Republic

Now the phrase master of himself is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions.Of course.But, said I, the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But when, because of bad breeding or some association,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 250 A.) the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitude[*](Cf. 442 A, Laws 689 A-B. The expression is intended to remind us of the parallelism between man and state. See Introduction.) of the worse, I think that our speech censures this as a reproach,[*](Cf. Symposium 189 E.) and calls the man in this plight unselfcontrolled and licentious. That seems likely, he said. Turn your eyes now upon our new city, said I, and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in which[*](Cf. 441 D, 443 B, 573 D.) the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered. I do turn my eyes upon it, he said, and it is as you say. And again, the mob of motley[*](παντοδαπός is disparaging in Plato.) appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in children[*](παισί: so Wolf, for Ms. πᾶσι, a frequent error. Cf. 494 B. Plato, like Shakespeare’s Rosalind, brackets boys and women as creatures who have for every passion something and for no passion truly anything.) and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are freemen in name.[*](Cf. on 336 A. The ordinary man who is passion’s slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached many sermons on this text. See Persius, Sat. v. 73. and 124, Epictetus Diss . iv. 1, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 5. 4, Xenophon Oecon. 1. 22-23.) By all means. But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated. True, he said. And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better? I do, he said. If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation. Most assuredly, he said. And is it not also to be called sober[*](Plato is again proceeding by seemingly minute verbal links. Cf. 354 A, 379 B, 412 D. καὶ μήν introduces a further verification of the definition.) in all these respects? Indeed it is, he said. And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don’t you think so? I most emphatically do, he said. In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled? In both, I suppose,[*](που marks the slight hesitation at the deviation from the symmetry of the scheme which would lead us to expect, as Aristotle and others have taken it, that σωφροσύνη is the distinctive virtue of the lowest class. It is so practically for the lower sense of σωφροσύνη, but in the higher sense of the willingness of each to fulfil his function in due subordination to the whole, it is common to all classes.) he said. Do you see then, said I, that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmony[*](Cf. 430 E. Aristotle gives this as an example of (faulty) defintion by metaphor (Topics iv. 3. 5).)? Why so?

Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut[*](δι’ ὅλης: sc. τῆς πόλεως, but as ἀτεχνῶς shows (Cf. on 419 E) it already suggets the musical metaphor of the entire octave διὰ πασῶν.) throughout, bringing about[*](The word order of the following is noteworthy. The translation gives the meaning. ταὐτόν, the object of συνᾴδοντας, is, by a trait of style that grows more frequent in the Laws and was imitated by Cicero, so placed as to break the monotony of the accusative terminations.) the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please,[*](For the comparison the kind of superiority is indifferent. See Thompson on Meno 71 E and compare the enumeration of claims to power in the Laws, ἀξιώματα . . . τοῦ ἀρχεῖν, Laws 690 A ff. and 434 B.) in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimity[*](The final statement of the definition, which, however, has little significance for Plato’s thought, when isolated from its explanatory context. Cf. Def. Plat. 413 E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 15. f., n. 82. Quite idle is the discussion whether σωφροσύνη is otiose, and whether it can be absolutely distinguished from δικαιοσύνη. They are sufficiently distinguished for Plato’s purpose in the imagery and analogies of the Republic.) to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual.[*](Cf. on 351 E.)I entirely concur, he said. Very well, said I. We have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgement.[*](Cf. Demosthenes 18 and 430 E ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν. Plato’s definitions and analyses are never presented as final. They are always sufficient for the purpose in hand. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 13, nn. 63-67 and 519.) What can be the remaining form that[*](δι’ ὅ: cf. my paper on the Origin of the Syllogism, Class. Phil . vol. xix. pp. 7 ff. This is an example of the terminology of the theory of ideas already in the first four books. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, n. 238, p. 38.) would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice. Obvious. Now then,[*](νῦν δή: i.e. νῦν ἤδη.) Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen[*](Cf. Soph. 235 B, Euthydemus 290 B-C, Phaedo 66 C, Laws 654 E, Parmenides 128 C, Lysis 218 C, Thompson on Meno 96 E, Huxley, Hume , p. 139 There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy. Cf. also Hardy’s He never could beat the covert of conversation without starting the game. The elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the importance of δικαιοσύνη and partly to relieve the monotony of continuous argument.) to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me. Would that I could, he said; but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fair[*](It is not necessary, though plausible, to emend μετρίως to μετρίῳ. The latter is slightly more idiomatical. Cf. Terence’s benigno me utetur patre.) use of me. Pray[*](Prayer is the proper preface of any act. Cf. Timaeus 27 C, Laws 712 B.) for success then, said I, and follow along with me. That I will do, only lead on, he said. And truly, said I, it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep shadows. It certainly is a dark covert, not easy to beat up. But all the same on we must go. Yes, on. And I caught view and gave a hulloa and said, Glaucon, I think we have found its trail and I don’t believe it will get away from us. I am glad to hear that, said he. Truly, said I, we were slackers[*](τὸ πάθος: for the periphrasis cf. 376 A.) indeed. How so? Why, all the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feet[*](Cf. Theaetetus 201 A.) from the start and yet we couldn’t see it, but were most ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands.[*](A homely figure such as Dante and Tennyson sometimes use.) So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which perhaps was the reason it escaped us. What do you mean? he said. This, I replied, that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselves[*](This sounds like Hegel but is not Hegelian thought.) or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense. That is a tedious prologue, he said, for an eager listener.