Parmenides

Ceph.And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.Of course not.But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?Quite impossible.But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one.True.Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all.No, they would not.Well, then, are the not one parts of the one?Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?Yes, they would partake of it.If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.No.But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another.Yes, we did.Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?Yes, let us say that.The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.That appears to be the result of our argument.Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?Perhaps.At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it.Of course.Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?Certainly.And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?Yes.In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.What do you mean?I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?Yes.Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?Yes.And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly?The same thing, of course.The word other is the name of something, is it not?Certainly. Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name.Assuredly.Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name.Certainly.