Republic

Then, my friend, we must still further enlarge our city by no small increment, but by a whole army, that will march forth and fight it out with assailants in defence of all our wealth and the luxuries we have just described.How so? he said; are the citizens themselves[*](Cf. 567 E τί δέ; αὐτόθεν. In the fourth century it was found that amateur soldiers could not compete with professionals, and war became a trade (Butcher, Demosthenes p. 17). Plato arrives at the same result by his principle one man one task (370 A-B). He is not here making citizens synonymous with soldiers nor laconizing as Adam says.) not sufficient for it? Not if you, said I, and we all were right in the admission we made when we were molding our city. We surely agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well. True, he said. Well, then, said I, don’t you think that the business of fighting is an art and a profession? It is indeed, he said. Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler’s art than for the art of war? By no means. Can we suppose,[*](For the thought of this a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 421 A.) then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that[*](ἵνα δή ironical.) we might have the cobbler’s business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure[*](Cf. 370 B-C.) from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easy[*](The ironical argument ex contrario is continued with fresh illustrations to the end of the chapter.) that a man who is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practise that and nothing else from childhood[*](Cf. on 467 A.) but treated it as an occasional business? And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that very day a competent combatant in heavy armor or in any other form of warfare—though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the science[*](For the three requisites, science, practice, and natural ability Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, note 596, and my paper on Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη, Tr. A. Ph. A. vol. xl., 1910.) of it nor sufficiently practised themselves in its use? Great indeed, he said, would be the value of tools in that case.[*](Cf. Thucydides ii. 40.) Then, said I, in the same degree that the task of our guardians[*](First mention. Cf. 428 D note, 414 B.) is the greatest of all, it would require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training. I think so, said he. Does it not also require a nature adapted to that very pursuit? Of course. It becomes our task, then, it seems, if we are able, to select which and what kind of natures are suited for the guardianship of a state. Yes, ours. Upon my word, said I, it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint so far as our strength allows.

No, we mustn’t.Do you think, said I, that there is any difference between the nature of a well-bred hound for this watch-dog’s work and of a well-born lad? What point have you in mind? I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended,[*](αἰσθανόμενον: present. There is no pause between perception and pursuit.) and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive. Why, yes, said he, there is need of all these qualities. And it must, further, be brave[*](In common parlance. Philosophically speaking, no brute is brave. Laches 196 D, 430 B.) if it is to fight well. Of course. And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or anything else? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,[*](Anger (or the heart’s desire?) buys its will at the price of life, as Heracleitus says (fr. 105 Bywater). Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1105 a 9, 1116 b 23.) the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable? I have. The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious. Yes. And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit. Yes, this too. How then, Glaucon, said I, will they escape being savage to one another[*](Cf. Spencer, Psychology 511: Men cannot be kept unsympathetic towards external enemies without being kept unsympathetic towards internal enemies. For what follows cf. Dio Chrys. Or. i. 44 R., Julian, Or. ii. 86 D.) and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature? Not easily, by Zeus, said he. And yet we must have them gentle to their friends and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about. True, he said. What, then, are we to do? said I. Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an opposition[*](The contrast of the strenuous and gentle temperamnets is a chief point in Platonic ethics and education. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 59, 70, 481.) between the spirited type and the gentle nature. There does. But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so the result is that a good guardian is impossible. It seems likely, he said. And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, I said, We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves.[*](Plato never really deduces his argument from the imagery which he uses to illustrate it.) What do you mean? We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities. Where? It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know. I am aware of that. The thing is possible, then, said I, and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian. It seems not. And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?