Republic

And they produce a bushel[*](ὅμαδον, lit. noise, hubbub, babel, here contemptuous. There is no need of the emendation ὁπμαθόν. Cf. 387 A, and Kern, Orphicorum Fragmenta, p. 82; cf. John Morley, Lit. Studies, p. 184, A bushel of books.) of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport[*](Cf. Laws 819 B.) for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice. What, Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them all the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life? Such a youth[*](Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 25: His (Plato’s) imagination was beset by the picture of some brilliant young Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in his mind whether the best chance for happiness lay in accepting the conventional moral law that serves to police the vulgar or in giving rein to the instincts and appetites of his own stronger nature. To confute the one, to convince the other, became to him the main problem of moral philosophy. Cf. Introduction x-xi; also The Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 214.) would most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks,

Is it by justice or by crooked deceit that I the higher tower shall scale and so live my life out in fenced and guarded security?

the seeming

masters the reality

And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice from fruits of our wrongdoing.[*](Cf. Verres’ distribution of his three years’ spoliation of Sicily, Cicero In C. Verrem actio prima 14 (40), and Plato Laws 906 C-D, Lysias xxvii. 6.) For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits of injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall win those profits, and, by the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we shall be brought to judgement in the world below for our unjust deeds here, we or our children’s children. Nay, my dear sir, our calculating friend[*](His morality is the hedonistic calculus of the Protagoras or the commercial religion of other-wordliness.) will say, here again the rites for the dead[*](For these τελεταί cf. 365 A.) have much efficacy, and the absolving divinities, as the greatest cities declare, and the sons of gods, who became the poets and prophets[*](Or rather mouthpieces.) of the gods, and who reveal that this is the truth. On what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice? If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our heart’s desire, with gods and men in life and death, as the words of the multitude and of men of the highest authority declare. In consequence, then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates, that any man who has the power of any resources of mind, money, body, or family should consent to honor justice and not rather laugh[*](Aristophanes Clouds 1241.) when he hears her praised? In sooth, if anyone is able to show the falsity of these arguments, and has come to know with sufficient assurance that justice is best, he feels much indulgence for the unjust, and is not angry with them, but is aware that except a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it, no one else is willingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some other weakness[*](Cf. Gorgias 492 A.) that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practise it. The fact is patent. For no sooner does such one come into the power than he works injustice to the extent of his ability. And the sole cause of all this is the fact that was the starting-point of this entire plea of my friend here and of myself to you, Socrates, pointing out how strange it is that of all you self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old whose discourses survive to the men of the present day, not one has ever censured injustice or commended justice otherwise than in respect of the repute, the honors, and the gifts that accrue from each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose—the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good.

For if you had all spoken in this way from the beginning and from our youth up had sought to convince us, we should not now be guarding against one another’s injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in communion with the greatest of evils.[*](Cf. 363 E.) This, Socrates, and perhaps even more than this, Thrasymachus and haply another might say in pleas for and against justice and injustice, inverting their true potencies, as I believe, grossly. But I— for I have no reason to hide anything from you—am laying myself out to the utmost on the theory, because I wish to hear its refutation from you. Do not merely show us by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself does to its possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good. But do away with the repute of both, as Glaucon urged. For, unless you take away from either the true repute and attach to each the false, we shall say that it is not justice that you are praising but the semblance, nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that you are at one with Thrasymachus in the opinion that justice is other man’s good,[*](Cf. 343 C.) the advantage of the other, and that injustice is advantageous and profitible to oneself but disadvantageous to the inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the class of those highest goods which are desirable both for their consequences and still more for their own sake, as sight, hearing, intelligence, yes and health too, and all other goods that are productive[*](Adam’s note on γόνιμα: i.q. γνήσια is, I think, wrong.) by their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which injustice inherently works upon its possessor. But the rewards and the honors that depend on opinion, leave to others to praise. For while I would listen to others who thus commended justice and disparaged injustice, bestowing their praise and their blame on the reputation and the rewards of either, I could not accept that sort of thing from you unless you say I must, because you have passed your entire life[*](Cf. 506 C.) in the consideration of this very matter. Do not then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil.

While I had always admired the natural parts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially pleased by their words on this occasion, and said:

1. It was excellently spoken of you, sons of the man we know,

Sons of Ariston,[*](The implied pun on the name is made explicit in 580 C-D. Some have held that Glaucon and Adeimantus were uncles of Plato, but Zeller decides for the usual view that they wre brothers. Cf. Ph. d. Gr. ii. 1, 4th ed. 1889, p. 392, and Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad., 1873, Hist.-Phil Kl. pp. 86 ff.) whose race from a glorious sire is god-like.

Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less.I think that is a good suggestion, he said. If, then, said I, our argument should observe the origin[*](Lit., coming into being. Cf. Introduction p. xiv. So Aristotle Politics i. 1, but iv. 4 he criticizes Plato.) of a state, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it. It may be, said he. And if this is done, we may expect to find more easily what we are seeking? Much more. Shall we try it, then, and go through with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then. We have reflected,[*](C’est tout reflechi.) said Adeimantus; proceed and don’t refuse. The origin of the city, then, said I, in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs,[*](Often imitated, as e.g. Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 10: Forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with a competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire . . . therefore to supply these defects . . . we are naturally inclined to seek communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting themselves at first in civil societies.) but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state? No other, said he. As a result of this, then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state, do we not? By all means. And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself. Certainly. Come, then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs. Obviously. Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life.[*](Aristotle says that the city comes into being for the sake of life, but exists for the sake of the good life, which, of course, is also Plato’s view of the true raison d’etre of the state. Cf. Laws 828 D and Crito 48 B.)Assuredly. The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing. That is so. Tell me, then, said I, how our city will suffice for the provision of all these things. Will there not be a farmer for one, and a builder, and then again a weaver? And shall we add thereto a cobbler and some other purveyor for the needs of body? Certainly. The indispensable minimum of a city, then, would consist of four or five men. Apparently.

What of this, then? Shall each of these contribute his work for the common use of all? I mean shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion of the food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with other people, but, himself for himself, mind his own affairs?[*](It is characteristic of Plato’s drama of ideas to give this kind of rhetorical advantage to the expression of the view that he intends to reject. In what follows Plato anticipates the advantages of the division of labor as set forth in Adam Smith, with the characteristic exception of its stimulus to new inventions. Cf. Introduction xv.) And Adeimantus said, But, perhaps, Socrates, the former way is easier. It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange, said I; for now that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another. Don’t you think so? I do. Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one? One at one, he said. And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that if one lets slip the right season, the favorable moment in any task, the work is spoiled. Obvious. That, I take it, is because the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but the workman must attend to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work. He must indeed. The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations. By all means. Then, Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens for the provision of the things we have mentioned. For the farmer, it appears, will not make his own plough if it is to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor his other agricultural implements, nor will the builder, who also needs many; and similarly the weaver and cobbler. True. Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it considerably. Certainly. Yet it still wouldn’t be very large even if we should add to them neat-herds and shepherds and other herders, so that the farmers might have cattle for ploughing,[*](Butcher’s meat and pork appear first in the luxurious city, 373 C. We cannot infer that Plato was a vegetarian.) and the builders oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and cobblers hides and fleeces for their use. It wouldn’t be a small city, either, if it had all these. But further, said I, it is practically impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not need imports. It is. There will be a further need, then, of those who will bring in from some other city what it requires. There will.

And again, if our servitor goes forth empty-handed, not taking with him any of the things needed by those from whom they procure what they themselves require, he will come back with empty hands, will he not?I think so.Then their home production must not merely suffice for themselves but in quality and quantity meet the needs of those of whom they have need.It must.So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen.Yes, more.And also of other ministrants who are to export and import the merchandise. These are traders, are they not?Yes.We shall also need traders, then.Assuredly.And if the trading is carried on by sea, we shall need quite a number of others who are expert in maritime business.Quite a number.But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the products of their labor? This was the very purpose of our association and establishment of a state.Obviously, he said, by buying and selling. A market-place, then, and money as a token[*](Aristotle adds that the medium of exchange must of itself have value (Politics 1257 a 36).) for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this. By all means. If, then, the farmer or any other craftsman taking his products to the market-place does not arrive at the same time with those who desire to exchange with him, is he to sit idle in the market-place and lose time from his own work? By no means, he said, but there are men who see this need and appoint themselves for this service—in well-conducted cities they are generally those who are weakest[*](Similarly in Laws 918-920.) in body and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy. This need, then, said I, creates the class of shopkeepers in our city. Or is not shopkeepers the name we give to those who, planted in the agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city merchants? Certainly. And there are, furthermore, I believe, other servitors who in the things of the mind are not altogether worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of body is sufficient for toil; so they, selling the use of this strength and calling the price wages, are designated, I believe, wage-earners, are they not? Certainly. Wage-earners, then, it seems, are the complement that helps to fill up the state.[*](Aristotle (Politics 1254 b 18) says that those, the use of whose bodies is the best they have to offer, are by nature slaves. Cf Jesus of Sirach xxxviii. 36 ἄνευ αὐτῶν οὐκ οἰκισθήσεται πόλις. So Carlyle, and Shakespeare on Caliban: We cannot miss him (Tempest, I. ii).) I think so. Has our city, then, Adeimantus, reached its full growth and is it complete? Perhaps. Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with which of the constituents that we have considered does it come into the state?

I cannot conceive, Socrates, he said, unless it be in some need that those very constituents have of one another. Perhaps that is a good suggestion, said I; we must examine it and not hold back. First of all, then, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men thus provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part unclad and unshod and in winter clothed and shod sufficiently? And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds or clean leaves, and, reclined on rustic beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking of their wine thereto, garlanded and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means lest they fall into poverty or war? Here Glaucon broke in: No relishes[*](ὄψον is anything eaten with bread, usually meat or fish, as Glaucon means; but Socrates gives it a different sense.) apparently, he said, for the men you describe as feasting. True said I; I forgot that they will also have relishes—salt, of course, and olives and cheese and onions and greens, the sort of things they boil in the country, they will boil up together. But for dessert we will serve them figs and chickpeas and beans, and they will toast myrtle-berries and acorns before the fire, washing them down with moderate potations and so, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and hand on a like life to their offspring. And he said, If you were founding a city of pigs,[*](Cf. Introduction p. xiv. By the mouth of the fine gentleman, Glaucon, Plato expresses with humorous exaggeration his own recognition of the inadequacy for ethical and social philosophy of his idyllic ideal. Cf. Mandeville, Preface to Fable of the Bees: A golden age must be as free/ For acorns as for honesty.) Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide? Why, what would you have, Glaucon? said I. What is customary, he replied; They must recline on couches, I presume, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have made dishes and sweetmeats such as are now in use. Good, said I, I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn’t such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder.