Hippias Major

Soc.

And, he will say, did the stranger from Elis say also that for Achilles it was beautiful to be buried later than his parents, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and all the others who were born of gods, and for the gods themselves?

Hipp.

What’s that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow’s are not even respectful to religion.

Soc.

Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?

Hipp.

Perhaps.

Soc.

Perhaps, then, you are the man, he will say, who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one’s offspring, and to bury one’s parents; or was not Heracles included in ’every one,’ he and all those whom we just now mentioned?

Hipp.

But I did not say it was so for the gods.

Soc.

Nor for the heroes either, apparently.

Hipp.

Not those who were children of gods.

Soc.

But those who were not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops [*](Pelops as the son of a mortal (Tantalus); the others mentioned were sons of gods.) and the others who were born as he was?

Hipp.

I think so.

Soc.

You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one’s parents and be buried by one’s offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful; and it is still more impossible, as it seems, for this to become and to be beautiful for all, so that the same thing has happened to this as to the things we mentioned before, the maiden and the pot, in a still more ridiculous way than to them; it is beautiful for some and not beautiful for others. And you are not able yet, even today, Socrates, he will say, to answer what is asked about the beautiful, namely what it is. With these words and the like he will rebuke me, if I reply to him in this way. For the most part, Hippias, he talks with me in some such way as that but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of training, he himself volunteers a question, and asks whether I think the beautiful is so and so or whatever else it is which happens to be the subject of our questions and our discussion.

Hipp.

What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Soc.

I will tell you. Oh, my dear Socrates, he says, stop making replies of this sort and in this way—for they are too silly and easy to refute; but see if something like this does not seem to you to be beautiful, which we got hold of just now in our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful. Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time for I don’t know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?

Hipp.

Yes, certainly, Socrates.

Soc.

Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.

Hipp.

Yes, we must consider.

Soc.

See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which, when it is added, makes each of those things to which it is added appear beautiful, or which makes them be beautiful, or neither of these?

Hipp.

I think so.

Soc.

Which?

Hipp.

That which makes them appear beautiful; as when a man takes clothes or shoes that fit, even if he be ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.

Soc.

Then if the appropriate makes him appear more beautiful than he is, the appropriate would be a sort of deceit in respect to the beautiful, and would not be that which we are looking for, would it, Hippias? For we were rather looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—like that by which all great things are great, that is, excess; for it is by this that all great things are great; for even if they do not appear great, but exceed, they are of necessity great; so, then, we say, what would the beautiful be, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or not? For it could not be the appropriate, since that, by your statement, makes things appear more beautiful than they are, but does not let them appear such as they are. But we must try to say what that is which makes things be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not; for that is what we are looking for, since we are looking for the beautiful.

Hipp.

But the appropriate, Socrates, makes things both be and appear beautiful by its presence.

Soc.

Is it impossible, then, for things which are really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful, at any rate when that is present which makes them appear so?

Hipp.

It is impossible.

Soc.

Shall we, then, agree to this, Hippias, that all things which are really beautiful, both uses and pursuits, are always believed to be beautiful by all, and appear so to them, or, quite the contrary, that people are ignorant about them, and that there is more strife and contention about them than about anything else, both in private between individuals and in public between states?

Hipp.

The latter rather, Socrates; that people are ignorant about them.

Soc.

They would not be so, if the appearance of beauty were added to them; and it would be added, if the appropriate were beautiful and made things not only to be beautiful, but also to appear so. So that the appropriate, if it is that which makes things be beautiful, would be the beautiful which we are looking for, but would not be that which makes things appear beautiful; but if, on the other hand, the appropriate is that which makes things appear beautiful, it would not be the beautiful for which we are looking. For that makes things be beautiful, but the same element could not make things both appear and be beautiful, nor could it make them both appear and be anything else whatsoever. Let us choose, then, whether we think that the appropriate is that which makes things appear or be beautiful.

Hipp.

That which makes them appear so, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc.

Whew! Our perception of what the beautiful is has fled away and gone, Hippias, since the appropriate has been found to be something other than the beautiful.

Hipp.

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and to me that is very queer.

Soc.

However, my friend, let us not yet give it up, for I still have hopes that what the beautiful is will be made clear.

Hipp.

Certainly, to be sure, Socrates, for it is not hard to find. Now I know that if I should go away into solitude and meditate alone by myself, I could tell it to you with the most perfect accuracy.

Soc.

Ah, don’t boast, Hippias. You see how much trouble it has caused us already; I’m afraid it may get angry and run away more than ever. And yet that is nonsense; for you, I think, will easily find it when you go away by yourself. But for Heaven’s sake, find it in my presence, or, if you please, join me, as you are now doing, in looking for it. And if we find it, that will be splendid, but if we do not, I shall, I suppose, accept my lot, and you will go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, I shall certainly not be a nuisance to you by asking what that was which you found by yourself; but now once more see if this is in your opinion the beautiful : I say, then, that it is—but consider, paying close attention to me, that I may not talk nonsense—for I say, then, whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful. But I said it with this reason for my thought; beautiful eyes, we say, are not such as seem to be so, which are unable to see, but those which are able and useful for seeing. Is that right?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then, too, in the same way we say that the whole body is beautiful, part of it for running, part for wrestling; and again all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also—pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way looking at each of them—how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted—the useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful; and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?

Hipp.

It is.Soc, Then are we right in saying that the useful rather than everything else is beautiful?

Hipp.

We are right, surely, Socrates.

Soc.

Now that which has power to accomplish anything is useful for that for which it has power, but that which is powerless is useless, is it not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Power, then, is beautiful, and want of power is disgraceful or ugly.

Hipp.

Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates, testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one’s own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.

Soc.

Good! Then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?

Hipp.

Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?

Soc.

Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.

Hipp.

What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully?

Soc.

I wish that might be the case; but consider this point with me: could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do?

Hipp.

By no means; for how could he do what he was powerless to do?

Soc.

Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them?

Hipp.

Evidently not.

Soc.

But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful for surely it is not by powerlessness.

Hipp.

Certainly not.

Soc.

And all who do, have power to do what they do?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.

Hipp.

That is true.

Soc.

Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it?

Hipp.

Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc.

Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.

Hipp.

They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.

Soc.

Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful?

Hipp.

Yes, in my opinion.

Soc.

But surely this is beneficial; or is it not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

So by this argument the beautiful persons and beautiful customs and all that we mentioned just now are beautiful because they are beneficial.

Hipp.

Evidently.

Soc.

Then the beneficial seems to us to be the beautiful, Hippias.

Hipp.

Yes, certainly, Socrates.

Soc.

But the beneficial is that which creates good.

Hipp.

Yes, it is.

Soc.

But that which creates is nothing else than the cause; am I right?

Hipp.

It is so.