Republic

By this analogy, then, said I, you must conceive what we too to the best of our ability were doing when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music[*](Cf. 522 A, Philebus 17 B.) and exercises of the body. The sole aim of our contrivance was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be[*](γίγνοιτο is process; ἐκπλύναι (aorist) is a single event (μή).) fast-colored both about the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might not be washed out by those lyes that have such dread[*](δεινά: it is not fanciful to feel the unity of Plato’s imagination as well as of his thought in the recurrence of this word in the δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα of the mortal soul in Timaeus 69 C.) power to scour our faiths away, pleasure more potent than any detergent or abstergent to accomplish this, and pain and fear and desire more sure than any lye. This power in the soul, then, this unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief[*](Cf. Protagoras 360 C-D, Laws 632 C, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1116 b 24. Strictly speaking, Plato would recognize four grades, (1) philosophic bravery, (2) the bravery of the ἐπίκουροι here defined, (3) casual civic bravery in ordinary states, (4) animal instinct, which hardly deserves the name. Cf. Laches 196 E, Mill, Nature, p. 47 Consistent courage is always the effect of cultivation, etc., Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 46 and 77.) about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless you have something different to say. No, nothing, said he; for I presume that you consider mere right opinion about the same matters not produced by education, that which may manifest itself in a beast or a slave,[*](Phaedo 69 B.) to have little or nothing to do with law[*](νόμιμον of the Mss. yields quite as good a meaning as Stobaeus’s μόνιμον. The virtuous habit that is inculcated by law is more abiding than accidental virtue.) and that you would call it by another name than courage. That is most true, said I. Well then, he said, I accept this as bravery. Do so, said I, and you will be right with the reservation[*](γε marks a reservation as 415 E στρατιωτικάς γε, Politicus 30 E, Laws 710 A τὴν δημώδη γε. Plotinus, unlike some modern commentators, perceived this. Cf. Enn. i. 2. 3. In Phaedo 82 A πολιτικήν is used disparagingly of ordinary bourgeois virtue. In Xenophon Rep. Lac. 10. 7 and Aristotle Eth. Nic. iii. 8. 1 (1116 a 17) there is no disparagement. The word is often used of citizen soldiery as opposed to professional mercenaries.) that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other time,[*](This dismissal of the subject is sometimes fancifully taken as a promise of the Laches. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 77 and 603.) if it please you, we will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but justice; and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done enough. You are quite right, he said. Two things still remain, said I, to make out in our city, soberness[*](Matthew Arnold’s word. But cf. on 398 D and 430 E — sobriety, temperance, Besonnenheit.) and the object of the whole inquiry, justice. Quite so. If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness. Well, I, for my part, he said, neither know of any such way nor would I wish justice to be discovered first if that means that we are not to go on to the consideration of soberness. But if you desire to please me, consider this before that. It would certainly be very wrong[*](εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ is idiomatic, I ought to. Cf. 608 D, 612, Menexenus 236 B.) of me not to desire it, said I. Go on with the inquiry then, he said. I must go on, I replied, and viewed from here it bears more likeness to a kind of concord and harmony than the other virtues did. How so? Soberness is a kind of beautiful order[*](Cf. Gorgias 506 E ff. σωφροσύνη and σωφρονεῖν sometimes mean etymologically of sound mind or level head, with or without ethical suggestion, according to the standpoint of the spaeker. Cf. Protagoras 333 B-C. Its two chief meanings in Greek usage are given in 389 D-E: subordination to due authority, and control of appetite, both raised to higher significance in Plato’s definition. As in the case of bravery, Plato distinguishes the temperamental, the bourgeois, the disciplined, and the philosophical virtue. But he affects to feel something paradoxical in the very idea of self-control, as perhaps there is. Cf. Laws 626 E ff., 863 D, A.J.P. vol. xiii. pp. 361 f., Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 77 and 78.) and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase master of himself I know not how; and there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that not so? Most certainly.

Now the phrase master of himself is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions.Of course.But, said I, the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But when, because of bad breeding or some association,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 250 A.) the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitude[*](Cf. 442 A, Laws 689 A-B. The expression is intended to remind us of the parallelism between man and state. See Introduction.) of the worse, I think that our speech censures this as a reproach,[*](Cf. Symposium 189 E.) and calls the man in this plight unselfcontrolled and licentious. That seems likely, he said. Turn your eyes now upon our new city, said I, and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in which[*](Cf. 441 D, 443 B, 573 D.) the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered. I do turn my eyes upon it, he said, and it is as you say. And again, the mob of motley[*](παντοδαπός is disparaging in Plato.) appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in children[*](παισί: so Wolf, for Ms. πᾶσι, a frequent error. Cf. 494 B. Plato, like Shakespeare’s Rosalind, brackets boys and women as creatures who have for every passion something and for no passion truly anything.) and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are freemen in name.[*](Cf. on 336 A. The ordinary man who is passion’s slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached many sermons on this text. See Persius, Sat. v. 73. and 124, Epictetus Diss . iv. 1, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 5. 4, Xenophon Oecon. 1. 22-23.) By all means. But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated. True, he said. And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better? I do, he said. If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation. Most assuredly, he said. And is it not also to be called sober[*](Plato is again proceeding by seemingly minute verbal links. Cf. 354 A, 379 B, 412 D. καὶ μήν introduces a further verification of the definition.) in all these respects? Indeed it is, he said. And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don’t you think so? I most emphatically do, he said. In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled? In both, I suppose,[*](που marks the slight hesitation at the deviation from the symmetry of the scheme which would lead us to expect, as Aristotle and others have taken it, that σωφροσύνη is the distinctive virtue of the lowest class. It is so practically for the lower sense of σωφροσύνη, but in the higher sense of the willingness of each to fulfil his function in due subordination to the whole, it is common to all classes.) he said. Do you see then, said I, that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmony[*](Cf. 430 E. Aristotle gives this as an example of (faulty) defintion by metaphor (Topics iv. 3. 5).)? Why so?

Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut[*](δι’ ὅλης: sc. τῆς πόλεως, but as ἀτεχνῶς shows (Cf. on 419 E) it already suggets the musical metaphor of the entire octave διὰ πασῶν.) throughout, bringing about[*](The word order of the following is noteworthy. The translation gives the meaning. ταὐτόν, the object of συνᾴδοντας, is, by a trait of style that grows more frequent in the Laws and was imitated by Cicero, so placed as to break the monotony of the accusative terminations.) the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please,[*](For the comparison the kind of superiority is indifferent. See Thompson on Meno 71 E and compare the enumeration of claims to power in the Laws, ἀξιώματα . . . τοῦ ἀρχεῖν, Laws 690 A ff. and 434 B.) in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimity[*](The final statement of the definition, which, however, has little significance for Plato’s thought, when isolated from its explanatory context. Cf. Def. Plat. 413 E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 15. f., n. 82. Quite idle is the discussion whether σωφροσύνη is otiose, and whether it can be absolutely distinguished from δικαιοσύνη. They are sufficiently distinguished for Plato’s purpose in the imagery and analogies of the Republic.) to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual.[*](Cf. on 351 E.)I entirely concur, he said. Very well, said I. We have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgement.[*](Cf. Demosthenes 18 and 430 E ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν. Plato’s definitions and analyses are never presented as final. They are always sufficient for the purpose in hand. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 13, nn. 63-67 and 519.) What can be the remaining form that[*](δι’ ὅ: cf. my paper on the Origin of the Syllogism, Class. Phil . vol. xix. pp. 7 ff. This is an example of the terminology of the theory of ideas already in the first four books. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, n. 238, p. 38.) would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice. Obvious. Now then,[*](νῦν δή: i.e. νῦν ἤδη.) Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen[*](Cf. Soph. 235 B, Euthydemus 290 B-C, Phaedo 66 C, Laws 654 E, Parmenides 128 C, Lysis 218 C, Thompson on Meno 96 E, Huxley, Hume , p. 139 There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy. Cf. also Hardy’s He never could beat the covert of conversation without starting the game. The elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the importance of δικαιοσύνη and partly to relieve the monotony of continuous argument.) to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me. Would that I could, he said; but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fair[*](It is not necessary, though plausible, to emend μετρίως to μετρίῳ. The latter is slightly more idiomatical. Cf. Terence’s benigno me utetur patre.) use of me. Pray[*](Prayer is the proper preface of any act. Cf. Timaeus 27 C, Laws 712 B.) for success then, said I, and follow along with me. That I will do, only lead on, he said. And truly, said I, it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep shadows. It certainly is a dark covert, not easy to beat up. But all the same on we must go. Yes, on. And I caught view and gave a hulloa and said, Glaucon, I think we have found its trail and I don’t believe it will get away from us. I am glad to hear that, said he. Truly, said I, we were slackers[*](τὸ πάθος: for the periphrasis cf. 376 A.) indeed. How so? Why, all the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feet[*](Cf. Theaetetus 201 A.) from the start and yet we couldn’t see it, but were most ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands.[*](A homely figure such as Dante and Tennyson sometimes use.) So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which perhaps was the reason it escaped us. What do you mean? he said. This, I replied, that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselves[*](This sounds like Hegel but is not Hegelian thought.) or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense. That is a tedious prologue, he said, for an eager listener.

Listen then, said I, and learn if there is anything in what I say. For what we laid down in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this I think, or[*](Cf. on 344 E. Justice is a species falling under the vague genus τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, which Critias in the Charmides proposed as a definition of σωφροσύνη (Charmides 161 B), but failed to sustain owing to his inability to distinguish the various possible meanings of the phrase. In the Republic too we have hitherto failed to learn from ourselves its true meaning, till now when Socrates begins to perceive that if taken in the higher sense of spiritual division of labor in the soul and in the state, it is the long-sought justice. Cf. 433 B-D, 443 C-D.) some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said, you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature is best adapted. Yes, we said that. And again that to do one’s own business and not to be a busybody is justice, is a saying that we have heard from many and have often repeated ourselves.[*](This need not refer to any specific passage in the dialogues. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 236. A Greek could at any time say that minding one’s own business and not being a busybody is σῶφρον or δίκαιον or both.) We have. This, then, I said, my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice,[*](τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον: as in the translation, not justice seems somehow to be proving to be this. Cf. 432 E, 516 C, Lysis 217 E, Laws 910 B, 495 A, 596 D, Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, 830. Yet, Cf. Politicus 291 D.) this principle of doing one’s own business. Do you know whence I infer this? No, but tell me, he said. I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you that[*](καίτοι: cf. on 360 C and 376 B. Here it points out the significance of τὸ ὑπόλοιπον if true, while ἀλλὰ μέντοι introduces the considerations that prove it true.) we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three. That is an unavoidable conclusion, he said. But moreover, said I, if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody. Hard to decide indeed, he said. A thing, then, that in its contribution to the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task. It is indeed, he said. And is not justice the name you would have to give[*](γε argues from the very meaning of ἐνάμιλλον. Cf. 379 B.) to the principle that rivals these as conducing to the virtue of state? By all means. Consider it in this wise too[*](So Phaedo 79 E ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε. It introduces a further confirmation. The mere judicial and conventional conception of justice can be brought under the formula in a fashion (πῃ), for legal justice est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens. Cf. 331 E and Aristotle Rhet. 1366 b 9 ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος.) if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers? Of course. Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall have what belongs to others[*](τἀλλότρια: the article is normal; Stallb. on Phaedrus 230 A. For the ambiguity of τἀλλότρια cf. 443 D. So οἰκείου is one’s own in either literal or the ideal sense of the Stoics and Emerson, and ἑαυτοῦ is similarly ambiguous. Cf. on 443 D.) or be deprived of his own? Nothing else but this. On the assumption that this is just? Yes.

From this point of view too, then, the having[*](ἕξις is still fluid in Plato and has not yet taken the technical Aristotelian meaning of habit or state.) and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice.That is so.Consider now[*](A further confirmation. For what follows cf. 421 A.) whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another’s tools or honors or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?Not much, he said. But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state. By all means. The interference with one another’s business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly[*](μάλιστα with κακουργία.) works it harm. Precisely so. And the thing that works the greatest harm to one’s own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice? Of course. This, then, is injustice. Again,[*](πάλιν, again, here means conversely. Cf. 425 A. The definition is repeated in terms of the three citizen classes to prepare the way for testing it in relation to the individual soul, which, if the analogy is to hold, must possess three corresponding faculties or parts. The order of words in this and many Platonic sentences is justified by the psychological investigation, which showed that when the question which do you like best, apples, pears, or cherries? was presented in the form apples, pears, cherries, which do you like best? the reaction time was appreciably shortened.) let us put it in this way. The proper functioning[*](οἰκειοπραγία: this coinage is explained by the genitive absolute. Proclus (Kroll i. p. 207) substitutes αὐτοπραγία. So Def. Plat. 411 E.) of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that[*](ἐκείνου: cf. ἐκείνοις, 425 A.) just described, would be justice and would render the city just. I think the case is thus and no otherwise, said he. Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly,[*](παγίως: cf. 479 C, Aristotle Met. 1062 b 15.) I said, but if this form[*](The doctrine of the transcendental ideas was undoubtedly familiar to Plato at this time. Cf. on 402 B, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 31, n. 194, p. 35. But we need not evoke the theory of παρουσία here to account for this slight personification of the form, idea, or definition of justice. Cf. 538 D, and the use of ἐλθών in Euripides Suppl. 562 and of ἰόν in Philebus 52 E. Plato, in short, is merely saying vivaciously what Aristotle technically says in the words δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν, Eth. Nic. 1107 a 28.) when applied to the individual man, accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which[*](In 368 E. For the loose internal accusative ἥν cf. 443 B, Laws 666 B, Phaedrus 249 D, Sophist 264 B, my paper on Illogical Idiom, T.A.P.A., 1916, vol. xlvii. p. 213, and the school-girl’s This is the play that the reward is offered for the best name suggested for it.) we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there,[*](ἐκεῖ though redundant need not offend in this intentionally ancoluthic and resumptive sentence. Some inferior Mss. read ἐκεῖνο. Burnet’s ἢ is impossible.) we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good[*](ἔν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ: cf. on 427 E, and for the force of γε cf. 379 B, 403 E.) city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well.

But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side[*](Cf. Sophist 230 B τιθέασι παρ’ ἀλλήλας, Isocrates Areopagiticus 79, Nic. 17.) and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks[*](Cf. L and S. and Morgan, De Ignis Eliciendi Modis, Harvard Studies, vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius (Ruelle, p. 54, line 18) καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ εξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται φῶς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων προστριβομένων.) we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth,[*](Cf. Gorgias 484 B, Epistle vii. 344 B.) and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds.Well, he said, that seems a sound method[*]( Plato often observes that a certain procedure is methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be.) and that is what we must do. Then, said I, if you call a thing by the same[*](ὅ γε ταὐτόν: there are several reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato’s ethical theory and an essential feature in the structure of the Republic. Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake (cf.. Introduction p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time important principles of logic afterwards codified in the treatises of Aristotle. γε marks the inference from the very meaning of ταὐτόν. Cf. on 379 B, 389 B, and Politicus 278 E; cf. also Parmenides 139 E. The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 D-E), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state.) name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like? Like, he said. Then a just man too will not differ[*](Cf. 369 A and Meno 72 B. In Philebus 12 E-13 C, Plato points out that the generic or specific identity does not exclude specific or sub-specific differences.) at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it. Yes, like. But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits[*](ἕξεις is here almost the Aristotelian ἕξις. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1105 b 20, regards πάθη, ἕξεις and δυνάμεις as an exhaustive enumeration of mental states. For δυνάμεις cf. 477 C, Simplic. De An. Hayduck, p. 289 ἀλλὰ τὰ ὧν πρὸς πρακτικὴν ἐδεῖτο ζωήν, τὰ τρία μόνα παρείληφεν.) of these three kinds. True, he said. Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations. Inevitable, he said. Goodness gracious, said I, here is another trifling[*](Cf. 423 C.) inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not. It does not seem to me at all trifling, he said, for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that ’fine things are difficult.’[*](A proverb often cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E.) Apparently, said I; and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never in the world apprehend this matter[*](τοῦτο by strict grammatical implication means the problem of the tripartite soul, but the reference to this passage in 504 B shows that it includes the whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately the whole of ethical and political philosophy. We are there told again that the definitions of the fourth book are sufficient for the purpose, but that complete insight can be attained only by relating them to the idea of the good. That required a longer and more circuitous way of discipline and training. Plato then does not propose the longer way as a method of reasoning which he himself employs to correct the approximations of the present discussion. He merely describes it as the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a new logic hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the evolution of Plato’s thought and the composition of the Republic based on supposed contradictions between this passage and the later books. Cf. Introduction p. xvi, Idea of Good, p. 190, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 16, n. 90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does not understand the connection of it all with the idea of good. Plato the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the problem under discussion (cf. on 353 c), and Plato the moralist never admits that the ideal has been adequately expressed, but always points to heights beyond. Cf. 506 E, 533 A, Phaedo 85 C, Ti. 29 B-C, Soph. 254 C.) from such methods as we are now employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of previous statements and inquiries. May we acquiesce in that? he said. I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present. And I surely should be more than satisfied, I replied. Don’t you weary then, he said, but go on with the inquiry. Is it not, then, said I, impossible for us to avoid admitting[*](Plato takes for granted as obvious the general correspondence which some modern philosophers think it necessary to reaffirm. Cf. Mill, Logic, vi. 7. 1 Human beings in society have no properties, but those which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws and the nature of individual man; Spencer, Autobiog. ii. p. 543 Society is created by its units. . . . The nature of its organization is determined by the nature of its units. Plato illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national characteristics, with a hint of the thought partially anticipated by Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle’s name, that they are determined by climate and environment. Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle Politics pp. 318-320.) this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any other source.

It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to[*](αἰτιάσαιτο: this merely varies the idiom αἰτίαν ἔχειν, predicate of,say of. Cf. 599 E. It was a common boast of the Athenians that the fine air of Athens produced a corresponding subtlety of wit. Cf. Euripides Medea 829-830, Isocrates vii. 74, Roberts, The Ancient Boeotians, pp. 59, 76.) the region where we dwell, or the love of money[*](φιλοχρήματον is a virtual synonym of ἐπιθυμητικόν. Cf. 580 E and Phaedo 68 C, 82 C.) which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians[*](In Laws 747 C, Plato tells that for this or some other cause the mathematical education of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which he commends, developed in them πανουργία rather than σοφία.) and the population of Egypt.One certainly might, he replied. This is the fact then, said I, and there is no difficulty in recognizing it. Certainly not. But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul[*](The questions debated by psychologists from Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1102 a 31) to the present day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry, and point of view rather than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the faculties of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold’s Lines on Butler’s Sermons and my remarks in The Assault on Humanism. Plato himself is well aware of this, and in different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose. There is no contradiction between this passage and Phaedo 68 C, 82 C, and Republic x. 611-12. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 42-43.) that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly. I think so too, he said. Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way. How? It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites[*](The first formulation of the law of contradiction. Cf. Phaedo 102 E, Theaetetus 188 A, Soph. 220 B, 602 E. Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436 E) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις (De interp. 17 a 36-37). Cf. Met. 1005 b 22 πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας, and Rhet. ii. 24. Plato invokes the principle against Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68. Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή (Met. 1005 b 18).) in the same respect[*](κατὰ ταὐτόν = in the same part or aspect of itself; πρὸς ταὐτόν = in relation to the same (other) thing. Cf. Sophist 230 B ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας.) in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find[*](For this method of reasoning cf. 478 D, 609 B, Laws 896 C, Charmides 168 B-C, Gorgias 496 C, Philebus 11 D-E.) these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was[*](ἦν = was all along and is.) not the same thing functioning but a plurality. Very well. Consider, then, what I am saying. Say on, he replied. Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest[*](The maxim is applied to the antithesis of rest and motion, so prominent in the dialectics of the day. Cf. Sophist 249 C-D, Parmenides 156 D and passim.) and in motion? By no means. Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part[*](Cf. Theaetetus 181 E.) of him is at rest and a part in motion. Is not that so? It is. Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rate[*](The argumentative γε is controversial. For the illustration of the top cf. Spencer, First Principle, 170, who analyzes certain oscillations described by the expressive though inelegant word wobbling and their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the equilibrium mobile.) stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such cases[*](The meaning is plain, the alleged rest and motion do not relate to the same parts of the objects. But the syntax of τὰ τοιαῦτα is difficult. Obvious remedies are to expunge the words or to read τῶν τοιούτων, the cacophony of which in the context Plato perhaps rejected at the cost of leaving his syntax to our conjectures.) were not in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we would say that there was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still[*](Cf. Aristotle Met. 1022 a 23 ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθὸ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθὸ ἕστηκεν, etc,) since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest. And that would be right, he said.

No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation to suffer, be,[*](εἴη, the reading of most Mss., should stand. It covers the case of contradictory predicates, especially of relation, that do not readily fall under the dichotomy ποιεῖν πάσχειν. So Phaedo 97 C ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν.) or do opposites.They will not me, I am sure, said he. All the same, said I, that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentions[*](ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly contemptuous. Cf. Aristotle , ἐνοχλήσεις, and Theaetetus 158 C τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν.) and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesis[*](It is almost a Platonic method thus to emphasize the dependence of one conclusion on another already accepted. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 471, Politicus 284 D, Phaedo 77 A, 92 D, Timaeus 51 D, Parmenides 149 A. It may be used to cut short discussion (Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 471) or divert it into another channel. Here, however, he is aware, as Aristotle is, that the maximum of contradiction can be proved only controversially against an adversary who says something. (cf. my De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, pp. 7-9, Aristotle Met. 1012 b 1-10); and so, having sufficiently guarded his meaning, he dismisses the subject with the ironical observation that, if the maxim is ever proved false, he will give up all that he bases on the hypothesis of its truth. Cf. Sophist 247 E.) that this is so, with the understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the assumption shall be invalidated. That is what we must do, he said. Will you not then, said I, set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavor after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?[*](Cf. Gorgias 496 E, and on 435 D.) None, said he, but they are opposites. What then, said I, of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting[*](ἐθέλειν in Plato normally means to be willing, and βούλεσθαι to wish or desire. But unlike Prodicus, Plato emphasizes distinctions of synonyms only when relevant to his purpose. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47 and n. 339, Philebus 60 D. προσάγεσθαι below relates to ἐπιθυμία and ἐπινεύειν to ἐθέλειν . . . βούλεσθαι.) and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question,[*](Cf. Aristotle De anima 434 a 9. The Platonic doctrine that opinion,δόξα, is discussion of the soul with herself, or the judgement in which such discussion terminates (Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47) is here applied to the specific case of the practical reason issuing in an affirmation of the will.) striving towards its attainment? I would say so, he said. But what of not-willing[*](ἀβουλεῖν recalls the French coinage nolonté, and the southern mule’s won’t-power. Cf. Epistle vii. 347 A, Demosthenes Epistle ii. 17.) and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul’s rejection[*](Cf. Aristotle’s ἀνθέλκειν, De anima 433 b 8. All willing is either pushing or pulling, Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology, p. 336. Cf. the argument in Spencer’s First Principles 80, that the phrase impelled by desires is not a metaphor but a physical fact. Plato’s generalization of the concepts attraction and repulsion brings about a curious coincidence with the language of a materialistic, physiological psychology (cf. Lange, History of Materialism, passim), just as his rejection in the Timaeus of attraction and actio in distans allies his physics with that of the most consistent materialists.) and repulsion from itself and generally into the opposite class from all the former? Of course. This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a class[*](Cf. on 349 E.) and that the most conspicuous members of that class[*](Cf. 412 B and Class. Phil. vii. (1912) pp. 485-486.) are what we call thirst and hunger? We shall, said he. Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food? Yes. Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul?[*](The argument might proceed with 439 A τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. All that intervenes is a digression on logic, a caveat against possible misunderstandings of the proposition that thirst qua thirst is a desire for drink only and unqualifiedly. We are especially warned (438 A) against the misconception that since all men desire the good, thirst must be a desire not for mere drink but for good drink. Cf. the dramatic correction of a misconception, Phaedo 79 B, 529 A-B.) I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat[*](In the terminology of the doctrine of ideas the presence of cold is the cause of cool, and that of heat, of hot. Cf. The Origin of the Syllogism, Class. Phil . vol. xix. p. 10. But in the concrete instance heat causes the desire of cool and vice versa. Cf. Philebus 35 A ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. If we assume that Plato is here speaking from the point of view of common sense (Cf. Lysis 215 E τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ), there is no need of Hermann’s transposition of ψυχροῦ and θερμοῦ, even though we do thereby get a more exact symmetry with πλήθους παρουσίαν . . . τοῦ πολλοῦ below.) is attached[*](προσῇ denotes that the presence is an addition. Cf. προσείη in Parmenides 149 E.) to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink,[*](Philebus 35 A adds a refinement not needed here, that thirst is, strictly speaking, a desire for repletion by drink.) and so hunger of food. That is so, he said; each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such.[*](Cf. 429 B. But (the desires) of such or such a (specific) drink are (due to) that added qualification (of the thirst).)

Let no one then,[*](μήτοι τις=look you to it that no one, etc.) said I, disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because (the argument will run[*](ἄρα marks the rejection of this reasoning. Cf 358 C, 364 E, 381 E, 499 C. Plato of course is not repudiating his doctrine that all men really will the good, but the logic of this passage requires us to treat the desire of good as a distinct qualification of the mere drink.)) all men desire good, and so, if thirst is desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires. Why, he said, there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection. But I need hardly remind you, said I, that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.[*](ὅσα γ’ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα etc.: a palmary example of the concrete simplicity of Greek idiom in the expression of abstract ideas. ὅσα etc. (that is, relative terms) divide by partitive apposition into two classes, τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ. The meaning is that if one term of the relation is qualified, the other must be, but if one term is without qualification, the other is also taken absolutely. Plato, as usual (Cf. on 347 B), represents the interlocutor as not understandiong the first general abstract statement, which he therefore interprets and repeats. I have varied the translation in the repetition in order to bring out the full meaning, and some of the differences between Greek and English idiom.) I don’t understand, he said. Don’t you understand, said I, that the greater[*](The notion of relative terms is familiar. Cf. Charmides 167 E, Theaetetus 160 A, Symposium 199 D-E, Parmenides 133 C ff., Sophist 255 D, Aristotle Topics vi. 4, and Cat. v. It is expounded here only to insure the apprehension of the further point that the qualifications of either term of the relation are relative to each other. In the Politicus 283 f. Plato adds that the great and small are measured not only in relation to each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 61, 62, and 531 A.) is such as to be greater than something? Certainly. Is it not than the less? Yes. But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so? Yes. And may we add the one time greater than the one time less and that which will be greater than that which will be less? Surely. And similarly of the more towards the fewer, and the double towards the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier towards the lighter, the swifter towards the slower, and yet again of the hot towards the cold and all cases of that kind,[*](καὶ . . . καὶ αὖ . . . καὶ ἔτι γε etc. mark different classes of relations, magnitudes, precise quantites, the mechanical properties of matter and the physical properties.) does not the same hold? By all means. But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoever[*](Plato does not wish to complicate his logic with metaphysics. The objective correlate of ἐπιστήμη is a difficult problem. In the highest sense it is the ideas. Cf. Parmenides 134 A.But the relativity of ἐπιστήμη (Aristotle Topics iv. 1. 5) leads to psychological difficulties in Charmides 168 and to theological in Parmenides 134 C-E, which are waived by this phrase. Sceince in the abstract is of knowledge in the abstract, architectural science is of the specific knowledge called architecture. Cf. Sophist 257 C.) we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind. I mean something like this: As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture. Certainly. Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kind[*](Cf. Philebus 37 C.) such as no other of all the rest? Yes. And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences? That is so. This then, said I, if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don’t at all mean[*](Cf. Cratylus 393 B, Phaedo 81 D, and for the thought Aristotle Met. 1030 b 2 ff. The added determinants need not be the same. The study of useful things is not necessarily a useful study, as opponents of the Classics argue. In Gorgias 476 B this principle is violated by the wilful fallacy that if to do justice is fine, so must it be to suffer justice, but the motive for this is explained in Laws 859-860.) that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thing[*](αὐτοῦ οὗπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν is here a mere periphrasis for μαθήματος, αὐτοῦ expressing the idea abstract, mere, absolute, or per se, but ὅπερ or ἥπερ ἐστίν is often a synonym of αὐτός or αὐτή in the sense of abstract, absolute, or ideal. Cf. Thompson on Meno 71 B, Sophist 255 D τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.) of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, namely, of health and disease, the result[*](δή marks the application of this digression on relativity, for δῖψος is itself a relative term and is what it is in relation to something else, namely drink.) was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but with the addition of the particular kind, medical science. I understand, he said, and agree that it is so.

To return to thirst, then, said I, will you not class it with the things[*](τῶν τινὸς εἶναι: if the text is sound, εἶναι seems to be taken twice, (1) with τοῦτο etc., (2)τῶν τινός as predicates. This is perhaps no harsher than τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι in Aeschylus Agamemnon 788. Cf. Tennyson’s How sweet are the looks that ladies bendOn whom their favors fall, and Pope’s And virgins smiled at what they blushed before. Possibly θήσεις τῶν τινός is incomplete in itself (cf. 437 B) and εἶναι τοῦτο etc. is a loose epexegesis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam’s insertion of καὶ τινὸς between τινὸς and εἶναι, which yields a smooth, but painfully explicit, construction.) that are of something and say that it is what it is[*](Cf. further Sophist 255 D, Aristotle Met. 1021 a 27. Aristotle Cat. v., Top. vi. 4. So Plotinus vi. 1. 7 says that relative terms are those whose very being is the relation καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι.) in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst? I will, said he, —namely of drink. Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only. By all means. The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is towards this. Obviously. Then if anything draws it back[*](Cf. on 437 C, Aristotle, De anima 433 b 8, Laws 644 E, 604 B, Phaedrus 238 C. The practical moral truth of this is independent of our metaphysical psychology. Plato means that the something which made King David refuse the draught purchased by the blood of his soldiers and Sir Philip Sidney pass the cup to a wounded comrade is somehow different than the animal instinct which it overpowers. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 b 24, Laws 863 E.) when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast[*](Cf. 589, Epistle 335 B. Cf. Descartes, Les Passions de l’âme, article xlvii: En quoi consistent les combats qu’on a coutume d’imaginer entre la partie inférieure et la supérieure de l’âme. He says in effect that the soul is a unit and the lower soul is the body. Cf. ibid. lxviii, where he rejects the concupiscible and the irascible.) to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing. We must admit that it does not. So I fancy it is not well said of the archer[*](Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 68: Plato . . . delights to prick the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric, and antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that the one is united by disunion (Symposium 187 A) or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow. But the epigram vanishes under logical analysis. For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler’s lines: He that will win his dame must doAs love does when he bends his bow,With one hand thrust his lady fromAnd with the other pull her home.) that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to. By all means, he said. Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink? We are indeed, he said, many and often. What then, said I, should one affirm about them? Is it not that there is[*](ἐνεῖναι μὲν . . . ἐνεῖναι δέ: the slight artificiality of the anaphora matches well with the Gorgian jingle κελεῦον . . . κωλῦον. Cf. Iambl. Protrept. p. 41 Postelli ἔστι γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὃ κελεύει καὶ κωλύει.) something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids? I think so. And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections[*](The pulls are distinguished verbally from the passions that are their instruments. νοσημάτων suggests the Stoic doctrine that passions are diseases. Cf. Cicero Tusc. iii. 4 perturbationes, and passim, and Philebus 45 C.) and diseases? Apparently. Not unreasonably, said I, shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational[*](λογιστικόν is one of Plato’s many synonyms for the intellectual principle. Cf. 441 C, 571 C, 587 D, 605 B. It emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion. Cf. Crito 46 B (one of the passages which the Christian apologists used to prove that Socrates knew the λόγος), Theaetetus 186 C ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν, and Laws 644 D. Aristotle Eth. 1139 a 12 somewhat differently.) and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter[*](ἐπτόηται: almost technical, as in Sappho’s ode, for the flutter of desire. ἀλόγιστον, though applied here to the ἐπιθυμητικόν only, suggests the bipartite division of Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1102 a 28.) and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion[*](So the bad steed which symbolizes the ἐπιθυμητικόν in Phaedrus 253 E is ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος.) of various repletions and pleasures. It would not be unreasonable but quite natural, he said, for us to think this. These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the Thumos[*](We now approach the distinctively Platonic sense of θυμός as the power of noble wrath, which, unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggets, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in the mortal soul of the Timaeus 69 D. In Laws 731 B-C Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, De ira, i. 9, and passim. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, Lord Brougham: Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger. The supine placidity of civilization is not favorable to animosity [Bacon’s word for θυμός]. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions, etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato.) or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these? Perhaps, he said, with one of these, the appetitive.

But, I said, I once heard a story[*](Socrates has heard and trusts a, to us, obscure anecdote which shows how emotion may act as a distinct principle rebuking the lower appetites or curiosities. Leontius is unknown, except for Bergk’s guess identifying him with the Leotrophides of a corrupt fragment of Theopompus Comicus, fr. 1 Kock, p. 739.) which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall,[*](He was following the outer side of the north wall up the city. Cf. Lysis 203 A, Frazer, Paus. ii. 40, Wachsmuth, Stadt Athen, i. p. 190.) becoming aware of dead bodies[*](The corpses were by, near, or with the executioner (ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι) whether he had thrown them into the pit (βάραθρον) or not.) that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he resisted[*](Cf. Antiphon fr. 18 Kock πληγείς, τέως μὲν ἐπεκράτει τῆς συμφορᾶς, etc., and Maids who shrieked to see the headsYet shrieking pressed more nigh.) and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, There, ye wretches,[*](He apostrophizes his eyes, in a different style from Romeo’s, Eyes, look your last.) take your fill of the fine spectacle! I too, he said, have heard the story. Yet, surely, this anecdote, I said, signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien. Yes, it does, he said. And do we not, said I, on many other occasions observe when his desires constrain a man contrary to his reason that he reviles himself and is angry with that within which masters him and that as it were in a faction of two parties the high spirit of such a man becomes the ally of his reason? But its[*](αὐτόν: we shift from the θυμός to the man and back again.) making common cause[*](ἀντιπράττειν: that is, opposite the reason. It may be construed with δεῖν or as the verb of αὐτόν. There are no real difficulties in the passage, though many have been found. The order of the words and the anacoluthon are intentional and effective. Cf. on 434 C. οὐκ ἂν . . . ποτέ is to literal understanding an exaggeration. But Plato is speaking of the normal action of uncorrupted θυμός. Plato would not accept the psychology of Euripides’ Medea (1079-1080): καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων. Cf. Dr. Loeb’s translation of Décharme, p. 340.) with the desires against the reason when reason whispers low[*](αἱροῦντος: cf. 604 C, and L. and S. s. v. A. II. 5.) Thou must not—that, I think, is a kind of thing you would not affirm ever to have perceived in yourself, nor, I fancy, in anybody else either. No, by heaven, he said. Again, when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong,[*](So Aristotle Rhet. 1380 b 17 οὐ γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, and Eth. Nic. 1135 b 28 ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. This is true only with Plato’s reservation γενναιότερος. The baser type is angry when in the wrong.) is it not true that the nobler he is the less is he capable of anger though suffering hunger and cold[*](Cf. Demosthenes xv. 10 for the same general idea.) and whatsoever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly therein, and as I say[*](ὃ λέγω: idiomatic, as I was saying.) his spirit refuses to be aroused against such a one? True, he said. But what when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his spirit in that case[*](ἐν τούτῳ: possibly in such an one, preferably in such a case.θυμός is plainly the subject of ζεῖ. (Cf. the physiological definition in Aristotle De anima 403 a 31 ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν αἵματος), and so, strictly speaking, of all the other verbs down to λήγει. καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν . . . πάσχειν is best taken as a parenthesis giving an additional reason for the anger, besides the sense of injustice.) seethe and grow fierce (and also because of his suffering hunger, cold and the like) and make itself the ally of what he judges just, and in noble souls[*](τῶν γενναίων: i.e. the θυμός of the noble, repeating ὅσῳ ἂν γενναιότερος ᾖ above. The interpretation does not desist from his noble (acts) destroys this symmetry and has no warrant in Plato’s use of γενναῖος. Cf. 375 E, 459 A. The only argument against the view here taken is that θυμός is not the subject of λήγει, which it plainly is. The shift from θυμός to the man in what follows is no difficulty and is required only by τελευτήσῃ, which may well be a gloss. Cf. A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.) it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called back by the reason within and calmed. Your similitude is perfect, he said, and it confirms[*](καίτοι γε calls attention to the confirmation supplied by the image. Cf on 376 B, and my article in Class. Journ. vol. iii. p. 29.) our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city. You apprehend my meaning excellently, said I. But do you also take note of this? Of what? That what we now think about the spirited element is just the opposite of our recent surmise. For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far from that, we say that, in the factions[*](Cf. 440 B and Phaedrus 237 E.) of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason. By all means, he said.

Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?We have to assume it as a third, he said. Yes, said I, provided[*](It still remains to distinguish the λογιστικόν from θυμός, which is done first by pointing out that young children and animals possess θυμός (Cf. Laws 963 E, Aristotle Politics 1334 b 22 ff.), and by quoting a line of Homer already cited in 390 D, and used in Phaedo 94 E, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct from the passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the mortal soul of the Timaeus. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 42-43.) it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive. That is not hard to be shown, he said; for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late. Yes, by heaven, excellently said, I replied; and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above:

1. He smote his breast and chided thus his heart.