Euthydemus

Soc.

So then I myself, Crito, finding I had fallen into this perplexity, began to exclaim at the top of my voice, beseeching the two strangers as though I were calling upon the Heavenly Twins to save us, the lad and myself, from the mighty wave[*](Lit. the big wave that comes in every three.) of the argument, and to give us the best of their efforts, and this done, to make plain to us what that knowledge can be of which we must get hold if we are to spend the remainder of our lives in a proper way

Cri.

Well, did Euthydemus consent to propound anything for you?

Soc.

Why, certainly; and he began his discourse, my good friend, in this very lofty-minded fashion: Would you rather, Socrates, that I instructed you as to this knowledge which has baffled you all this while, or propound that you have it? O gifted sir, I exclaimed, and have you the power to do this? Certainly I have, he replied. Then for Heaven’s sake, I cried, propound that I have it! This will be much easier than learning foraman of my age. Come then, answer me this, he said: Do you know anything? Yes, indeed, I replied. and many things, though trifles. That is enough, he said; now do you think it possible that anything that is should not be just that which it actually is? On my soul, not I. Now you, he said, know something? I do. Then you are knowing, if you really know? Certainly, in just that something. That makes no difference; you are not under a necessity of knowing everything, if you are knowing? No, to be sure, I replied; for there are many other things which I do not know. Then if you do not know something, you are not knowing? Not in that thing, my dear sir, I replied. Are you therefore any the less unknowing? Just now you said you were knowing; so here you are, actually the very man that you are, and again, not that man, in regard to the same matter and at the same time! Admitted, Euthydemus, I said: as the saying goes, well said whate’er you say. How therefore do I know that knowledge which we were seeking? Since forsooth it is impossible for the same thing to be so and not be so; by knowing one thing I know all;—for I could not be at once both knowing and unknowing;—and as I know everything I have that knowledge to boot: is that your line of argument? Is this your wisdom? Yes, you see, Socrates, he said, your own words refute you. Well, but, Euthydemus, I continued, are you not in the same plight? I assure you, so long as I had you and this dear fellow Dionysodorus to share my lot, however hard, I should have nothing to complain of. Tell me, you both know some existent things, of course, and others you do not? By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus. How do you mean? I asked: do you then not know anything? Oh yes, we do, he said.