Republic

And truly, I said, many other considerations assure me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry.[*](In Book III. On the whole question see Introd. Max. Tyr. Diss. 23 Εἰ καλῶς Πλάτων Ὅμηρον τῆς Πολιτείας παρῃτήσατο, and 32 ἔστι καθ’ Ὅμηρον αἵρεσις. Strabo i. 2 3. Athenaeus v. 12. 187 says that Plato himself in the Symposium wrote worse things than the poets whom he banishes. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 138, thinks that the return to the poets in Book X. is intended to justify the poetry of Plato’s dialogues. On the banishment of the poets and Homer cf. also Minucius Felix (Halm), pp. 32-33, Tertullian (Oehler), lib. ii. c. 7, Olympiodorus, Hermann vi. p. 367, Augustine, De civ. Dei, ii. xiv.) What about it? he said. In refusing to admit[*](Supra 394 D, 568 B, and on 398 A-B, 607 A.) at all so much of it as is imitative[*](In the narrower sense. Cf. Vol. I. p. 224, note c, on 392 D, and What Plato Said, p. 561.); for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think, still more plainly apparent now that we have distinguished the several parts[*](Lit. species. Cf. 435 B ff., 445 C, 580 D, 588 B ff., Phaedr. 271 D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42.) of the soul. What do you mean? Why, between ourselves[*](Cf. Gorg. 462 B, Protag. 309 A, 339 E.)—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption[*](Cf. 605 C, Meno 91 C, Laws 890 B.) of the mind of all listeners who do not possess, as an antidote[*](φάρμακον: this passage is the source of Plutarch’s view of literature in education; see Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat 15 C.) a knowledge of its real nature. What is your idea in saying this? he said. I must speak out, I said, though a certain love and reverence for Homer[*](Isoc. ii. 48-49 is perhaps imitating this. For Homer as a source of tragedy cf. also 598 D, 605 C-D, 607 A, 602 B, Theaet. 152 E, schol. Trendelenburg, pp. 75 ff.; Dryden, Discourse on Epic Poetry: The origin of the stage was from the epic poem . . . those episodes of Homer which were proper for the state the poets amplifies each into an action, etc. Cf. Aristot. Poet. 1448 b 35 f., Diog. Laert. iv. 40, and 393 A ff.) that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honor a man above truth,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 532, on Phaedo 91 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1096 a 16 ἄμφοιν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, Henri-Pierre Cazac, Polémique d’Aristote contre la théorie platonicienne des Idées, p. 11, n.: Platon lui-même, critiquant Homère, . . . fait une semblabe réflexion, On doit plus d’égards à la vérité qu’à un homme. Cousin croit, après Camérarius, que c’est là l’origine du mot célèbre d’Aristote. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei. x. 30 homini praeposuit veritatem.) but, as I say, speak our minds. By all means, he said. Listen, then, or rather, answer my question. Ask it, he said. Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at. It is likely, then,[*](For ἦ που Cf. Phaedo 84 D.) he said, that I should apprehend!

It would be nothing strange, said I, since it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener.[*](Perhaps a slight failure in Attic courtesy. Cf. Laws 715 D-E, and for ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων927 B, Euthydem. 281 D, Rep. 404 A, Themist. Orat. ii. p. 32 C. Cf. the saying πολλάκι καὶ κηποῦρος ἀνὴρ μάλα καίριον εἶπεν.) That is so, he said; but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it. Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure[*](Cf. Phaedo 76 D, 100 B, Phileb. 16 D, 479 E, Thompson on Meno 72 D. See Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1. p. 660. The intentional simplicity of Plato’s positing of the concept here (cf. 597 A), and his transition from the concept to the idea, has been mistaken for a primitive aspect of his thought by many interpreters. It is quite uncritical to use Aristot. Met. 991 b 6 ff. to prove that Plato’s later theory of ideas did not recognize ideas of artefacts, and therefore that this passage represents an earlier phase of the theory. He deliberately expresses the theory as simply as possible, and a manufactured object suits his purpose here as it does in Cratyl. 389. See also ibid, Introd. pp. xxii-xxiii.)? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form[*](Forms with a capital letter is even more misleading than ideas.) in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand? I do. In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables. Of course. But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table. Yes. And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes[*](Cf. Cratyl. 389 A-B. There is no contradiction, as many say, with 472 D.) on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he? By no means. But now consider what name you would give to this craftsman. What one? Him who makes all the things[*](Cf. Emerson, The Poet: and therefore the rich poets—as Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare and Raphael—have no limits to their riches except the limits of their lifetime, and resemble a mirror carried through the streets ready to render an image of every created thing. (Cf. 596 D-E κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν and Julian, Or. v. 163 D.) Empedocles, fr. 23 (Diels i.3 pp. 234-235): ὡς δ’ ὁπόταν γραφέες . . . δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας . . . ) that all handicraftsmen severally produce. A truly clever and wondrous man you tell of. Ah, but wait,[*](Climax beyond climax. Cf. on 508 E p. 104, note c.) and you will say so indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself,[*](It is a tempting error to refer this to God, as I once did, and as Wilamowitz, Platon. i. p. 604 does. So Cudworth, True Intel. System of the Universe, vol. ii. p. 70: Lastly, he is called ὃς πάντα τά τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτόν, he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself. But the producer of everything, including himself, is the imitator generalized and then exemplified by the painter and the poet. Cf. Soph. 234 A-B.) and thereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth. A most marvellous sophist,[*](Eurip. Hippol. 921 δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας.) he said. Are you incredulous? said I. Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense there could be such a creator of all these things, and in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that you yourself would be able to make all these things in a way? And in what way,[*](καὶ τίς is sceptical as in Aristoph. Acharn. 86.) I ask you, he said. There is no difficulty, said I, but it is something that the craftsman can make everywhere and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke. Yes, he said, the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth. Excellent, said I, and you come to the aid of the argument opportunely. For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class of producers, does he not? Of course. But you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter[*](Art is deception. Diels ii.3 p. 339, Dialex. 3 (10) ἐν γὰρ τραγωιδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις κε πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος, Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 1 γραφική ἐστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων. Cf. Plut. Quomodo adolescens 17 F-18 A on painting and poetry. There are many specious resemblances between Plato’s ideas on art and morality and those of the lunatic fringe of Platonism. Cf. Jane Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, pp. 21-22, Charles F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi’s Ideas, p. 332. William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 89: In the tenth book of the Republic he says that, whereas the artificer in making any material object imitates the eternal idea, an artist only imitates the imitation (595 A-598 D); but in Book V he said that we do not blame an artist who depicts a face more beautiful than any actual human face either is or ever could be (472 D). But this does not affect Plato’s main point here, that the artist imitates the real world, not the world of ideas. The artist’s imitation may fall short of or better its model. But the model is not the (Platonic) idea.) too makes a couch, does he not? Yes, he said, the appearance of one, he too.

What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not just now saying that he does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in itself,[*](ὃ ἔστι belongs to the terminology of ideas. Cf. Phaedo 74 D, 75 B, 75 D, Rep. 507 B.) but only some particular couch?Yes, I was.Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense[*](τελέως . . . ὄν: Cf. 477 A, and Soph. 248 E παντελῶς ὄντι.) belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true.That would be the view, he said, of those who are versed[*](An indirect reference to Plato and his school like the friends of ideas in Soph. 248 A.) in this kind of reasoning. We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality. No, we must not. Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this imitator? If you please, he said. We get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature[*](Cf. 597 C, 598 A, 501 B φύσει, Phaedo 103 B, Parmen. 132 D.) which, I take it, we would say that God produces,[*](Proclus says that this is not seriously meant (apud Beckmann, Num Plato artifactorum Ideas statuerit, p. 12). Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1, p. 666, who interprets the passage correctly; A. E. Taylor, in Mind, xii. p. 5 Plato’s meaning has been supposed to be adequately indicted by such half-jocular instances as that of the idea of a bed or table in Republic x., etc.) or who else? No one, I think. And then there was one which the carpenter made. Yes, he said. And one which the painter. Is not that so? So be it. The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches. Yes,three. Now God,whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was laid upon him[*](In Tim. 31 A the same argument is used for the creation of one world ἵνα . . . κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ. See my De Plat. Idearum doct. p. 39. Cf. Renan, Dialogues Phil. p. 25: Pour forger les premières tenailles, dit le Talmud, il fallut des tenailles. Dieu les créa.) not to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought and created one only,[*](The famous argument of the third man. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 585, on Parmen. 132 A and Introd. p. xxiii.) the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being. How so? he said. Because, said I, if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two. Right, he said. God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique. So it seems. Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind? That would certainly be right, he said, since it is by and in nature[*](Cf. Soph. 265 E θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 3. 4 those things which Nature is said to do are by divine art preformed, using nature as an instrument, Browne, apud J. Texte, Etudes de littérature européenne, p. 65 la nature est l’art de Dieu, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. 13 deoque tribuenda, id est mundo, De leg. i. 7. 21, Seneca, De benef. iv. 7 quid enim aliud est natura quam deus? Höffding, Hist. of Mod. Philos. ii. 115 Herder uses the word Nature in his book in order to avoid the frequent mention of the name of God.) that he has made this and all other things. And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of a couch? Yes. Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that sort of thing? By no means. What will you say he is in relation to the couch? This, said he, seems to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which those others produce. Very good, said I; the producer of the product three removes[*](Cf. 587 C, Phaedr. 248 E, where the imitator is sixth in the scale.) from nature you call the imitator? By all means, he said. This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators. It would seem so.

We are in agreement, then, about the imitator. But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen?The works of the craftsmen, he said. Is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point.[*](Cf. Gorg. 488 D, Soph. 222 C.) What do you mean? he said. This: Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things? That is the way of it, he said: it appears other but differs not at all. Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is[*](Cf. Soph. 263 B, Cratyl. 385 B, Euthydem. 284 C.) or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth? Of a phantasm,[*](Cf. 599 A, Soph. 232 A, 234 E, 236 B, Prot. 356 D.) he said. Then the mimetic art is far removed[*](Cf. 581 E.) from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom[*](For εἴδωλον cf. p. 197, note e.); as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts,[*](Commentators sometimes miss the illogical idiom. So Adam once proposed to emend τεχνῶν to τεχνίτων, but later withdrew this suggestion in his note on the passage. Cf. 373 C, Critias 111 E, and my paper in T.A.P.A. xlvii. (1916) pp. 205-234.) but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and foolish men,[*](Cf. Soph. 234 B.) and make them believe it to be a real carpenter. Why not? But for all that, my friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind in all such cases: When anyone reports to us of someone, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts and everything else[*](So Dryden, Essay on Satire: Shakespeare . . . Homer . . . in either of whom we find all arts and sciences, all moral and natural philosophy without knowing that they ever studied them, and the beautiful rhapsody of Andrew Lang, Letters to Dead Authors, p. 238: They believe not that one human soul has known every art, and all the thoughts of women as of men, etc. Pope, pref. to his translation of the Iliad: If we reflect upon those innumerable knowledges, those secrets of nature and physical philosophy which Homer is generally supposed to have wrapped up in his allegories, what a new and ample scene of wonder may this consideration afford us. Cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 6. Brunetière, Epoques, p. 105, says: Corneille . . . se piquait de connaître à fond l’art de la politique et celui de la guerre. For the impossibility of universal knowledge Cf. Soph. 233 A, Charm. 170 B, Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 146 on Hipp. Min. 366 C ff. Cf. also Ion 536 E, 541 B, 540 B, and Tim. 19 D. Tate, Plato and Allegorical Interpretation, Class. Quarterly, Jan. 1930, p. 2 says: The true poet is for Plato philosopher as well as poet. He must know the truth. This ignores the ἄρα in 598 E. Plato there is not stating his own opinion but giving the arguments of those who claim omniscience for the poet. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 313 n. 1 completely misunderstands and misinterprets the passage. Cf. Class. Phil. xxvii. (1932) p. 85. E.E. Sikes, The Greek View of Poetry, p. 175, says Rymer held that a poet is obliged to know all arts and sciences. Aristotle from a different point of view says we expect the wise man to know everything in the sense in which that is possible, Met. 982 a 8.) that men severally know, and that there is nothing that he does not know[*](Cf. οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχί Charm. 175 C, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ Ala. I 105 E, Phil. 54 B, Phaedo 110 E, Euthyph. 3 C, Euthydem. 294 D, Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Herod. v. 97.) more exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise,[*](πάσσοφος is generally ironical in Plato. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 489, on Lysis 216 A.) because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance[*](For ἀνεπιστημοσύνην Cf. Theaet. 199 E f.) and imitation. Most true, he said. Then, said I, have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer,[*](For Homer as tragedian cf. on 595 B-C, p. 420, note a.) since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create.

So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking upon their works they cannot perceive that these are three removes from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms,[*](Cf. on 598 B.) not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well?We certainly must examine the matter, he said. Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms[*](Cf. 598 B.) and set this in the forefront of his life as the best thing he had? I do not. But, I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real things[*](Cf. Petit de Julleville, Hist. lit. francaise vii. p. 233, on the poet Lamartine’s desire to be a practical statesman, and ibid: Quand on m’apprendrait que le divin Homère a refusé les charges municipales de Smyrne ou de Colophon, je ne croirais jamais qu’il eût pu mieux mériter de la Grèce en administrant son bourg natal qu’en composant l’Iliade et l’Odyssée.) than to the imitation of them, and would endeavor to leave after him many noble deeds[*](But Cf. Symp. 209 D.) and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser. I think so, he said; for there is no parity in the honor and the gain. Let us not, then, demand a reckoning[*](For the challenge to the poet to specify his knowledge Cf. Ion 536 E f.) from Homer or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician’s talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health as Asclepius did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after him as Asclepius did his descendants; and let us dismiss the other arts and not question them about them; but concerning the greatest and finest things of which Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship[*](Cf. Ion 541 A f.) and the administration of cities and the education of men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imitator, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you,[*](Cf. Gorg. 515 B, Laches 186 B.) even as Lacedaemon was because of Lycurgus,[*](Cf. Laws 630 D, 632 D, 858 E, Symp. 209 D, Phaedr. 258 B, Minos 318 C, Herod. i. 65-66, Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 2 and passim, Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus. ) and many other cities great and small because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them? Italy and Sicily say this of Charondas and we of Solon.[*](Cf. Symp. 209 D, Phaedr. 258 B, 278 C, Charm. 155 A, 157 E, Prot. 343 A, Tim. 20 E ff., Herod. i. 29 ff. and 86, ii. 177, v. 113, Aristot. Ath. Pol. v. ff., Diog. Laert. i. 45 ff., Plutarch, Life of Solon,Freeman, The Work and Life of Solon. ) But who says it of you? Will he be able to name any? I think not, said Glaucon; at any rate none is mentioned even by the Homerids themselves.

Well, then, is there any tradition of a war in Homer’s time that was well conducted by his command or counsel?None.Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions[*](On the literature of inventions, εὑρήματα, see Newman ii. p. 382 on Aristot. Pol. 1274 b 4. Cf. Virgil, Aen. vi. 663 inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes, and Symp. 209 A.) for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as they are of Thales[*](Diog. Laert. i. 23-27.) the Milesian and Anacharsis[*](Diog. Laert. i. 105 says he was reported to be the inventor of the anchor and the potter’s wheel.) the Scythian?Nothing whatever of the sort.Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric way of life[*](In the (spurious?) seventh epistle, 328 A, Plato speaks of the life and λόγος advocated by himself. Cf. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 168.) just as Pythagoras[*](Diels i3 pp. 27 f.) was himself especially honored for this, and his successors, even to this day, denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean,[*](Cf. ὀρφικοὶ . . . βίοι Laws 782 C.) are distinguished among their contemporaries?No, nothing of this sort either is reported; for Creophylos,[*](Of the beef-clan. The scholiast says he was a Chian and an epic poet. See Callimachus’s epigram apud Sext. Empir., Bekker, p. 609 (Adv. Math. i. 48), and Suidas s. v. κρεώφυλος ) Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps be even more ridiculous than his name[*](Modern Greeks also are often very sensitive to the etymology of proper names. Cf. also on 580 B, p. 369, note d.) as a representative of Homeric culture and education, if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh.Why, yes, that is the tradition, said I; but do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really been able to educate men[*](See on 540 B, p. 230, note d.) and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them? But are we to believe that while Protagoras[*](Cf. Prot. 315 A-B, 316 C.) of Abdera and Prodicus[*](See What Plato Said, p. 486, on Laches 197 D.) of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city[*](For διοικεῖν Cf. Protag. 318 E.) unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom[*](See Thompson on Meno 70 B.) that their companions all but[*](On μόνον οὐκ Cf. Menex. 235 C, Ax. 365 B.) carry them about on their shoulders,[*](Stallbaum refers to Themist. Orat. xxii. p. 254 A ὃν ἡμεῖς διὰ ταύτην τὴν φαντασίαν μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρομεν, Erasmus, Chiliad iv. Cent. 7 n. 98 p. 794, and the German idiom einen auf den Händen tragen.) yet, forsooth, that Homer’s contemporaries, if he had been able to help men to achieve excellence,[*](Cf. Protag. 328 B.) would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their gold,[*](The article perhaps gives the word a contemptuous significance. So Meno 89 B τὸ χρυσίον.) and constrained them to dwell with them[*](οἴκοι εἶναι: J. J. Hartman, Ad Platonis Remp. 600 E, Mnem. 1916, p. 45, would change εἶναι to μεῖναι. But cf. Cic. Att. vii. 10 erimus una.) in their homes, or failing to persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wheresoever they went until they should have sufficiently imbibed their culture? What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates, he said.

Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer,[*](Cf. 366 E. Gorg. 471 C-D, Symp. 173 D.) are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they create,[*](Or about which they versify, playing with the double meaning of ποιεῖν.) and do not lay hold on truth? but, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler’s art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colors[*](For the association of χρώματα and σχήματα Cf. Phileb. 12 E. 47 A, 51 B, Laws 669 A, Soph. 251 A, Meno 75 A with Apelt’s note, Cratyl. 431 C, Gorg. 465 B, Phaedo 100 D, Aristot. Poet. 1447 a 18-19.)?Certainly.And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases[*](Cf. Symp. 198 B, Apol. 17 C. The explicit discrimination of ὀνόματα as names of agents and ῥήματα as names of actions is peculiar to Soph. 262. But Cf. Cratyl. 431 B, 425 A, Theaet. 206 D. And in Soph. 257 B ῥήματι is used generally. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 56-57. Cf. Euthydem. 304 E with Symp. 187 A, Phaedr. 228 D, 271 C and my note in Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) p. 262.) the colors of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 240 A.) will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, meter and harmony about cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell[*](Cf. 607 C, Laws 840 C, Protag. 315 A-B.) that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical coloring and taken by themselves,[*](Cf. Gorg. 502 C εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμόν, 392, Ion 530 b, Epicharmus apud Diog. Laert. iii. 17 περιδύσας τὸ μέτρον ὃ νῦν ἔχει, Aeschines, In Ctes. 136 περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον, Isoc. Evag. 11 τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ with Horace, Sat. i. 4. 62 invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae, Aristot. Rhet. 1404 a 24 ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν. Sext. Empir., Bekker, pp. 665-666 (Adv. Math. ii. 288), says that the ideas of poets are inferior to those of the ordinary layman. Cf. also Julian, Or. ii. 78 D, Coleridge, Table Talk: If you take from Virgil his diction and metre what do you leave him?) I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them.I have, he said. Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them?[*](Aristot. Rhet. 1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus 8 (6). 28 ὄφρ’ ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, Mimnermus i. 4 ἥβης ἄνθη γίγνεται ἁρπαλέα; Theognis 1305: παιδείας πλουηράτου ἄνθος ὠκύτερον σταδίου Xen. Symp. 8. 14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παρακμάζει, Plato, Symp. 183 E τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι ) By all means, he said. Come, then, said I, consider this point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance. Is not that so? Yes. Let us not, then, leave it half said but consider it fully. Speak on, he said. The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit. Yes. But the maker[*](The δέ γε has almost the effect of a retort.) will be the cobbler and the smith. Certainly. Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 10-11 καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἡ χαλινοποιικὴ. . .)? Most true. And shall we not say that the same holds true of everything? What do you mean? That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user’s art,[*](For the idea that the user knows best see Cratyl. 390 B, Euthydem. 289 B, Phaedr. 274 E. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.) ii. p. 247, attributes this pertinent observation to Aristotle. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1277 b 30 αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. See 1282 a 21, 1289 a 17. Coleridge, Table Talk: In general those who do things for others know more about them than those for whom they are done. A groom knows more about horses than his master. But Hazlitt disagrees with Plato’s view.) the maker’s, and the imitator’s. Yes. Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness[*](So in Laws 669 A-B, Plato says that the competent judge of a work of art must know three things, first, what it is, second, that it is true and right, and third, that it is good.) of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use[*](For the reference of beauty to use see Hipp. Maj. 295 C ff.) for which each is made or by nature adapted? That is so. It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him. Of course. The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make them. Yes.

Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have right belief[*](πίστιν ὀρθήν is used because of πιστεύων above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of δόξαν ὀρθήν below, 602 A. Cf. 511 E.) about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge.Certainly.And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion[*](This does not contradict book V. 477-478. For right opinion and knowledge cf. 430 B and What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B.)?Neither.Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations.It seems not.Most charming,[*](χαρίεις is ironical like χαριέντως in 426 A and καλόν in Theaet. 183 A, but Glaucon in his answer takes it seriously.) then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations.Not at all.Yet still he will none the less[*](Note the accumulation of particles in the Greek. Similarly in 619 B, Phaedo 59 D, 61 E, 62 B, 64 A, Parmen. 127 D, Demosth. xxiii. 101, De cor. 282, Pind. Pyth. iv. 64 A, Isoc. Peace 1, Aristot. De gen. et corr. 332 a 3, Iliad vii. 360.) imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude.Why, what else?On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play,[*](Cf. on 536 C, p. 214, note b.) not to be taken seriously,[*](Cf. 608 A.) and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse,[*](For ἐν ἔπεσι cf. 607 A, 379 A, Meno 95 D.) are all altogether imitators.By all means.In heaven’s name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not?Yes.And now again, to what element[*](The antithesis of περί and πρός marks the transition.) in man is its function and potency related?Of what are you speaking?Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far[*](Cf. Protag. 356 A, 523 C.) does not appear equal.Why, no.And the same things appear bent and straight[*](Cf. Tennyson (The Higher Pantheism) For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool. For the illusions of sense, and measurement as a means of correcting them Cf. Phileb. 41 E-42 A f., 55 E, Protag. 356 C-D, Euthyphro 7 C.) to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colors, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation[*](ἐπιθεμένη helps to personify σκιαγραφία. Cf. Gorg. 464 C.) of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft,[*](Adam’s leaves no magic art untried is misleading. ἀπολείπειν is here used as in 504 C. For the idiomatic οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει see p. 200, note b, on 533 A.) and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances.True.And have not measuring and numbering and weighing[*](Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 9.) proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently[*](Cf. Protag. 356 D ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις ) greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned[*](λογισάμενον: Cf. Laws 644 D, Crito 46 B.) and numbered or even weighed?Certainly.But this surely would be the function[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 36, note a. Of course some of the modern connotations of function are unknown to Plato.) of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.[*](For λογιστικοῦ cf. on 439 D.)Why, yes, of that.And often when this has measured[*](See p. 448, note c, and my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176.) and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary.Yes.And did we not say[*](436 B, Vol. I. p. 383.) that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?And we were right in affirming that.

The part of the soul, then, that opines in contradiction of measurement could not be the same with that which conforms to it.Why, no.But, further, that which puts its trust in measurement and reckoning must be the best part of the soul.Surely.Then that which opposes it must belong to the inferior elements of the soul.Necessarily.This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and is its companion and friend[*](Cf. 604 D, Phaedr. 253 D and E.) for no sound and true purpose.[*](Cf. Lysias ix. 4 ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ὑγιεῖ and for the idiom οὐδὲν ὑγιές on 523 B, p. 153, note f.)By all means, said he. Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring.[*](Cf. 496 A, and on 489 D, p. 26, note b.) It seems so. Does that, said I, hold only for vision or does it apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry? Presumably, he said, to that also. Let us not, then, trust solely to the plausible analogy[*](Cf. Phaedo 92 D διὰ τῶν εἰκότων.) from painting, but let us approach in turn that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part. So we must. Let us, then, put the question thus: Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily,[*](Cf. 399 A-B, Laws 655 D, 814 E ff., Aristot. Poet. 1448 A 1-2 ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι, ibid. 1449 b 36-37 f.) and as a result of their actions supposing themselves to have fared well or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy. Did we find anything else but this? Nothing. Is a man, then, in all this of one mind with himself, or just as in the domain of sight there was faction and strife and he held within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things,[*](See What Plato Said, p. 505, on Gorg. 482 A-B.) so also in our actions there is division and strife[*](Cf. 554 D, and p. 394, note e, on 586 E.) of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion[*](439 B ff.) we were sufficiently agreed that our soul at any one moment teems with countless such self-contradictions. Rightly, he said. Yes, rightly, said I; but what we then omitted[*](Plato sometimes pretends to remedy an omission or to correct himself by an afterthought. So in Book V. 449 B-C ff., and Tim. 65 C.) must now, I think, be set forth. What is that? he said. When a good and reasonable man, said I, experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too,[*](387 D-E.) that he will bear it more easily than the other sort. Assuredly. But now let us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate[*](This suggests the doctrine of μετριοπάθεια as opposed to the Stoic ἀπάθεια. Joel ii. 161 thinks the passage a polemic against Antisthenes. Seneca, Epist. xcix. 15 seems to agree with Plato rather than with the Stoics: inhumanitas est ista non virtus. So Plutarch, Cons. ad Apol. 3 (102 cf.). See also ibid. 22 (112 E-F). Cf. Horace, Odes ii. 3. 1 aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem, and also Laws 732 C, 960 A.) in his grief? That, he said, is rather the truth.