Phaedo

Phaedo.But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal.But, Cebes, said Simmias, what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.Briefly, said Cebes, a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort.And if you are not convinced in that way, Simmias, said Socrates, see if you don’t agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?I am not incredulous, said Simmias, but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say.It was this, said he. We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?Certainly, said he.Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?What do you mean?Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.Of course.Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples.To be sure you could, said Simmias.Now, said he, is that sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?Certainly, he replied.Well, then, said Socrates, can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?Surely.

Phaedo.And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?Yes, said he.All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?Yes.And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?Inevitably, he replied.Now see, said he, if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not? We shall say that there is, said Simmias, most decidedly.And do we know what it is?Certainly, said he.Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?Certainly.Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?No, Socrates, never.Then, said he, those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract.Not at all, I should say, Socrates.But from those equals, said he, which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?Very true, he replied.And it is either like them or unlike them?Certainly.It makes no difference, said he. Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.Surely.Now then, said he, do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?They fall very far short of it, said he.Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it, he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of? We must.Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?It certainly is.