Parmenides
Plato
Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 4 translated by Harold North Fowler; Introduction by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
Ceph.You understand what I mean, do you not?Certainly, said Socrates, I understand. Then knowledge also, if abstract or absolute, would be knowledge of abstract or absolute truth? Certainly. And likewise each kind of absolute knowledge would be knowledge of each kind of absolute being, would it not? Yes. And would not the knowledge that exists among us be the knowledge of the truth that exists among us, and each kind of our knowledge be the knowledge of each kind of truth that exists among us? Yes, that is inevitable. But the ideas themselves, as you, agree, we have not, neither can they be among us. No, they cannot. And the various classes of ideas are known by the absolute idea of knowledge? Yes. Which we do not possess. No, we do not. Then none of the ideas is known by us, since we do not partake of absolute knowledge. Apparently not. Then the absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. I am afraid they are. Now we come to a still more fearful consequence. What is it? You would say, no doubt, that if there is an absolute kind of knowledge, it is far more accurate than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and all the rest? Yes. And if anything partakes of absolute knowledge, you would say that there is no one more likely than God to possess this most accurate knowledge? Of course. Then will it be possible for God to know human things, if he has absolute knowledge? Why not? Because, said Parmenides, we have agreed that those ideas are not relative to our world, nor our world to them, but each only to themselves. Yes, we have agreed to that. Then if this most perfect mastership and this most accurate knowledge are with God, his mastership can never rule us, nor his knowledge know us or anything of our world; we do not rule the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, they likewise, being gods, are not our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs. But surely this, said he, is a most amazing argument, if it makes us deprive God of knowledge.