Parmenides

Ceph.It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself.It is.But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest.Certainly.Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion?True.Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest.That is clear.And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true.How is that?Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part.Obviously.Now is the one a part of itself?By no means.Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself.No, that is impossible.Nor can it be other than itself.Certainly not.Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself?It must.Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place?I think so.Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time.Yes, we saw that it was so.Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself.So it appears.Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it?Certainly.Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one?Of course.Then the one would be other than the others.Yes, it is other.Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another?Of course.Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?No.Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not?Yes, it would.But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing.True.Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one.No, it cannot.Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one.No.

Ceph.And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.Of course not.But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?Quite impossible.But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one.True.Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all.No, they would not.Well, then, are the not one parts of the one?Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?Yes, they would partake of it.If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.No.But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another.Yes, we did.Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?Yes, let us say that.The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.That appears to be the result of our argument.Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?Perhaps.At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it.Of course.Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?Certainly.And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?Yes.In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.What do you mean?I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?Yes.Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?Yes.And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly?The same thing, of course.The word other is the name of something, is it not?Certainly. Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name.Assuredly.Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name.Certainly.

Ceph.In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not?Yes.Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things.So it appears.But the like is opposed to the unlike.Yes.And the other to the same.That is also true.But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others.Yes, it was.And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others.Certainly.In so far as it was other it was shown to be like.Yes.Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like.Yes.Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other.So it appears.Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same.Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable.But there is another besides.What is it?In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike.True.Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others.Certainly.And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself.That is inevitable.Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things.I am considering.The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself.Right.And the one is also in other things?Yes.Then by reason of being in the others it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself.That is clear.Thus the one would touch itself and the other things.It would.But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it?It must.Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in which it is.Yes, it must.

Ceph.The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once; but so long as it is one, it will not?No, it will not.The one can no more touch itself than it can be two.No.Nor, again, will it touch the others.Why not?Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be outside of that which it is to touch, and next it, and there must be no third between them.True.Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact.There must.And if to the two a third be added in immediate succession, there will be three terms and two contacts.Yes.And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms; for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of their contacts. For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts.Right.Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less.True.But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact.Of course not.We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other.They do not.Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them.Of course not.Then the others are neither one nor two, nor have they the name of any other number.No.The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two.That is clear.There is no contact if there are no two terms.No, there is none.Then the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one, since there is no contact.No, certainly not.Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch itself and the others.So it appears.And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others?How is that?If the one were greater or less than the others, or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures, they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or vice versa, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?Certainly.

Ceph.These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not?For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things.That is obvious.Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it.Necessarily.What if it be in the whole of one?Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?Clearly.And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?Of course.But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?No, it cannot.Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it.Yes.And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist.Inevitably.Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness.So it appears.Nor will greatness exist in the one. For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere.True.But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness.No.Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.Evidently not.Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?Certainly not.Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality, and being on an equality, must be equal.Of course.And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself.Certainly.The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others.Evidently.

Ceph.But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself, and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; thus the one would be both greater and less than itself.Yes, it would.And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one and the others?Of course.But that which exists must always exist somewhere.Yes.And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can it?No, it cannot.But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the others in the one and the one in the others, or else be nowhere at all?Clearly.And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.So it appears.Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others.Evidently.And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts.Of course.And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in number to itself and the others.How is that?If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal.True.Then one, being greater and less than itself and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?Of course.And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself.Clearly.And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things?Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others?Yes, it must.And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number.Yes, it will.And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others?What do you mean?If one is, it is thereby shown to be.Yes.

Ceph.But is to be anything else than participation in existence together with present time, just as was denotes participation in existence together with past time, and will be similar participation together with future time?True.Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.Certainly.And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?Yes.Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.Certainly.Now, do we not remember that there is something becoming younger when the older becomes older than it?Yes, we do.Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, would become older than a self which becomes younger?There is no doubt of it.Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself.Yes.And it is older (is it not) when in becoming older it is in the present time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to the future it cannot avoid the present.No, it cannot.Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older? For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future.True.But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.Clearly.The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and straightway is older.Certainly.It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older; and it was becoming older than itself.Yes.And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it not?It is.Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present.Undoubtedly.But the present is inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is now whenever it is.Of course.Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself.So it appears.And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time?For an equal time.But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age.Of course.But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger.No.Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself.I agree.Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?

Ceph.I cannot tell.But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are more than one and have multitude.Yes, they have.And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one.Of course.Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the greater or the smaller numbers?The smaller.Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it not?Yes.The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other.They have.And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things.Yes, they would.Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?It is impossible.But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.Yes.And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not?Certainly.And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.Yes, we shall say that.The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being; so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.That is clear.Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.I think that is clear, too.Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part?It must.Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being.True.

Ceph.Then one has the same age as all the others so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them. And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one.Certainly.In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?I cannot say.But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first.Yes, of course.Then that which exists can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same; but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become younger, but it does not become so.True.And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger than the other things.No, it does not.But see whether they become older and younger in this way.In what way?Because the one was found to be older than the others, and the others than the one.What then?When the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.Yes.Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller fraction?By a smaller fraction.Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?Yes.And that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which it formerly was older?Yes, it becomes younger.But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in turn become older than formerly in relation to the one?Certainly.

Ceph.Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but is always becoming older; for the latter always tends towards being younger, and the former towards being older. And conversely the older becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they become older and younger than one another—the one becomes younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into being earlier, and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier.Yes, that is clear.Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, and vice versa—from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily become both older and younger than one another, must they not?Certainly.For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others.Perfectly true.But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?It must.Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.Certainly.And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?Certainly.And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it.You are right.And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one.That is perfectly true.Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being?Yes, it must.And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it?No, it cannot.Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.

Ceph.True.And is there not also a time when it assumes being and when it gives it up? How can it sometimes have and sometimes not have the same thing, unless it receives it at some time and again loses it?There is no other way at all.But would you not say that receiving existence is generation or becoming?Yes.And losing existence is destruction?Certainly.The one, then, as it appears, since it receives and loses existence, is generated and destroyed.Inevitably.And being one and many and being generated and destroyed, when it becomes one its existence as many is destroyed, and when it becomes many its existence as one is destroyed, is it not?Certainly.And in becoming one and many, must it not be separated and combined?Inevitably.And when it becomes like and unlike, it must be assimilated and dissimilated?Yes.And when it becomes greater and smaller and equal, it must be increased and diminished and equalized?Yes.And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it must itself be in no time at all.How is that?It is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without changing.Of course.And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at rest.No, there is none.And certainly it cannot change without changing.I should say not.Then when does it change? For it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion or when it is in time.No, it does not.Does this strange thing, then, exist, in which it would be at the moment when it changes?What sort of thing is that?The instant. For the instant seems to indicate a something from which there is a change in one direction or the other. For it does not change from rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still moving; but there is this strange instantaneous nature, something interposed between motion and rest, not existing in any time, and into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest and that which is at rest changes into motion.Yes, that must be so.Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, must change in each direction; for that is the only way in which it can do both. But in changing, it changes instantaneously, and when it changes it can be in no time, and at that instant it will be neither in motion nor at rest.No.

Ceph.And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes? When it changes from being to destruction or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed?Yes, so it appears.And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimilation; and in passing from small to great and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality.Apparently not.All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists.Yes, certainly.Must we not consider what is likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists?We must.Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one, if one exists?Let us do so.Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one for if they were, they would not be other than the one.True.And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way.In what way?Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.True.But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole.Yes, we affirm that they do.But the whole must be one composed of many and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole.How is that?If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs.That is clear.Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all this it is of which the part is a part.Certainly.If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one.True.Then the things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts.Yes, they must.

Ceph.And the same reasoning applies to each part for the part must partake of the one. For if each of the parts is a part, the word each implies that it is one, separated from the rest, and existing by itself; otherwise it will not be each.True.But its participation in the one clearly implies that it is other than the one, for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one.Yes, it is impossible.And both the whole and the part must necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole of which the parts are parts, and again each individual one which is a part of a whole will be a part of the whole.Yes.And will not the things which participate in the one be other than the one while participating in it?Of course.But the things which are other than the one will be many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they would not be anything.No.But since the things which participate in the one as a part and the one as a whole are more than one, must not those participants in the one be infinite in number?How so?Let us look at the question in this way. Is it not true that at the moment when they begin to participate in the one they are not one and do not participate in one?Clearly.Then they are multitudes, in which the one is not, are they not?Yes, they are multitudes.Well, then, if we should subtract from them in thought the smallest possible quantity, must not that which is subtracted, if it has no participation in one, be also a multitude, and not one?It must.And always when we consider the nature of the class, which makes it other than one, whatever we see of it at any time will be unlimited in number, will it not?Certainly.And, further, when each part becomes a part, straightway the parts are limited in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts.Undoubtedly.The result, then, to the things which are other than one, that from the one and the union of themselves with it there arises, as it appears, something different within themselves which gives them a limitation in relation to one another; but their own nature, when they are left to themselves, gives them no limits.So it appears.Then the things which are other than one, both as wholes and as parts, are both unlimited and partake of limitation.Certainly.And are they also both like and unlike one another and themselves?How is that?Inasmuch as they are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way.Certainly.And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also.Obviously.

Ceph.And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another.Yes.But opposites are as unlike as possible.To be sure.Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike.Yes, that must be true.Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another.So they are.And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things which are other than one experience all the opposite affections.You are right.Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have said, and there is no alternative.Certainly.Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must happen to the things which are other than one.By all means.Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from the one?Why is that?Because there is nothing else besides these, which is other than one and other than the others. For when we have said one and the others we have included all things.Yes, all things.Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one and the others may be.No.Then the one and the others can never be in the same.Apparently not.Then they are separate?Yes.And surely we say that what is truly one has no parts.How can it have parts?Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts.Of course not.Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole.No, apparently not.The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in themselves any unity.No.But neither are the others many; for if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole; but actually the things that are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not participate in the one in any way.Right.Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them, if they are entirely deprived of unity.True.Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one another.That is clear.But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not even partake of one.Impossible.

Ceph.The others are, then, not like nor unlike nor both. For if they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two elements, and if they were both, of the two opposites and that was shown to be impossible.True.They are, then, neither the same nor other, nor in motion nor at rest, nor becoming nor being destroyed, nor greater nor less nor equal, and they experience no similar affections; for if the others are subject to such affections, they will participate in one and two and three and odd and even, in which we saw that they cannot participate, if they are in every way utterly deprived of unity.Very true.Therefore if one exists, the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.Perfectly true.Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happen if one does not exist?Yes, we ought.What, then, is the sense of this hypothesis—if one does not exist?Is it different in any way from this—if not one does not exist?Certainly it is different.Is it merely different, or are the two expressions—if not one does not exist and if one does not exist—complete opposites?They are complete opposites.Now if a person should say if greatness does not exist, if smallness does not exist, or anything of that sort, would he not make it clear that in each case the thing he speaks of as not existing is different?Certainly.And in our case does he not make it clear that he means, when he says if one is not, that the thing which is not is different from other things, and do we not know what he means?Yes, we do know.In the first place, then, he speaks of something which is known, and secondly of something different from other things, when he says one, whether he adds to it that it is or that it is not; for that which is said to be non-existent is known none the less, and is known to be different from other things, is it not?Certainly.Then we should begin at the beginning by asking: if one is not, what must follow? In the first place this must be true of the one, that there is knowledge of it, or else not even the meaning of the words if the one does not exist would be known.True.And is it not also true that the others differ from the one, or it cannot be said to differ from the others?Certainly.Then a difference belongs to the one in addition to knowledge; for when we say that the one differs from the others, we speak of a difference in the one, not in the others.That is clear.And the non-existent one partakes of that and some and this and relation to this and these and all notions of that sort; for the one could not be spoken of, nor could the things which are other than one, nor could anything in relation to the one or belonging to it be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of the notion some or of those other notions.True.

Ceph.It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor that, is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all; [*](i.e. if non-existence cannot be predicated either of the one (unitas) or of that (illuditas), but that of which we predicate non-existence is something else, then we may as well stop talking. It has just been affirmed that if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not, then the one must partake of numerous attributes. Now it is affirmed that if the converse is true, further discussion is futile.) but if non-existence is the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of that and of many other attributes.Yes, certainly.And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind.Yes.And are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind?Of course.And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not?Yes, they are unlike.Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it.Evidently.Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike.So it appears.But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself?How is that?If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one.Certainly.But that is inadmissible.It certainly is.Then the one must possess likeness to itself.It must.And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist.Yes, they are impossible.And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they?Certainly not.And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not?Yes.And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them?Of course.Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it?Yes, it does.But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality.Yes.Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness?So it appears.Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another.Certainly.Then there is always something between them.There is.Can you think of anything between them except equality?No, only equality.Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two.That is clear.Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness.So it appears.And it must also, in a way, partake of existence.How is that?It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right?You are.

Ceph.Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, we necessarily assert that we say that which is.Necessarily.Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non-existent, but gives up something of being to not-being, [*](i.e. if it ceases to be non-existent, gives up something of being (as applied to non-existence) to not-being, so that it no longer is non-existent, but is not non-existent.) then it will be existent.Certainly.Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence. For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent, thus assuring its own perfect existence, and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-existent also secures its perfect non-existence.Very true.Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily partakes of existence to attain non-existence.Yes, necessarily.Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence.Clearly.And non-existence also, if it does not exist.Of course.Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that condition without changing from it?No, it cannot.Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change.Of course.But change is motion; we agree to that?It is motion.And did we not see that the one is and is not?Yes.Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition.So it appears.And we have seen that the non-existent one has motion, since it changes from being to not-being.There is not much doubt of that.But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another.Of course not.Then its motion cannot be change of place.No, it cannot.Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any existent thing.No, it is impossible.Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not.No.And the one, whether existent or non-existent, cannot change into something other than itself; for if it changed into something other than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about something else.Quite right.But if it neither changes into something else, nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way?No how can it?But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest.Yes, it must.Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion.So it appears.

Ceph.And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one.True.Then in moving, the one changes in nature.Yes.And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way.No.Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change.True.Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change.So it appears.And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?That is inevitable.Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes.Quite true.Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different.Yes, we should do that.We ask, then, if the one is not, what will be the consequences in regard to it?Yes.Does the expression is not denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?No, nothing else.And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression is not mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?Without any qualifications whatsoever.Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence.No.But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence.No, nothing else.But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it.Of course not.Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all.That is reasonable.Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence.No; that is clear.Then it is not changed in nature at all; for such change involves coming into being and perishing.True.And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?Certainly not.And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same.Yes, of course, the same place.Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion.No, neither.

Ceph.Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence.That is plain.Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it.No.Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things.Clearly not.And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it?Impossible.Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different.No.Well, then, will the notions of that or to that or some, or this or of this or of another or to another or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent?No.Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever.It appears to have none whatsoever.Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist.Let us do so.Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others.True.But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?Yes, I do.And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other?Yes.Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others.Yes, there must be.Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist.No.Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing.True.They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist. But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it.Very true.Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist.Certainly.There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist?Yes.And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many.Certainly.And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist.True.

Ceph.And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions.Of course.And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality.That is reasonable.And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?Why is that?Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist.Very true.So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one.Certainly.Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right?That is perfectly conclusive.Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not.Yes, they must.And will they not also appear to be like and unlike?Why?Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike.Certainly.But when you come close to them they appear to be many and different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in kind and unlike each other.Yes.And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.Certainly.And also the same and different, and in contact with one another and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest, and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, if the many exist and the one does not.Very true.Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not.Let us do so.Well, the others will not be one?Of course not.Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many.True.If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one.No.