Statesman

Soc. Really I am greatly indebted to you, Theodorus, for my acquaintance with Theaetetus and with the Stranger, too.

Theo. Presently, Socrates, you will be three times as much indebted, when they have worked out the statesman and the philosopher for you.

Soc. Indeed! My dear Theodorus, can I believe my ears? Were those really the words of the great calculator and geometrician?

Theo. Why, what do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. When you rated sophist, statesman, and philosopher at the same value, though they are farther apart in worth than your mathematical proportion can express.

Theo. By Ammon, our special divinity, [*](Theodorus was from Cyrene, not far from the oasis of Ammon.) that is a good hit, Socrates; evidently you haven’t forgotten your mathematics, and you are quite right in, finding fault with my bad arithmetic. I will get even with you at some other time; but now, Stranger, I turn to you. Do not grow tired of being kind to us, but go on and tell us about the statesman or the philosopher, whichever you prefer to take first.

Str. That is the thing to do, Theodorus, since we have once begun, and we must not stop until we have finished with them. But what shall I do about Theaetetus here?

Theo. In what respect?

Str. Shall we give him a rest and take his schoolmate here, the young Socrates, in his place? What is your advice?

Theo. Make the change as you suggest. They are young, and if they have a chance to rest by turns, they will bear any labor better.

Soc. And besides, Stranger, it seems to me that they are both related to me after a fashion;

Soc. one of them anyhow, as you say, looks like me in his cast of countenance, and the other has the same name and appellation, which implies some sort of kinship. Of course we ought always to be eager to get acquainted with our relatives by debating with them. Now I myself had an argument with Theaetetus yesterday and have been listening to his answers just now, but I do not know Socrates in either way and must examine him, too. But let him reply to you now; my turn will come by and by.

Str. Very well; Socrates, do you hear what Socrates says?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And do you agree?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. There seems to be no objection on your part, and I suppose there should be still less on mine. Well, then, after the sophist, I think it is our next duty to seek for the statesman; so please tell me: should we rank him also among those who have a science, or not?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Must the sciences, then, be divided as when we were examining the sophist?

Y. Soc. Perhaps.

Str. In that case, Socrates, I think the division will not be along the same lines.

Y. Soc. How will it be?

Str. Along other lines.

Y. Soc. Very likely.

Str. Where, then, shall we find the statesman’s path? For we must find it, separate it from the rest, and imprint upon it the seal of a single class; then we must set the mark of another single class upon all the other paths that lead away from this, and make our soul conceive of all sciences as of two classes. [*](i.e. one class is to be separated and then all the rest are to be marked as one other class—the familiar division into two parts.)

Y. Soc. This, Stranger, is now your affair, I think, not mine.

Str. And yet, Socrates, it must be your affair, too, when we have found the path.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. Are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts pure sciences, without regard to practical application, which merely furnish knowledge?

Y. Soc. Yes, they are.

Str. But the science possessed by the arts relating to carpentering and to handicraft in general is inherent in their application, and with its aid they create objects which did not previously exist.

Y. Soc. To be sure.

Str. In this way, then, divide all science into two arts, calling the one practical, and the other purely intellectual.

Y. Soc. Let us assume that all science is one and that these are its two forms.

Str. Shall we then assume that the statesman, king, master, and householder too, for that matter, are all one, to be grouped under one title, or shall we say that there are as many arts as names? But let me rather help you to understand in this way.

Y. Soc. In what way?

Str. By this example: If anyone, though himself in private station, is able to advise one of the public physicians, must not his art be called by the same name as that of the man whom he advises?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Well, then, if a man who is himself in private station is wise enough to advise him who is king of a country, shall we not say that he has the science which the ruler himself ought to possess?

Y. Soc. We shall.

Str. But certainly the science of a true king is kingly science?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And will not he who possesses this science, whether he happen to be a ruler or a private citizen, rightly be called kingly, when considered purely with reference to his art?

Y. Soc. At least he has a right to be.

Str. And surely the householder and the master of a family are the same.

Y. Soc. Yes, of course.

Str. Well, so far as government is concerned, is there any difference between the grandeur of a large house and the majesty of a small state?

Y. Soc. No.

Str. Then as for the point we were just discussing, it is clear that all these are the objects of one science, and whether a man calls this the art of kingship or statesmanship or householding, let us not quarrel with him.

Y. Soc. By no means.

Str. But this is plain, that any king can do little with his hands or his whole body toward holding his position, compared with what he can do with the sagacity and strength of his soul.

Y. Soc. Yes, that is plain.

Str. Shall we say, then, that the king is more akin to the intellectual than to the manual or the practical in general?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Shall we, therefore, put all these together as one—the political art and the statesman, the royal art and the king?

Y. Soc. Obviously.

Str. Then we should be proceeding in due order if we should next divide intellectual science?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Now pay attention to see if we can perceive any natural line of cleavage in it.

Y. Soc. Tell us of what sort it is.

Str. Of this sort. We recognized a sort of art of calculation.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. It is, I suppose, most certainly one of the intellectual arts.

Y. Soc. Of course.

Str. And shall we grant to the art of calculation, when it has found out the difference between numbers, any further function than that of passing judgement on them when found out?

Y. Soc. No, certainly not.

Str. Every architect, too, is a ruler of workmen, not a workman himself.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. As supplying knowledge, not manual labor.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. So he may fairly be said to participate in intellectual science.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. But it is his business, I suppose, not to pass judgement and be done with it and go away, as the calculator did, but to give each of the workmen the proper orders, until they have finished their appointed task.

Y. Soc. You are right.

Str. Then all such sciences, and all those that are in the class with calculating, are alike intellectual sciences, but these two classes differ from one another in the matter of judging and commanding. Am I right?

Y. Soc. I think so.

Str. Then if we bisected intellectual science as a whole and called one part the commanding and the other the judging part, might we say we had made fitting division?

Y. Soc. Yes, in my opinion.

Str. And surely when men are doing anything in common it is pleasant for them to agree.

Y. Soc. Of course it is.

Str. On this point, then, so long as we ourselves are in agreement, we need not bother about the opinions of others.

Y. Soc. Of course not.

Str. Now to which of these two classes is the kingly man to be assigned? Shall we assign him to the art of judging, as a kind of spectator, or rather to the art of commanding, inasmuch as he is a ruler?

Y. Soc. Rather to the latter, of course.

Str. Then once more we must see whether the art of command falls into two divisions. It seems to me that it does, and I think there is much the same distinction between the kingly class and the class of heralds as between the art of men who sell what they themselves produce and that of retail dealers.

Y. Soc. How so?

Str. Retail dealers receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have generally been sold before.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And in like manner heralds receive the purposes of others in the form of orders, and then give the orders a second time to others.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Shall we, then, join the art of the king in the same class with the art of the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, the herald, and many other kindred arts, all of which involve giving orders? Or, as we just now made a comparison of functions, shall we now by comparison make a name also—since the class of those who issue orders of their own is virtually nameless—and assign kings to the science of giving orders of one’s own, disregarding all the rest and leaving to someone else the task of naming them? For the object of our present quest is the ruler, not his opposite.

Y. Soc. Quite right.

Str. Then since a reasonable distinction between this class and the rest has been made, by distinguishing the commands given as one’s own or another’s, shall we again divide this class, if there is in it any further line of section?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. I think there is one; please help me in making the section.

Y. Soc. On what line?

Str. Take the case of all those whom we conceive of as rulers who give commands: shall we not find that they all issue commands for the sake of producing something?

Y. Soc. Of course.

Str. Furthermore it is not at all difficult to divide all that is produced into two classes.

Y. Soc. How?

Str. Of the whole class, some have life and others have no life.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And on these same lines we may, if we like, make a division of the part of intellectual science which commands.

Y. Soc. In what way?

Str. By assigning one part of it to the production of lifeless, the other to that of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided into two parts.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Let us then leave one half and take up the other, and then let us divide that entire half into two parts.

Y. Soc. Which half shall we take up?

Str. That which issues commands relating to living objects, assuredly. For certainly the science of the king is not, like that of the architect, one which supervises lifeless objects; it is a nobler science, since it exercises its power among living beings and in relation to them alone.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Now you may notice that the breeding and nurture of living beings is sometimes the nurture of a single animal and sometimes the common care of creatures in droves.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But we shall find that the statesman is not one who tends a single creature, like the driver of a single ox or the groom who tends a horse; he has more resemblance to a man who tends a herd of cattle or a drove of horses.

Y. Soc. That seems to be true, now that you mention it.

Str. Shall we call the art of caring for many living creatures the art of tending a herd or something like community management?

Y. Soc. Whichever we happen to say.