Gorgias

Soc.

Then can you tell me why you disapprove of this kind of power?

Pol.

I can.

Soc.

Why, then? Tell me.

Pol.

Because it is inevitable that he who acts thus will be punished.

Soc.

And is it not a bad thing to be punished?

Pol.

Certainly.

Soc.

So, my remarkable friend, you have come round again to the view that if doing what one thinks fit is attended by advantage in doing it, this is not merely a good thing but at the same time, it seems, the possession of great power; otherwise it is a bad thing and means little power. And let us consider another point besides; do we not admit that sometimes it is better to do those things that we were mentioning just now—to put people to death and banish them and deprive them of property—while sometimes it is not?

Pol.

To be sure.

Soc.

Then here is a point, it seems, that is admitted both on your side and on mine.

Pol.

Yes.

Soc.

Then when do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me where you draw the line.

Pol.

Nay, I would rather that you, Socrates, answered that.

Soc.

Well then I say, Polus, if you prefer to hear it from me, that it is better when these things are done justly, and worse when unjustly.

Pol.

So hard to refute you, Socrates! Nay, a mere child could do it, could he not, and prove your words are untrue?

Soc.

Then I shall be most grateful to the child, and equally to you, if you refute me and rid me of foolery. Come, do not grow weary in well-doing towards your friend, but refute me.

Pol.

Well, to be sure, Socrates, there is no need to refute you with ancient instances; for those happenings of but a day or two ago are enough to refute you, and prove that many a wrongdoer is happy.

Soc.

What sort of thing do you mean?

Pol.

I suppose you see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of Macedonia?[*](Archelaus usurped the throne of Macedonia in 413 B.C., and ruled till his death in 399 B.C. Euripides, Agathon, and other distinguished Athenians were guests at his court; Socrates was also invited, but declined to visit him (Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23. 8), and this is probably the point of Socrates’ next remark.)

Soc.

Well, if I do not, at any rate I hear it.

Pol.

Do you consider him happy or wretched?

Soc.

I do not know, Polus; I have never met the man.

Pol.

What? Could you find out by meeting him, and cannot otherwise tell, straight off, that he is happy?

Soc.

No, indeed, upon my word.

Pol.

Then doubtless you will say, Socrates, that you do not know that even the Great King is happy.

Soc.

Yes, and I shall be speaking the truth; for I do not know how he stands in point of education and justice.

Pol.

Why, does happiness entirely consist in that?

Soc.

Yes, by my account, Polus; for a good and honorable man or woman, I say, is happy, and an unjust and wicked one is wretched.