Gorgias

Call.

Yes, I do.

Soc.

But to enjoy oneself when feeling pain you have admitted to be possible.

Call.

Apparently.

Soc.

Hence enjoyment is not faring well, nor is feeling pain faring ill, so that the pleasant is found to be different from the good.

Call.

I cannot follow these subtleties of yours, Socrates.

Soc.

You can, but you play the innocent, Callicles. Just go on a little further, that you may realize how subtle is your way of reproving me. Does not each of us cease at the same moment from thirst and from the pleasure he gets by drinking?

Call.

I cannot tell what you mean.

Gorg.

No, no, Callicles, you must answer him, for our sakes also, that the arguments may be brought to a conclusion.

Call.

But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias he keeps on asking petty, unimportant questions until he refutes one.

Gorg.

Why, what does that matter to you? In any case it is not your credit that is at stake, Callicles; just permit Socrates to refute you in such manner as he chooses.

Call.

Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours, since Gorgias is so minded.

Soc.

You are fortunate, Callicles, in having been initiated into the Great Mysteries before the Little:[*](Socrates means that one cannot hope to know great things without first learning the truth about little things.) I did not think that was the proper thing. So go on answering where you left off—as to whether each of us does not cease to feel thirst and pleasure at the same time.

Call.

I grant it.

Soc.

And so, with hunger and the rest, does he cease to feel the desires and pleasures at the same time?

Call.

That is so.

Soc.

And also ceases to feel the pains and pleasures at the same time?

Call.

Yes.

Soc.

But still he does not cease to have the good and bad at the same time, as you agreed; and now, you do not agree?

Call.

I do; and what then?

Soc.

Only that we get the result, my friend, that the good things are not the same as the pleasant, nor the bad as the painful. For with the one pair the cessation is of both at once, but with the other two it is not, since they are distinct. How then can pleasant things be the same as good, or painful things as bad? Or if you like, consider it another way—for I fancy that even after that you do not admit it. Just observe: do you not call good people good owing to the presence of good things, as you call beautiful those in whom beauty is present?

Call.

I do.

Soc.

Well now, do you give the name of good men to fools and cowards? It was not they just now but brave and wise men whom you so described. Or is it not these that you call good?

Call.

To be sure it is.

Soc.

And now, have you ever seen a silly child enjoying itself?

Call.

I have.

Soc.

And have you never seen a silly man enjoying himself?

Call.

I should think I have; but what has that to do with it?

Soc.

Nothing; only answer.

Call.

I have seen one.