Alcibiades 1

Soc. But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the better, Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?

Alc. Very.

Soc. Then consider and do your best to tell me the connection of better in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.

Alc. Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.

Soc. But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, and what name we give it when we do so?

Alc. I do: we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.

Soc. Enough: how do we suffer each of these things? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.

Alc. Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way?

Soc. Precisely.

Alc. Why, there you have all the difference in the world.

Soc. Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just?

Alc. That is a hard question: for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.

Soc. For that would not be lawful, I suppose?

Alc. No, indeed; nor is it considered honorable either.

Soc. So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches?

Alc. Necessarily.

Soc. Then must not that better about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster?

Alc. Apparently it is.

Soc. How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked [*](Cf. above, Plat. Alc.1 106e.) your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.

Alc. You are joking, Socrates.

Soc. No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.

Alc. But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way?

Soc. Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.

Alc. But do you not think I might discover it?

Soc. Yes, quite so, if you inquired.

Alc. And do you not think I might inquire?

Soc. I do, if you thought you did not know.

Alc. And was there not a time when I held that view?

Soc. Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.

Alc. Well, I thought I knew.

Soc. And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind?

Alc. I was.

Soc. But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.

Alc. How do you know it so well?

Soc. Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher’s or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?

Alc. But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me?

Soc. Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask—What are you to do?

Alc. Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

Soc. So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.

Alc. I did; and I knew too.

Soc. At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time.

Alc. Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.

Soc. So you do not know it by discovery.

Alc. Not at all, apparently.

Soc. But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence?

Alc. Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery.

Soc. Then how was it done?

Alc. I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

Soc. Back we come to the same argument. From whom? Please tell me.

Alc. From the many.

Soc. They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many!

Alc. Why, are they not competent to teach?

Soc. Not how to play, or not to play, draughts; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What? Do you not think so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter?

Alc. I think so: at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts.

Soc. What sort of things?

Alc. For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.

Soc. Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.

Alc. And why?

Soc. Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers.

Alc. What do you mean by that?

Soc. You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Then how can they be teachers of it?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute?

Alc. They do.

Soc. Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by the many that you speak of?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?

Alc. I have.

Soc. And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it?

Alc. I should.