Sophist

Str. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold. [*](Cf. 242d above.)

Theaet. What questions? Remind me.

Str. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

Theaet. That is right.

Str. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

Theaet. Yes, I do.

Str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

Theaet. By no means.

Str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

Theaet. Of course not.

Str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

Theaet. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

Str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

Theaet. Apparently.

Str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

Theaet. You are about right.

Str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

Theaet. What indeed?

Str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?

Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.

Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

Theaet. Of course I do.

Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?

Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.