Republic

No, we mustn’t.Do you think, said I, that there is any difference between the nature of a well-bred hound for this watch-dog’s work and of a well-born lad? What point have you in mind? I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended,[*](αἰσθανόμενον: present. There is no pause between perception and pursuit.) and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive. Why, yes, said he, there is need of all these qualities. And it must, further, be brave[*](In common parlance. Philosophically speaking, no brute is brave. Laches 196 D, 430 B.) if it is to fight well. Of course. And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or anything else? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,[*](Anger (or the heart’s desire?) buys its will at the price of life, as Heracleitus says (fr. 105 Bywater). Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1105 a 9, 1116 b 23.) the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable? I have. The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious. Yes. And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit. Yes, this too. How then, Glaucon, said I, will they escape being savage to one another[*](Cf. Spencer, Psychology 511: Men cannot be kept unsympathetic towards external enemies without being kept unsympathetic towards internal enemies. For what follows cf. Dio Chrys. Or. i. 44 R., Julian, Or. ii. 86 D.) and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature? Not easily, by Zeus, said he. And yet we must have them gentle to their friends and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about. True, he said. What, then, are we to do? said I. Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an opposition[*](The contrast of the strenuous and gentle temperamnets is a chief point in Platonic ethics and education. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 59, 70, 481.) between the spirited type and the gentle nature. There does. But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so the result is that a good guardian is impossible. It seems likely, he said. And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, I said, We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves.[*](Plato never really deduces his argument from the imagery which he uses to illustrate it.) What do you mean? We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities. Where? It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know. I am aware of that. The thing is possible, then, said I, and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian. It seems not. And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?

How so? he said; I don’t apprehend your meaning. This too, said I, is something that you will discover in dogs and which is worth our wonder in the creature. What? That the sight of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any injury, but an acquaintance he will fawn upon though he has never received any kindness from him. Have you never marvelled at that? I never paid any attention to the matter before now, but that he acts in some such way is obvious. But surely that is an exquisite trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom.[*](φιλόσοφον: etymologically here, as ὡς ἀληθῶς indicates. Your dog now is your only philosopher, says Plato, not more seriously than Rabelais (Prologue): Mais vistes vous oncques chien rencontrant quelque os medullaire: c’est comme dit Platon, lib. ii. de Rep., la beste du monde plus philosophe. Cf. Huxley, Hume , p. 104: The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not a general idea of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion? Dummler and others assume that Plato is satirizing the Cynics, but who were the Cynics in 380-370 B.C.?) In what respect, pray? In respect, said I, that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you,[*](καίτοι πῶς: humorous oratorical appeal. Cf. 360 C καίτοι.) can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance? It certainly cannot, he said. But you will admit, said I, that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same? The same, he said. Then may we not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that if he is to be in some sort gentle to friends and familiars he must be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning? Let us so assume, he replied. The love of wisdom, then, and high spirit and quickness and strength will be combined for us in the nature of him who is to be a good and true guardian of the state. By all means, he said. Such, then, I said, would be the basis[*](Cf. 343 E. ὑπάρχοι marks the basis of nature as opposed to teaching.) of his character. But the rearing of these men and their education, how shall we manage that? And will the consideration of this topic advance us in any way towards discerning what is the object of our entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw it out to tiresome length? And Glaucon’s brother replied, Certainly, I expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end. Certainly, then, my dear Adeimantus, said I, we must not abandon it even if it prove to be rather long. No, we must not. Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fables[*](Cf. Introduction pp. xxi-xxii, and Phaedrus 276 E.) and had ample leisure,[*](Plato likes to contrast the leisure of philosophy with the hurry of business and law. Cf. Theaetetus 172 C-D.) let us educate these men in our discourse. So we must. What, then, is our education?[*](For the abrupt question cf. 360 E. Plato here prescribes for all the guardians, or military class, the normal Greek education in music and gymnastics, purged of what he considers its errors. A higher philosophic education will prepare a selected few for the office of guardians par excellence or rulers. Quite unwarranted is the supposition that the higher education was not in Plato’s mind when he described the lower. Cf. 412 A, 429 D-430 C, 497 C-D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 650.) Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered?[*](For this conservative argument Cf. Politicus 300 B, Laws 844 A.) Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body[*](Qualified in 410 C. μουσική is playing the lyre, music, poetry, letters, culture, philosophy, according to context.) and for the soul music. It is. And shall we not begin education in music earlier than in gymnastics? Of course. And under music you include tales, do you not? I do. And tales are of two species, the one true and the other false[*](A slight paradox to surprise attention.)? Yes.