I, shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational[*](λογιστικόν is one of Plato’s many synonyms for the intellectual principle. Cf. 441 C, 571 C, 587 D, 605 B. It emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion. Cf. Crito 46 B (one of the passages which the Christian apologists used to prove that Socrates knew the λόγος), Theaetetus 186 C ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν, and Laws 644 D. Aristotle Eth. 1139 a 12 somewhat differently.) and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter[*](ἐπτόηται: almost technical, as in Sappho’s ode, for the flutter of desire. ἀλόγιστον, though applied here to the ἐπιθυμητικόν only, suggests the bipartite division of Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1102 a 28.) and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion[*](So the bad steed which symbolizes the ἐπιθυμητικόν in Phaedrus 253 E is ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος.) of various repletions and pleasures. It would not be unreasonable but quite natural, he said, for us to think this. These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the Thumos[*](We now approach the distinctively Platonic sense of θυμός as the power of noble wrath, which, unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggets, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in the mortal soul of the Timaeus 69 D. In Laws 731 B-C Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, De ira, i. 9, and passim. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, Lord Brougham: Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger. The supine placidity of civilization is not favorable to animosity [Bacon’s word for θυμός]. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions, etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato.) or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these? Perhaps, he said, with one of these, the appetitive.