Gorgias

Soc.

Then just help me to reckon up the results we get from our admissions for you know they say:

That which seemeth well, ’tis well twice and also thrice to tell,

[*](The saying—καὶ δὶς γὰρ ὃ δεῖ καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν—was attributed by some to Empedocles.) and to examine too. We say that the wise and brave man is good, do we not?

Call.

Yes.

Soc.

And that the foolish and cowardly is bad?

Call.

Certainly.

Soc.

And again, that he who enjoys is good?

Call.

Yes.

Soc.

And that he who feels pain is bad?

Call.

Necessarily.

Soc.

And that the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain in a like manner, or perhaps the bad rather more?

Call.

Yes.

Soc.

Then is the bad man made bad or good in a like manner to the good man, or even good in a greater measure? Does not this follow, along with those former statements, from the assumption that pleasant things and good things are the same? Must not this be so, Callicles?

Call.

Let me tell you, Socrates, all the time that I have been listening to you and yielding you agreement, I have been remarking the puerile delight with which you cling to any concession one may make to you, even in jest. So you suppose that I or anybody else in the world does not regard some pleasures as better, and others worse!

Soc.

Oh ho, Callicles, what a rascal you are, treating me thus like a child—now asserting that the same things are one way, now another, to deceive me! And yet I started with the notion that I should not have to fear any intentional deception on your part, you being my friend; but now I find I was mistaken, and it seems I must, as the old saying goes, e’en make the best of what I have got,[*](The proverb usually has τίθεσθαι instead of ποιεῖν; cf. Lucian, Necyom. 21.) and accept just anything you offer. Well then, what you now state, it seems, is that there are certain pleasures, some good, and some bad; is not that so?

Call.

Yes.

Soc.

Then are the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones bad?

Call.

Certainly.

Soc.

And are those beneficial which do some good, and those evil which do some evil?

Call.

I agree.

Soc.

Now are these the sort you mean—for instance, in the body, the pleasures of eating and drinking that we mentioned a moment ago? Then the pleasures of this sort which produce health in the body, or strength, or any other bodily excellence,—are these good, and those which have the opposite effects, bad?

Call.

Certainly.

Soc.

And similarly in the case of pains, are some worthy and some base?

Call.

Of course.

Soc.

So it is the worthy pleasures and pains that we ought to choose in all our doings?

Call.

Certainly.

Soc.

And the base ones not?

Call.

Clearly so.