Gorgias

Soc.

I think now, Gorgias, you have come very near to showing us the art of rhetoric as you conceive it, and if I at all take your meaning, you say that rhetoric is a producer of persuasion, and has therein its whole business and main consummation. Or can you tell us of any other function it can have beyond that of effecting persuasion in the minds of an audience?

Gorg.

None at all, Socrates; your definition seems to me satisfactory; that is the main substance of the art.

Soc.

Then listen, Gorgias: I, let me assure you, for so I persuade myself—if ever there was a man who debated with another from a desire of knowing the truth of the subject discussed, I am such a man; and so, I trust, are you.

Gorg.

Well, what then, Socrates?

Soc.

I will now tell you. What the real nature of the persuasion is that you speak of as resulting from rhetoric, and what the matters are with which persuasion deals, I assure you I do not clearly understand; though I may have my suspicions as to what I suppose you to mean by it, and with what things you think it deals. But nevertheless I will ask you what you do mean by the persuasion that results from rhetoric, and with what matters you think it deals. Now why is it that, having a suspicion of my own, I am going to ask you this, instead of stating it myself? It is not on your account, but with a view to the argument, and to such a progress in it as may best reveal to us the point we are discussing. Just see if you do not think it fair of me to press you with my question: suppose I happened to ask you what Zeuxis was among painters, and you said a figure painter, would it not be fair of me to ask you what sort of figures he painted, and where?

Gorg.

Certainly.

Soc.

Would this be the reason—that there are also other painters who depict a variety of other figures?

Gorg.

Yes.

Soc.

But if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been right?

Gorg.

Yes, of course.

Soc.

Come then, tell me now about rhetoric: do you think rhetoric alone effects persuasion, or can other arts do it as well? I mean, for example, when a man teaches anything, does he persuade in his teaching? Or do you think not?

Gorg.

No, to be sure, Socrates, I think he most certainly does persuade.

Soc.

Then let us repeat our question with reference to the same arts that we spoke of just now: does not numeration, or the person skilled in numeration, teach us all that pertains to number?

Gorg.

Certainly.

Soc.

And persuades also?

Gorg.

Yes.

Soc.

So that numeration also is a producer of persuasion?

Gorg.

Apparently.